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Belgium 

Neutral   and   Loyal 

The  War  of  1914 


By 
Emile  Waxweiler 

Director  of  the  Solway  Institute  of  Sociology  at  Brussels 
Member  of  the  Royal  Asademy  of  Belgium 

2-77^3 


G.  P.  Putnam's  Sons 

New   York  and  London 

Sbe    Imicfterbocher    press 

1915 


Copyright,  1915 

BY 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S   SONS 


Ub«  Ikntcherbocher  flJresa,  mew  Hoxk 


GiS 


PUBLISHERS'  NOTE 

This  book,  which  is  now  issued  in  an  Enghsh 
translation,  appeared  originally  some  months  ago 
in  Switzerland,  where  the  author  had  undertaken 
to  vindicate  his  fatherland  before  the  public 
opinion  of  that  neutral  country  whose  sympathy 
Belgium  so  highly  appreciates. 

The  book  was  published  simultaneously  in 
French  at  Lausanne,  and  in  German  at  Zurich. 
Both  editions  met  with  an  astonishing  success  and 
were  repeatedly  reprinted. 

The  book  penetrated  extensively  into  Germany 
where  it  made  so  deep  an  impression  that  the 
socialist  paper  Vorwdrts,  notwithstanding  the 
Imperial  censorship,  published  an  article  comment- 
ing on  the  book  and  advising  all  German  socialists 
to  read  it.  Only  recently  a  prominent  lawyer  in 
Germany  wrote  to  the  Zurich  Editor,  Orell  Fussli, 
to  express  his  sympathy  with  the  book  which 
he  said  had  been  unjustly  attacked  in  his  country. 
In  all  the  leading  Swiss  papers,  German  as  well  as 
French,  important  articles  have  expressed  the 
sincerest  approval. 


iv  Publishers'  Note 

The  author  is  well  known  by  his  numerous 
publications  on  social  problems,  and  the  Solvay 
Institute  of  Sociology  in  Brussels,  of  which  he  is 
the  organizer  and  leader,  has  won  a  well  deserved 
fame. 

It  is  due  to  Professor  Waxweiler's  scientific 
attitude  of  mind  and  his  special  training  that  the 
work  possesses  the  calm  objective  character  which 
has  so  impressed  neutral  countries. 

The  book  is  based  on  the  most  authoritative 
Belgian  sources,  and  the  latest  information  has 
been  taken  into  account  in  the  preparation  of  the 
English  edition. 


PREFACE 

"  Truth  must  constantly  be  re- 
stated, for  falsehood  never  ceases 
to  whisper  in  our  ears,  and  works 
notthroughindividuuls  but  through 
masses." 

Goethe : 
"  Conversations  with 
Eckermann." 

When  unjust  accusations  are  made  against  the 
honour  of  any  one  who  is  dear  to  us,  when  doubts  are 
thrown  on  his  honesty  and  his  loyalty  is  questioned^ 
we  are  carried  away  by  an  irrepressible  feeling  of 
sorrow  and  anger.  And  if  he  undergoes  moral 
suffering  at  the  same  time  that  he  is  overwhelmed  by 
other  misfortunes,  our  soids  are  wrung  with  such 
anguish  that  it  seems  worth  any  effort  to  hasten 
the  work  of  reparation. 

These  are  the  feelings  of  every  Belgian  to-day  on 
the  subject  of  his  country. 

That  country  has  been  given  up  to  the  devastation 
and  outrages  of  war.  The  confidence  which  she 
placed  in  solemn  promises  has  been  betrayed.  There 
is  no  torture  to  which  she  has  not  been  subjected. 
Now  charges  are  made  against  her  loyalty  and  she 


VI 


Preface 


becomes  at  once  hateful  to  her  enemies  and  an  object 
of  suspicion  even  to  some  of  her  friends.  What 
task  could  be  sweeter  than  to  undertake  her  full 
defence?  Not  to  write  for  her  an  apologia  or  even 
a  plea;  but  to  state  simply  and  frankly  what  she  is 
and  what  she  has  dojie.  Germany  seeks  to  throw 
discredit  upon  the  manner  in  which  Belgium  in- 
terpreted her  duties  as  a  neutral  before  the  war; 
accusations  are  heaped  upon  her;  she  is  spoken 
of  only  in  accents  of  hostility;  Germany  is  appar- 
ently making  a  deliberate  attempt  to  prevent  others 
from  entertaining  for  her  feelings  of  affection  and 
respect. 

In  the  universal  turmoil  of  the  present  moment 
public  opinion  is  slow  in  forming;  it  is  fostered 
mainly  by  impressions.  Perliaps  the  moment  has 
come  to  lay  facts  before  it.  To  clear  up  every 
doubt  and  furnish  the  material  for  a  considered 
judgment,  it  will  not  be  superfluous  to  meet  every 
accusation,  even  those  whose  mere  recital  violates 
common  sense,  and  to  bestow  upon  them  more  atten- 
tion than  might  at  first  sight  be  considered  appropriate. 
Belgium  has  nothing  with  which  to  reproach  herself; 
it  is  due  to  her  that  this  should  be  proved  by  evidence; 
that  no  piece  of  testimony  should  be  omitted  and  that 
every  mistake  and  every  slander  should  be  exposed 
firmly  but  dispassionately. 


Preface  vU 

Other  nations  besides  my  own  have  an  equal 
interest  in  this.  To  represent  Belgium  as  having 
failed  to  keep  her  promises  strikes  a  blow  at  the  cause 
of  little  nations  and  at  the  theory  of  perpetual 
neutrality. 

The  history  of  the  future  will  without  doubt  be  that 
of  the  free  development  of  nations,  jealous  of  their 
independence  and  impatient  to  escape  from  the  play 
of  intrigue  and  the  hegemony  of  foreign  influence. 
The  nations  which  have  grown  great  under  the  shelter 
of  the  sanction  of  law,  as  well  as  those  who  may  perhaps 
dream  of  attaining  that  benefit  in  the  future,  ought  to 
have  full  knowledge  of  the  lessons  of  the  experience 
of  Belgium. 

These  lines  are  dated  from  Switzerland.  In  this 
country,  which  bears  so  strong  a  resemblance  to  my 
own,  I  have  found  not  only  the  moral  support  of 
sympathy  but  also  that  moderate  and  critical  attitude 
of  mind  which  is  necessary  for  one  who  undertakes 
a  work  in  which  so  much  restraint  is  necessarily 
placed  upon  the  feelings  of  the  writer. 

With  a  view  to  making  this  little  work  as  valuable 
as  possible  I  have  deliberately  submitted  all  my 
statements  to  the  most  searching  criticism,  for 
the  scientific  mind  is  among  the  most  scrupulous. 
I  thank  very  sincerely  all  those  who,  whether  abroad 
or  in  what  remains  of  my  country,  have  enabled  we 


VIU 


Preface 


to  collect  the  truth,  even  when  hy  its  very  nature,  or 
owing  to  the  position  of  those  from  whom  I  learned 
it,  it  was  necessarily  to  he  kept  secret. 

It  is  not  without  a  certain  regret  that  I  bring  to  an 
end  this  hook.  I  found  in  writing  it  the  pleasure  of 
one  who  dwells  lingeringly  on  a  misfortune  hy  way 
of  consolation.  I  commit  it  to  all  those  who  have 
preserved  their  minds  from  malice  and  prejudice. 

Emile  Waxweiler. 

Geneva,  December,  1914. 


CONTENTS 


I.  Up  to  7  P.M.  ON  August  2,  1914    .         .         i 

Public  opinion  in  Belgium  in  regard  to  Germany — 
The  policy  of  the  Government— The  confidence  of 
Belgium  in  her  neighbours — Effect  of  European 
policy  on  those  responsible  for  the  Government  of 
Belgium — Reorganization  of  the  Belgian  Army — 
Cordial  relations  of  Belgium  with  Germany,  Eng- 
land, and  France — The  Austro-Serbian  conflict: 
The  steps  taken  by  Belgium— Public  confidence. 

II.  To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  .         .         -39 

The  "very  confidential"  note  of  the  German  Govern- 
ment to  the  Belgian  Government — Had  Belgium 
the  power  to  accede  to  the  demand?  The  notion  of 
permanent  neutraUty— The  bargain  offered  by  the 
"very  confidential"  note — The  attempt  of  the 
"very  confidential"  note  to  justify  the  terms  of 
the  bargain — The  true  reason  for  the  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality— The  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality  was  premeditated — The  reply  of  the 
Belgian  Government  to  the  "very  confidential" 
note— The  attitude  of  France— The  German 
Government's  announcement  that  the  German 
Army  intended  to  cross  Belgium  by  force — The 
appeal  of  Belgium  to  the  Powers  guaranteeing  her 
neutrality. 

III.  Belgian  Neutrality  before  Europe  .       83 

The  raison  d'itre  of  the  permanent  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium— Declaration  of  neutrality  in   1870 — Great 


X  Contents 

PAGE 

Britain  as  the  guardian  of  Belgian  neutrality — The 
action  of  the  British  Government  in  1914 — The 
German  plot  against  Belgium — IVIain  features 
in  the  attitude  of  Germany,  Great  Britain,  and 
Belgium. 

IV.  Imputations  against  the   Loyalty  of 
Belgium   .         .         .         .         .         .         .129 

To  mitigate  her  action  Germany  endeavours  to  evade 
the  question  of  Belgium — Belgium  had  not  merited 
confidence  in  carrying  out  her  international  obliga- 
tions: The  administration  of  the  Congo — The 
suggested  inadequacy  of  the  Belgian  military  organi- 
zation— Alleged  subservience  to  France  on  the 
military  side;  on  the  economic  side — Alleged  sub- 
servience to  Great  Britain :  Belgium  would  not  have 
resisted  Germany  except  at  the  instigation  of  Great 
Britain — Conversations  on  military  matters  be- 
tween the  Belgian  and  British  Chiefs  of  General 
Stafifs. 

V.  German  Rules  of  War  and  their  Appli- 
cation TO  Belgium  .....     209 

The  peculiar  situation  of  Belgium  in  the  conflict  en- 
titled her  to  expect  that  Germany  would  exercise  ^ 
certain  moderation  in  military  operations — The 
war  has,  on  the  contrary,  been  conducted  by  Ger- 
many with  a  cruel  vigour — Germany's  attempt  to 
throw  the  responsibility  on  Belgium — Arguments 
put  forward  by  Germany  to  this  end:  (i).  The  par- 
ticipation of  the  civil  population  in  the  hostilities 
(francs-tireurs);  (2).  The  treatment  of  the 
wounded — The  treatment  of  foreigners — The 
German  code  of  war — The  "laws  of  war  on  land" — 
The  German  contemporary  doctrine — The  arbi- 
trary power  of  the  command — The  application  of 
this  system  in  Belgium — Collective  repression — 
The  taking  of  hostages — Conclusion. 


Contents  xi 

PAGE 

Appendix:  Report  of  the  Belgian  Chief  of 
General  Staff  Respecting  the  Confiden- 
tial Interviews  with  the  British  Military 
Attache  in  1906       .....     301 

Index  .         .         .         .         ,         .         .311 


Up  to  7  P.  M.  on  August  2,  I9t4 


The  War  of  1914 


2  77>j>3 


UP   TO   7   P.M.    ON  AUGUST  2,    I914 

During  the  last  twenty-five  years  there  had 
been  a  great  change  in  the  attitude  of  Belgian 
public  opinion  toward  matters  German.  That 
kind  of  half-mystical  admiration  inspired  by  a 
power  which  one  does  not  understand  was  on  the 
wane;  people  had  becomxC  anxious  to  get  a  nearer 
view  of  this  power  and  were  curious  to  understand 
it. 

Belgians  had  seen  Germans  in  many  fields  of 
activity.  In  the  first  place,  they  had  noticed  the 
arrival  in  their  own  country,  in  ever-increasing 
numbers,  of  industrious  and  persevering  young 
men  who  sought  for  employment,  often  poorly 
paid,  in  banks,  manufactories,  and  shops.  Side 
by  side  with  them  there  came  men  of  technical 
knowledge  who  had  gone  through  a  highly  special- 
ized professional  education  and  were  thus  assured 


2  The  War  of  191 4 

of  the  most  coveted  posts  in  factories  and  labora- 
tories. Then  came  the  great  financial  or  commer- 
cial firms  in  which  a  German  staff  managed  German 
capital,  or  representatives  of  German  houses  who 
travelled  through  town  and  country  to  establish 
their  business  and  strengthen  their  relations  with 
their  customers.  Even  in  the  case  of  certain 
enterprises  which  remained  Belgian,  either  nomi- 
nally or  actually,  the  participation  of  German 
financial  groups  introduced  influences  whose  eflect 
was  often  very  far-reaching. 

This  invasion,  it  is  true,  gave  rise  to  a  certain 
amount  of  doubt  and  reserve  among  those  who 
were  injured  in  their  private  interests  by  the 
competition  of  the  foreigner,  but  these  formed  only 
a  very  small  minority;  the  public  at  large  set  a 
high  value  on  the  zeal  and  the  exact  and  deep 
knowledge  of  the  young  Germans,  and  these 
foreigners  were  often  held  up  as  an  example  to  the 
young  men  of  the  country  who  were  too  apt  to 
take  no  trouble  to  keep  the  places  which  the 
invaders  took  from  them. 

Every  year,  in  the  summer,  more  than  20,000 
German  families  visited  the  watering  places  on  the 
Belgian  coast;  Blankenberghe,  Heyst,  Knocke, 
and  even  the  more  modern  resorts  of  Westende 
and  Duinbergen  were  considered  almost  as  German 


August  2,  1 91 4  3 

watering  places.  "You  cannot  imagine,"  wrote 
a  German  lady  in  a  letter  published  two  years 
ago  in  the  weekly  review,  Die  Woche,  "the  charm 
of  life  on  the  Belgian  coast ;  it  is  of  the  simple  and 
homely  type  to  which  we  Germans  attach  so  much 
importance."  The  welcome  given  to  these  visitors 
by  the  inhabitants  was  warm  and  cordial.  The 
latter  enjoyed  hearing  in  front  of  the  hotels  the 
jolly  or  serious  songs  which  the  summer  visitors 
sung  in  chorus  on  the  evenings  of  Liederabend. 
When  children's  parties  were  organized  on  the 
beach  or  among  the  dunes  it  was  quite  common  to 
see  as  many  German  as  Belgian  little  flags. 

A  great  number  of  German  experts  in  different 
subjects  as  well  as  ordinary  tourists  were  attracted 
also  by  Exhibitions  and  Congresses.  Brussels 
was  the  natural  place  for  international  gatherings 
and  associations,  which  found  there  obvious 
political  and  geographical  advantages.  In  particu- 
lar, in  1910,  the  German  participations  in  the 
Universal  Exhibition  and  in  the  Congresses  held 
at  that  time  greatly  increased  the  intercourse 
between  Belgians  and  Germans,  and  the  latter  did 
not  fail  to  take  every  opportunity  of  expressing 
their  pleasure  at  being  received  with  so  much 
sympathy. 

German  schools  were  established  at  Antwerp 


4  The  War  of  191 4 

and  Brussels.  They  benefited  by  the  prestige  of 
German  educational  methods;  they  were  directed 
by  men  of  ability  and  conducted  with  obvious  care 
for  good  education  and  did  not  fail  to  attract 
a  large  number  of  Belgian  children.  At  the 
same  time  German  publishing  firms  brought  be- 
fore the  Belgian  public  extensive  library  facili- 
ties in  a  thousand  small  ways  and  thus  secured 
a  large  trade  in  books  and  magazines. 

Other  circumstances  also  tended  to  bring  the 
two  countries  together. 

Industrially,  Belgium  lives  by  its  export  trade; 
in  several  markets  of  the  world  she  was  en- 
countering more  and  more  the  competition  of 
German  production.  In  self-defence  she  set  her- 
self to  study,  no  longer  superficially  but  deliber- 
ately and  carefully,  the  causes  of  the  enormous 
economic  progress  of  Germany.  Young  people 
who  were  intended  for  business  were  forced  by  the 
imperative  need  of  knowing  the  language  of  their 
formidable  competitor  to  learn  to  speak  and  write 
German.  Books  on  the  training  of  German 
merchants,  manufacturers,  and  bankers  were  read 
greedily.  "Give  us  young  men  educated  like 
the  Germans,"  said  King  Leopold  II.  the  last 
time  that  he  received  the  staff  of  the  University 
of    Brussels    at    the    Roval     Palace    on    New 


August  2,  1 91 4  5 

Year's  Day.  Committees  to  study  conditions  in 
Germany  were  sent  to  that  country;  close  per- 
sonal ties  were  formed.  The  true  reason  for  the 
economic  activity  of  the  present  day  became  obvi- 
ous. In  Germany,  just  as  in  the  United  States, 
it  was  through  "Organization"  that  capital  as 
well  as  labour  produced  an  unexpectedly  pro- 
ductive return. 

German  Organization  and  Co-ordination  were 
found  in  the  powerful  groups  of  manufacturers 
which  lined  both  frontiers,  and  were  the  cause 
of  the  periodical  meetings  of  representatives  of 
metal,  glass,  and  chemical  works  as  well  as  textile 
manufactories  from  Belgium,  Germany,  and  other 
countries.  They  were  found  also  in  those  modern 
cities,  like  Dusseldorf  or  Frankfort,  in  which  the 
pressure  of  modern  needs  has  produced  a  form  of 
municipal  government  whose  successful  results 
cannot  fail  to  be  recognized. 

In  all  these  matters  there  was  a  free  interchange 
of  ideas  between  the  two  countries.  The  Ger- 
mans, somewhat  surprised  to  find  the  Belgians 
so  receptive  of  the  views  of  their  neighboiirs, 
threw  open  to  them  their  reviews  and  daily 
papers.  They  even  came  themselves  with  a  view 
to  studying  the  conditions  of  the  country  and  to 
seeing  at  close  quarters  the  little  nation  which 


6  The  War  of  1914 

was  growing  up  by  their  side,  and  they  took 
pleasure  in  discovering  at  the  same  time  its  great 
quahties  and  extensive  resources.  For  several 
years  the  great  German  papers  of  BerHn,  Frank- 
fort, and  Cologne  had  accredited  correspondents 
in  Belgium  who  followed  the  vicissitudes  of 
the  political  and  economic  life  of  the  country 
with  skill  and  interest. 

But  it  was  in  the  realm  of  science  that  the 
mutual  currents  of  influence  and  thought  became 
most  frequent  and  most  regular. 

For  several  years  it  has  been  true  to  say  that 
a  young  Belgian  man  of  science  was  hardly  en- 
titled to  serious  consideration  if  he  had  not 
attended  a  German  University.  Each  of  these 
students  in  the  course  of  his  stay  in  Germany 
established  an  outpost  of  scientific  good-fellowship, 
whither  he  often  retiu"ned  and  whence  emanated 
mutual  help  and  exchanges  of  correspondence. 

In  psychology,  physiology,  chemistry,  medi- 
cine, and  the  natural  sciences  those  engaged  in 
research  were  grouped  together  by  the  periodical 
publications,  the  Jahresberichte  and  regular  meet- 
ings of  Congresses,  or  were  divided  into  groups 
in  accordance  with  their  various  lines  of  study. 
Vacation  courses,  particularly  in  the  science 
of     education,     attracted    more    and    more    the 


August  2,  1 91 4  7 

minds  of  those  who  were  curious  to  study  new 
methods. 

In  the  social  sciences  it  was  German  science 
which  produced  in  Belgium  the  great  thaw  of 
which  the  French  economist,  Charles  Gide,  spoke 
in  his  memorable  lecture.  The  famous  manifesto 
of  Eisenach  which  gave  a  new  direction  to  social 
politics  awakened  a  late  but  loud  echo  among 
the  generation  in  Belgium  which  was  receiving 
its  education  about  1890.  In  the  more  general 
realm  of  sociology  an  agreement  between  my 
German  colleagues  and  myself  had  resulted  quite 
recently  in  the  issuance  of  a  periodical  published 
conjointly.  Close  ties  united  on  the  one  hand 
the  leaders  of  Belgian  socialism  with  those  of 
German  social  democracy,  and  on  the  other  hand 
the  chiefs  of  the  Catholic  democracy  in  the  two 
countries. 

None  of  these  things  was  in  any  way  surprising, 
for  it  was  inevitable  that  Belgium  should  be  im- 
pressed by  the  strong  influence  of  Germany;  but 
they  were  novel.  It  was  strange  to  all  those  who 
had  known  Belgians  at  an  earlier  stage  of  their 
development  to  see  them  now  so  well-informed  on 
all  aspects  of  German  life. 

There  were  some  who  were  annoyed  at  the  de- 
velopments which  we  have  just  described.     Was 


8  The  War  of  1914 

there  not  a  risk  lest  this  attitude  of  welcome 
should  lend  itself  to  an  unfortunate  subservience? 
Was  not  this  policy  of  the  open  door  preparing 
the  way  for  an  overwhelming  influence  of  Germany 
upon  Belgium?  In  certain  quarters,  for  example, 
attempts  were  made  to  collect  together  evidence 
of  German  predominance  at  Antwerp,  the  metro- 
polis of  sea-borne  trade  and  the  indispensable 
centre  for  Belgian  imports  and  exports. 

But  it  was  easy  to  allay  this  mistrust.  After 
all  a  great  part  of  the  hinterland  of  the  Port  of 
Antwerp  was  geographically  German;  it  was 
natural  and  inevitable  that  German  firms  should 
have  installed  branches  in  the  city,  and  it  was  also 
natural  and  inevitable  that  these  branches  should 
have  acquired  considerable  interests  there.  The 
municipal  and  even  the  national  authorities  did 
not  hesitate  to  pay  well-earned  homage  to  the 
activity  and  enterprising  spirit  of  the  Germans  of 
Antwerp ;  a  few  years  ago  one  of  the  most  powerful 
personalities  in  the  business  world,  Herr  von 
Bary,  had  organized  a  banquet  in  honour  of  the 
burgomasters  of  the  principal,  German  towns 
along  the  Rhine;  Prince  Albert,  now  the  King  of 
Belgium,  was  present  on  that  occasion.  Still 
more  recently  the  anniversary  of  the  foundation 
of  the  Norddeutscher-Lloyd  was  made  the  occa- 


August  2,  1 91 4  9 

sion  of  a  demonstration  in  Antwerp  which  was 
attended  by  several  members  of  the  present 
Cabinet. 

Besides,  it  is  in  order  to  state  that  Germans 
who  had  settled  in  Belgium  were  adapting  them- 
selves rapidly  to  the  customs  of  the  country ;  they 
did  not  interpose  any  obstacle  to  the  spontaneous 
development  of  national  resources;  they  even  did 
not  hide  the  satisfaction  that  they  felt  at  living 
in  Belgium. 

It  is  worth  remarking  that  the  hospitable 
attitude  of  the  Belgians  towards  the  Germans  did 
not  seem  to  diminish  in  any  way  the  general 
sympathy  for  the  French;  one  had  not  grown  at 
the  expense  of  the  other.  Belgium,  which  was 
already  swayed  in  two  directions  by  the  impulses 
of  the  two  races  composing  her  population,  had 
arrived  at  a  kind  of  equilibrium  of  tendencies; 
perhaps  the  recent  teaching  of  her  historians  had 
led  her  to  this  compromise,  by  showing  her  the 
double  influence  of  the  past  on  her  national  per- 
sonality ;  perhaps  she  was  impelled  to  it  by  an  in- 
tuitive sense  of  the  necessity  of  self-preservation. 

But  even  among  those  few  who  had  latterly  been 
taking  an  active  part  in  a  movement  which  was 
directed  to  drawing  closer  the  bonds  of  friendship 
with  France,   there   existed   no   real   resentment 


10  The  War  of  191 4 

against  German}'';  they  were  concerned  for  the 
most  part  only  with  the  pro-Flemish  movement, 
and  the  pro-Flemish  movement,  in  spite  of  appear- 
ances to  the  contrary,  was  in  no  way  helped  by 
Germans  in  Belgium. 

Such  was  the  state  of  mind  that  had  gradually 
grown  up  among  the  Belgian  population  during 
the  course  of  the  last  twenty-five  years.  What  had 
been  the  attitude  of  Government  policy  during 
this  period? 

King  Leopold  II.  died  at  the  end  ot  1909. 
King  Albert  succeeded  him.  It  is  an  open  secret 
that  during  the  latter  part  of  the  reign  of  Leopold 
II.  there  was  no  particular  cordiality  between  the 
Belgian  and  the  German  Courts.  The  King's  colo- 
nial policy  and  various  other  circumstances  had  un- 
favourably affected  official  circles  in  Berlin.  With 
the  commencement  of  the  new  reign  there  was 
a  change.  The  personal  relations  between  the 
royal  couple  and  the  Crown  Prince  were  well 
known ;  it  is  common  knowledge  that  the  Emperor 
was  very  favourably  disposed  to  the  marriage 
of  Prince  Albert  with  the  Duchess  Elizabeth  in 
Bavaria,  and  that  he  had  a  great  affection  for 
the  young  Belgian  King.  A  few  months  after 
their  accession  in  June,  1910 ,  the  King  and  Queen 


August  2,  1914  II 

paid  a  visit  to  Berlin ;  toasts  inspired  by  sentiments 
of  sincere  mutual  regard  were  exchanged. 

The  Crown  Prince,  after  having  offered  to  the 
King  and  Queen  of  Belgium  a  cordial  welcome  in 
the  name  of  the  Emperor,  who  was  prevented 
from  attending,  assured  them  "of  the  feelings  of 
sincere  respect  which  the  German  Government 
and  people  entertained  for  their  Majesties";  then 
he  added: 

Historical  memories  bind  our  people  together. 
Our  families  are  related  by  blood. 

Your  Majesty  has  found  in  the  princely  German 
House  a  Consort  with  whom  your  Majesty  offers 
a  brilliant  example  of  happy  family  life. 

Your  Majesty  must  be  convinced  that  «very- 
thing  which  contributes  to  strengthen  the  friend- 
ship of  our  Houses  finds  a  lively  echo  in  the  German 
heart. 

In  the  name  of  my  father  I  wish  to  your  Majesty 
the  enjoyment  of  a  long  and  prosperous  reign,  by 
the  side  of  the  Queen  for  the  good  of  gentle  Belgitun. 

King  Albert  replied  by  a  toast,  of  which  the 
following  are  the  important  passages: 

Your  Highness' s  words  will  find  sympathetic 
echo  in  Belgium,  for  the  Belgians  feel  a  true  friend- 
ship for  the  German  people,  a  friendship  which  has 
developed  without  interruption  ever  since  Belgium 
obtained  her  independence. 


12  The  War  of  1914 

To  our  esteem  and  friendship  for  the  German 
nation  itself  there  must  be  added  our  admiration 
for  the  fine  spirit  which  animates  the  Emperor  in 
the  accomplishment  of  his  duties  as  Sovereign. 

The  Emperor  offers  us  a  noble  example  of  a  life 
dedicated  wholly  to  the  well-being  of  his  subjects, 
to  the  power  of  expansion  and  production  of  Ger- 
many, to  its  brilliant  representation  in  foreign  lands, 
and  to  universal  peace. 

I  am  convinced  that  the  relations  between  the 
two  countries  and  the  two  ruling  Houses  will  become 
still  closer  and  more  cordial  as  the  result  of  our  visit. 

A  little  time  afterwards,  in  October,  1910,  the 
Emperor  and  Empress,  accompanied  by  Princess 
Victoria  Louise,  came  to  Brussels  to  return  the 
visit  which  the  Belgian  sovereigns  had  paid  to 
them.  The  Emperor  did  not  conceal  his  pleasure 
at  the  welcome  given  to  him  by  the  population 
of  Brussels.  At  the  dinner  at  the  Royal  Palace 
cordial  speeches  were  once  more  exchanged: 

Sire  [said  the  King],  the  Belgian  people  will  value 
highly  the  friendly  interest  which  your  Majesty 
takes  in  them.  They  see  and  they  salute  in  the 
Emperor  a  monarch  who  is  as  far-sighted  as  he  is 
enlightened,  and  who  has  known  so  well  how  to 
further  the  brilliant  career  of  his  country  in  every 
realm  of  human  activity. 

They  desire  no  less  sincerely  than  I  do  that  the 
relations  existing  between  the  two  reigning  houses, 


August  2,  1914  13 

which  are  those  of  confident  trust,  should  fortify 
the  friendship  between  the  two  nations. 

As  for  me,  while  I  am  connected  with  your 
Imperial  Majesty  by  blood  as  well  as  by  affection, 
as  your  Majesty  was  good  enough  to  recall  at 
Potsdam,  I  know  how  valuable  are  the  feelings 
which  your  Majesty  entertains  towards  the  Queen 
and  myself. 

The  Emperor  replied : 

The  brilliant  reception  which  has  been  prepared 
for  us  by  your  Majesties  and  the  Belgian  people 
in  this  splendid  capital  has  touched  us  deeply,  and 
has  awakened  sentiments  of  gratitude  which  are  «,11 
the  more  lively  because  we  see  in  that  welcome  a 
pledge  of  the  close  union  which  exists  not  only 
between  our  families,  but  also  between  our  peoples. 
Filled  with  friendly  sympathy  I  know  and  I  observe, 
like  all  Germany,  the  surprising  success  of  the 
Belgian  people,  with  their  untiring  activity  in  every 
department  of  commerce  and  industry,  whose 
climax  we  have  been  able  to  welcome  at  the  universal 
exhibition  of  this  year,  which  was  so  brilliant  and  so 
successful. 

.  .  .  May  the  relations  between  us  of  confident 
trust  and  of  neighbourly  friendship,  of  which  the 
negotiations  between  our  Governments  have  re- 
cently given  so  friendly  an  example,  bind  us  still 
closer  together ! 

This  allusion  in  the  Emperor's  speech  was  to  the 
Treaty  of  August  11,  1910,  delimiting  the  frontier 


14  The  War  of  191 4 

of  the  German  territory  and  Belgian  Congo  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  Lake  Kivu. 

It  may  be  noted  that  sentiments  similar  to 
those  expressed  in  these  speeches  were  shown  also 
at  the  time  of  the  visits  exchanged  between  the 
King  and  the  President  of  the  French  Republic. 
At  Paris,  in  July,  1910,  King  Albert,  speaking  of 
the  two  neighbouring  peoples  said : 

The  closest  relations  have  never  ceased  to  exist 
between  them,  and  every  day  seems  to  create  new 
ones.  Side  by  side  with  the  commercial  intercourse 
between  the  countries,  whose  constant  progress  is 
proved  by  statistics,  they  enjoy  a  continual  inter- 
change of  ideas.  Side  by  side  with  the  trade  be- 
-  tween  the  two  countries  they  are  bound  together 
by  relations  of  a  less  material  kind. 

The  literary  and  artistic  influence  of  France,  and 
her  passionate  devotion  to  progress  in  every  branch 
of  human  activity,  have  played  a  part  even  more 
powerful  than  that  of  economic  interests  in  drawing 
our  two  countries  together  and  a  true  intellectual 
commerce  draws  us  to  that  generous  nation  whose 
fertile  influence  has  made  itself  felt  for  cen- 
turies on  the  whole  of  humanity.  Our  thinkers,  our 
artists,  our  writers  in  the  French  tongue,  attached 
though  they  be  to  the  characteristics  of  their  race, 
know  well  what  they  owe  to  France,  to  the  lucidity 
of  her  genius,  to  the  perfection  of  her  taste,  to  that 
sense  of  the  artistic  which  adorns  everything  which 
she  produces. 


August  2,  1 91 4  15 

At  Brussels  In  May,  191 1,  President  Fallieres 
laid  stress  on  the  idea  to  which  the  King  had  given 
expression,  and  said  in  his  turn: 

My  visit  is  not  only  the  fulfilment  of  a  pleasant 
duty  of  politeness;  it  is  also  the  expression  of  the 
high  value  which  my  country  places  upon  the 
friendship  of  yours.  France  watches  with  equal 
interest  and  admiration  the  rapid  and  brilliant 
career  of  your  young  nationality.  She  has  seen  its 
birth  and  its  growth  in  strength  midst  the  greatest 
difficulties.  In  every  branch  of  human  activity — 
industry,  commerce,  politics,  letters,  the  sciences, 
and  the  arts,  Belgium  has  made  for  herself  a  high 
place  among  the  nations;  no  one  greets  those  suc- 
cesses with  greater  warmth  than  ourselves,  and  we 
unite  with  your  Majesty  in  expressing  the  wish  that, 
through  our  common  desires,  both  our  countries 
should  advance  towards  an  even  closer  concord  of 
all  their  economic  interests. 


Thus  Belgium's  attitude  in  ofBcial  as  well  as  un- 
official matters  was  the  same  towards  both  her 
great  neighbours.  Belgium's  confidence  in  both  was 
so  great  that  many  politicians  were  of  the  opinion 
that  the  country  would  never  have  to  fear  an 
invasion.  At  one  session  of  the  commission  set 
up  in  1900  to  investigate  the  question  of  the 
reorganization  of  the  army,  some  ministers  of  state 
and  party  leaders  of  great  influence  left  the  room 


i6  The  War  of  191 4 

in  which  the  Commission  was  held,  thinking  that 
it  was  inopportune  to  make  any  change  in  the  ex- 
isting miHtary  arrangements  which  were  then  still 
based  on  the  system  of  conscription  by  lot.  "  Such 
a  change,  "  said  one  of  them,  "would  be  to  weaken 
the  force  of  the  treaties  which  guarantee  the 
inviolability  of  Belgium,  and  to  throw  doubt  upon 
them." 

Further,  at  this  very  time  Germany  had  shown 
that  she  was  anxious  that  Belgian  policy  should 
be  kept  within  the  strict  limits  of  absolute  neu- 
trality. A  proposal  was  set  on  foot  by  the  burgo- 
masters of  the  four  great  towns  of  Belgium  for  the 
constitution  of  a  body  of  volunteers  intended  to 
defend  Belgian  interests  in  China  which  were  then 
threatened  by  the  Boxer  rising.  Germany  repre- 
sented energetically  that  such  a  step  was  forbid- 
den to  Belgium  by  reason  of  her  situation  as  a 
neutral  state.  Belgium  gave  way,  in  spite  of  the 
danger  to  which  her  political  representatives  and 
her  subjects  w^re  exposed.  She  believed,  on  the 
other  hand,  that  she  had  obtained  decisive  evi- 
dence of  the  determined  attitude  which  her  power- 
ful neighbour  intended  to  take  up  as  guarantor 
of  her  neutrality. 

At  a  later  date  this  evidence  was  reinforced  with 
still  greater  strength.     In  191 1,  during  the  contro- 


August  2,  1 914  17 

versy  which  was  aroused  by  the  announcement 
of  the  Dutch  plans  for  the  fortification  of  Flushing, 
certain  papers  had  announced  that  in  case  of  a 
Franco-German  war,  Belgian  neutrality  would 
be  violated  by  Germany.  The  Belgian  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  suggested  that  a  declaration 
made  in  the  German  Parliament  during  the  debate 
on  foreign  policy  would  have  the  effect  of  quieting 
public  opinion  and  setting  at  rest  the  suspicions 
which  were  regrettable  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  relations  between  the  two  countries.  Herr 
von  Bethmann-Hollweg  replied  that  he  highly 
appreciated  the  feelings  which  had  inspired  the 
request  made  by  Belgium.  He  declared  that 
Germany  had  no  intention  of  violating  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium,  but  he  thought  that  if  a  public 
declaration  to  that  effect  were  made,  Germany 
would  weaken  her  military  position  vis-d-vis  of 
France  who,  reassured  on  her  northern  frontier, 
would  transfer  all  her  troops  to  the  eastern  side.'' 
This  reply  by  the  Imperial  Chancellor  was 
communicated  orally,  in  accordance  with  his 
instructions,  to  the  Belgian  Government,  which 
gave  way  to  the  objections  which  the  Chancellor 
had  raised  on  the  subject  of  the  public  declaration 
for  which  they  had  asked.  ^ 

'  See  Grey  Book,  No.  12.  » Ibid. 


i8  The  War  of  191 4 

In  1 91 3  still  more  precise  declarations  were 
made  during  the  sitting  of  the  Reichstag  Com- 
mittee on  the  Budget  on  April  29th.  The  Nord- 
deutscJie  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  whose  semi-official 
character  is  well  known,  reported  it  in  the  following 
terms  :^ 

A  member  of  the  Social  Democrat  Party  said: 

"  The  approach  of  a  war  between  Germany  and 
France  is  viewed  with  apprehension  in  Belgium, 
for  it  is  feared  that  Germany  will  not  respect  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium." 

Herr  von  Jagow,  Secretary  of  State,  replied: 
"  Belgian   neutrality   is    provided    for    by    Inter- 
national Conventions  and  Germany  is  determined 
to  respect  those  Conventions." 

This  declaration  did  not  satisfy  another  member 
of  the  Social  Democrat  Party.  Herr  von  Jagow 
said  that  he  had  nothing  to  add  to  the  clear  state- 
ment he  had  made  respecting  the  relations  between 
Germany  and  Belgium. 

In  answer  to  fresh  enquiries  by  a  member  of  the 
Social  Democrat  Party,  Herr  von  Heeringen,  the 
Minister  of  War,  replied:  "  Belgium  plays  no  part 
in  the  causes  which  justify  the  proposed  reor- 
ganization of  the  German  militar}^  system.  That 
proposal  is  based  on  the  situation  in  the  East. 
Germany  will  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  is  guaranteed  by  interna- 
tional treaty." 

A  member  of  the  Progressive  Party  having  once 

*  See  Grey  Book,  No.  12. 


August  2,  1 91 4  19 

again  spoken  of  Belgium,  Herr  von  Jagow  repeated 
that  this  declaration  in  regard  to  Belgium  was 
sufficiently  clear. 

All  these  declarations  summed  up  and  amplified 
a  statement  made  by  the  German  Minister  in 
Belgium,  Baron  von  Wallwitz,  at  a  banquet  at 
Antwerp  in  1905,  the  year  of  the  seventy-fifth 
anniversary  of  Belgian  independence.  "Respect 
for  Belgian  neutrality,"  he  said,  "is  a  political 
axiom  for  Germany  and  it  could  never  be  dis- 
regarded without  incurring  the  most  serious 
consequences." 

In  spite  of  these  assurances,  the  course  of 
European  politics  made  a  deep  impression  on 
those  responsible  for  the  Government  of  Belgium. 

The  long  drawn-out  Morocco  crisis  made  a 
sensation  in  the  country.  At  the  same  time  the 
formation  of  the  two  diplomatic  groups  of  Great 
Powers  had  brought  together  France  and  England 
who,  up  to  then,  had  reserved  complete  liberty 
of  action.  There  was  a  growing  impression  in 
the  chancelleries  and  military  circles  of  certain 
capitals  that  a  European  war  was  imminent.  To 
complete  her  uneasiness,  in  1912  Belgium  received 
from  a  Sovereign  who  belonged  neither  to  the 
Triple  Entente  nor  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  and 
whose    great    wisdom    and    long    experience    of 


20  The  War  of  1914 

European  politics  was  well-known  in  diplomatic 
circles,  King  Charles  of  Roumania,  the  friendly 
advice  to  keep  a  careful  watch  on  the  defence  of 
all  her  frontiers:  "The  miracle  of  1870,"  he  said, 
"will  not  be  repeated:  Belgium  runs  a  great 
danger  of  seeing  her  neutrality  violated  by  one 
of  her  three  neighbours."  At  the  same  time  other 
warnings  reached  Belgium;  plans  for  a  surprise 
invasion  of  Belgian  territory  by  German  troops 
were  discovered,  and  the  military  arrangements 
made  by  France  on  her  northern  frontier  took  a 
definite  form. 

Moreover,  these  fears  received  disturbing  con- 
firmation from  German  military  writers.  For 
instance.  General  von  Bernhardi,  who  was  widely 
read  in  Germany,  published,  at  the  end  of  191 1, 
under  the  title  of  Deutschland  und  der  ndchste 
Krieg,  a  book  which  was  full  of  statements  which 
were  very  alarming  for  Belgium.  I  repeat  here 
some  of  the  most  characteristic  of  them : 

The  conception  of  permanent  neutrality  is  en- 
tirely opposed  to  the  essential  nature  of  the  State; 
the  State  can  only  attain  her  high  moral  ends  by 
competition  with  other  States.' 

No  natural  obstacle  or  powerful  barriers  there 
[in   Belgium  and   Holland]   stand  in  the   way   of 

'  Chapter  V.,  page  120. 


August  2,  1 91 4  21 

hostile  invasion,  and  neutrality  is  only  a  paper 
bulwark.  To  the  south  also  the  Rhine  barrier 
could  easily  be  turned  by  going  through  Switzerland, 
•r  although  on  this  side  there  are  serious  geographical 
natural  obstacles.'' 

King  Albert  from  the  moment  of  his  accession 
laid  stress  on  the  necessity  for  Belgium  to  bring 
her  military  organization  into  line  with  modern 
progress.  On  many  occasions  he  chose  this  as 
the  subject  of  his  public  speeches,  and  he  took 
pleasure  in  recalling  the  eloquent  appeals  which 
King  Leopold  II.  had  himself  addressed  to  the 
nation,  to  arouse  in  it  the  consciousness  of  the 
obligations  of  patriotism.  Speaking  to  the  Grena- 
dier regiment,  for  example.  King  Albert  said: 

It  is  my  earnest  hope  that  the  nation  should 
understand  more  and  more  with  a  clear  view  into 
the  future,  the  supreme  and  imperative  obligation 
which  the  very  fact  of  neutrality  lays  upon  her — a 
continuous  duty  of  sacrifice  on  a  level  comparable 
to  the  duty  which  the  army  would  have  to  fulfil  if, 
on  some  future  date,  international  complications, 
which  are  always  possible,  should  force  Belgium  to 
defend  the  inviolabilit}'  of  her  territory. 

At  last,  in  19 13,  Parliament  passed  a  measure 
for    a   far-reaching   reorganization  of   the   army. 

'  Chapter  VII.,  page  169. 


22  The  War  of  191 4 

Before  the  public  discussion  of  the  question,  the 
Minister  for  War,  Monsieur  de  Broqueville,  was 
careful  to  furnish  to  Parliament  the  confiden- 
tial communications  which,  as  stated  above,  the 
Government  had  received.  This  was  done  during 
a  secret  sitting,  and  these  statements  exercised 
a  decisive  influence  on  the  vote  which  was  taken. 

While  these  events  were  proceeding,  the  political 
relations  between  Belgium  and  her  three  great 
neighbours,  Germany,  Great  Britain,  and  France, 
developed  on  lines  of  very  sincere  sympathy. 
King  Albert,  taking  advantage  of  his  passing 
through  Paris  on  his  return  from  a  holiday,  stayed 
there  to  pay  his  respects  to  the  President  of  the 
Republic  in  the  same  spirit  of  courtesy  which  in 
the  course  of  that  year  also  took  him  to  Berne 
during  one  of  his  stays  in  Switzerland;  in  fact  it 
was  always  the  King's  personal  opinion  that  it  is 
his  duty  to  be  acquainted  with  the  highest  au- 
thorities in  the  countries  in  which  he  frequently 
travels.  At  Paris  the  King  received  from  Presi- 
dent Poincare  a  formal  assurance  that  France  was 
resolved  upon  a  peaceful  policy  and  had  no 
thought  of  violating  Belgian  neutrality. 

Great  Britain  little  by  little  had  realized  the 
firm  determination  of  Belgium  to  carry  out  the 


August  2,  1 91 4  23 

reforms  in  the  Congo  which  the  new  King  had 
solemnly  promised  on  the  day  of  his  coronation. 
[  Finally,  in  Germany,  the  King  was  present  in 
November,  19 13,  at  the  anniversary  celebrations  of 
the  regiment  of  which  he  was  Honorary-Colonel. 
He  sent  his  portrait  to  the  regiment  and  the 
Emperor  in  return  forwarded  his  own  to  the 
Belgian  regiment  of  Grenadiers.  In  the  course 
of  this  stay  in  Germany  the  King  had  been  invited 
to  Potsdam  where  the  Emperor  talked  over  with 
him  the  general  political  situation  in  Europe,  and 
did  not  hide  from  him  its  gravity.  He  thought 
that  it  would  become  difficult  to  avoid  war  with 
France,  who  made  no  response  to  the  conciliatory 
overtures  of  the  Emperor,  and  whose  press  openly 
showed  growing  hostility.  If  it  were  inevitable 
that  war  should  come,  he  added,  the  triumph  of 
the  German  armies  could  not  be  doubted.  This 
conversation,  which  made  a  profound  impression 
on  the  King,  was  a  proof  of  the  confidence  which 
the  Emperor  continued  to  repose  in  him.  This 
confidence  was  manifested  once  again  in  this  very 
year  of  1914.  The  Emperor  had  invited  the  King 
to  be  present  at  the  manoeuvres  which  were  to  take 
place  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Cologne,  on  the  17th 
of  September,  last.  At  the  beginning  of  July  the 
King  informed  him  that  he  would  attend. 


24  The  War  of  191 4 

In  Belgium  there  was  a  growing  desire  that 
Belgian  policy  should  observe  the  strictest  neu- 
trality. For  example,  the  leader  of  the  Liberal 
Party,  M.  Hymans,  has  recounted  in  the  Outlook 
(September  30th,  page  255)  how  he  had  been 
requested  by  the  members  of  the  majority  to 
recommend  to  the  newspapers  of  his  party  reserve 
and  prudence  in  discussing  German  affairs. 

To  be  frank,  there  was  a  portion  of  the  Belgian 
public  which  disliked  these  evidences  of  friendship 
between  the  Courts  of  Berlin  and  Brussels,  to 
which  a  sensitive  patriotism  might  attach  a 
significance  which  was  certainly  not  in  accordance 
with  the  facts.  The  perfectly  correct  attitude 
of  the  King  and  Queen  furnished  an  answer  to 
these  fanciful  rumours,  and  they  are  only  men- 
tioned here  so  as  to  make  the  picture  of  public 
opinion  in  Belgium  exact  in  every  essential. 

On  July  24,  1914,  the  Belgian  Minister  at 
Vienna  forwarded  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Af- 
fairs at  Brussels  the  text  of  the  ultimatum  which 
Austria-Hungary  had  just  addressed  to  Servia. 
This  communication  took  place  at  the  same  time 
as  all  those  sent  by  the  Ambassadors  at  Vienna 
to  their  respective  countries. 

The  sensation  which  this  document  caused  in  all 


August  2,  1914  25 

the  Chancelleries  is  well  known.  Very  naturally  a 
profound  impression  was  produced  at  Brussels  also. 
On  the  same  day,  July  24th,  the  Belgian 
Government  sent  to  its  principal  Ministers  abroad 
the  following  letter ' : 

The  Belgian  Government  have  had  under  their 
consideration  whether,  in  present  circumstances,  it 
would  not  be  advisable  to  address  to  the  Powers  who 
guaranteed  Belgian  independence  and  neutrality  a 
communication  assuring  them  of  Belgium's  determi- 
nation to  fulfil  the  international  obligations  imposed 
upon  her  by  treaty  in  the  event  of  a  war  breaking 
out  on  her  frontiers. 

The  Government  have  come  to  conclusion  that 
such  a  communication  would  be  premature  at 
present,  but  that  events  might  move  rapidly  and 
not  leave  sufficient  time  to  forward  suitable  instruc- 
tions at  the  desired  moment  to  the  Belgian  repre- 
sentatives abroad. 

In  these  circumstances  I  have  proposed  [wrote 
the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs]  to  the  King  and 
to  my  colleagues  in  the  Cabinet,  who  have  con- 
curred, to  give  you  now  exact  instructions  as  to  the 
steps  to  be  taken  by  you  if  the  prospect  of  a 
Franco-German  war  became  more  threatening. 

I  enclose  herewith  a  note,  signed  but  not  dated, 
which  you  should  read  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  and  of  which  you  should  give  him  a  copy, 
if  circumstances  render  such  a  communication 
necessary. 

'  Grey  Book,  No.  27. 


26  The  War  of  1914 

I  will  inform  you  by  telegram  when  you  are  to 
act  on  these  instructions. 

This  telegram  will  be  despatched  when  the 
order  is  given  for  the  mobilization  of  the  Belgian 
army  if,  contrary  to  our  earnest  hope  and  to  the 
apparent  prospect  of  a  peaceful  settlement,  our 
information  leads  us  to  take  this  extreme  measure 
of  precaution. 

The  terms  of  this  document  are  perfectly  clear; 
it  was  a  question  of  guarding  against  the  possibility 
of  being  taken  by  surprise  by  the  developments 
of  the  situation.  Since  the  arrangements  which 
Belgiiim  might  perhaps  be  forced  to  take  ought 
to  be  measures  of  defence,  it  was  necessary  at 
any  cost  that  she  should  be  prepared  for  every 
contingency. 

During  the  following  days  diplomatic  activity 
in  the  Chancelleries  became  more  and  more 
hurried;  the  British  Blue  Book,  for  example,  gives 
eighty  documents  between  the  25th  and  29th 
July.  The  Belgian  Government  were  kept  in- 
formed by  their  diplomatic  agents  of  the  course 
of  events.  In  particular,  on  Monday  the  27th, 
the  Government  received  from  the  Belgian  Min- 
ister at  Berlin  alarming  information  on  the  course 
which  the  Austro-Servian  dispute  was  taking: 
"War, "  says  Baron  Bey  ens  in  his  message,  "seems 
inevitable,  and  we  can  only  expect  the  worst  con- 


August  2,  1 91 4  27 

sequences.  Belgium  must  from  now  on  take 
thought  for  all  the  precautions  required  by  the 
situation."  Next  day,  a  telegram  from  the  Bel- 
gian Minister  at  Vienna  announced  that  Austria- 
Hungary  had  declared  war  on  Servia. 

At  this  moment  the  Belgian  Government  did 
not  hesitate.  On  Wednesday,  the  29th  July,  they 
decided  to  place  the  army  on  a  strengthened  peace 
footing — a  measure  of  simple  precaution,  as  they 
hastened  to  explain  to  the  Belgian  Ministers 
abroad,  in  the  following  letter': 

The  Belgian  Government  have  decided  to  place 
the  army  upon  a  strengthened  peace  footing. 

This  step  should  in  no  way  be  confused  with 
mobilization. 

Owing  to  the  small  extent  of  her  territory,  all 
Belgium  is,  in  some  degree,  a  frontier  zone.  Her 
army  on  the  ordinary  peace  footing  consists  of 
only  one  class  of  armed  militia;  on  the  strength- 
ened peace  footing,  owing  to  the  recall  of  three 
classes,  her  army  divisions  and  her  cavalry  division 
comprise  effective  units  of  the  same  strength  as 
those  of  the  corps  permanently  maintained  in  the 
frontier  zones  of  the  neighbouring  Powers. 

This  information  will  enable  you  to  reply  to  any 
questions  which  may  be  addressed  to  you. 

Up  to  this  moment  nothing  extraordinary  had 
happened   in   Belgium.     But   on   the    31st   July 

'  Grey  Book,  No.  8. 


28  The  War  of  1914 

the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs,  had  two  inter- 
views of  the  greatest  importance. 

The  French  Minister  called  to  show  him  a 
telegram  from  the  Agence  Havas  announcing  that 
Kriegsgefahr  (a  state  of  danger  of  war)  had  been 
proclaimed  in  Germany,  a  step  which  involved 
certain  measures  of  precaution  caused  by  a  state 
of  tension  in  the  relations  of  Germany  with 
another  country.  The  French  Minister  at 
Brussels  on  this  occasion  made  the  following 
declaration ' : 

I  seize  th's  opportunity  to  declare  that  no  incur- 
sion of  French  troops  into  Belgium  will  take  place, 
even  if  considerable  forces  are  massed  upon  the 
frontiers  of  your  country.  France  does  not  wish 
to  incur  the  responsibility,  as  far  as  Belgium  is 
concerned,  of  taking  the  first  hostile  act.  Instruc- 
tions in  this  sense  will  be  given  to  the  French 
authorities. 

The  Belgian  Minister  replied : 

We  had  always  had  the  greatest  confidence  in  the 
loyal  observance  by  both  our  neighbouring  States 
of  their  engagements  towards  us.  We  have  also 
every  reason  to  believe  that  the  attitude  of  the 
German  Government  will  be  the  same  as  that  of  the 
Government  of  the  French  Republic. 

I  Grey  Book,  No.  9. 


August  2,  1 91 4  29 

The  second  call  made  on  July  31st  was  that  of 
the  British  Minister. ' 

He  was  directed  to  inform  the  Belgian  Minister 
that  England  expected  that  Belgium  would  do  her 
utmost  to  maintain  her  neutrality;  an  early  reply 
was  expected.  The  Minister  also  announced  that 
England  had  just  asked  Germany  and  France 
separately  if  they  were  each  of  them  ready  to  re- 
spect Belgian  neutrality  so  long  as  no  other  Power 
violated  it.  England  desired  and  expected  that 
the  Powers  would  maintain  and  observe  that 
neutrality. 

The  Belgian  Minister  replied  to  this  communica- 
tion in  terms  similar  to  those  of  his  reply  to  the 
French  Minister,  and  he  added  that  the  Belgian 
military  forces,  which  had  been  considerably 
developed  in  consequence  of  the  recent  reorgan- 
ization, were  sufficient  to  enable  the  country 
to  defend  herself  energetically  in  the  event  of 
violation  of  her  territor}^  ^ 

Lastly,  on  the  same  day,  Friday,  July  31st, 
the  Belgian  railway  authorities  were  informed  by 
the  German  railway  administration  that  trains 
could  no  longer  cross  the  German  frontier. 

Thus  the  situation  suddenly  assumed  a  char- 
acter of  exceptional  gravity.     On  the  same  day 

'  Grey  Book,  No.  11.  » Ibid. 


30  The  War  of  1914 

July  31st,  the  Government  ordered  the  mobiliza- 
tion of  the  army,  and  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  informed  all  the  Belgian  Legations  abroad 
of  this  position  by  telegram  ^ : 

The  Minister  of  War  informs  me  that  mobiliza- 
tion has  been  ordered,  and  that  Saturday,  August 
1st,  will  be  the  first  day. 

Next  day,  Saturday,  August  ist,  the  first 
day  of  mobilization,  in  accordance  with  the 
instructions  which  he  had  despatched  on  July 
24th  by  telegram,  the  Foreign  Minister  directed 
Ministers  abroad  to  carry  out  the  provisional 
instructions  which  he  had  already  given  them. 
These  instructions  were  as  follows  ^ : 

The  international  situation  is  serious,  and  the 
possibility  of  a  war  between  several  Powers  naturally 
preoccupies  the  Belgian  Government. 

Belgium  has  most  scrupulously  observed  the 
duties  of  a  neutral  State  imposed  upon  her  by  the 
treaties  of  April  19,  1839;  and  those  duties  she 
will  strive  unflinchingly  to  fulfil,  whatever  the 
circumstances  may  be. 

The  friendly  feelings  of  the  Powers  towards  her 
have  been  so  often  reaffirmed  that  Belgium  confi- 
dently expects  that  her  territory  will  remain  free 
from  attack,  should  hostilities  break  out  upon  her 
frontiers. 

All  necessary  steps  to  ensure  respect  of  Belgian 
*  Grey  Booh,  No.  lo.  '  Ibid.,  No.  2  Annex. 


August  2,  1 914  31 

neutrality  have  nevertheless  been  taken  by  the 
Government.  The  Belgian  army  has  been  mo- 
bilized and  is  taking  up  such  strategic  positions 
as  have  been  chosen  to  secure  the  defence  of  the 
country  and  the  respect  of  its  neutrality.  The 
forts  of  Antwerp  and  on  the  Meuse  have  been  put 
in  a  state  of  defence. 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  dwell  upon  the  nature 
of  these  measures.  They  are  intended  solely  to 
enable  Belgium  to  fulfil  her  international  obliga- 
tions; and  it  is  obvious  that  they  neither  have 
been  nor  can  have  been  undertaken  with  any  inten- 
tion of  taking  part  in  an  armed  struggle  between 
the  Powers  or  from  any  feeling  of  distrust  of  any 
of  those  Powers. 

At  the  same  time  the  King,  anxious  that  all  the 
guarantees  upon  which  the  country  had  a  right  to 
depend  should  be  fulfilled,  and  relying  on  the 
warmth  of  his  personal  relations  with  the  German 
Emperor,  wrote  to  the  latter  a  personal  letter, 
reminding  him  of  the  right  which  Belgium 
possessed  to  inviolability. 

The  Belgian  Government,  who  as  I  have  just 
stated,  had  been  informed  on  the  previous  evening 
of  the  enquiry  addressed  by  England  to  Germany 
and  France,  awaited  the  reply  to  it  with  complete 
confidence.  In  the  course  of  the  day  the  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  received  a  telegram  from  the 
Belgian  Legation  in  London: 


32  The  War  of  191 4 

Germany's  reply  is  awaited;  France  has  replied 

in  the  affirmative.^ 

On  the  same  day,  August  1st,  the  French 
Minister  at  Brussels  called  on  the  Minister  for 
Foreign  Affairs  and  made  to  him  the  following 
oral  communication : 

I  am  authorized  to  declare  that  in  the  event  of  an 
international  war,  the  French  Government,  in 
accordance  with  the  declarations  they  have  always 
made,  will  respect  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  In 
the  event  of  this  neutrality  not  being  respected  by 
another  Power,  the  French  Government  to  secure 
their  own  defence  might  find  it  necessary  to  modify 
their  attitude.' 

Having  regard  to  the  importance  of  this  formal 
declaration,  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  com- 
municated it  not  only  to  the  Belgian  Ministers 
in  the  principal  capitals,  but  also  to  the  German 
Minister  at  Brussels,  and  the  latter,  meeting  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  on  the  same  day, 
thanked  him  for  his  courtesy,  adding  that  up  to 
the  present  he  had  not  been  directed  to  make 
any  official  communication,  but  that  his  personal 
opinion  as  to  the  feelings  of  security  which  Belgium 
had  the  right  to  entertain  towards  her  eastern 
neighbours  was  well  known.  ^  To  this  the  Belgian 
Foreign  Minister  replied  immediately : 

'  Grey  Book,  No.  13.        » Ibid.,  No.  15.  3  Ibid.,  No.  19. 


August  2,  1 91 4  33 

All  that  we  know  of  the  intentions  of  our  eastern 
neighbour,  as  indicated  in  ntimerous  previous  con- 
versations, does  not  allow  us  to  doubt  their  per- 
fect correctness  towards  Belgium,  but  we  should 
attach  the  greatest  importance  to  the  possession  of 
a  formal  declaration  which  the  Belgian  nation  would 
hear  with  joy  and  gratitude.^ 

During  the  course  of  these  interviews  at  Brussels, 
which  maintained  a  very  friendly  tenor,  a  telegram 
from  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin  announced 
that 

The  Imperial  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  replied 
that  he  was  unable  to  answer  the  question  asked  by 
England.  2 

Next  day,  Sunday,  August  2d,  the  German 
Minister  called  on  the  Director  of  the  Political 
Department  at  the  Ministry  for  Foreign  Affairs 
early  in  the  afternoon  and  discussed  with  him  in  a 
friendly  way  the  question  of  Germans  living  in 
Belgium  who  had  been  recalled  to  their  own 
country  by  mobilization.  The  point  in  question 
was  that  of  facilitating  their  return  by  railways 
which  were  already  congested  by  Belgian  mobili- 
zation. With  great  consideration  the  Director 
undertook  to  authorize  the  Germans  who  had  been 
recalled  to  travel  in  any  train,  even  if  the  effect  of 

'  Gre.y  Book,  No.  19.  'Ibid.,  No.  14. 

3 


34  The  War  of  191 4 

their  doing  so  was  to  exceed  the  number  allowed 
to  travel  in  the  carriages.  "Understand,"  added 
the  Director,  "that  what  we  are  doing  for  Germany 
we  shall  also  do  for  France.  We  make  a  point  of 
respecting  the  susceptibilities  of  all  parties."  "I 
quite  understand  that,"  replied  the  German 
Minister,  "but  you  know  well  that  so  far  as  we  are 
concerned  you  can  have  perfect  confidence." 

The  departure  of  the  young  Germans  took 
place  in  the  best  conditions  and  with  no  mani- 
festations of  hostility  at  all  on  the  part  of  the 
public.  The  Kolnische  Zeiiung  of  August  3d 
(No.  881)  even  stated  that  on  the  Northern  Rail- 
way Station  of  Brussels  the  departing  trains  were 
saluted  by  vigorous  cheers  from  the  German 
families  in  the  town,  and  another  correspondent 
writes  to  the  same  paper  that  Belgian  women 
and  young  girls  mingled  with  these  German 
families  (No.  888,  August  6th).  This  corre- 
spondent adds  also  that  Belgians  who  have  been 
called  to  the  colours  by  mobilization  are  in  high 
spirits,  because  they  look  forward  to  going  to  the 
Frontier  to  perform  only  the  easy  work  of  sur- 
veillance imposed  by  the  neutrality  of  the  country. 

On  the  same  day,  vSunday,  August  2d,  the 
German  Minister  interviewed  by  the  paper  Le 
Soir  guaranteed  the  friendly  feelings  of  Germany 


August  2,  1 91 4  35 

towards  Belgium  and  summed  up  his  view  in  this 
phrase:  "Perhaps  your  neighbour's  house  will 
burn,  but  your  house  will  remain  safe." 

On  the  same  day  Captain  Bringmann,  German 
Military  Attache  at  Brussels,  made  a  very  courte- 
ous request  to  the  paper  called  Le  XXme  Steele  to 
deny  categorically  that  Germany  had  declared 
war  on  France  or  even  on  Russia: 

"The  news  is  false,"  said  the  Captain  on  the 
telephone.  "It  has  been  spread  by  the  enemies  of 
Germany.  You  will  oblige  me  if  you  contradict 
it  without  delay  in  large  type  under  a  heavy  head 
line  in  exactly  the  same  way  as  you  announced 
it."  "But,  Captain,"  replied  the  editor,  "your 
troops  to-night  have  invaded  and  occupied  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Luxembourg."  "Impossible! 
Wait  a  moment;  I  will  go  and  find  out."  After  a 
silence  of  a  few  minutes  the  Military  Attache 
returned  on  the  telephone:  "What  did  I  tell  you? 
It  is  absolute  nonsense.  Our  troops  have  not 
occupied  the  Grand  Duchy.  Perhaps  a  detach- 
ment has  by  some  mistake  crossed  the  Grand 
Ducal  frontier.  There  is  nothing  to  frighten  the 
Belgians ;  besides,  the  relations  of  the  two  countries 
to  Germany  are  quite  different.  No  doubt  you 
know  that  the  Grand  Ducal  railways  are  German 
and  consequently  we  have  to  take  precautions. 


36  The  War  of  191 4 

But  do  not  let  this  disturb  you.  In  any  case 
Germany  has  not  declared  war  on  any  one;  you 
can  say  so,  it  is  the  absolute  truth."  "Can  we 
give  the  source  of  our  information?  Can  we  say, 
for  example,  in  contradicting  both  stories,  that  it 
is  the  German  Military  Attache  who  asks  us  to  do 
so?"     "Certainly." 

Consequently,  on  Sunday,  August  2d,  two  Bel- 
gian papers,  Le  Soir  and  Le  XX me  Steele,  relying 
on  categorical  statements,  reassured  the  public 
of  Brussels. 

A  few  hours  afterwards,  on  that  same  Sunday, 
August  2d,  the  German  Minister  asked  the  Minis- 
ter for  Foreign  Affairs  to  grant  him  an  interview 
at  seven  in  the  evening  in  order  that  he  might  make 
an  important  communication  to  him.  Everyone 
expected  that  this  communication  can  be  only  a 
formal  renewal  of  the  statement  of  Germany's  in- 
tention to  respect  the  frontier  of  Belgium  in  the 
coming  war,  as  France  had  already  promised 
to  do. 

While  the  interview  was  going  on,  the  King's 
Secretary,  in  a  conversation  with  a  new  Minister 
of  State,  was  congratulating  himself  that  the 
situation  was  clearing  up. 

Everywhere  a  feeling  of  optimism  prevailed. 


II 


To  Be  or  Mot  To  Be 


37 


II 

TO   BE   OR   NOT   TO   BE 

The  audience  asked  for  on  Sunday,  August  2d, 
at  7  o'clock  in  the  evening  by  the  German  Minis- 
ter at  Brussels  had  for  its  object  to  hand  to  His 
Majesty's  Government  the  following  note,  to 
reply  to  which  they  were  given  twelve  hours. 
The  note  was  drawn  up  in  German  but  on  it  were 
written — a  point  which  it  is  useful  to  mention 
here — the  words,  "Very  Confidential." 

Reliable  information  has  been  received  by  the 
German  Government  to  the  effect  that  French 
forces  intend  to  march  on  the  line  of  the  Meuse  by 
Givet  and  Namur.  This  information  leaves  no 
doubt  as  to  the  intention  of  France  to  march  through 
Belgian  territory  against  Germany. 

The  German  Government  cannot  but  fear  that 
Belgium,  in  spite  of  the  utmost  goodwill,  will  be 
unable,  without  assistance,  to  repel  so  considerable 
a  French  invasion  with  sufficient  prospect  of  success 
to  afford  an  adequate  guarantee  against  danger  to 
Germany.  It  is  essential  for  the  self-defence  of 
Germany  that  she  should  anticipate  any  such 
hostile  attack.  The  German  Government  would, 
39 


40  The  War  of  191 4 

however,  feel  the  deepest  regret  if  Belgium  re- 
garded as  an  act  of  hostility  against  herself  the 
fact  that  the  measures  of  Germany's  opponents 
force  Germany,  for  her  own  protection,  to  enter 
Belgian  territory. 

In  order  to  exclude  any  possibility  of  misunder- 
standing, the  German  Government  make  the 
following  declaration : 

1.  Germany  has  in  view  no  act  of  hostility 
against  Belgium.  In  the  event  of  Belgium  being 
prepared  in  the  coming  war  to  maintain  an  attitude 
of  friendly  neutrality  towards  Germany,  the  Ger- 
man Government  bind  themselves,  at  the  conclusion 
of  peace,  to  guarantee  the  possessions  and  independ- 
ence of  the  Belgian  Kingdom  in  full. 

2.  Germany  undertakes,  under  the  above- 
mentioned  condition,  to  evacuate  Belgian  territory 
on  the  conclusion  of  peace. 

3.  If  Belgium  adopts  a  friendly  attitude, 
Germany  is  prepared,  in  co-operation  with  the 
Belgian  authorities,  to  purchase  all  necessaries  for 
her  troops  against  a  cash  payment,  and  to  pay  an 
indemnity  for  any  damage  that  may  have  been 
caused  by  German  troops. 

4.  Should  Belgium  oppose  the  German  troops, 
and  in  particular  should  she  throw  difficulties  in  the 
way  of  their  march  by  a  resistance  of  the  fortresses 
on  the  Meuse,  or  by  destroying  railways,  roads,  tun- 
nels, or  other  similar  works,  Germany  will,  to  her  re- 
gret, be  compelled  to  consider  Belgium  as  an  enemy. 

In  this  event,  Germany  can  undertake  no  obliga- 
tions towards  Belgium,  but  the  eventual  adjustment 
of  the  relations  between  the  two  States  must  be 
left  to  the  decision  of  arms. 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  41 

The  German  Government,  however,  entertain  the 
distinct  hope  that  this  eventuality  will  not  occur, 
and  that  the  Belgian  Government  will  know  how  to 
take  the  necessary  measures  to  prevent  the  occur- 
rence of  incidents  such  as  those  mentioned.  In  this 
case  the  friendly  ties  which  bind  the  two  neighbour- 
ing States  will  grow  stronger  and  more  enduring. 

It  is  essential  to  dwell  at  some  length  on  this 
document  and  to  analyse  separately  its  different 
parts. 

Germany  was  asking  Belgium  to  open  her 
frontier  to  German  armies. 

Assuming  that  Belgium  had  the  desire  or 
considered  that  it  was  to  her  interest  to  accede 
to  this  demand,  was  it  in  her  power  to  do  so? 

As  a  State,  Belgium  is  a  diplomatic  creation. 
After  the  Revolution  of  1830  had  violently  sepa- 
rated the  southern  provinces  of  the  Kingdom  of 
the  Netherlands  which  was  established  in  18 15, 
the  five  great  Powers — England,  Austria,  France, 
Russia,  and  Prussia — met  in  conference  at  London 
to  elaborate  the  international  statute  of  the  new 
State.  It  was  created  "Perpetually  Neutral"  by 
the  Treaty  of  1839  (Article  7). 

Perpetual  Neutrality,  or  to  use  a  more  exact 
expression.  Permanent  Neutrality,  is  a  curious 
notion  of  international  law.  It  has  been  elabo- 
rated entirely  for  the  purpose  of  meeting  certain 


42  The  War  of  191 4 

political  necessities.  It  must  not  be  confounded 
with  Occasional  Neutrality  which  consists  in 
abstention  from  siding  with  any  of  the  belligerents 
during  the  course  of  a  particular  war.  To  say 
that  a  State  is  protected  by  Permanent  Neutrality 
is  to  say  that  it  is  excluded  from  any  war 
whatsoever. 

Permanent  Neutrality  tends  essentially,  as  has 
been  said,  to  safeguard  small  States  against  the 
encroachment  of  powerful  neighbours  in  such  a 
way  as  to  maintain  equilibrium  between  the  great 
countries. 

With  a  view  to  this  object.  Permanent  Neu- 
trality binds  by  reciprocal  obligations  the 
neutralized  State  and  the  States  which  have 
sanctioned  its  neutrality. 

I  emphasize  this  point  since  it  is  decisive. 

A  State  does  not  neutralize  itself;  it  is  neu- 
tralized by  others.  The  basis  of  the  neutralization 
of  a  State  is  an  agreement,  a  consensus  or  a 
convention  between  several  States.  These  States 
enter  as  between  themselves  and  as  regards  the 
neutralized  State  into  engagements  which  will 
guarantee  the  latter  the  privileged  condition  of 
enjoying  a  permanent  peace;  in  return  the  neu- 
tralized State  accepts,  with  regard  to  the  others, 
obligations  which  will  ensure  the  realization  of 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  43 

that  equilibrium  of  interests  which  they  judge  it 
opportune  to  estabhsh.  This  is  exactly  what  took 
place  after  the  Belgian  Revolution  of  1830.  In 
order  that,  as  in  1814,  "the  Belgian  provinces 
might  contribute  to  the  establishment  of  an 
equitable  equilibrium  in  Europe,"  the  five  Powers 
agreed  to  "secure,  by  means  of  a  new  combina- 
tion, that  European  tranquillity  of  which  the  union 
of  Belgium  with  Holland  had  constituted  one  of 
the  bases."  The  international  constitution  of 
Belgium  was  defined  in  1839  i^  ^  Treaty  between 
Belgium  and  the  Netherlands,  and  the  articles  of 
the  Treaty  were  placed  under  the  guarantee  of  the 
five  Powers  in  a  Treaty  concluded  the  same  day 
between  those  Powers  and  the  Netherlands,  as 
well  as  in  a  Treaty  concluded  also  the  same  day 
between  the  Powers  and  Belgium. 

The  practical  result  of  the  system  of  reciprocal 
obligations  which  I  have  defined  is  that  it  induces 
each  of  the  States  which  confer  the  neutrality  to 
respect  this  neutrality  in  the  State  which  accepts 
it,  that  is  to  say,  not  to  declare  war  against  that 
State  or  provoke  it  to  abandon  the  condition  of 
peace,  and,  moreover,  to  defend  it  against  any  State 
which,  whether  or  no  it  was  a  party  to  the  primary 
convention,  should  cause  it  to  abandon  its  neu- 
trality.   In  a  word  one  may  say  that  each  of  the 


44  The  War  of  191 4 

States  which  creates  a  neutraHzed  State  becomes 
its  guarantor.  The  said  guarantee  necessarily  ex- 
tends at  the  same  time  to  the  inviolabihty  of  the 
territory,  for  the  violation  of  the  territory  is  the 
most  summary  means  by  which  the  neutrality 
which  protects  it  may  be  effectively  destroyed. 

In  return  the  neutralized  State  is  boimd  itself  to 
defend  its  neutrality  when  threatened,  and  to 
take  all  the  steps  which  may  be  necessary  for 
such  defence.  This  is  indeed  its  solemn  duty,  for 
if  it  allowed  itself  to  be  induced  by  a  State  to 
adopt  towards  its  guarantors  such  an  attitude 
as  might  cause  them  prejudice  it  would  tend 
thereby  to  destroy  the  equilibrium  of  interest 
which  is  the  basis  of  the  convention  by  which  it 
has  bound  itself. 

This  obligation  is  so  inherent  in  the  very  notion 
of  neutrality  that  a  State  which  has  acted  on  the 
defensive  is  not  considered  in  international  law  as 
having  committed  an  act  of  hostility  against  the 
State  which  violated  its  neutrality.  In  fact,  Arti- 
cle X.  of  The  Hague  Convention  of  October  18, 
1907,  concerning  the  rights  and  duties  of  neutral 
Powers  and  persons  in  general  declares  as  follows : 

The  fact  of  a  neutral  power  resisting,  even  by 
force,  attempts  to  violate  its  neutrality,  cannot  be 
regarded  as  a  hostile  act. 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  45 

The  neutralized  State  could  not  avoid  the 
obligation  of  defending  its  neutrality  unless  at  the 
time  when  the  neutrality  had  been  conferred  upon 
it  it  had  been  forbidden  to  keep  an  army  or  to 
construct  fortifications.  Such  is  the  case  with  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Luxembourg. 

In  particular,  the  neutralized  State  must  pre- 
vent the  troops  of  belligerent  States  from  passing 
through  its  territory.  This  results  from  the  very 
nature  of  its  obligations.  There  is  no  wavering  in 
regard  to  this  in  the  interpretations  given  by 
contemporary  jurists,  and  we  must  admit  that 
their  opinion  alone  has  any  weight.  In  a  science 
which  like  International  Law  develops  under  the 
pressure  of  historical  facts,  it  is  out  of  place  to 
invoke,  as  the  Kolnische  Zeitung  has  done  (No. 
li8o,  October  i8th),  Hugo  Grotius,  who  has  held 
the  distinction  of  a  founder,  but  would  never 
have  aspired  to  that  of  a  perpetual  authority. 

Rivier'  says,  for  example: 

During  war  a  passage  across  its  territory  could 
not  be  granted  by  a  neutral  State  to  the  sol- 
diers of  one  of  the  belligerents,  neither  to  individ- 
ual soldiers  nor  to  bodies  of  troops.  Formerly,  the 
passage  was  claimed  as  a  right ;  later  neutrals  were 
allowed  to  grant  it  provided  that  they  granted  it 

'  Principes  du  droit  des  gens,  vol.  ii.,  p.  399. 


46  The  War  of  191 4 

to  both  parties;  subsequently  this  power  was  re- 
stricted to  the  case  where  the  passage  could  be 
claimed  in  virtue  of  a  treaty  or  servitude.  The 
right  principle  is  that  of  absolute  refusal  to  both 
parties  in  all  cases.  It  is  the  only  solution  which  is 
in  conformity  with  impartiality.  Moreover  the 
neutral  State  must  actually  prevent  the  passage. 

Similarly  Geffcken^  writes: 

The  first  duty  of  a  neutral  Government  is  to 
watch  over  the  inviolability  of  its  territory  and, 
consequently,  not  to  allow  one  of  the  belligerents 
to  make  use  of  it  as  a  base  of  operations  for  hostili- 
ties against  the  other  party.  Formerly,  it  is  true, 
it  was  admitted  that  neutrality  had  been  respected 
when  the  Government  itself  did  not  give  any  active 
assistance  to  anyone  of  the  belligerents  but  per- 
mitted both  parties  without  distinction  to  do  certain 
things.  Experience  has  shown  that  it  is  impossible 
to  observe  in  this  case  a  true  impartiality.  The 
situation  of  a  neutral  country  will  in  itself  be  more 
favourable  to  one  of  the  parties  than  to  the  other. 

Belgiimi  [Geffcken  says  further]  has  not  hesitated 
to  make  great  efforts  and  has  been  put  to  consid- 
erable expense  with  a  view  to  the  defence  of  the 
inviolability  of  her  territory,  and  Switzerland  in 
187 1  prepared  to  fulfil  her  obligations  as  a  neutral 
State  at  the  time  when  Bourbaki's  army  entered 
the  country. 

'  Die  Neutralitdt  in  Handbuch  des  Volkerrechts,  Holtzendorff , 
vol.  iv.,  p.  139. 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  47 

The  question  of  the  passage  of  belHgerent 
armies  has  moreover  been  formally  decided  by  The 
Hague  Convention  to  which  I  have  just  alluded. 
Article  V.  declares  in  fact  that  a  neutral  Power 
cannot  allow  troops  or  even  the  convoys  of  belliger- 
ents to  pass  through  its  territory,  and  it  is  manifest 
that  this  prohibition  applies  as  well  to  permanent 
as  to  occasional  neutrality. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  add  that  only  an  independ- 
ent State  can  be  a  neutralized  State — independent 
not  only  in  form  but  in  fact.  As  soon  as  a  State 
places  itself  or  allows  itself  to  be  placed  under  the 
protection  of  another;  as  soon  as  it  accepts  or 
does  not  refuse  systematic  interference  resulting 
from  foreign  authority  or  influence,  in  whatever 
domain  it  may  be  manifested,  it  ceases  to  contain 
the  essential  elements  of  neutrality,  for  it  thereby 
destroys  in  one  way  or  another  the  equilibriimi  of 
the  interest  which  the  primary  convention  had 
for  its  object  to  guarantee. 

It  would  be  inexact  to  say  that  the  juridical 
tenor  of  Permanent  Neutrality  is  to-day  precisely 
defined;  the  notion  is,  as  we  have  seen,  a  recent 
one.  There  have  been  but  few  applications  of  it, 
and  one  can  only  quote  Switzerland  as  a  coimtry 
of  which  the  international  situation  is  really 
capable   of   comparison   with   that   of   Belgium. 


48  The  War  of  1914 

Yet  the  permanent  neutrality  of  Switzerland  has 
historical  foundations  resting  on  the  free  will 
of  the  nation,  whereas  the  permanent  neutrality 
of  Belgium  has  been  imposed  upon  her.  It  was 
by  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  November  20,  18 15, 
that  six  Powers  formally  recognized  the  neu- 
trality of  Switzerland,  and  it  is  not  without  inter- 
est to  recall  here  the  fact  that  they  justified  their 
decision  by  declaring  that  "the  independence 
of  Switzerland  from  all  foreign  influence  was  in 
conformity  with  the  true  interest  of  European 
politics." 

The  theoretical  considerations  which  precede 
have  not  led  us  away  from  our  object.  They  bring 
us  there  in  direct  line,  for  they  trace  the  attitude, 
the  only  attitude,  which  Belgium  as  a  State,  that 
is  to  say  on  the  ground  of  international  law,  could 
adopt  in  face  of  the  German  Note. 

Belgium  could  not  open  her  frontier  to  the 
German  armies  because  she  had  entered  into  a 
formal  obligation  with  regard  to  England,  Austria- 
Hungary,  France,  and  Russia,  Powers  which  were 
co-contractors  with  Prussia,  not  to  abandon  the 
neutrality  that  she  had  by  convention  accepted  in 
1839.  To  grant  a  passage  to  the  German  armies 
was  clearly  to  show  favour  to  one  of  the  belliger- 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  49 

ents,  namely  Germany,  to  the  detriment  of  the 
other,  namely  France,  both  of  whom  moreover 
were  parties  to  the  convention. 

Again,  Germany  could  not  have  really  expected 
that  Belgium  would  accept  her  demand,  for  the 
very  day  on  which  her  armies  were  crossing  the 
Belgian  frontier,  namely  on  the  4th  of  August,  she 
received  from  Switzerland — the  only  nation,  as 
we  have  seen,  whose  international  situation  could 
be  compared  with  that  of  Belgium — a  notification 
that  she  would  remain  neutral  during  the  war. 
What  did  Germany  reply? 

The  Government  has  had  the  honour  to  receive 
the  circular  note  addressed  on  the  4th  of  August  of 
this  year  to  the  signatory  Powers  of  the  Treaty  of 
1815  in  which  the  Federal  Council  declares  that  in 
the  course  of  the  present  war  the  Swiss  Confedera- 
tion will  maintain  and  defend  by  all  the  means  at 
her  disposal  her  neutrality  and  the  inviolability  of 
her  territory.  The  Imperial  Government  has  taken 
cognizance  of  this  declaration  with  sincere  satis- 
faction and  is  convinced  that  the  Confederation, 
with  the  support  of  its  strong  army  and  the  in- 
domitable will  of  the  entire  Swiss  people,  will  repel 
every  attempt  to  violate  its  neutrality. 

Thus  Germany  counted  upon  Switzerland  doing 
exactly  that  which  she  was  asking  Belgium  not  to 
do! 


50  The  War  of  1914 

Certain  publicists  whose  insidious  reasoning 
has  been  supported  with  remarkable  lucidity  by 
my  colleague,  the  Swedish  professor  G.  F.  Steffen, 
allege  that  if  in  fact  Belgium  opposed  the  Ger- 
man armies  with  a  resistance  which  "cost  her  her 
annihilation"  she  did  not  do  so  in  order  to  defend 
her  neutrality  but  for  the  reason  that  the  Belgian 
people  are  germanophobe  and  are  convinced  that 
their  future  lies  in  a  close  friendship  with  France 
and  England. ' 

I  trust  that  I  have  shown  in  the  earlier  pages  of 
this  short  study  how  little  such  a  judgment  is  in 
conformity  with  the  real  state  of  affairs  before  the 
war,  both  as  regards  the  public  opinion  of  the 
country  and  also  as  far  as  the  ruling  classes  are 
concerned.  It  betrays  that  strange  need  to  find 
some  other  explanation  of  acts  than  the  simple 
"heroism  of  righteousness"  to  adopt  the  expres- 
sion of  Paul  Bourget  in  his  stirring  article  on 
"King  Albert  the  Honest  Man." 

But  the  thesis  defended  by  Steffen  has  also  a 
deeper  meaning.  It  purports  to  place  a  sort  of 
barrier  before  the  defence  of  neutrality  beyond 
which  it  would  be  sheer  nonsense  to  think  of 
continuing  it.     It  implies  that  when,  in  order  to 

'  See  Le  Suicide  de  la  Belgique,  by  G.  F.  SteflFen,  as  reproduced 
in  L' Independance  Roumaine,  October  31,  1913. 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  51 

resist  the  violation  of  its  neutrality,  the  State 
would  have  to  go  the  length  of  accepting  an 
alliance  to  the  death  with  the  enemies  of  the  guilty 
Power,  it  ought  to  consider  whether  it  would  not 
be  more  in  its  interests  to  remain  passive.  By 
this  reasoning  Belgium  ought  to  have  accepted  the 
"way  of  escape  offered  by  Germany's  demands," 
and  she  would  have  been  perfectly  justified  in  so 
doing.  It  is  only  necessary  to  sketch  the  broad 
outlines  of  this  thesis  in  order  to  perceive  the 
sophism  on  which  it  is  constructed.  It  is  not 
the  part  of  a  neutralized  State  itself  to  define  the 
extent  of  the  obligations  by  which  it  is  bound  by 
reason  of  its  neutrality.  They  are  at  the  same 
time  the  source  and  the  safeguard  of  the  obliga- 
tions which  the  other  contracting  Powers,  by 
which  I  mean  the  guaranteeing  Powers,  have 
assumed.  An  engagement  to  remain  neutral  is  in 
no  way  unilateral;  it  remains  for  all  time  that 
which  it  was  at  the  beginning,  the  expression  of  an 
equilibrium  of  interests  acting  and  reacting  on  one 
another.  Permanent  neutrality  is  by  definition  a 
complete  notion;  none  of  those  who  accept  its 
obligations  or  its  advantages  has  the  power  of 
impairing  or  mutilating  it. 

To  return  to  the  case  of  Belgium.     It  must  be 
added  that  even  if  she  did  not  offer  any  opposi- 


$2  The  War  of  1914 

tion  to  the  passage  of  the  German  armies  she 
would  see  her  territory  invaded  by  other  armies, 
not  only  those  of  the  countries  at  war  with  Ger- 
many but  also  those  of  the  countries  which  guar- 
anteed her  neutrality.  In  fact  the  doctrine  teaches, 
though  one  sometimes  forgets  it  in  the  contro- 
versies to  which  the  notion  of  neutrality  gives 
rise,  that  in  cases  of  violation  the  intervention  of 
the  guaranteeing  States  must  take  place  ex  officio 
and  even  in  spite  of  the  opposition  of  the  neutral 
State ;  for  as  Despagnet  very  truly  says,  "neutrality 
is  a  right  acquired  by  the  guaranteeing  States."' 

Bluntschli  in  particular  is  very  definite  when 
speaking  expressly  of  Belgium. 

The  European  Powers  [he  writes]  in  guaranteeing 
in  the  interest  of  European  peace  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  have  clearly  acquired  the  right  of  inter- 
vening as  against  any  Power  threatening  the 
neutrality  or  the  independence  of  that  country, 
even  when  intervention  is  not  claimed  by  the  party 
interested.^ 

.  .  .  The  States  which  have  guaranteed  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium  and  did  not  defend  her  against 
an  aggressor  would  not  be  holding  to  their  engage- 


'  Despagnet  et  de  Boeck,  Droit  international  public,  p.  185; 
see  in  the  same  sense,  for  example,  Descamps,  "  La  Neutralite 
de  la  Belgique,"  p.  550;  Hagerup,  "La  Neutralite  Permanente," 
Revue  generale  de  droit  international  public,  1905,  p.  601. 

» Bluntschli,  Droit  international  codifie,  livre  vi..  No.  432. 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  53 

ments,  and  would  be  rendering  themselves  guilty  of 
a  violation  of  the  law.' 

It  was  the  duty,  therefore  of  England,  France, 
and  Russia,  even  without  the  consent  of  Belgium, 
spontaneously  to  defend  their  interests  which  had 
been  injured  by  the  violation  of  the  Convention 
concluded  in  common  with  Germany;  and,  conse- 
quently, England  and  France  at  least  would  have 
sent  their  troops  across  Belgium  to  meet  the  Ger- 
man troops.  In  any  case  then,  war  must  have 
broken  out  on  her  territory. 

But  the  consideration  of  such  a  contingency 
could  only  be  of  a  secondary  character:  in  the 
society  of  States  as  in  that  of  individuals  he  who 
has  any  regard  for  the  esteem  of  others  determines 
his  actions  by  faithfulness  to  the  engagements 
which  he  has  undertaken. 

That  this  path  of  honour  and  probity  is,  rarely 
the  shortest,  but  that  it  is  always  the  surest  and 
becomes  in  time  the  most  profitable,  has  been 
already  admirably  demonstrated  by  Tocqueville 
in  his  study  of  the  relations  between  morality  and 
politics. 

The  German  Press  has  not  failed  to  represent 
that  the  Belgians  made  a  great  mistake  in  resisting 
the  advance  of  the  German  troops. 

'  Bluntschli,  Droit  international  codifie,  livre  vi.,  No.  440. 


54  The  War  of  1914 

See  [they  say]  the  example  of  the  Grand  Duchy 
of  Luxembourg  where  prosperity  and  tranquillity 
have  not  ceased  to  reign/ 

It  is  not,  however,  difficult  to  show  that  at  a 
time  when  the  relations  between  nations  are 
governed  by  factors  of  an  economic  order  a  State 
which  has  lost  the  confidence  of  certain  others 
immediately  experiences  the  very  practical  effects 
of  this  circumstance.  Whether  she  is  attempting 
to  appeal  to  public  credit  and  contract  a  loan, 
whether  she  is  endeavouring  to  carry  on  negotia- 
tions regarding  customs  duties  or  transport  tariffs, 
or  conditions  of  labour  in  the  interest  of  national 
trade ;  whether  she  is  seeking  to  gain  for  her  busi- 
ness men  due  participation  in  the  allotment  of 
contracts  for  work  to  be  done  or  goods  to  be  fur- 
nished, at  every  turn,  her  reputation  like  that  of  a 
bankrupt  in  private  life  will  go  before  her  and  she 
will  bear  the  burden  of  her  disloyalty.  She  will 
have  no  other  recourse  than  to  seek  for  aid  and 
protection  from  the  State  whose  designs  she  has 
furthered,  and  from  that  moment  she  will  have 
subjected  every  most  vital  interest  of  all  her  citi- 
zens to  foreign  interests.  The  penalty  which  they 
will  suffer  may  be  less  tragic  than  that  inflicted  by 

'  German  Communique,  published  on  the  30th  October. 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  55 

the  war  but  it  will  be  none  the  less  severe  and 
irreparable. 

Thus,  from  a  general  point  of  view,  everything 
bade  Belgium  not  to  accede  to  the  demand  of 
Germany, — regard  for  her  honour  no  less  than 
regard  for  the  facts  of  the  situation. 

This  resolute  and  deliberate  attitude  of  resist- 
ance which  it  was  Belgium's  duty  to  adopt  was 
dictated  no  less  by  the  special  points  of  view 
raised  by  the  German  Note. 

The  actual  terms  as  well  as  the  general  purport 
of  this  Note  suggested  a  bargain  to  Belgium. 
Any  one  who  is  prepared  to  examine  it  in  this 
light  will  find  it  instructive. 

The  points  of  the  proposal  are  somewhat 
confused.  The  general  term  of  the  document 
gives  clear  evidence  of  a  certain  enhancement  in  the 
presentation  of  the  ideas.  But  however  that  may 
be,  it  is  not  difficult,  as  we  shall  see,  to  set  out  the 
proposed  bargain,  leaving  on  one  side  circum- 
stances of  secondary  importance. 

In  exchange  for  an  attitude  which  must  not  be 
merely  passive  or  indifferent  but  benevolent, 
friendly  {wohlwollend,  freundschaftlich),  Germany 
engages  to  guarantee  "in  full"  {invollem  Umfang) 
the  integrity  {Besitzstand)  and  the  independence 


56  The  War  of  191 4 

(Unabhdngigkeit)  of  Belgium.  Further  she  will 
indemnify  her  for  any  damage  caused  by  the 
German  troops. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  by  any  means  whatever 
Belgium  places  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  advance 
of  the  German  troops  the  very  existence  of  Bel- 
gium as  a  State  will  be  compromised,  and  Germany, 
henceforth  freed  from  every  engagement,  will 
allow  the  decision  of  arms  to  determine  the 
relations  between  the  two  countries. 

Let  us  consider  the  first  contingency. 

Belgium  gives  way.  The  German  armies  cross 
her  frontiers  without  meeting  with  resistance. 
But  France,  who  is  menaced  by  the  invasion,  will, 
to  meet  an  undoubted  strategic  necessity,  send 
armies  into  Belgium;  while  England,  bound,  as  I 
have  shown  as  a  joint  contractor  to  defend  a 
violated  neutrality,  will  disembark  troops  to 
oppose  the  German  armies.  And  that  will  not  be 
merely  a  passage  of  soldiers  through  a  forbidden 
territory,  it  will  be  the  outbreak  of  war  on  a 
territory  foreign  to  the  belligerents.  Germany 
promises  that  directly  there  is  peace  {beim  Frieden- 
schluss)  she  will  guarantee  the  integrity  and 
independence  of  the  Kingdom.  Will  she  be  able  to 
do  so? 

Even  if  she  is  victorious,  who  can  foresee  the 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  57 

issue  of  the  conflict  of  interests  and  influences 
which  will  determine  the  conditions  of  peace? 
Who  can  guarantee  that  Germany,  whether  she 
has  unlimited  or  limited  power  to  dictate  her 
conditions,  will  resist  covetousness  and  intrigue  at 
a  time  when  Belgium,  abandoned  by  those  whom 
she  will  have  betrayed  in  failing  to  keep  her  con- 
tractual obligations,  will  no  longer  have  at  her 
side  to  defend  her  right  to  existence  any  other  than 
the  nation  to  whose  overtures  she  submitted? 

Again,  what  meaning  will  independence  have 
for  a  country  who  owes  it  to  the  omnipotence  of 
a  single  State?  By  what  restrictions  will  such 
independence  be  limited?  What  economic  vassal- 
age will  it  disguise?  It  will  certainly  be  the  re- 
verse of  that  neutrality  which  is  the  raison  d'etre 
of  Belgium  and  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  only 
compatible  with  the  full  autonomy  of  the  country 
which  it  safeguards. 

And — for  after  all,  when  war  breaks  out, 
nobody  can  foresee  the  issue — what  if  Germany 
should  not  be  victorious?  What  weight  as  against 
the  claims  of  the  conqueror  will  attach  to  the 
independence  of  a  small  country  which,  for  fear 
of  the  horrors  of  war  or  through  interested  calcu- 
lations or  in  deference  to  a  powerful  neighbour, 
became  a  willing  party  to  the  forfeiture  of  that 


58  The  War  of  191 4 

independence?  What  penalty  in  the  form  of 
restrictions  on  her  hberty  will  she  not  have  to 
pay  for  having  consented  to  the  surrender  of  her 
national  conscience? 

Germany  further  promises  that  she  will  in- 
demnify Belgium  for  all  or  any  damage  caused 
by  the  German  troops.  But  from  the  moment 
that  the  war  has,  by  the  act  of  Germany,  been 
carried  into  Belgian  territory,  is  it  to  be  supposed 
that  the  German  troops  alone  will  cause  damage 
there?  It  is  even  possible  that  the  most  serious 
and  most  irreparable  devastations  will  be  caused 
by  other  armies.  Germany  does  not,  of  course, 
enter  into  any  engagement  with  regard  to  these 
damages. 

Such  was  the  bargain. 

Not  for  one  moment  was  there  in  Belgium  any 
hesitation  on  the  part  of  those  who  direct  the 
policy  of  the  country  or  on  the  part  of  the  people, 
and  nobody  imagined  that  it  would  be  possible 
to  adopt  the  attitude  of  the  money  dealers  of  the 
temple.  But  even  looking  at  the  matter  from  a 
basely  mercantile  point  of  view,  it  would  be  dif- 
ficult to  discern  the  advantage  that  Germany  was 
offering  Belgium  with  a  view  to  her_^seduction.  It 
is  manifest  that  the  promises  of  Germany  were 
wholly  out  of  proportion  to  the  perils  to  which  she 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  59 

exposed  Belgium,  so  that  if  the  latter  gave  way, 
she  would  be  accepting,  at  the  same  time,  the 
certainty  of  being  dishonoured  and  the  risk  of 
being  duped. 

The  German  Note  contained  something  else 
besides  the  conditions  of  the  bargain  proposed  to 
Belgium.    It  attempted  a  justification  of  them. 

This  justification  appears  to  be  summed  up  in 
two  words,  "auch  seinerseits,"  with  which  Ger- 
many expresses  her  regret  to  be  obliged  also  to 
violate  the  Belgian  frontier.  It  is  as  though  she 
would  say  that  she  finds  herself  in  the  position 
of  a  guaranteeing  Power  intervening  ex  officio — a 
Power  which,  as  I  have  explained  above,  draws 
the  sword  at  the  moment  that  another  Power 
violates  the  common  engagement. 

But  it  is  precisely  on  this  ground  that  her 
justification  fails. 

What,  in  fact,  does  Germany  allege?  She  could 
adduce  no  evidence  that  the  Belgian  frontier 
would  have  been  crossed  by  French  troops;  on 
the  day  before  the  German  Government  already 
had  knowledge  of  the  declaration  by  which  the 
French  Government  formally  promised  to  respect 
Belgian  territory.  They  had  knowledge  of  this 
declaration  from  two  sources  at  least:  from  the 


6o  The  War  of  1914 

communication  made  to  their  minister  at  Brussels* 
and  from  the  conversation  which  the  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs  at  London  had  had  with 
the  German  Ambassador.^ 

Hence,  not  being  able  to  pretend  that  Belgian 
neutrality  had  been  violated  by  another  Power, 
Germany  contents  herself  with  apprehensions 
that  it  might  be  so  violated: 

French  forces  intend  to  march  on  the  line  of  the 
Meuse  by  Givet  and  Namur ;  .  .  .  this  information 
leaves  no  doubt  as  to  the  intention  of  France  to 
march  through  Belgian  territory  against  Germany. 
.  .  .  The  German  Government  cannot  but  fear  that 
Belgium,  in  spite  of  the  utmost  goodwill,  will  be 
unable  without  assistance  to  repel  so  considerable 
a  French  invasion.^ 

All  these  apprehensions  and  all  these  presumptions 
rest  on  no  controllable  data.  Germany  knew  it  her- 
self. Therefore  from  this  moment  she  was  on  the 
lookout  for  any  circumstances  which  it  would 
be  possible  to  cite  with  a  view  to  her  exculpation. 
Hence,  no  doubt,  the  strange  step  taken  by  the  Ger- 
man Minister  at  Brussels  in  the  middle  of  the  night 
only  a  few  hours  after  the  Very  Confidential  Note 
had  been  handed  in.  I  borrow  the  account  of  it 
from  the  diplomatic  correspondence  of  Belgium.  ^ 

'  Grey  Book,  No.  19.  *  Blue  Booh,  No.  123. 

i  See  p.  39.  *Crey  Book,  No.  21. 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  6i 

At  1.30  A.M.,  the  German  Minister  asked  to  see 
Baron  van  der  Elst.  He  told  him  that  he  had  been 
instructed  by  his  Government  to  inform  the  Belgian 
Government  that  French  dirigibles  had  thrown 
bombs  and  that  a  French  cavalry  patrol  had  crossed 
the  frontier  in  violation  of  international  law,  seeing 
that  war  had  not  been  declared. 

The  Secretary-General  asked  M.  de  Below  where 
these  incidents  had  happened  and  was  told  that  it 
was  in  Germany.  Baron  van  der  Elst  then  observed 
that  in  that  case  he  could  not  understand  the  object 
of  this  communication.  Herr  von  Below  stated 
that  these  acts,  which  were  contrary  to  international 
law,  were  calculated  to  lead  to  the  supposition  that 
other  acts  contrary  to  international  law  would  be 
committed  by  France. 

To  what  does  all  that  amount  except  to  uncer- 
tain assertions  in  support  of  hypotheses,  of  which 
the  object  was  to  justify  certain  presumptions? 

Be  that  as  it  may,  let  us  spare  the  trouble  of 
considering  to  what  extent  the  information  which 
Germany  invokes  was  worthy  of  belief,  or  of 
asking  ourselves  whether  it  did  not  require  under 
such  grave  circumstances  some  further  form  of 
verification.  Let  us  resist  even  the  temptation 
of  comparing  the  German  assertion  with  the  events 
which  took  place  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities 
and  which  have  shown  that,  far  from  operations 
being  carried  on  to  the  south  of  Belgium,  the 
concentration  of  the  French  forces  took  place  in 


62  The  War  of  191 4 

front  of  Alsace- Lorraine.  Let  us  examine  only  the 
assertion  that  France  was  preparing  to  violate 
Belgian  territory. 

Not  only  does  Germany  assert  this,  but  she 
adds  that  Belgium,  if  abandoned  to  herself  "ohne 
Hillje,'"  will  without  doubt  be  powerless  to  prevent 
a  movement  carried  out  in  the  execution  of  so  vast 
a  plan  from  becoming  a  menace  to  Germany.  One 
would  therefore  suppose  that  Germany  was  about 
to  give  a  friendly  warning  to  Belgium  of  the 
danger.  She  would  ask  if  Belgium  were  prepared 
to  offer  resistance  to  the  passage  of  the  French 
armies  and  make  it  known  that,  if  the  contingency 
feared  were  really  to  come  about,  she  would  assist 
Belgium  to  repel  the  aggressor.  By  so  doing,  not 
only  would  Germany  defend  her  immediate  in- 
terests, but  she  would  be  carrying  out  the  obliga- 
tions by  which  Prussia  is  bound  in  consequence  of 
the  Treaties  of  1839,  and  she  would  safeguard  the 
rights  of  her  co-contractors. 

That  would  be  in  conformity  on  every  point 
with  international  law  and  with  the  procedure 
imposed  by  that  law  in  case  of  the  violation  of  a 
neutrality  convention. 

This  was  the  correct  step,  and  every  considera- 
tion demanded  that  it  should  be  taken ;  self-respect, 
faithfulness   to   obligations,   and,   above   all,  the 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  63 

friendly  ties  which  bind  the  two  neighbouring 
States,  to  which  the  Note  itself  cannot  help 
alluding  {die  freundschaftlichen  Bdnde,  die  beide 
Nachharstaaten  verbinden).  This  step  Germany 
did  not  take. 

She  declares — while  giving  to  her  communica- 
tion a  "very  confidential"  character,  which  would 
singulariy  facilitate  a  discreet  complicity — that 
she  intends  to  "prevent "  the  advance  of  the  French 
armies  and  that  she  will  cross  Belgian  territory 
for  the  purpose  of  meeting  them,  not  in  virtue  of 
the  rights  which  she  might  have  acquired  by  the 
Treaties  of  1839 — she  does  not  mention  a  word 
about  these  Treaties — but  solely  with  a  view  to 
assuring  her  own  safety  which  she  considers  to  be 
menaced. 

What  a  strange  conclusion  to  this  preamble  of 
justification!  How  much  more  simple  and  more 
frank  it  would  have  been  to  say  to  Belgium:  "We 
are  going  to  cross  your  territory  because  it  suits 
us  so  to  do;  neither  honour  nor  right  can  stop 
us." 

Moreover  that  is  exactly  what  two  days  after- 
wards, on  Tuesday,  August  4th,  the  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  the  German  Empire, 
Herr  von  Jagow,  declared  to  the  Belgian  Minister 
at  Berlin,  Baron  Beyens,  at  the  very  beginning  of 


64  The  War  of  1914 

the  conversation  in  which  things  were  said  which 
dominate  the  whole  course  of  subsequent  events. 
Baron  Beyens  has  been  good  enough  to  give  me  an 
account  of  this  conversation,  the  animated  tone 
of  which  I  will  endeavour  to  reproduce. 

Early  on  Tuesday  morning,  the  4th  of  August, 
the  Belgian  Minister  had  requested  by  telephone 
that  he  might  be  received  by  the  Secretary  of 
State.    The  audience  was  immediately  granted. 

The  Belgian  Minister  had  only  uttered  a  few 
words  before  Herr  von  Jagow  exclaimed : 

"Believe  me  that  it  is  with  acute  grief  that 
Germany  decides  to  violate  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium,  and  personally  I  feel  the  most  profound 
regret  on  that  account.  But  there  is  no  help  for  it. 
It  is  a  question  of  the  life  or  death  of  the  Empire. 
If  the  German  armies  do  not  wish  to  be  caught 
between  the  hammer  and  the  anvil  they  must 
strike  a  severe  blow  in  the  direction  of  France,  in 
order  that  they  may  afterwards  turn  their  arms 
against  Russia." 

"But,"  said  Baron  Beyens,  "the  French  fron- 
tiers are  sufficiently  extended  to  enable  one  to 
avoid  passing  through  Belgium." 

"They  are  too  strongly  fortified.  Moreover, 
what  is  it  we  are  asking  of  you?  Simply  to  allow 
us  a  free  passage  without  destroying  your  railways 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  65 

or  your  tunnels  and  to  allow  us  to  occupy  the 
fortified  places  of  which  we  have  need." 

"There  is,"  replied  the  Belgian  Minister  at  once, 
"a  very  easy  way  of  formulating  the  only  reply 
of  which  such  a  question  admits,  and  that  is  to 
imagine  that  France  had  addressed  to  us  the  same 
invitation  and  that  we  had  accepted  it.  Would  not 
Germany  have  said  that  we  had  betrayed  her  in 
a  cowardly  manner?" 

As  the  Secretary  of  State  gave  no  reply  to  this 
very  direct  question.  Baron  Bey  ens  continued. 
"At  least,"  he  asked,  "have  you  anything  with 
which  to  reproach  us?  Have  we  not  always,  for 
three-quarters  of  a  century,  fulfilled,  with  regard 
to  Germany  as  with  regard  to  all  the  Great 
Guaranteeing  Powers,  all  the  duties  of  our  neu- 
trality? Have  we  not  given  Germany  tokens  of 
loyal  friendship?  How  does  Germany  propose  to 
pay  us  for  that?  By  making  Belgium  a  European 
battle-field.  And  we  know  what  devastations  and 
calamities  modern  war  brings  in  its  train.    .   .   ." 

"Germany  has  nothing  with  which  to  reproach 
Belgium,  and  the  attitude  of  Belgium  has  always 
been  perfectly  correct." 

"You  must    recognize    then,"    replied    Baron 

Beyens,  "that  Belgium  cannot  give  you  any  other 

reply   than    that  which  she  has  now  given  you 
5 


66  The  War  of  191 4 

without  losing  her  honour.  It  is  with  nations  as 
with  individuals:  there  are  not  different  codes 
of  honour  for  peoples  and  for  private  persons. 
You  must  recognize,"  insisted  Baron  Beyens, 
"that  the  reply  was  bound  to  be  what  it  is." 

"As  a  private  person  I  do  recognize  it,  but 
as  Secretary  of  State  I  have  no  opinion  to 
express." 

There  was  no  more  to  be  said  on  either  side. 
However,  the  Belgian  Minister  added  that  in  his 
opinion  Germany  was  deceiving  herself.  She 
was  provoking  a  war  with  England,  and  further, 
the  German  troops  would  not  pass  by  Lidge  as 
easily  perhaps  as  she  imagined.  When  the  Minis- 
ter intimated  that  he  would  no  doubt  ask  for  his 
passports,  Herr  von  Jagow  protested,  saying: 
"Do  not  go  yet.  Perhaps  we  shall  still  have 
reason  to  talk."  "What  is  going  to  happen,'* 
said  Baron  Beyens  finally,  "  depends  on  neither  of 
us.  Henceforth  the  decision  rests  with  the  Bel- 
gian Government. " 

Every  word  uttered  during  this  important 
exchange  of  ideas  is  of  equal  weight.  I  desire, 
however,  to  dwell  for  a  moment  on  the  explanation 
given  as  to  the  passage  of  German  armies  through 
Belgium.  It  happened  that  the  Secretary  of 
State   had   an  opportunity  of  repeating  this  ex- 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  67 

planation  in  the  conversation  which  he  had  the 
same  day  with  the  British  Ambassador. 

If  Germany  [he  then  said]  is  obliged  to  take  this 
step,  it  is  because  she  had  to  advance  into  France 
by  the  quickest  and  easiest  way  so  as  to  be  able  to 
get  well  ahead  with  the  operations  and  endeavour  to 
strike  some  decisive  blow  as  early  as  possible.  It 
was  a  matter  of  life  and  death  for  them,  as  if  they 
had  gone  by  the  more  sudden  route  they  could  not 
have  hoped,  in  view  of  the  paucity  of  roads  and  the 
strength  of  the  fortresses,  to  have  got  through  with- 
out formidable  opposition  entailing  great  loss  of 
time.  This  loss  of  time  would  have  meant  time 
gained  by  the  Russians  for  bringing  up  their  troops 
to  the  German  frontier.  Rapidity  of  action  was  the 
great  German  asset,  while  that  of  Russia  was  an 
inexhaustible  supply  of  troops.^ 

In  the  course  of  a  second  interview  with  the 
same  Ambassador  a  few  hours  later,  the  Secretary 
of  State  thus  summarized  his  arguments: 

The  safety  of  the  Empire  rendered  it  absolutely 
necessary  that  the  Imperial  troops  should  advance 
through  Belgimn.* 

The  Chancellor  himself  was  still  more  categor- 
ical again  the  same  day  at  the  sitting  of  the 
Reichstag : 

Our  troops  have  occupied  Luxembourg  and  have 
»  Blue  Book,  No.  i6o.  » Ibid. 


68  The  War  of  191 4 

perhaps  already  entered  Belgian  territory.  That  is 
a  breach  of  International  Law.  .  .  .  Thus  we  were 
forced  to  ignore  the  rightful  protests  of  the  Govern- 
ments of  Luxembourg  and  Belgium.  The  wrong — 
I  speak  openly — the  wrong  we  thereby  commit 
we  will  try  to  make  good  as  soon  as  our  military 
aims  have  been  attained. 

He  who  is  menaced  as  we  are  and  is  fighting  for  his 
highest  possession,  can  only  consider  how  he  is  to 
hack  his  way  through.  ,  .  .  We  are  in  a  state  of 
necessity  and  necessity  knows  no  law.  Not  kennt 
kein  Gebot! 

The  Chancellor  thought  that  he  could  thus 
justify  injustice  by  invoking  the  excuse  of  neces- 
sity; that  is  to  say,  force  majeure  or  legitimate 
defence.  Let  us  examine  for  a  moment  this 
method  of  reasoning. 

With  regard  to  the  saying  "Not  kennt  kein 
GebotT'  one  might  point  out  how  unreal  was  the 
peril  with  which  Germany  pretended  that  she  was 
menaced.  One  might  also  indulge  in  subtle  judicial 
controversies  and  formulate  rash  analogies  be- 
tween private  and  public  law.'  But  it  is  on  an 
altogether  different  groimd  that  the  discussion 
must  take  place. 

It  is  not  in  fact  a  case  of  deciding  whether  in 
extreme  circumstances  a  State  may  be  excused 

»  See,  for  example,  the  articles  of  the  Kolnische  Zeitung,  Nos. 
995  and  1019,  where  are  to  be  found  references  to  Von  Liszt, 
Rivier,  and  Von  Ullmann. 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  69 

for  violating  an  engagement;  the  duty  of  self- 
preservation  may,  if  we  may  believe  Rivier,  for 
example,  override  every  other  duty.'  Nor  is  it 
a  question  of  determining  whether  every  engage- 
ment entered  into  by  a  State  must  always  be  ob- 
served by  that  State,  even  if  the  circumstances 
which  exist  at  the  time  of  that  engagement  should 
be  suddenly  and  completely  changed ;  that  would 
be,  according  to  Gladstone,  who  in  1870  adopted 
the  view  of  Lord  Aberdeen  and  of  Lord  Palmerston, 
"a  rigid  and  impracticable  view  of  the  guar- 
antee." 

No!  the  question  here  can  be  put  in  terms 
infinitely  more  simple.  In  1839,  Prussia,  whose 
obligations  Germany  accepted,  contracted  never 
to  violate  Belgian  territory.  This  obligation  is 
precise  and  definite.  It  means  that  Germany 
promised  never  to  be  induced  by  a  strategic 
necessity  to  pass  through  Belgium. 

The  obligation  means  this — or  it  means  nothing 
at  all.  One  cannot  imagine,  for  example,  that  it 
could  be  formulated  in  the  following  manner: 
"Germany  engages  never  to  enter  Belgium  with 
her  armies  except  when  she  considers  it  necessary ! " 
It  is  self-evident  that  the  object  of  the  neutraliza- 
tion treaty  is  precisely  to  forbid  each  one  of  the 

*  Principes  du  droit  des  gens,  ii.,  p.  103. 


70  The  War  of  191 4 

contracting  parties  to  make  use  of  the  neutral- 
ized territory  for  strategical  purposes  in  any  cir- 
cumstances whatever;  that  is  to  say,  that  each  of 
the  contracting  parties  must  organize  its  own 
defence  without  in  any  way  making  use  of  that 
territory.  To  permit  one  of  them  to  invoke  the 
necessity  of  violating  a  territory  the  inviolability 
of  which  he  has  guaranteed,  would  be  literally  to 
stultify  the  treaty.  Such  was  exactly  the  opinion 
expressed  by  Talleyrand  concerning  the  neutraliza- 
tion of  Switzerland.  ' '  Through  this  resolution  [he 
wrote  in  his  Memoirs,  edited  by  de  Broglie,  second 
volume],  the  means  of  defence  for  France,  Ger- 
many, and  Italy  have  been  increased  and  the 
means  of  attack  reduced.  .  .  .  The  neutrality  of 
Switzerland  gives  to  France  an  impregnable  bul- 
wark along  the  only  border  where  she  is  weak  and 
unfortified." 

Perhaps  Germany  was  wrong  in  1839  to  guaran- 
tee Belgian  neutrality.  Perhaps  she  would  have 
done  better  to  consider  at  that  time,  as  Bemhardi 
did  in  191 1,  that  the  conception  of  a  permanent 
neutrality  is  political  heresy.  Perhaps,  even,  she 
might  have  been  able  to  realize  her  error  between 
1839  and  1914  and  to  convoke  a  new  diplomatic 
conference  with  a  view  to  deneutralizing  Belgium. 
But  the  fact  remains  that  in  1839  she  signed  a 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  71 

treaty  of  neutralization,  that  in  1870  she  referred 
to  it  with  emphasis  in  order  to  attest  her  desire 
to  respect  the  Belgian  frontier,  and,  finally, 
that  in  1907  she  signed  the  first  article  to  The 
Hague  Convention  which  lays  it  down  that  the 
territory  of  neutral  Powers  is  inviolable.  She 
could  not  but  have  thought  of  those  neutral  States 
par  excellence,  Belgium,  Switzerland,  and  the 
Grand  Duchy  of  Luxembourg,  the  inviolability  of 
which  she  had  been  herself  safeguarding  for  so 
many  years. 

Consequently,  in  19 14,  the  engagement  into 
which  Germany  entered  remained  intact,  solemn 
and  categorical,  and  it  is  merely  a  political  sophism 
to  pretend  to  assert  that  she  was  forced  to  break 
this  engagement  under  the  constramt  of  necessity. 
The  Chancellor  was  more  happily  inspired  when, 
carried  away  in  the  midst  of  a  diatribe  against 
England,  he  exclaimed  to  the  British  Ambassador 
at  Berlin:' 

Just  for  a  word  "  neutrality,  "—a  word  which  in 
war  time  had  so  often  been  disregarded — just  for  a 
scrap  of  paper.  .  .  . 

Undoubtedly,  however,  the  Chancellor  had  not 
in  his  mind,  on  that  day,  certain  words  which  his 

'  Bltie  Book,  No.  i6o. 


72  The  War  of  191 4 

illustrious  predecessor  Bismarck  pronounced  in 
the  Reichstag  on  May  2,  1871,  after  the  creation 
of  the  German  Empire: 

There  could  be  no  question  for  us  [Bismarck  then 
explained]  of  forming  Alsace  and  Lorraine  into  a 
neutral  country  like  Belgium  and  Switzerland,  for 
that  would  have  erected  a  barrier  which  would  have 
made  it  impossible  for  us  to  attack  France.  We  are 
accustomed  to  respect  treaties  and  neutralities. 

In  19 14,  on  the  contrary,  the  Reichstag  heard 
the  Chancellor  explain,  that  Germany,  determined 
to  conquer  both  France  and  Russia,  had  simply 
adopted  the  plan  which  appeared  to  her  to  offer 
most  chances  of  success  or,  briefly  stated,  that  she 
was  violating  right  for  strategical  expediency. 

Nay  more,  this  violation  was  premeditated. 

It  was  not  in  a  moment  of  anguish  that,  un- 
expectedly menaced  in  her  national  existence,  the 
German  Empire  had  recourse  to  a  desperate 
resolve  and  exposed  Belgium,  a  loyal  friend,  to 
all  the  consequences  of  her  crime.  For  no  person 
of  good  sense  will  believe  that  the  sudden  and 
formidable  invasion  which  spread  over  Belgian 
territory  with  a  method  and  rapidity  which  have 
won  the  admiration  of  military  critics  of  all  coiin- 
tries,  was  unprepared.  To  assume  that  would  be 
an  insult  to  Germany's  power  of  organization  which 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  73 

she  would  rightly  resent  with  indignation.  The 
invasion  of  Belgium  was  so  much  one  of  the  ele- 
ments of  the  plan  of  campaign  in  case  of  war  that 
on  July  31st,  in  a  conversation  with  the  British 
Ambassador,  the  German  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs  declared  that  it  was  not  possible 
to  speak  of  what  would  be  the  attitude  of  Ger- 
many with  regard  to  Belgian  neutrality,  for  that 
would  be  revealing  her  strategical  plans.  ^  Obvi- 
ously, it  was  necessary  to  keep  the  plan  secret  in 
order  to  ensure  its  success. 

This  being  so,  how  valueless  appear,  then,  the 
official  assurances  given  at  various  times  ^  by  the 
representatives  of  Germany,  with  a  view  to 
attesting  her  unaltered  intention  to  respect,  in 
conforming  with  her  engagements,  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium! 

Was  Belgium  wrong  in  placing  confidence  in 
such  assertions?  Were  they  not,  on  the  con- 
trary, in  perfect  accord  with  the  general  state 
of  the  relations  between  the  two  countries  and 
with  the  whole  ensemble  of  facts  which  we  have 
attempted  frankly  to  outline  in  the  first  pages  of 
this  narrative? 

What  then  are  we  to  conclude? 

Are  we  to  think  that  the  conduct  of  Germany's 

*  Blue  Book,  No.  122.  ^See  pp.  17-19. 


74  The  War  of  191 4 

foreign  affairs  was  without  unity  or  consistency, 
that  her  diplomacy  was  sincere  but  was  thwarted 
by  influences  which  rendered  its  power  and  au- 
thority unstable?  Was  the  premeditation  rather 
of  a  military  than  a  political  character,  and  does 
the  feeling  of  uneasiness — I  had  almost  said  of 
awkwardness — which  the  "Very  Confidential 
Note"  leaves,  betray  a  conflict  of  tendencies  at 
the  end  of  which  correctitude,  honesty  of  inten- 
tion, and  regard  for  right  gave  way  to  unscrupu- 
lousness  and  to  a  total  misapprehension  of  the 
moral  principles  of  life? 

Or  must  we  really  believe  that  the  extremely 
reassuring  declarations  made  by  Germany  had 
no  other  object  than  to  lull  public  opinion  in 
Belgium  into  a  sense  of  security  while  German 
influences  were  being  systematically  made  to 
infiltrate  into  the  sphere  of  national  activity 
with  the  object  of  preparing  militant  sym- 
pathies, or  passive  indifference,  against  the  day 
when  the  powerful  Empire  would  solicit  the 
good- will  of  the  little  kingdom?  Did  Germany 
really  return  in  cold  hypocrisy  all  that  Belgium 
had  given  her  out  of  her  candid  and  honest 
loyalty? 

The  German  Note  was  handed  in  on  Sunday, 
August  2d,  at  7  P.M.     At  9  o'clock  a  Council  of 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  75 

Ministers,  attended  by  the  Ministers  of  State,  was 
held  under  the  presidency  of  the  King.  During 
the  night  the  following  reply  was  drawn  up  and 
handed  the  following  morning,  Monday,  August 
3d,  to  the  German  Legation  at  Brussels. ' 

The  German  Government  stated  in  their  note  of 
August  2,  1 914,  that  according  to  reliable  informa- 
tion French  forces  intended  to  march  on  the  Meuse 
via  Givet  and  Namur  and  that  Belgium,  in  spite 
of  the  best  intentions,  would  not  be  in  a  position  to 
repulse  without  assistance  an  advance  of  French 
troops. 

The  German  Government  therefore  considered 
themselves  compelled  to  anticipate  this  attack  and 
to  violate  Belgian  territory.  In  these  circumstances 
Germany  proposed  to  the  Belgian  Government  to 
adopt  a  friendly  attitude  towards  her  and  under- 
took on  the  conclusion  of  peace  to  guarantee  the 
integrity  of  the  kingdom  and  its  possessions  to 
their  full  extent.  The  Note  added  that  if  Belgium 
put  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the  advance  of  the 
German  troops,  Germany  would  be  compelled  to 
consider  her  as  an  enemy  and  to  leave  the  ultimate 
adjustment  of  the  relations  between  the  two  States 
to  the  decision  of  arms. 

This  Note  has  made  a  deep  and  faithful  impres- 
sion upon  the  Belgian  Government.  The  inten- 
tions attributed  to  France  by  Germany  are  in 
contradiction  to  the  formal  declaration  made  on 
August  I  st  in  the  name  of  the  French  Government. 

'  Grey  Book,  No.  22. 


76  The  War  of  1914 

Moreover,  if  contrary  to  her  expectations  Belgian 
neutrality  should  be  violated  by  France,  Belgium 
intends  to  fulfil  her  international  obligations  and 
the  Belgian  Army  would  offer  the  most  vigorous 
resistance  to  the  invader. 

The  Treaties  of  1839,  confirmed  by  the  Treaties 
of  1870,  vouch  for  the  independence  and  neutrality 
of  Belgium  under  the  guarantee  of  the  Powers  and 
notably  of  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia. 

Belgium  has  always  been  faithfvil  to  her  inter- 
national obligations.  She  has  carried  out  her  duties 
in  a  spirit  of  impartiality  and  she  has  left  nothing 
undone  to  maintain  and  enforce  respect  for  her 
neutrality. 

The  attack  upon  her  independence  with  which 
the  German  Government  threatened  her,  consti- 
tutes a  flagrant  violation  of  international  law. 
No  strategic  interest  justifies  such  a  violation  of 
law. 

The  Belgian  Government,  if  they  were  to  accept 
the  proposals  submitted  to  them,  would  sacrifice 
the  honour  of  the  nation  and  betray  their  duty 
towards  Europe. 

Conscious  of  the  part  which  Belgium  has  played 
for  more  than  eighty  years  in  the  civilization  of 
the  world,  they  refuse  to  believe  that  the  independ- 
ence of  Belgium  can  be  preser\'ed  only  at  the  price 
of  the  violation  of  her  neutrality.  If  this  hope  is 
disappointed,  the  Belgian  Government  are  firmly 
resolved  to  repel  by  all  the  means  in  their  power 
every  attack  upon  their  rights. 

At  the  same  time  on  Monday,  August  3d,  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Aifairs  informed  the  repre- 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  T] 

sentatives  of  Belgium  abroad  by  telegraph  of  the 
demand  made  by  Germany  and  of  the  reply  which 
had  been  given  to  it. 

The  French  Minister  in  Brussels,  when  in- 
formed of  these  events,  went  immediately  to 
make  the  following  declaration  to  the  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs ' : 

Although  I  have  received  no  instructions  to  make 
a  declaration  from  my  Government  I  feel  justified, 
in  view  of  their  well-known  intentions,  in  saying 
that  if  the  Belgian  Government  were  to  appeal  to 
the  French  Government  as  one  of  the  Powers 
guaranteeing  their  neutrality,  the  French  Govern- 
ment would  at  once  respond  to  Belgium's  appeal. 
If  such  an  appeal  were  not  made,  it  is  probable  that, 
unless  of  course  exceptional  measures  were  rendered 
necessary  in  self-defence,  the  French  Government 
would  not  intervene  until  Belgium  had  taken  some 
effective  measure  of  response. 

The  Belgian  Minister  thanked  him  but  declined 

the  support  that  France  had  been  good  enough  to 
offer  in  case  of  need  and  told  him  that  the  Govern- 
ment were  making  no  appeal  at  present  to  the 
guarantee  of  the  Powers,  and  that  they  would 
decide  later  what  ought  to  be  done.'' 

What  does  this  mean?     It  is  sufficient  to  re- 
fer  to  the   explanations  which   have  been  given 

'  Grey  Book,  No.  24.  » Ibid. 


78  The  War  of  191 4 

above  with  regard  to  the  notion  of  Permanent 
Neutrahty  in  order  to  show  the  true  significance  of 
this  step  and  the  reply  which  it  provoked.  France 
acts  in  conformity  with  the  obligation  in  which 
she  finds  herself  to  intervene  in  order  to  safeguard 
her  own  rights  and  those  of  Belgium,  violated  by 
the  German  invasion.  If  Belgium  demands  it, 
France  will  intervene  at  once;  if  not,  France  will 
wait  until  Belgium  has  actually  offered  resistance 
to  the  passage  of  German  troops.  Belgium 
chooses  without  hesitation  the  second  alternative. 
She  does  not  accept  France's  offer.  She  is  confi- 
dent of  the  justice  of  her  cause;  she  intends  to 
keep  her  hands  free  and  will  see  later  on  what 
circumstances  dictate  to  her. 

The  circumstances  now  rapidly  took  a  critical 
turn.  During  the  night  information  reached 
Brussels  that  left  no  doubt  concerning  Germany's 
intentions,  and  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning, 
August  4th,  the  Government  received  the  follow- 
ing letter  from  the  German  Minister  at  Brussels ' : 

In  accordance  with  my  instructions  I  have  the 
honour  to  inform  Your  Excellency  that  in  conse- 
quence of  the  refusal  of  the  Belgian  Government 
to  entertain  the  well-intentioned  proposals  made  to 
them  by  the  German  Government,  the  latter,  to 

*  Grey  Book,  No.  27. 


To  Be  or  Not  To  Be  79 

their  deep  regret,  find  themselves  compelled  to  take, 
ij  necessary  by  force  of  arms,  those  measures  of  defence 
already  foreshadowed  as  indispensable  in  view  of 
the  menace  of  France. 

A  few  moments  later  the  Belgian  Staff  announced 
that  territory  had  been  violated  at  Gemmenich.* 
The  die  was  cast.  Germany  intended  to  cross 
Belgium  by  brute  force. 

A  Council  of  Ministers  was  immediately  held 
to  consider  whether  it  was  opportime  to  appeal  to 
the  intervention  of  the  Guaranteeing  Powers  or 
at  least  the  three  Powers,  England,  France,  and 
Russia,  whose  co-operation  it  was  permissible  to 
hope  for.  With  absolute  disinterestedness,  and 
without  desiring  to  take  any  security  for  the 
future,  a  simple  decision  in  the  affirmative  was 
taken  and  the  appeal  drawn  up  in  these  terms 
was  sent  in  the  evening  of  August  4th  ^: 

The  Belgian  Government  regret  to  have  to  an- 
nounce to  Your  Excellency  that  this  morning  the 
Armed  Forces  of  Germany  entered  Belgian  territory 
in  violation  of  treaty  engagements. 

The  Belgian  Government  are  firmly  determined  to 
resist  by  all  the  means  in  their  power. 

Belgium  appeals  to  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
Russia  to  co-operate,  as  Guaranteeing  Powers,  in 
the  defence  of  her  territory. 

»  Grey  Book,  No.  30.  '  Ihid.,  No.  40. 


8o  The  War  of  191 4 

There  should  be  concerted  and  joint  action  to 
oppose  the  forcible  measures  taken  by  Germany 
against  Belgium  and  at  the  same  time  to  guarantee 
the  future  maintenance  of  the  independence  and 
integrity  of  Belgium.  Belgium  is  happy  to  be  able 
to  declare  that  she  would  undertake  the  defence  of 
her  fortified  places. 

From  this  moment  it  is  on  another  scene  of 
action  that  we  must  follow  the  vicissitudes  of  the 
events  which  have  so  unexpectedly  come  to  pass. 


Ill 

Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe 


81 


Ill 

BELGIAN    NEUTRALITY   BEFORE    EUROPE 

We  have  seen  how  the  permanent  neutrality  of 
Belgium  had  been  created  in  1839  by  five  Powers. 
This  expedient  had  been  thought  out  by  Talleyrand 
as  early  as  January,  1831,  and  had  been  strongly 
supported  by  Lord  Palmerston  in  order  to  avoid 
the  difficulties  which  the  Belgian  revolution  had 
raised  for  the  Powers,  divided  as  they  were  by 
jealous  rivalry/  The  agreement  was  made  pre- 
cisely because  the  arrangement  which  neutrahzed 
Belgian  territory  neutralized  at  the  same  time 
the  influences  from  which  each  of  the  Powers 
sought  to  shield  the  new  State.  The  terms  in 
which  the  neutrality  was  defined  show  clearly  the 
scope  of  the  convention.  The  Powers  represented 
the  declaration  of  neutrality  as 

a  solemn  manifestation,  a  clear  proof  of  the  firm 
determination  which  they  had  not  to  seek  either 
in  the  arrangements  with  regard  to  Belgium  or  in 

•  Memoirs,  edited  by  de  Broglie,  vol.  iv. 
83 


84  The  War  of  191 4 

any  circumstances  which  might  arise  in  the  future, 
any  increase  of  territory,  any  exclusive  influence,  any 
separate  advantage,  and  of  giving  to  this  nation, 
as  well  as  to  all  the  States  surrounding  it,  the  best 
guarantees  for  peace  and  security. 

I  would  emphasize  one  passage  in  this  declaration. 
The  signatory  Powers  engage  themselves  solemnly 
never  to  seek  with  regard  to  Belgium  any  exclusive 
influence  or  separate  advantage.  This  can  only 
mean  that  each  of  the  five  guaranteeing  Powers  pre- 
cluded itself  from  exercising  on  Belgium  any  kind  of 
action  calculated  to  attach  in  any  way  the  destiny 
of  Belgium  to  its  own.  Any  attempt,  direct  or 
indirect,  to  render  her  dependent  must  therefore 
put  the  other  Powers  on  their  guard  and  provoke 
their  suspicions.  The  equilibrium  of  influences 
established  in  1839  is  an  equilibrium  of  interests. 
On  the  surface  it  has  as  a  safeguard  the  fidelity  of 
each  of  the  Powers  to  its  solemn  engagements  and 
the  feeling  of  national  honour  possessed  by  the 
Governments  of  each ;  but  the  real  strength  of  the 
arrangement  lies  none  the  less  in  the  interest  of 
each  Power  that  it  should  endure. 

The  war  which  broke  out  in  1870  between 
France  and  Germany  furnished  a  perfect  example 
of  the  delicacy  of  the  equilibrium  obtained  by  the 
neutralization    of    Belgium.     The    revelation    by 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe  85 

Bismarck  on  July  25,  1870,  of  the  plan  against 
Belgium  which  Napoleon  III.  had  proposed  to 
him  in  1866  caused  a  deep  sensation  in  Great 
Britain.  The  British  Government  feared  that 
a  French  victory  would  arouse  the  covetousness 
of  the  Emperor,  and,  in  order  to  prevent  any 
surprise,  they  inquired  of  the  two  belligerents 
whether  they  were  prepared  to  respect  Belgian 
neutrality.  Each  party  entered  into  a  separate 
obligation,  and  these  were  embodied  in  the  treaties 
of  August  9  and  11,  1870,  which  simply  reproduced 
the  fundamental  undertakings  of  1839. 

I  cannot  refrain  from  quoting  here  the  striking 
remark  that  Bismarck  made  on  this  occasion  to 
the  Belgian  Minister,  Baron  Nothomb.  In  a 
private  letter  he  gave  him  a  fresh  assurance  that 
Prussia  would  not  violate  the  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium and  he  added:  "I  am  astonished  that  a 
man  of  your  shrewdness  should  think  that  Bis- 
marck would  be  so  simple  as  to  throw  Belgium 
into  the  arms  of  France."  In  another  letter  he 
formulated  an  official  declaration,  which,  he 
added,  was  superfluous  in  view  of  the  existing 
treaties. 

This  intervention  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain 
was  natural.  Great  Britain  was  a  neighbour  of 
Belgium  and  her  special  interest  in  the  neutrality 


86  The  War  of  19 14 

of  the  coast  and  of  the  maritime  port  of  Antwerp 
was  obvious.  She  was  driven  to  take  this  atti- 
tude by  "due  regard  to  the  country's  honour  and 
to  the  country's  interest,"  to  quote  the  words  of 
Lord  Granville  on  August  8,  1870,  in  the  House 
of  Lords.  Gladstone  laid  special  stress  on  the 
latter.  "There  is  also,"  he  explained  in  the  House 
of  Commons,  "this  further  consideration  the 
force  of  which  we  must  all  feel  most  deeply,  and 
that  is,  the  common  interests  against  the  unmeas- 
ured aggrandizement  of  any  Power  whatever." 

In  19 1 4  the  situation  was  in  no  way  different 
from  that  of  1870  and  so  England  was  perfectly 
justified  in  renewing  the  inquiry  made  to  Germany 
and  France  in  1870  in  identical  circumstances. 

It  was  on  July  31st  that  this  step  was  taken — 
the  same  day  in  which,  as  we  have  already  seen 
(page  29),  the  British  Minister  brought  it  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  Belgian  Government. 

The  telegram  sent  by  Sir  Edward  Grey,  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs  in  Great  Britain,  to  the 
Ambassadors  at  Berlin  and  at  Paris  runs  thus': 

I  still  trust  that  situation  is  not  irretrievable, 
but  in  view  of  prospect  of  mobilization  in  Germany 
it  becomes  essential  to  His  Majesty's  Government, 
in  view  of  existing  treaties,  to  ask  whether  French 

^  Blue  Book,  No.  114. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe  87 

(German)  Government  are  prepared  to  engage  to 
respect  neutrality  of  Belgium  so  long  as  no  other 
Power  violates  it. 

A  similar  request  is  being  addressed  to  German 
(French)  Government.  It  is  important  to  have  an 
early  answer. 

In  order  to  appreciate  in  all  its  bearings  the 
significance  of  this  double  request,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  visualize  the  positions  occupied  at  this 
moment  by  the  pieces  on  the  European  chess- 
board. I  will,  therefore,  try,  by  extracts  from 
the  diplomatic  "books"  published  by  the  several 
Governments,  to  trace  roughly  the  course  of 
events,  and  will  attempt  to  bring  out  from  this 
dense  tangle  of  letters  and  telegrams  the  points 
which  especially  concern  Belgium. 

The  "not  irretrievable  situation"  of  which 
Sir  Edward  Grey  speaks,  is  that  resulting  from 
the  diplomatic  struggle  caused  in  Europe  by  the 
Ultimatum  addressed  by  Austria-Hungary  to 
Servia  as  a  result  of  the  assassination  of  the 
Hereditary  Archduke.  "The  bolt  once  fired," 
to  use  an  expression  of  the  German  Ambassador 
in  one  of  his  interviews  at  the  Foreign  Office  at 
Paris, '  "Germany  was  perfectly  aware  that  a 
warlike  attitude  of  Austria-Hungary  against  Ser- 

'  Orange  Book,  No.  19. 


88  The  War  of  191 4 

via  might  bring  Russia  upon  the  field,  and  in 
this  way  involve  Germany  in  a  war  in  accordance 
with  her  duty  as  ally."'  To  prevent  "the  posi- 
tion of  the  Teutonic  race  from  becoming  un- 
tenable in  Central  Europe,  Germany  permitted 
Austria  a  completely  free  hand."^  Thencefor- 
ward she  was  inclined  to  consider  that  the  ques- 
tion was  of  interest  only  to  Austria  and  Servia, 
but  that  by  her  aggressive  intervention  Russia 
had  changed  the  venue  of  the  dispute;  action  for 
the  purpose  of  avoiding  a  war  ought  therefore  to 
be  taken  at  St.  Petersburg.^ 

Opposed  to  this  argument  was  that  put  forward 
by  Russia,  who  declared  that  she  could  not  re- 
main indifferent  to  a  conflict  which  threatened 
to  destroy  the  sovereignty  of  Servia.''  Since  the 
threat  came  from  Austria  it  was  at  Vienna  that 
action  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  a  war  should 
be  taken.     France  supported  Russia. 

In  face  of  such  a  divergence  of  views,  no  media- 
tion had  any  chance  of  success.  It  was  not  so 
much  a  question  as  to  the  possibility  or  the  ex- 
tent of  any  action  in  the  direction  of  mediation,  it 
was  a  question  as  to  the  place  where  the  action 
should  be  taken. 

^  White  Book,  English  edition,  p.  2.  '  Ibid. 

3  Orange  Book,  pp.  40  to  53.  ■*  Cf.  Blue  Book,  No.  17. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe  89 

Now,  it  was  England  who  was  taking  action 
in  the  direction  of  mediation. 

She  had  resisted  the  various  requests  which 
urged  her  to  take  her  place  on  the  side  of  Russia 
either  directly,  or  indirectly  by  joining  France. 
"If  England  took  her  stand  firmly  with  France 
and  Russia  there  would  be  no  war,"  the  British 
Ambassador  in  Russia  had  telegraphed  to  Sir  Ed- 
ward Grey  on  July  25th. '  Sir  Edward  Grey  had 
in  his  answer  shown  marked  regard  for  public  opin- 
ion which  in  England  always  has  such  weight  in 
diplomatic  decisions.  "I  cannot  promise  any- 
thing of  the  sort, "  he  said,  "and  I  do  not  consider 
that  public  opinion  here  would  sanction  that  Great 
Britain  should  go  to  war  over  a  Servian  quarrel."^ 

On  July  27th,  the  British  Ambassador  returned 
to  the  subject  of  the  refusal  of  Great  Britain  to 
join  with  France  and  Russia. 

It  would  not  be  a  way  to  advance  the  cause  of 
peace  [he  added],  for  it  is  a  mistake  to  believe  that 
if  Germany  learned  that  Great  Britain  had  joined 
France  and  Russia  she  would  adopt  a  more  concilia- 
tory attitude;  the  contrary  would  be  the  case.^ 

On  the  28th  a  similar  communication  was  made 
at  Paris,  ^  and  in  order  to  confirm  his  attitude  Sir 

'  Blue  Book,  No.  17;  see  also  No.  6,  '  Ibid.,  No.  24. 

3  Ibid.,  No.  44;  see  also  No.  47.  *  Ibid.,  No.  59. 


90  The  War  of  191 4 

Edward  Grey  on  the  next  day  gave  very  cate- 
gorical explanations  to  the  French  Ambassador  at 
London : 

The  friendly  tone  of  their  conversations  should 
not  lead  to  any  mistake  and  should  not  cause  France 
to  think  that  Great  Britain  would  be  on  the  side 
of  France  if  her  efforts  to  preserve  peace  should 
fail.  Public  opinion  in  England  approached  the 
present  difficulty  from  quite  a  different  point  of 
view  from  that  taken  during  the  difficulty  as  to 
Morocco  a  few  years  before.  Even  the  question  of 
the  supremacy  of  Teuton  or  Slav  in  the  Balkans 
would  not  change  our  passive  attitude.  If  Germany 
became  involved  and  France  became  involved, 
Great  Britain  would  have  to  consider  what  to  do, 
but  she  was  free  from  all  engagements  and  would 
have  to  have  regard  to  her  own  interests.* 

On  July  30th,  the  President  of  the  French  Re- 
public again  urged  this  point  of  view  upon  the 
British  Ambassador  at  Paris. 

Peace  is  in  the  hands  of  Great  Britain  [he  said]. 
If  she  announced  that  she  would  come  to  the  aid  of 
France  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  between  France 
and  Germany,  Germany  would  at  once  modify  her 
attitude.* 

The  Ambassador  resisted;  it  would  be  very  diffi- 
ciilt  for  the  British  Government  to  make  such  an 
announcement.  ^ 

'  Blue  Book,  No.  87.  '  Ibid.,  No.  99.  J  Ibid. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe  91 

While  Russia  and  France  thus  urged  her  to 
declare  her  attitude,  Germany  also  suddenly  added 
her  urgent  solicitation ' : 

The  Imperial  Chancellor  on  July  29th  explained 
to  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin  that  the 
conflagration  was  threatening.  France  would  be 
drawn  into  it  by  her  obhgations  towards  Russia. 
Germany  knew  that  Great  Britain  would  never 
stand  by  and  allow  France  to  be  crushed;  that, 
however,  was  not  the  object  at  which  Germany 
aimed.  She  was  ready  to  give  Great  Britain  every 
assurance  that  if  she  proved  victorious  in  any  war 
that  might  ensue  she  would  not  annex  any  part  of 
French  territory,  but  she  could  only  give  these  assur- 
ances in  exchange  for  a  promise  of  British  neutrality. 

"What  would  happen  to  the  French  colonies?" 
asked  the  Ambassador.  The  Chancellor  answered 
that  he  could  not  give  the  same  assurance  with 
regard  to  them. 

"And  as  to  Holland?" 

Germany  will  respect  her  integrity  and  her 
neutrality  as  long  as  her  enemies  do  the  same. 

"And  as  to  Belgium?" 

It  will  depend  on  the  action  of  France  what 
operations  Germany  may  be  forced  to  undertake 
in  Belgium,  but  after  the  war  Belgium  will  maintain 
her  integrity  if  she  does  not  take  sides  against 
Germany. 

The  British  Ambassador  merely  replied  that  he 
did  not  think  that  in  the  present  state  of  affairs 

'  Bltie  Book,  No.  85. 


92  The  War  of  1914 

his  Government  would  wish  to  bind  themselves 
by  any  engagement. 

This  is  the  first  time  that  the  name  of  Belgium 
is  mentioned  with  reference  to  the  Austro- Servian 
dispute,  and  it  is  well  to  mark  this  moment.  On 
July  29th,  Germany  confessed  that  thereafter 
the  fate  of  the  little  nation  that  she  has  guaranteed 
would  be  at  the  mercy  of  military  operations. 
Moreover  she  took  care  to  tell  her  nothing  about 
it  and  not  to  disturb  the  confident  calm  which 
she  herself  had  encouraged  by  many  reassuring 
declarations. 

Almost  at  the  same  moment  that  this  interview 
was  taking  place  in  Berlin,  Sir  Edward  Grey  saw 
the  German  Ambassador  in  London  and  made  to 
him  a  declaration  similar  to  that  which  he  had 
just  made  to  the  French  Ambassador': 

Germany  should  not  be  misled  by  the  friendly 
tone  of  the  negotiations;  the  situation  was  very 
grave.  Great  Britain  might  be  involved  in  order 
to  defend  her  interests.  She  makes  this  frank 
declaration  so  that  Germany  shall  not  say  later 
that  if  she  had  known  it,  the  course  of  affairs 
might  have  been  different.^ 

On  July  30th,  Sir  Edward  Grey   hastened  to 
reply  to  the  suggestions  of  Germany  with  reference 
^  See  page  89.  » Blue  Book,  No.  89. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe  93 

to  the  conditions  of  British  neutrahty  in  the  course 
of  the  coming  conflict.  It  is  a  non  possumus, 
but  the  answer  opens  the  door  to  future  agree- 
ments. The  text  of  this  telegram  is  so  im- 
portant for  the  purpose  of  defining  the  attitude 
of  Great  Britain,  especially  in  so  far  as  Belgium 
is  concerned,  that  I  think  it  well  to  print  it  here  in 
full.' 

His  Majesty's  Government  cannot  for  a  moment 
entertain  the  Chancellor's  proposal  that  they  should 
bind  themselves  to  neutrality  on  such  terms. 

What  he  asks  us  in  effect  is  to  engage  to  stand 
by  while  French  colonies  are  taken  and  France 
is  beaten  so  long  as  Germany  does  hot  take  French 
territory  as  distinct  from  the  colonies. 

From  the  material  point  of  view  such  a  pro- 
posal is  unacceptable,  for  France,  without  further 
territory  in  Europe  being  taken  from  her,  could 
be  so  crushed  as  to  lose  her  position  as  a  Great 
Power,  and  become  subordinate  to  German  polic3^ 

Altogether  apart  from  that,  it  would  be  a  disgrace 
for  us  to  make  this  bargain  with  Germany  at  the 
expense  of  France,  a  disgrace  from  which  the  good 
name  of  this  country  would  never  recover. 

The  Chancellor  also  in  effect  asks  us  to  bargain 
away  whatever  obligation  or  interest  we  have  as 
regards  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  We  could  not 
entertain  that  bargain  either. 

Having  said  so  much  it  is  unnecessary  to  examine 

^  Blue  Book,  No.  loi. 


94  The  War  of  191 4 

whether  the  prospect  of  a  future  general  neutrality 
agreement  between  England  and  Germany  offered 
positive  advantages  sufficient  to  compensate  us  for 
tying  our  hands  now.  We  must  preserve  our  full 
freedom  to  act  as  circumstances  may  seem  to  us  to 
require  in  any  such  unfavourable  and  regrettable 
development  of  the  present  crisis  as  the  Chancellor 
contemplates. 

You  should  speak  to  the  Chancellor  in  the  above 
sense,  and  add  most  earnestly  that  the  one  way  of 
maintaining  the  good  relations  between  England  and 
Germany  is  that  they  should  continue  to  work 
together  to  preserve  the  peace  of  Europe;  if  we 
succeed  in  this  object  the  mutual  relations  of  Ger- 
many and  England  will,  I  believe,  be  ipso  facto 
improved  and  strengthened.  For  that  object  His 
Majesty's  Government  will  work  in  that  way  with 
all  sincerity  and  goodwill. 

And  I  will  say  this:  If  the  peace  of  Europe  can 
be  preserved,  and  the  present  crisis  safely  passed, 
my  own  endeavour  will  be  to  promote  some  ar- 
rangement to  which  Germany  could  be  a  party,  by 
which  she  could  be  assured  that  no  aggressive  or 
hostile  polic}''  would  be  pursued  against  her  or  her 
Allies  by  France,  Russia,  and  ourselves,  jointly  or 
separately.  I  have  desired  this  and  worked  for  it, 
so  far  as  I  could,  through  the  last  Balkan  crisis, 
and,  Germany  having  a  corresponding  object,  our 
relations  sensibly  improved.  The  idea  has  hitherto 
been  too  Utopian  to  form  the  subject  of  definite 
proposals,  but  if  this  present  crisis,  so  much  more 
acute  than  any  that  Europe  has  gone  through  for 
generations,  be  safely  passed,  I  am  hopeful  that  the 
relief  and  reaction  which  will  follow  may  make 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe  95 

possible    some    more    definite    rapprochement    be- 
tween the  Powers  than  has  been  possible  hitherto. 

On  the  next  day,  July  31st,  while  Sir  Edward 
Grey  spared  no  steps  in  order  to  bring  his  pro- 
jects for  mediation  to  a  successful  issue,  he 
received  from  Beriin  and  St.  Petersburg,  succes- 
sively, news  of  preparations  for  mobilization. 

Nevertheless  he  used  very  energetic  language  in 
speaking  to  the  French  Ambassador  at  London. 

The  British  Cabinet  [he  said]  had  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  they  could  not  give  any  pledge  at 
the  present  time.  Up  to  the  present  moment 
neither  the  government  nor  public  opinion  felt  that 
any  treaties  or  obligations  of  Great  Britain  were 
involved.  Further  developments  might  alter  this 
situation.  The  preservation  of  the  neutrality  of 
Belgiuin  might  be  an  important  but  not  a  decisive 
factor  in  determining  our  attitude.  In  any  case 
Parliament  would  wish  to  know  the  situation  with 
regard  to  the  neutrahty  of  Belgium.  In  spite  of 
the  repeated  requests  of  the  French  Ambassador, 
Sir  Edward  Grey  refused  to  undertake  any  definite 
engagement  with  regard  to  France.^ 

It  was  then  that,  although  he  did  not  yet 
consider  the  situation"  irretrievable,"  Sir  Edward 
Grey  addressed  to  Germany  and  France  his  de- 
mand with  reference  to  respecting  Belgian  neu- 

'  Blue  Book,  No.  119. 


96  The  War  of  191 4 

trality,*  and  to  Belgium  his  demand  concerning 
the  defence  of  her  neutrality.^  On  the  same 
evening  France  answered  as  follows  ^ : 

The  French  Government  are  resolved  to  respect 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  and  it  would  only  be  in 
the  event  of  some  other  Power  violating  that  neu- 
trality that  France  might  find  herself  under  the 
necessity,  in  order  to  assure  the  defence  of  her  own 
security,  to  act  otherwise. 

This  assurance  has  been  given  several  times. 
The  President  of  the  Republic  spoke  of  it  to  the 
King  of  the  Belgians,  and  the  French  Minister  at 
Brussels  has  spontaneously  renewed  the  assurance 
to  the  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  to-day. 

The    following    telegram    was    received    from 
Berlin  4: 

I  have  seen  Secretary  of  State,  who  informs  me 
that  he  must  consult  the  Emperor  and  the  Chancel- 
lor before  he  could  possibly  answer.  I  gathered 
from  what  he  said  that  he  thought  any  reply  they 
might  give  could  not  but  disclose  a  certain  amount 
of  their  plan  of  campaign  in  the  event  of  war  en- 
suing, and  he  was  therefore  very  doubtful  whether 
they  wotdd  return  any  answer  at  all.  His  Excel- 
lency, nevertheless,  took  note  of  your  request. 

It  appears  from  what  he  said  that  German 
Government  consider  that  certain  hostile  acts  have 
already  been  committed  by  Belgium.   As  an  instance 

»  See  page  86.  '  See  page  29. 

J  Blue  Book,  No.  125.  ■•  Ibid.,  No.  122. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe  97 

of  this,  he  alleged  that  a  consignment  of  corn  for  Ger- 
many had  been  placed  under  an  embargo  already, 

I  hope  to  see  His  Excellency  to-morrow  again  to 
discuss  the  matter  further,  but  the  prospect  of 
obtaining  a  definite  answer  seems  to  me  remote. 

In  speaking  to  me  to-day  the  Chancellor  made  it 
clear  that  Germany  would  in  any  case  desire  to 
know  the  reply  returned  to  you  by  the  French 
Government. 

I  do  not  dwell  for  the  moment  on  the  allusion 
made  by  the  Secretary  of  State  to  an  incident 
concerning  a  consignment  of  corn,  I  shall  have 
occasion  to  show  later  by  documentary  evidence 
that  in  this  unimportant  affair  Belgium  had,  on 
the  contrary,  tried  to  do  everything  in  order  to 
satisfy  Germany.'  Furthermore,  as  we  shall  see, 
at  Brussels  the  request  for  information  sent  by 
the  German  Minister  was  most  courteous,  while  to 
England  this  insignificant  incident  was  represented 
as  "many  hostile  acts." 

As  soon  as  Sir  Edward  Grey  was  in  possession 
of  the  telegram  from  Berlin,  received  in  the  morn- 
ing of  August  1st,  he  hastened^  to  have  an  in- 
terview with  the  German  Ambassador,  and  he 
commimicated  a  precis  of  the  interview  to  the 
British  Ambassador  at  Berlin.  The  reader  will 
observe  the  insistence  with  which  the  Minister 

'  See  pages  129  et  seq.  '  Blue  Book,  No.  123. 

7 


98  The  War  of  191 4 

speaks  of  public  opinion :     British  diplomacy,  more 
than  any  other,  tries  carefully  to  follow  its  trend. 

I  told  the  German  Ambassador  to-day  that  the 
reply  of  the  German  Government  with  regard  to 
the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  a  matter  of  very 
great  regret,  because  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
affected  feeling  in  this  country.  If  Germany 
could  see  her  way  to  give  the  same  assurance  as 
that  which  has  been  given  by  France  it  would 
materially  contribute  to  relieve  anxiety  and  tension 
here.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  were  a  violation 
of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  by  one  combatant 
while  the  other  respected  it,  it  would  be  extremely 
difficult  to  restrain  public  feeling  in  this  country. 
I  said  that  we  had  been  discussing  this  question  at  a 
Cabinet  meeting,  and  as  I  was  authorized  to  tell 
him  this  I  gave  him  a  memorandum  of  it. 

He  asked  me  whether,  if  Germany  gave  a  pro- 
mise not  to  violate  Belgium  neutrality,  we  would 
engage  to  remain  neutral. 

I  replied  that  I  could  not  say  that;  our  hands 
were  still  free,  and  we  were  considering  what  our 
attitude  should  be.  All  I  could  say  was  that  our 
attitude  would  be  determined  largely  by  public 
opinion  here,  and  that  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
would  appeal  very  strongly  to  public  opinion  here. 
I  did  not  think  that  we  could  give  a  promise  of 
neutrality  on  that  condition  alone. 

The  Ambassador  pressed  me  as  to  whether  I  could 
formulate  conditions  on  which  we  would  remain 
neutral.  He  even  suggested  that  the  integrity  of 
France  and  her  colonies  might  be  guaranteed. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe  99 

I  said  that  I  felt  obliged  to  refuse  definitely  any 
promise  to  remain  neutral  on  similar  terms,  and  I 
cotdd  only  say  that  we  must  keep  our  hands  free. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  this  precis  in  the  English 
Blue  Book  agrees  absolutely  with  the  German 
version  of  the  same  interview  sent  to  Berlin  by  the 
Ambassador,  the  text  of  which  is  to  be  found  in 
the  semi-official  article  of  the  NorddeiUsche  Allge- 
meine  Zeitung  of  September  6th.  The  German 
Ambassador  gives  even  more  details  concerning 
Belgium : 

Sir  Edward  Grey  [he  says]  turned  again  and 
again  to  Belgian  neutrality  and  was  of  opinion 
that  this  question  would  also  play  a  great  part. ' 

One  passage  of  the  report  of  the  interview  at 
London  should  be  remembered.  The  German 
Ambassador  asked  whether,  if  Germany  gave  a 
promise  not  to  violate  Belgian  neutrality,  Great 
Britain  would  engage  to  remain  neutral.  The 
Minister  replied  that  he  could  not  promise  any- 
thing. Several  publicists  have  tried  to  find  in 
this  reply  substance  for  a  controversy  with  regard 
to  the  designs  of  English  policy.  ^ 

'  White  Paper,  edition  v.  Massow,  p.  88. 

"For  example,  Kohiische Zeitung,  No.  886,  August  5th,  and  No. 
996,  September  6th;  see  also  the  speech  of  the  Dutch  professor 
d'Aulnis  de  Bourrouil  in  the  Kolnische  Zeitung,  No.  1205,  No- 
vember 3d. 


100  The  War  of  191 4 

I  am  not  in  the  least  concerned  here  with  an 
analysis  of  English  policy ;  I  am  trying  to  discover 
the  intentions  of  Germany  with  regard  to  Belgium 
in  order  to  clear  up  the  events  which  resulted  from 
it.  Now  the  offer  of  Germany  shows  that  in  the 
coming  conflict  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  was  for 
her  not  a  sacred  obligation  but  merely  a  pawn  in 
her  game,  which  she  intended  to  bargain  away. 
England  was  a  formidable  adversary;  she  was 
interested  in  the  independence  of  Belgium.  The 
problem,  therefore,  for  Germany  could  be  stated 
as  follows:  "By  means  of  what  arrangements,  of 
which  Belgium  will  be  the  basis,  can  we  purchase 
the  abstention  of  England  and  buy  her  complicity  ? ' ' 

During  the  whole  of  the  day  of  August  1st 
very  urgent  telegrams  were  again  exchanged  by  the 
several  chancelleries,  with  a  view  to  discovering 
possible  common  ground  for  mediation  in  the 
Austro-Servian  dispute.  But  the  question  of  Bel- 
gium was  not  raised;  as  far  as  she  was  concerned 
the  reply  of  Germany  was  awaited. 

On  August  2d,  Sir  Edward  Grey  saw  the 
French  Ambassador  in  the  morning;  he  reports 
as  follows  the  interview  that  he  had  with  him,  in 
the  course  of  which  the  position  of  Belgium  was 
considered  * : 

» Blue  Book,  No.  148. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe    loi 

After  the  Cabinet  this  morning  I  gave  M.  Cam- 
bon  the  following  memorandum : 

"  I  am  authorized  to  give  an  assurance  that,  if  the 
German  fleet  comes  into  the  Channel  or  through  the 
North  Sea  to  undertake  hostile  operations  against 
French  coasts  or  shipping,  the  British  fleet  will  give 
all  the  protection  in  its  power. 

"  This  assurance  is  of  course  subject  to  the  policy 
of  His  Majesty's  Government  receiving  the  support 
of  Parliament,  and  must  not  be  taken  as  binding 
His  Majesty's  Government  to  take  any  action  until 
the  above  contingency  of  action  by  the  German 
fleet  takes  place." 

I  pointed  out  that  we  had  very  large  questions 
and  most  difficult  issues  to  consider,  and  that 
Government  felt  that  they  could  not  bind  them- 
selves to  declare  war  upon  Germany  necessarily  if 
war  broke  out  between  France  and  Germany  to- 
morrow, but  it  was  essential  to  the  French  Govern- 
ment, whose  fleet  had  long  been  concentrated  in  the 
Mediterranean,  to  know  how  to  make  their  disposi- 
tions with  their  north  coast  entirely  undefended. 
We  therefore  thought  it  necessary  to  give  them  this 
assurance.  It  did  not  bind  us  to  go  to  war  with 
Germany  unless  the  German  fleet  took  the  action 
indicated,  but  it  did  give  a  security  to  France  that 
would  enable  her  to  settle  the  disposition  of  her  own 
Mediterranean  fleet. 

M.  Cambon  asked  me  about  the  violation  of 
Luxemburg.  I  told  him  the  doctrine  on  that  point 
laid  down  by  Lord  Derby  and  Lord  Clarendon  in 
1867.  He  asked  me  what  we  should  say  about  the 
violation  of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium.  I  said  that 
was  a  much  more  important  matter;  we  were  con- 


102  The  War  of  191 4 

sidering  what  statement  we  should  make  in  Parlia- 
ment to-morrow — in  effect,  whether  we  should 
declare  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  to  be  a 
casus  belli.  I  told  him  what  had  been  said  to  the 
German  Ambassador  on  this  point. 

During  the  course  of  August  3d,  Sir  Edward 
Grey  learned  that  the  German  Note  to  Belgium 
had  been  sent,  without  however  being  put  in 
possession  of  the  text  by  the  Belgian  Lega- 
tion. Shortly  afterwards  the  King  of  England 
received  from  the  King  of  the  Belgians  a  telegram 
worded  as  follows : 

Remembering  the  numerous  proofs  of  your  Maj- 
esty's friendship  and  that  of  your  Majesty's  pre- 
decessors as  well  as  the  friendly  attitude  of  Great 
Britain  in  1870  and  of  the  proof  of  sympathy  she 
has  just  given  us  again,  I  make  a  supreme  appeal 
to  the  diplomatic  intervention  of  your  Majesty's 
Government  to  safeguard  the  neutrality  of  Belgium. 

This  supreme  appeal  was  only  too  well  justified. 
Three  days  before,  on  July  31st,  the  King  of 
the  Belgians  had  also  addressed  a  personal  letter 
to  the  German  Emperor,'  and  on  that  same  day 
the  Government  of  the  King  had  been  informed 
by  the  British  Minister  at  Brussels  of  the  simul- 
taneous demands  which  Great  Britain  had  ad- 

'■  See  page  31. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe    103 

dressed  to  Germany  and  to  France,  thus  renewing 
in  1 9 14  the  proof  of  sympathy  which  she  had  given 
to  Belgium  in  1870. 

On  this  same  day,  August  3d,  Sir  Edward  Grey, 
with  inadequate  information  at  his  disposal,  went 
down  to  the  House  of  Commons.  He  there 
made  a  speech,  which  is  a  sort  of  public  self- 
examination,  during  the  course  of  which  he  com- 
municated to  the  members,  who  he  no  doubt  felt 
were  in  a  state  of  some  hesitation,  the  considera- 
tions which  moved  him.  As  the  Oxford  historians 
have  remarked  in  their  recent  pamphlet,  we  should 
not  forget  that  Great  Britain  has  a  responsible  Cab- 
inet and  a  responsible  Parliament ;  before  an  Eng- 
lish Minister  can  act  in  a  question  of  international 
importance,  he  must  convince  his  colleagues  and 
they  must  convince  a  democracy  which  is  essen- 
tially pacifist,  prudent,  and  slow  to  move.  I  will 
only  reproduce  here  from  the  speech  of  Sir  Edward 
Grey  some  of  the  passages  which  deal  with  Bel- 
gium, according  to  the  text  which  appeared  as  an 
appendix  to  the  English  edition  of  the  Blue  Book, 
especially  pages  93-96.  There  is  to  be  noted  the 
double  thread  which  had  marked  already  in  1870 
the  speeches  of  Lord  Granville  and  of  Gladstone 
— the  interests  of  Great  Britain  and  her  honour. 

Sir  Edward  Grey  began  by  recalling  what  had 


104  The  War  of  191 4 

passed  in  1870  and  he  observ^ed  that  Germany, 
represented  by  Prince  Bismarck,  had  at  that  time 
perfectly  recognized  the  inviolability  of  the 
Treaties  of  1839,  and  had  again  guaranteed  the 
permanent  neutrality  of  Belgium.  Then,  coming 
to  the  request  which  the  King  of  the  Belgians  had 
addressed  to  the  King  of  England,  he  said: 

The  King  of  the  Belgians  has  made  a  supreme 
appeal  to  our  diplomatic  intervention.  Diplomatic 
intervention  took  place  last  week  on  our  part. 
What  can  diplomatic  intervention  do  now?  We 
have  great  and  vital  interests  in  the  independence — 
and  integrity  is  the  least  part — of  Belgium.  Ger- 
many sounded  us  in  the  course  of  last  week  as  to 
whether,  if  a  guarantee  were  given  that,  after  the 
war,  Belgian  integrity  would  be  preserved,  that 
would  content  us.  We  replied  that  we  could  not 
bargain  away  whatever  interests  or  obligations  we 
had  in  Belgian  neutrality.  If  Belgium  is  compelled 
to  submit  to  allow  her  neutrality  to  be  violated,  of 
course  the  situation  is  clear.  Even  if  by  agreement 
she  admitted  the  violation  of  her  neutrality,  it  is 
clear  she  could  only  do  so  under  duress.  The  smaller 
States  in  that  region  of  Europe  ask  but  one  thing. 
Their  one  desire  is  that  they  should  be  left  alone  and 
independent.  The  one  thing  they  fear  is,  I  think, 
not  so  much  that  their  integrity  but  that  their 
independence  should  be  interfered  with.  If  in  this 
war  which  is  before  Europe  the  neutrality  of  one  of 
those  countries  is  violated,  if  the  troops  of  one  of 
the  combatants  violate  its  neutrality  and  no  action 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe   105 

be  taken  to  resent  it,  at  the  end  of  the  war,  whatever 
the  integrity  may  be,  the  independence  will  be  gone. 
No,  Sir,  if  it  be  the  case  that  there  has  been  any- 
thing in  the  nature  of  an  ultimatum  to  Belgium, 
asking  her  to  compromise  or  violate  her  neutrality, 
whatever  may  have  been  offered  to  her  in  return, 
her  independence  is  gone  if  that  holds.  If  her  in- 
dependence goes,  the  independence  of  Holland  will 
follow.  I  ask  the  House,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
British  interests,  to  consider  what  may  be  at  stake. 
If  France  is  beaten  in  a  struggle  of  life  and  death, 
beaten  to  her  knees,  loses  her  position  as  a  great 
Power,  becomes  subordinate  to  the  will  and  power 
of  one  greater  than  herself — consequences  which  I 
do  not  anticipate,  because  I  am  sure  that  Prance 
has  the  power  to  defend  herself  with  all  the  energy 
and  ability  and  patriotism  which  she  has  shown  so 
often — still,  if  that  were  to  happen,  and  if  Belgium 
fell  under  the  same  dominating  influence,  and  then 
Holland,  and  then  Denmark,  then  would  not  Mr. 
Gladstone's  words  come  true,  that  just  opposite  to 
us  there  would  be  a  common  interest  against  the 
unmeasured  aggrandizement  of  any  Power? 

This  statement  of  the  problem  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey  shows  a  perfect  grasp  of  the  situation,  for 
if,  forgetting  the  actual  crisis,  we  place  our- 
selves before  the  realities  of  the  future,  we  see 
that  the  simple  question  is  whether  the  hegemony 
of  the  German  Empire  will  be  established  over 
Central  Europe  and  whether  the  small  nations 
will  only    escape  conquest  by  accepting   vassal- 


io6  The  War  of  1914 

age.  The  Germans — with  the  exception  perhaps 
of  my  colleague,  Professor  Werner  Sombart, 
who,  if  you  please,  considers  Belgium  as  a  po- 
litical abortion'  and  the  Belgian  nation  as  an 
object  for  gentle  mirth  ^ — are  doubtless  the  first 
to  understand  that  other  nations,  while  thoroughly 
recognizing  how  wonderful  many  realizations  of 
Germany  are,  cherish  their  autonomy  and  strive 
with  all  their  might  towards  a  future  based  on 
their  own  traditions  and  their  own  patrimony. 
Now,  if  military  interests  are  alone  to  influence 
the  relations  between  States,  is  it  not  obvious 
that  the  supremacy  of  the  strongest  military  State 
will  be  assured,  since  the  small  nations,  even  if 
united,  would  not  be  able  to  withstand  her  power? 
Raising  the  debate  to  a  higher  plane.  Sir  Edward 
Grey  continued : 

I  have  one  further  quotation  from  Mr.  Gladstone : 
"We  have  an  interest  in  the  independence  of  Bel- 
gium which  is  wider  than  that  which  we  may  have 
in  the  literal  operation  of  the  guarantee.  It  is  found 
in  the  answer  to  the  question  whether,  under  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  this  country,  endowed 
as  it  is  with  influence  and  power,  would  quietly 
stand  by  and  witness  the  perpetration  of  the 
direst  crime  that  ever  stained  the  pages  of  history, 
and  thus  become  participators  in  the  sin." 

'  Eine  Missgehurt  der  Politik. 

'  Berliner  Tageblatt,  November  2d,  No.  557. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe   107 

It  may  be  said,  I  suppose,  that  we  might  stand 
aside,  husband  our  strength,  and  that,  whatever 
happened  in  the  course  of  this  war,  at  the  end  of  it 
intervene  with  effect  to  put  things  right,  and  to 
adjust  them  to  our  own  point  of  view.  If,  in  a  crisis 
like  this,  we  run  away  from  those  obligations  of 
honour  and  interest  as  regards  the  Belgian  treaty, 
1  doubt  whether,  whatever  material  force  we  might 
have  at  the  end,  it  would  be  of  very  much  value  in 
face  of  the  respect  that  we  should  have  lost.  We 
should  have  sacrificed  at  the  same  time  our  repu- 
tation before  the  world  and  our  most  important 
economic  interests. 

Nevertheless  Sir  Edward  Grey  suspended  any 
decision  until  he  should  receive  precise  information 
with  regard  to  the  nature  of  the  demand  addressed 
to  Belgium  by  Germany  for  permission  to  pass 
through  Belgium,  and  he  finished  by  recalling  the 
fact  that  he  merely  wished  to  explain  to  the  House 
the  attitude  of  the  Government  and  to  put  it  in 
possession  of  all  the  vital  facts. 

But  later  in  the  course  of  the  same  day  he  again 
spoke  and  announced  that  he  had  just  received 
from  the  Belgian  Legation  the  exact  text  of  the 
Note  telegraphed  in  the  morning  by  the  Belgian 
Government^  and  in  conclusion  said  simply: 

I  can  only  say  that  the  Government  are  prepared 
to  take  into  grave  consideration  the  information 

'  S«e  page  76. 


io8  The  War  of  191 4 

which   they   have  received.      I   make   no   further 
comment  upon  it.* 

The  Cabinet  met  shortly  afterwards  and  as  a 
result  of  the  meeting  Sir  Edward  Grey  informed 
the  Belgian  Minister  at  London  that  "if  Bel- 
gian neutrality  is  violated  it  means  war  with 
Germany."* 

On  the  next  day,  the  4th  of  August,  in  the 
morning,  Sir  Edward  Grey  sent  to  Berlin  this 
telegram  which  contains  the  result  of  the  delibera- 
tions of  the  evening  before  ^i 

The  King  of  the  Belgians  has  made  an  appeal  to 
His  Majesty  the  King  for  diplomatic  intervention  on 
behalf  of  Belgium  in  the  following  terms: 

"Remembering  the  numerous  proofs  of  your 
Majesty's  friendship  and  that  of  your  Majesty's 
predecessors,  as  well  as  the  friendly  attitude  of 
Great  Britain  in  1870  and  the  proof  of  sympathy 
she  has  just  given  us  again,  I  make  a  supreme 
appeal  to  the  diplomatic  intervention  of  your 
Majesty's  Government  to  safeguard  the  neutrality 
of  BelgiiuTi. " 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  also  informed  that 
the  German  Government  have  delivered  to  the 
Belgian  Government  a  note  proposing  friendly 
neutrality  entailing  free  passage  through  Belgian 
territory,  and  promising  to  maintain  the  independ- 

'  Blue  Book,  p.  97.  *  Grey  Book,  No.  26. 

»  Blue  Book,  No.  153. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe    109 

ence  and  integrity  of  the  kingdom  and  its  possessions 
at  the  conclusion  of  peace,  threatening  in  case  of 
refusal  to  treat  Belgium  as  an  enemy.  An  answer 
was  requested  within  twelve  hours. 

We  also  understand  that  Belgium  has  cate- 
gorically refused  this  as  a  flagrant  violation  of  the 
law  of  nations. 

His  Majesty's  Government  are  bound  to  protest 
against  this  violation  of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany 
is  a  part  in  common  with  themselves,  and  must 
request  an  assurance  that  the  demand  made  upon 
Belgium  will  not  be  proceeded  with  and  that  her 
neutrality  will  be  respected  by  Germany.  You 
should  ask  for  an  immediate  reply. 

Shortly  afterwards  the  news  was  telegraphed  by 
the  British  Minister  at  Brussels  that  a  second 
German  Note  had  been  presented  announcing 
that  troops  were  about  to  cross  the  frontier  in 
spite  of  the  refusal  of  Belgium.'  Sir  Edward 
Grey  immediately  telegraphed  the  following  Note 
to  the  Ministers  in  Belgium,  in  Holland,  and  in 
Norway'': 

Please  declare  that  Great  Britain  expects  that 
these  three  kingdoms  will  resist  German  pressure 
and  observe  neutrality.  Should  they  resist  they 
will  have  the  support  of  Great  Britain,  who  is  ready 
in  that  event,  should  the  three  above  mentioned 
Governments  desire  it,  to  join  France  and  Russia, 

*  See  page  78.  » Grey  Book,  No.  37. 


no  The  War  of  191 4 

in  offering  an  Alliance  to  the  said  Governments  for 
the  purpose  of  resisting  the  use  of  force  by  Germany 
against  them,  and  a  guarantee  to  maintain  the  future 
independence  and  integrity  of  the  three  kingdoms. 

With  regard  to  Belgium  this  proposal  was  made, 
as  Sir  Edward  Grey  explained  to  the  Belgian 
Minister  at  London,  in  case  the  neutrality  of  the 
kingdom  should  be  violated.'  As  we  shall  see, 
however,  it  was  cancelled  soon  afterwards. 

Scarcely  had  this  Note  been  sent  when  there 
arrived  in  quick  succession  telegrams  from  Berlin 
and  Brussels;  the  latter  announced  the  violation 
of  the  frontier  at  Gemmenich^;  the  former,  sent 
by  the  Chancellor  to  the  German  Ambassador, 
dealt  exclusively  with  Belgium.  It  is  of  the 
greatest  importance  in  the  panorama  of  events 
with  which  we  are  now  dealing.  ^ 

Please  dispel  any  mistrust  that  may  subsist  on 
the  part  of  the  British  Government  with  regard  to 
our  intentions,  by  repeating  most  positively  formal 
assurance  that,  even  in  the  case  of  armed  conflict 
with  Belgium,  Germany  will,  under  no  pretence 
whatever,  annex  Belgian  territory.  Sincerity  of 
this  declaration  is  borne  out  by  the  fact  that  we 
solemnly  pledged  our  word  to  Holland  strictly  to 
respect  her  neutrality.    It  is  obvious  that  we  could 

■  Grey  Book,  No.  137.  » Blue  Book,  No.  158. 

» Ibid.,  No.  157. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe   iii 

not  profitably  annex  Belgian  territory  without 
making  at  the  same  time  territorial  acquisitions 
at  expense  of  Holland.  Please  impress  upon  Sir  E. 
Grey  that  the  German  army  could  not  be  exposed 
to  French  attack  across  Belgium,  which  was  planned 
according  to  absolutely  unimpeachable  informa- 
tion. Germany  had  consequently  to  disregard 
Belgian  neutrality,  it  being  for  her  a  question  of  life 
or  death  to  prevent  French  advance. 

The  passage  in  which  Germany  affirms  that  in 
case  of  armed  conflict  with  Belgium  she  will  under 
no  pretence  whatever  annex  Belgian  territory 
should  be  carefully  noted.  It  means  that  Ger- 
many will  respect  the  territorial  integrity  of 
Belgium  but  enters  into  no  engagement  with 
reference  to  the  political  or  economic  independence 
of  that  country. 

But  a  little  later  in  the  course  of  the  same  day, 
the  4th  of  August,  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  in  his 
official  declaration  to  the  Reichstag,  went  a  step 
further. 

We  have  given  [he  said]  an  assurance  to  Great 
Britain  that  so  long  as  she  remains  neutral  we  shall 
respect  the  territorial  integrity  and  independence 
of  Belgium.  This  declaration  I  renew  here  publicly 
before  the  whole  world. 

This  promise,  like  the  one  formulated  in  the 
telegram,  was  unconditional  so  far  as  Belgium  was 


112  The  War  of  191 4 

concerned;  whether  she  resisted  or  not,  not  only 
her  integrity,  but  even  her  independence  ought  to 
be  guaranteed. 

We  must  lay  stress  on  this  point,  for  it  clearly 
shows  the  real  attitude  of  Germany  in  considering 
Belgian  neutrality,  as  I  have  already  stated  above, 
not  as  a  sacrosanct  thing  defended  by  a  solemn 
guarantee,  but  as  a  pawn  with  which  she  might 
bargain. 

Let  us  first  compare  this  declaration  of  the  4th 
of  August  with  the  offer  made  on  July  29th 
by  the  Imperial  Chancellor  that  the  integrity  of 
Belgium  would  be  respected  if  she  did  not  side 
against  Germany.  Then  let  us  recall  the  terms 
of  the  Very  Confidential  Note  of  August  2d: 
Germany  fully  guaranteed  the  integrity  and 
independence  of  the  country  if  Belgium  received 
in  a  friendly  spirit  the  German  armies  in  their 
march  towards  France;  she  did  not  guarantee 
anything  if  Belgium  opposed  their  passage.  We 
see  how  the  conditions  of  the  bargain  which 
Germany  forced  upon  Belgium  were  modified 
during  the  five  days.  Those  formulated  in  ex- 
tremis on  the  afternoon  of  the  4th  of  August,  when 
the  firm  attitude  of  Great  Britain  had  already 
been  made  clear,  are  more  favourable  than  those  of 
the  morning  of  August  4th,  which  were  already 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe   113 

more  favourable  than  those  of  the  2d  of  August, 
which,  in  their  turn,  were  more  favourable  than 
those  of  the  29th  of  July. 

The  bidding  was  not  to  stop  even  at  the  pro- 
posals of  August  4th.  Anticipating  the  chrono- 
logical course  of  events  I  will  here  remark  that  on 
August  9th  new  proposals  were  sent  to  Belgium. 
This  time  the  Belgian  army  had — these  are  the 
very  words  of  this  new  German  Note — "just 
upheld  the  honour  of  its  arms  in  the  most  brilliant 
manner  by  its  heroic  resistance  to  very  superior 
force,"  ^  Liege  had  just  been  occupied.  Germany 
then  turned  to  Belgium  and  said  in  a  tone  of  far 
greater  deference  than  that  of  the  Very  Confiden- 
tial Note  of  August  2d: 

The  German  Government  most  deeply  regrets 
that  bloody  encounters  should  have  resulted  from 
the  Belgian  Government's  attitude  towards  Ger- 
many. Germany  is  not  coming  as  an  enemy  into 
Belgium.  It  is  only  through  the  force  of  circum- 
stances that  she  has  had,  owing  to  the  military 
measures  of  France,  to  take  the  grave  decision  of 
entering  Belgium  and  occupying  Liege  as  a  base 
for  her  further  military  operations.  The  German 
Government  beg  the  King  of  the  Belgians  and  the 
Belgian  Government  to  spare  Belgium  the  horrors 
of  war.     The  German  Government  are  ready  for 

'  Grey  Book,  No.  62. 


114  The  War  of  191 4 

any  compact  with  Belgium  which  can  in  any  way  be 
reconciled  with  their  arrangements  with  France. 
Germany  gives  once  more  her  solemn  assurance 
that  she  has  not  been  animated  by  the  intention  of 
appropriating  Belgian  territory  for  herself,  and  that 
such  an  intention  is  far  from  her  thoughts.  Ger- 
many is  still  ready  to  evacuate  Belgium  as  soon  as 
the  state  of  war  will  allow  her  to  do  so. 

This  time  we  have  reached  the  highest  bid. 
Let  us  return  along  the  course  we  have  traversed. 
Belgium  had  two  alternatives.  She  could  either 
allow  the  German  troops  to  pass,  or  could  oppose 
them  with  an  armed  resistance.  She  chose  the 
second  alternative.     This  attitude  meant  for  her: 

On  July  29th,  the  loss  of  her  integrity  and  no 
guarantee  with  regard  to  her  independence; 

On  August  2d,  a  fate  depending  on  the  force  of 
arms; 

On  August  4th,  in  the  morning,  the  preservation 
of  her  integrity,  without  any  guarantee  as  to  her 
independence; 

On  August  4th,  in  the  afternoon,  the  preserva- 
tion of  her  integrity  and  of  her  independence; 

On  August  9th,  when  she  had  already  taken  up 
this  attitude,  it  meant  for  her  all  the  guarantees 
which  she  might  desire  so  long  as  they  were 
compatible  with  the  Franco-German  dispute. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe   115 

We  can  now  see  clearly  the  nature  of  Germany's 
action. 

She  not  only  violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
in  spite  of  treaties  signed  by  her;  she  really  con- 
spired against  her  very  existence;  she  attempted 
the  life  of  this  little  nation. 

Indeed,  to  cross  territory  which  is  inviolable  is 
one  thing;  but  to  rob  an  innocent  country  of  her 
integrity  and  her  independence  is  quite  another 
thing ! 

Germany  declared  to  Switzerland,  on  August 
4th,  that  she  was  convinced  that  "the  Swiss  Con- 
federation, with  the  support  of  her  strong  army 
and  the  indomitable  will  of  the  entire  Swiss  people, 
will  repel  every  attempt  to  violate  her  neutrality"* 
and  to  Belgium,  neutral  like  Switzerland,  she 
announced  on  August  2d*  that  if  she  dared  to 
defend  herself  against  the  German  armies,  her 
fate  would  be  left  to  the  decision  of  arms ! 

To  this  threat  Belgium  answered  with  dignity^ 
that  she  refused  to  believe  that  her  independence 
could  only  be  maintained  at  the  price  of  the 
violation  of  her  neutrality.  What  would  she  have 
said  had  she  but  been  aware  of  the  plot  hatched 
against  her  during  the  past  five  days? 

Why  did  not  Germany,  from  the  first  day  on 

'  See  page  49.       »  See  page  39.       3  See  page  75. 


ii6  The  War  of  191 4 

which  she  dragged  Belgium  into  the  European 
conflict,  act  honestly,  turn  to  her  frankly,  and 
say  that  in  no  case,  whether  she  resisted  or 
did  not  resist,  would  any  attempt  ever  be  made 
against  her  independence  or  her  integrity  or  any 
of  her  international  prerogratives?  Instead  of 
acting  thus  honestly,  on  July  29th  she  gave  Eng- 
land, whose  inaction  she  wished  to  purchase 
and  whose  complicity  she  wished  to  secure,  to 
understand  that  Belgium  would  only  remain 
intact  if  she  did  not  resist.  She  thus  began  to 
bargain  about  Belgium  behind  Belgium's  back 
and  five  days  before  communicating  with  her, 
while  at  Brussels  she  was  still  lavishing  upon  her 
tokens  of  confidence  and  sympathy! 

What  does  all  this  mean?  Did  Germany  wish 
to  annex  the  whole  or  part  of  Belgium?  Did  she 
want  Antwerp?  Did  she  want  the  coast?  Did 
she  wish  to  fetter  the  independence  of  the  nation? 
On  August  4th  she  stated^  that  in  order  "pro- 
fitably" to  annex  Belgian  territory  she  would 
have  to  make  territorial  acquisitions  at  the  expense 
of  Holland,  which  she  did  not  wish  to  do.  Was 
Belgium  then  really  nothing  more  than  an  object 
of  greed  and  covetousness?  Had  then  the  march 
across  Belgium,  simply  undertaken  in  order  to  en- 

'  See  pp.  iio-iii. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe   117 

sure  the  security  of  the  Empire,  changed  into  a 
war  of  subjection?  Was  Maximilian  Harden  right 
when  he  wrote : 

Noble  Germanism  must  conquer  new  provinces 
here.  .  .  .  Antwerp,  not  in  opposition  to  but  side 
by  side  with  Hamburg  and  Bremen;  Liege  side 
by  side  with  the  armour  works  of  Hesse,  Berlin, 
and  Swabia;  Cockerill  allied  with  Krupp;  Belgian 
and  German  iron,  coal,  and  cloth  under  the  same 
directorship.  .  .  .  From  Calais  to  Antwerp,  Flan- 
ders, Limburg,  and  Brabant,  up  to  the  line  of 
fortresses  of  the  Meuse,  aU  Prussian!'' 

Was  this  then  the  plain  meaning  of  the  offer 
which  on  July  29th,  amid  the  silence  of  the 
chancelleries,  was  communicated  to  England? 
And  was  it  a  finesse  on  Germany's  part,  in  order 
to  create  an  excuse  for  the  subjugation  of  Belgium, 
to  drive  her  to  a  resistance  which  Germany  knew 
was  inevitable — since  she  congratulated  Switzer- 
land on  organizing  a  precisely  similar  resistance? 
This  diplomatic  manoeuvre  would  certainly  be 
particularly  clever.  It  is  a  threefold  manoeuvre. 
In  any  case  England  was  intimidated;  if  Belgium 
resisted  she  would  be  brought  into  subjection; 
and  if,  contrary  to  expectation,  she  decided  not 
to  resist,  the  road  to  France  was  open. 

^  Zukunjt,  October  17th. 


ii8  The  War  of  191 4 

And  so  from  the  first  moment  that  Germany 
mentioned  the  name  of  Belgium,  in  a  dispute 
which  did  not  concern  this  Httle  nation,  she 
formed  her  plan:  "To  force  Belgium  to  defend 
herself  and,  in  order  to  punish  her  for  having  done 
her  duty,  to  bring  her  into  subjection." 

Truly  in  the  face  of  such  evidence,  the  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality  falls  into  the  background  and 
there  appears  on  the  foreground  an  implacable 
Plot  Against  Belgium. 

No  mention  of  any  of  these  machinations  was 
made  by  the  Imperial  Chancellor  or  the  German 
White  Book:  when  a  public  justification  had  to 
be  made,  and  the  Chancellor  had  to  recognize 
on  two  separate  occasions  in  the  Reichstag  that 
Germany  was  committing  a  wrong  law,  {Ein 
Unrecht)  he  was  content  to  hide  behind  the  maxim 
Not  kennt  kein  Gebot,  "Necessity  knows  no  law!" 

The  excuse  of  necessity !  I  have  already  shown  * 
that  only  by  a  mere  political  sophism  could  this 
excuse  be  made  in  the  case  of  the  violation  of  Bel- 
gian neutrality.  But  this  does  not  matter  here. 
The  point  of  the  argument  is  that  during  a  diplo- 
matic dispute  Germany  made  bargains  at  the  ex- 
pense of  Belgium.  The  necessity  of  her  strategic 
convenience  could  only  force  Germany  to  pass 

'  See  page  69. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe   119 

through  Belgium,  and  nothing  more.  And  if  it  is 
true  that  the  only  thought  in  the  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality  was  care  for  the  safety  of  the 
Empire,  why  try  to  tear  Belgium's  sovereignty  to 
shreds  or  allow  her  to  maintain  it  only  at  the 
expense  of  compliant  submission  to  outrage? 

Do  not  the  best  friends  of  Germany,  and  even 
those  Germans  themselves  who  know  during  the 
poignant  time  which  their  country  is  going  through 
how  to  maintain  their  critical  judgment,  feel  in 
face  of  these  facts  very  uncomfortable  and,  in 
short,  filled  with  remorse?  Do  they  not  bow 
before  the  indignation  which  stirred  the  Bel- 
gians to  action  in  the  hour  when  they  were 
attacked,  and  still  makes  them  shake  with  sup- 
pressed wrath,  cut  off  as  they  are  from  the  world 
in  the  land  of  their  birth,  which  is  occupied  by 
an  invader? 


When  Sir  Edward  Grey  received  the  telegram 
from  Germany  on  August  4th  he  cancelled  by 
telegram  his  communication  to  Belgium,  Holland, 
and  Norway,^  and  he  replied  to  Berlin  repeating 
his  request  for  a  formal  undertaking  to  respect 
Belgian   neutrality.  ^ 

'  Grey  Book,  No.  43.  'Blue  Book,  No.  159. 


120  The  War  of  191 4 

We  hear  that  Germany  has  addressed  a  note  to 
Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  stating  that 
the  German  Government  will  be  compelled  to  carry 
out,  if  necessary  by  force  of  arms,  the  measures 
considered  indispensable. 

We  are  also  informed  that  Belgian  territory  has 
been  violated  at  Gemmenich. 

In  these  circumstances,  and  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  Germany  declined  to  give  the  same  assurance 
respecting  Belgium  as  France  gave  last  week  in 
reply  to  our  request  made  simultaneously  at  Berlin 
and  Paris,  we  must  repeat  that  request,  and  ask 
that  a  satisfactory  reply  to  it  and  to  my  telegram 
of  this  morning  be  received  here  by  12  o'clock  to- 
night. If  not,  you  arc  instructed  to  ask  for  your 
passports,  and  to  say  that  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment feel  bound  to  take  all  steps  in  their  power  to 
uphold  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  and  the  observ- 
ance of  a  treaty  to  which  Germany  is  as  much  a 
party  as  ourselves. 

In  the  afternoon  the  British  Ambassador,  in 
accordance  with  his  instructions,  called  upon  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  en- 
quired whether  his  Government  would  respect 
Belgian  neutrality. 

"  I  am  sorry  to  say  *  No,'  "  answered  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  "  as,  in  consequence  of  the  German 
troops  having  crossed  the  frontier  already,  Belgian 
neutrality  has  been  already  violated."^ 

'  Blue  Book,  No.  160. 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe   121 

The  strategic  reason  for  the  crossing  of  the 
frontier  was  then  given  in  the  words  which  have 
already  been  quoted  above.  ^  There  is  no  need  to 
repeat  them  here.  But  it  is  useful  to  make  some 
quotations  from  the  conversation  which  the 
British  Ambassador  had  on  the  same  evening 
with  the  Imperial  Chancellor.  The  points  of 
view  of  Germany  and  England  are  there  con- 
trasted in  a  striking  manner.  I  take  them  from 
the  report  sent  to  Sir  Edward  Grey  by  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Berlin^: 

I  found  the  Chancellor  very  agitated.  His 
Excellency  at  once  began  a  harangue,  which  lasted 
for  about  twenty  minutes.  He  said  that  the  step 
taken  by  His  Majesty's  Government  was  terrible 
to  a  degree;  just  for  a  word — "neutrality,"  a  word 
which  in  war  time  had  so  often  been  disregarded — 
just  for  a  scrap  of  paper  Great  Britain  was  going  to 
make  war  on  a  kindred  nation  who  desired  nothing 
better  than  to  be  friends  with  her.  All  his  efforts 
in  that  direction  had  been  rendered  useless  by  this 
last  terrible  step,  and  the  poHcy  to  which,  as  I  knew, 
he  had  devoted  himself  since  his  accession  to  office 
had  tumbled  down  like  a  house  of  cards.  What  we 
had  done  was  unthinkable;  it  was  like  striking  a 
man  from  behind  while  he  was  fighting  for  his  life 
against  two  assailants.  He  held  Great  Britain  re- 
sponsible for  all   the   terrible   events   that   might 

'  See  page  67.  » Blue  Book,  No.  160. 


122  The  War  of  191 4 

happen.  I  protested  strongly  against  this  statement 
and  said  that,  in  the  same  way  as  he  and  Herr  von 
Jagow  wished  me  to  understand  that  for  strategical 
reasons  it  was  a  matter  of  Hfe  and  death  to  Germany 
to  advance  through  Belgium  and  violate  the  latter's 
neutrality,  so  I  would  wish  him  to  understand  that 
it  was,  so  to  speak,  a  matter  of  "life  and  death "  for 
the  honour  of  Great  Britain  that  she  should  keep 
her  solemn  engagement  to  do  her  utmost  to  defend 
Belgium's  neutrality  if  attacked.  That  solemn 
compact  simply  had  to  be  kept,  or  what  confidence 
could  anyone  have  in  engagements  given  by  Great 
Britain  in  the  future?  The  Chancellor  said:  "But 
at  what  price  will  that  compact  have  been  kept? 
Has  the  British  Government  thought  of  that?" 
I  hinted  to  His  Excellency  as  plainly  as  I  could  that 
fear  of  consequences  could  hardly  be  regarded  as  an 
excuse  for  breaking  solemn  engagements,  but  His 
Excellency  was  so  excited,  so  evidently  overcome 
by  the  news  of  our  action,  and  so  little  disposed 
to  hear  reason  that  I  refrained  from  adding  fuel  to 
the  flame  by  further  argument.  As  I  was  leaving 
he  said  that  the  blow  of  Great  Britain  joining 
Germany's  enemies  was  all  the  greater  that  almost 
up  to  the  last  moment  he  and  his  Government  had 
been  working  with  us  and  supporting  our  efforts  to 
maintain  peace  between  Austria  and  Russia.  I 
said  that  this  was  part  of  the  tragedy  which  saw 
the  two  nations  fall  apart  just  at  the  moment  when 
the  relations  between  them  had  been  more  friendly 
and  cordial  than  they  had  been  for  years.  Unfor- 
tunately, notwithstanding  our  efforts  to  maintain 
peace  between  Russia  and  Austria,  the  war  had 
spread  and  had  brought  us  face  to  face  with  a 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe   123 

situation  which,  if  we  held  to  our  engagements,  we 
could  not  possibly  avoid,  and  which  unfortunately 
entailed  our  separation  from  our  late  fellow- workers. 
He  would  readily  understand  that  no  one  regretted 
this  more  than  I. 

What  an  impression  of  sombre  grandeur  emerges 
from  the  picture  here  outlined.  How  well  we 
realize  the  earnestness  of  the  dramatic  duologue. 
Nothing  is  omitted,  nothing  is  glozed  over,  in  this 
encounter.  Both  men  tremble  before  the  frightful 
responsibility  which  they  are  undertaking.  The 
deep  impulses  which  animate  them,  the  secret 
driving  power  of  their  thoughts,  alone  dominate 
them  at  this  moment.  The  interview  was  "some- 
what painful,"  the  Ambassador  said  simply  in 
his  report,  and  we  can  feel  the  pent-up  emotion 
which  this  word  enshrines  for  him. 

This  interview  sheds  a  strong  light  on  the  at- 
titudes of  Germany,  Great  Britain,  and  Belgium, 
not  only  in  the  conflict  which  was  about  to  break 
out,  but  also  during  all  the  preceding  period.  I 
will  here  sum  up  briefly  the  main  features  of  these 
attitudes. 

Great  Britain,  as  we  have  seen,  had  refused  the 
urgent  entreaties  of  Russia  and  France  to  place 
herself  at  their  side.  She  had  also  flatly  refused 
to  enter  into  any  undertaking  with  Germany  to 


124  The  War  of  191 4 

remain  outside  the  conflict  on  condition  that  she 
should  be  satisfied  with  certain  guarantees  as  to 
the  future  position  of  Belgium,  if,  as  was  prob- 
able, the  German  armies  were  to  violate  Belgian 
territory. 

Germany  had  hoped  that  as  soon  as  she  gave 
this  assurance  to  Great  Britain  the  latter  would 
think  that  the  risk  of  war  with  Germany  was  too 
high  a  price  to  pay  for  the  protection  of  Belgian 
neutrality.  And  so,  after  having  reconnoitred 
the  British  position  on  July  29th,  Germany  had 
put  off  from  day  to  day  her  answer  to  the  invita- 
tion of  Sir  Edward  Grey  that  she  should  enter 
into  a  formal  undertaking  to  respect  the  treaties. 
In  the  meantime  she  had  made  a  higher  bid  than 
that  which  she  first  offered  and  she  had  succes- 
sively reduced  her  demands,  until  on  August  4th 
she  guaranteed  the  integrity  and  independence  of 
Belgium  even  if  the  latter  were  to  offer  resistance 
to  the  German  troops.  Germany  had  thereby  re- 
vealed her  fixed  intention  to  take  as  much  from 
Belgium  as  Great  Britain  would  allow  her  to  take, 
and  she  had  shown  that  she  really  considered  Bel- 
gian neutrality  merely  as  an  object  for  bargaining. 

Belgium,  now — I  think  I  have  proved  this  in 
the  preceding  pages — waited  until  the  last  possible 
moment  before  asking  for  any  help.     She  knew 


Belgian  Neutrality  Before  Europe   125 

(and  this  was  a  sad  conviction  for  a  nation  which 
was  conscious  of  having  worthily  maintained  the 
place  which  elder  nations  had  made  for  her)  that 
her  neutrality  was  the  creation  of  others,  that 
she  was  in  the  hands  of  others,  that  all  her 
thoughts,  all  her  riches,  all  that  made  her  what 
she  was  scarcely  counted  at  this  supreme  crisis; 
and  she  did  not  ask  for  help  for  fear  of  awaking 
susceptibilities  or  of  not  keeping  full  liberty  of 
action.  When  the  German  menace  rose  before 
her  she  came  to  her  decision  alone,  without  taking 
advice  from  any  one,  without  furnishing  explana- 
tions or  excuses  to  any  one  because  she  was  not 
bound  to  any  one,  or  rather  because  she  was 
equally  bound  to  all  by  an  equal  respect  for  her 
obligations.  Even  in  this  tragic  moment  she  was 
willing  to  rely  on  the  sense  of  justice  of  her  guaran- 
tors— all  her  guarantors.  She  limited  herself  to 
pointing  out  to  them  the  unexpected  danger 
which  threatened  them  at  the  same  time  as  herself. 
She  refused  the  military  help  which  France  offered 
her.  Her  king,  remembering  what  Great  Britain 
had  spontaneously  done  in  identical  circumstances, 
asked  her — for  what?  For  arms  to  repel  the 
invader?  For  pledges,  before  exposing  his  little 
nation  to  the  worst  calamities?  No,  for  diplo- 
matic   intervention    in    order    to    safeguard    her 


126  The  War  of  191 4 

neutrality,  which  the  Powers  had  mutually  given 
a  solemn  promise  to  respect.  And  Belgium 
awaited  the  "act  of  war"  before  asking  her 
guarantors,  as  late  as  on  August  4th,  to  co-operate 
for  the  defence  of  her  territory. 

I  refrain  here  from  passing  any  judgment  on  the 
European  policy  of  any  of  the  Great  Powers. 
But  one  thing  I  must  do,  as  must  every  honest 
man,  and  that  is  to  affirm,  without  any  fear  of 
contradiction,  the  absolute  loyalty  of  Belgium 
during  the  course  of  all  the  negotiations  which 
preceded  the  war. 


IV 

The  Imputations  against  the  Loyalty  of 
Belgium 


itf 


IV 


THE   IMPUTATIONS   AGAINST    THE   LOYALTY    OF 
BELGIUM 

On  August  4th  one  point  seemed  to  be  clear, 
namely  the  admission  by  Germany  that  she  only 
violated  the  neutrality  of  Belgium  because  forced 
to  do  so  by  necessity.  Whether  the  necessity  was 
to  anticipate  the  presumed  intentions  of  France,' 
or  the  necessity  of  insuring  a  military  success, 
which  might  have  been  jeopardized  by  adopting 
any  other  route  than  that  through  Belgium, '  does 
not  matter :  the  point  is  that  Germany  did  not  at 
that  moment  make  any  accusation  against  Belgium. 
The  "Very  Confidential  Note"  paid  tribute  to  the 
"utmost  good  will"  of  Belgium,^  and  the  German 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  had  declared 
to  the  Belgian  Minister,  "The  correctness  of  your 
country's  attitude  has  been  perfect:  Germany 
can  have  no  complaint  against  her."^ 

'  See  pp.  39,  60.  '  See  pp.  64-65,  67. 

3  See  p.  39.  ^  See  pp.  65-66. 

9  129 


I30  The  War  of  191 4 

But  from  the  first  day  of  hostilities  a  curious 
change  came  over  the  German  attitude. 

On  the  one  hand  the  pubHc  were  left  in  ignorance 
of  facts  which  must  have  presented  Belgian 
politics  in  their  true  light.  Thus  the  Kolnische 
Zeitung  never  published  the  text  of  the  Belgian 
reply  to  the  "Very  Confidential  Note"  any  more 
than  it  published  the  text  of  the  speech  of  King 
Albert  to  Parliament.  Thus  again  in  the  German 
White  Book,  Belgium  is  never  once  mentioned, 
and  in  particular  no  reference  is  made  to  such 
typical  interviews  as  those  of  July  29th  and  30th 
at  Berlin.^  And,  what  is  more,  it  was  only  on 
August  8th  that  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  pub- 
lished a  telegram  of  the  Wolff  Agency  giving 
the  text  of  the  "very  confidential  note"  of  the 
2d,  and — I  would  call  the  reader's  particular 
attention  to  this — the  text  was  followed  by  this 
sentence:  "This  note  remained  unanswered" 
{Auf  diese  Note  erfolgte  keine  Antwort).''  Of  all 
that  Belgium  had  said,  of  all  that  she  had  done, 
not  one  word — except  a  flagrant  untruth. 

The  order  was  thus  given  to  conceal  the  loyalty 
of  Belgium  from  the  German  public.  At  the  same 
time  imputations  suddenly  sprang  up  on  all  sides; 

'  See  pp.  91,  92 

'  Urkunden,  Depeschen  und  Berichte  der  Frank/.  Ztg.,  p.  87. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      131 

a  savage  attack  was  made  on  the  good  name  of  the 
Httle  country  which  Germany's  troops  were  in- 
vading. The  most  harmless  incidents  were  ex- 
aggerated; the  most  upright  intentions  furnished 
matter  for  suspicion.  Germany  seemed  gradually 
to  make  the  discovery  that  the  deed  she  had  done 
was  justifiable  on  grounds  quite  different  from 
those  which  she  had  invoked :  that,  after  all,  Bel- 
gium had  been  guilty,  while  she  had  been  thought 
to  be  innocent.  Why  this  talk  of  the  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality?  The  neutrality  of  Belgium 
had  vanished ;  it  had  been  conjured  away  by  Bel- 
gium herself.  False  to  all  her  duties,  this  ob- 
structive country  had,  before  the  war,  parted 
with  her  freedom  for  the  benefit  of  Germany's 
enemies.  Forgetting  that  her  neutrality  imposed 
on  her  the  obligation  to  hold  aloof  from  the  com- 
plications of  international  politics,  she  had,  behind 
the  back  moreover  of  some  of  her  guarantors, 
put  her  hand  to  engagements  which  could  not 
be  tolerated.  Therefore  Belgium's  fate  was  just 
retribution;  her  cause  deserved  neither  interest 
nor  sympathy.  Even — and  this  argimient  has 
been  much  more  widely  echoed  in  neutral  countries 
than  common  sense  would  have  led  one  to  expect 
— it  was  Germany,  not  Belgium,  who  found  herself 
menaced: 


132  The  War  of  191 4 

Ought  we  to  have  waited  [wrote  a  correspondent 
of  the  Kolnische  Zeitung^  to  some  Dutch  friends] 
until  Belgium  and  the  Allies  into  whose  hands  she 
had  long  since  willingly  delivered  herself  had  given 
Aix-la-Chapelle  over  to  the  flames?  Or  ought  we 
to  have  marched  boldly  into  Belgium? 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  even  if  we  supposed  that 
all  these  accusations  had  been  substantiated,  not 
one  of  which  either  the  German  Government  or 
the  Imperial  Chancellor  or  the  Secretary  of  State 
thought  of  putting  forward  between  the  2d  and  the 
4th  of  August,  this  would  not  lighten  by  a  single 
grain  Germany's  load  of  moral  responsibility. 
She  tried  to  buy  another  nation's  complicity  in 
her  political  ends  at  the  price  of  Belgium's  very 
existence.  All  that  she  said  and  did  remains 
said  and  done. 

But  Belgium  does  not  intend  to  be  accused 
without  defending  herself  with  the  firm  deter- 
mination to  make  the  truth  known. 

We  must  therefore  recapitulate  patiently  the 
charges  made,  either  against  the  Government  or 
against  the  people  of  Belgium.  I  will  class  them 
under  three  heads : 

Hostile  acts  before  the  war; 

Subservience  to  France; 

Subservience  to  England. 

»  No.  1 1 88,  October  30th, 


Imputations  against  Belgium      133 

I  must  however  at  the  outset  refute  two  impu- 
tations which  are  independent  of  the  events  of 
the  present  war  and  which  are  designed  to  shake 
the  general  confidence  that  can  be  placed  in  the 
honesty  of  Belgium's  political  relations. 

It  has  been  said  that  Belgium'  had  already- 
failed  to  respect  her  international  engagements 
when  it  was  a  question  of  observing  the  obligations 
of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  with  regard  to  freedom  of 
trade  and  suppression  of  slavery  in  the  Congo. 
The  answer  is  easy. 

Opinion  may  differ  as  to  the  administration  of 
the  former  Congo  Free  State,  but  one  thing  is 
certain:  it  was  the  administration  of  that  State 
and  in  no  way  that  of  Belgium.  When  Belgium 
acquired  sovereignty  over  the  Congo  she  intro- 
duced prompt  and  radical  changes  into  the  econo- 
mic administration.  The  annexation  dates  from 
November,  1908,  the  Reform  Decrees  from  19 10, 
and  the  new  administration  conformed  so  exactly 
with  the  stipulations  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  and 
the  confidence  of  the  Powers  in  the  manner  in 
which  Belgium  observed  treaty  obligations  was  so 
great,  that  all  oi  them  recognized  the  annexa- 
tion, and  Germany  herself  was  the  first  to  do  so. 

The  accusation  is  therefore  without  any  founda- 

'  Kolnische  Zeitung,  No.  1028,  November  15th. 


134  The  War  of  191 4 

tion.  It  forms  the  ground,  I  may  add,  of  an 
opinion  which  has  been  fostered  in  certain  German 
circles,  and  to  which  Bernhardi  in  particular  gave 
expression  in  the  work  from  which  I  have  already 
quoted. '  Belgium  had,  he  said,  profoundly  changed 
the  neutrality  guaranteed  to  her  by  the  Treaties  of 
1839  because,  since  then,  she  had  annexed  the 
Congo.  This  point  of  view  omits  to  take  into 
consideration  one  single  factor,  but  it  is  one  of 
capital  importance.  This  is  precisely  the  fact 
that  the  guarantor  Powers  recognized  the  annexa- 
tion without  formulating  any  reservations.  This 
was  clear  evidence  that  they  did  not  consider  that 
the  equilibrium  of  interests  established  by  the 
Treaties  of  1839  or  the  guarantees  that  they  had 
assumed  were  impaired  by  the  constitution  of  the 
Congo  into  a  Belgian  Colony. 

A  second  proof  of  the  inability  of  Belgium  to 
carry  out  her  international  obligations  is  to  be 
found,  according  to  some,  in  the  inadequacy  of 
her  military  organization.^ 

It  is  wholly  erroneous  to  suppose  that  Belgium, 
even  before  the  recent  reorganization  of  her  army, 
had   neglected   the   duties   of   defence.     On   the 

'  Deutschland  und  der  ndchste  Krieg  (6th  edition,  p.  123). 
*  See  for  instance  von  Blume,  Die  belgische  Neutralitdt  und  Wir, 
in  Das  Grossere  Deutschland,  1914,  pp.  1041  and  onward. 


Imputations  against  Belgium       135 

contrary,  she  possessed  a  well-ordered  system  of 
strategic  protection.  The  fortress  of  Antwerp, 
which  formed  an  entrenched  camp  of  the  first 
order,  the  fortifications  of  Liege  and  Namur, 
which  served  as  places  d'arret,  bridgeheads,  and 
points  d'appui,  and  the  field  army  supplemented 
by  the  fortress  army,  these  three  elements  to- 
gether formed  a  defensive  organization  capable  of 
holding  the  army  of  an  invading  country  in  check 
pending  the  intervention  of  the  other  guarantor 
countries. 

The  expenditure  sanctioned  for  fortifications 
had  been  considerable.  To  quote  only  the  most 
recent  one,  an  extraordinary  vote  of  £2,520,000 
was  granted  for  the  erection  round  Antwerp  on 
both  banks  of  the  Scheldt  of  thirteen  new  forts 
and  twelve  new  redoubts  in  the  exterior  line,  for 
the  completion  of  the  twelve  existing  forts  in  the 
interior  line,  and  the  erection  of  two  new  forts  for 
the  defence  of  the  lower  Scheldt.  A  short  time 
afterwards  the  expenditure  was  still  further  in- 
creased by  another  £160,000.  The  defences  of 
the  Meuse  forts  had  meanwhile  been  completely 
equipped. 

As  to  the  effective  strength  of  the  army,  it  had 
consisted  of  180,000  men  until  the  reform  of 
1909-13;  that  is  to  say,  sufficient,  in  the  opinion 


136  The  War  of  191 4 

of  the  most  competent  military  authorities,  to 
play  the  part  necessitated  by  the  various  require- 
ments of  the  defence  of  the  country  as  a  whole. 
But  since  the  modifications  introduced  in  the 
strategic  disposition  of  the  neighbouring  countries 
it  had  been  manifestly  insufficient.  The  Belgians 
did  not  hesitate  to  respond  to  the  appeals  made 
to  them  by  their  sovereigns.  A  campaign  of 
public  opinion  was  organized  and  the  country 
accepted  without  demur  the  increase  of  army 
expenditure.  In  this  way  the  effective  strength  of 
the  first  line,  independently  of  the  reserves,  was 
to  be  doubled. 

The  ordinary  annual  expendittire  on  the  army 
had  risen  from  about  £2,750,000,  the  average  of 
the  first  decade  of  the  present  century,  to  £3,500,000 
for  the  year  19 13,  an  increase  of  approximately 
thirty  per  cent.,  due  largely  to  the  reform  which, 
from  1909  onwards,  had  established  the  rule  of 
every  family  providing  a  son  for  the  military 
duties,  and  in  19 13  had  imposed  general  service. 
The  organization  of  the  higher  commands  of  the 
army  had  at  the  same  time  undergone  some 
important  alterations. 

Moreover,  the  experience  of  the  present  war 
shows  sufficiently  what  the  Belgian  army  was 
capable  of. 


\       Imputations  against  Belgium       137 

In  the  first  place  it  was  concentrated  and  ready 
for  action  in  so  short  a  time  and  such  perfect 
order  that  the  German  military  attache  congratu- 
lated the  permanent  Secretary  of  the  War  Office 
on  the  performance.  All  the  services  were  set  up 
in  less  than  five  days  from  the  time  when  the 
mobilization  order  was  issued,  with  the  result 
that  the  German  troops,  sudden  as  was  their 
attack  (the  note  of  August  26.  preceded  the  viola- 
tion of  the  frontier  by  only  thirty-six  hours),  were 
not  able  to  throw  the  organization  of  the  defence 
out  of  gear,  and  found  themselves  face  to  face 
with  an  army  fully  prepared.  The  destruction  of 
bridges  and  tunnels  which  might  have  been  useful 
to  the  enemy  was  completed,  and  all  communica- 
tions with  the  rear  were  secured. 

As  to  the  active  part  played  by  the  army, 
from  the  very  commencement  of  hostilities  it  has 
compelled  the  admiration  even  of  the  Germans. 
Alike  in  the  sectors  of  the  forts,  in  trenches  in  the 
open,  and  on  the  main  lines  of  communication, 
rivers,  canals,  or  railways  whose  passage  had  to  be 
resisted,  Belgian  soldiers  have  sustained  an  unequal 
combat  with  a  valour,  bravery,  and  endurance 
worthy  of  the  highest  praise.  And  it  is  really 
farcical  to  denounce  the  military  weakness  of  a 
country  of  which  Germany  had  on  August  9th 


138  The  War  of  191 4 

officially  to  acknowledge  "the  heroic  resistance 
against  considerably  superior  forces."' 

But  none  could  foresee,  that,  under  the  fire  of 
the  heavy  Krupp  guns,  concrete  forts  would  form 
a  less  durable  barrier  than  trenches  in  the  ground, 
and  when  Antwerp  was  spoken  of  by  the  greatest 
experts  as  "the  impregnable  city"  they  did  not 
think  that  they  were  using  merely  an  empty 
phrase. 

This  fable  of  Belgium's  being  oblivious  of  her 
military  duties  must  therefore  be  silenced  once 
and  for  all. 

But  there  is  one  aspect  of  the  charges  made  by 
von  Blume  which  is  particularly  ridiculous.  How 
could  one  admit  that  Germany  should  have  chosen 
for  her  chastisement  of  Belgium  the  very  year  in 
which  the  final  reform  of  the  Belgian  army,  already 
greatly  strengthened  since  1909,  was  to  be  com- 
pleted? Germany  never  addressed  any  diplomatic 
remonstrances  to  Belgium  on  this  subject;  on  the 
contrary,  in  19 12  the  Emperor  showed  astonish- 
ment at  the  measures  of  defence  taken  by  the 
Belgian  Government  when  he  received  at  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  the  Belgian  General  who  had  been  sent 
to  welcome  him  on  behalf  of  the  King.  The  truth 
is  that  Germany  knew  that  Belgium  had  voted 

'  See  page  1 13. 


Imputations  against  Belgium       139 

very  considerable  sums  for  her  fortifications  and 
military  organization,  and  she  was  not  unaware 
of  the  significance  of  this  expenditure. 

In  this  connection  the  Prime  Minister,  M.  de 
Broqueville,  described  very  clearly  the  meaning 
of  Belgium's  continued  efforts,  at  the  sitting  of  the 
Chamber  on  November  30,  191 1,  when  he  said: 

Our  forts  and  our  army  are  the  expression  of  our 
immutable  resolve  to  remain  a  free  and  independent 
people.  They  are',  as  it  were,  the  assertion  of  our 
national  pride  and  the  earnest  of  Belgium's  partici- 
pation in  the  task  of  maintaining  the  integrity  of  her 
territory  as  well  as  of  her  independence  and  national 
safety.  We  would  scorn  to  lend  ourselves  to  any 
arrangement  that  could  be  open  to  suspicion.  We 
Belgians  mean  to  remain  Belgians,  and  for  that  very 
reason  we  mean  to  remain  always  loyal  and  honest 
patriots. 

But  I  must  waste  no  more  time  in  coming  to  the 
specific  allegations  made  against  Belgium. 

Hostile  Acts  before  the  War 

Before  the  opening  of  hostilities  no  complaint 
was  addressed  directly  to  Belgium. 

However,  on  July  31st,  the  German  Secretary 
of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs,  in  conversation 
with  the  British  Ambassador  at  Berlin,  gave  the 


140  The  War  of  191 4 

latter  to  understand  that  hostile  acts  had  been 
committed  by  Belgium  before  that  date.  "For 
instance,"  he  said,  "a  consignment  of  com  for 
Germany  has  been  placed  under  an  embargo 
already."  Apart  from  this  "instance"  no  other 
fact  had  then,  or  afterwards,  been  adduced. 

On  the  same  day  on  which  this  so-called  hostile 
act  was  denounced  at  Berlin,  the  German  Min- 
ister at  Brussels  addressed  the  following  friendly 
request  to  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs ' : 

I  am  informed  from  Antwerp  that  the  Customs 
have  forbidden  the  despatch  of  vessels  containing 
cargoes  of  grain  for  Germany. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  it  is  not  in  this  case  a 
question  of  the  export  of  grain,  but  of  grain  in  transit, 
the  goods  in  question  having  been  merely  trans- 
shipped at  Antwerp,  I  have  the  honour  to  ask  your 
good  offices  in  order  that  the  vessels  in  question 
may  be  allowed  to  leave  for  Germany. 

At  the  same  time  I  beg  your  Excellency  to  inform 
me  if  the  port  of  Antwerp  is  closed  for  the  transit  of 
those  goods  specified  in  the  Moniteur  of  to-day. 

On  the  following  day,  August  1st,  the  Belgian 
Minister  replied^: 

In  reply  to  your  Excellency's  note  of  July  31st,  I 
have  the  honour  to  inform  you  that  the  Belgian 

»  Grey  Book,  No.  79,  Annex  2. 
'  Ibid.,  Annex  3. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      141 

decree  of  July  30th  concerns  onl}^  the  export  and 
not  the  transit  of  the  products  mentioned. 

I  at  once  communicated  your  note  to  the  Minister 
of  Finance  and  begged  him  to  issue  precise  instruc- 
tions to  the  customs  officials  in  order  that  any  error 
in  the  application  of  the  above-mentioned  decree 
might  be  avoided. 

And  on  the  same  day,  so  anxious  were  the  Bel- 
gian Government  to  do  nothing  that  could  lend 
any  colour  to  the  suggestion  that  they  were  not 
friendly  disposed,  the  liberation  of  the  consignment 
of  com  was  authorized.  The  delay  was  due  to 
a  pure  misunderstanding,  and,  moreover,  as  the 
Minister  explained  in  a  further  letter  to  the  Ger- 
man Minister, '  it  was  merely  a  matter  of  customs 
formalities:  there  was  no  intention  to  hinder  in 
any  way  the  transit  of  the  goods.  The  measures 
taken  by  the  Belgian  Government  at  this  time 
merely  constituted  elementary  precautions  which 
it  is  the  right  and  the  duty  of  every  State  to  take 
in  such  exceptional  circumstances. 

The  "hostile  act"  therefore  really  reduces  itself 
to  a  mark  of  "good  offices,"  to  use  the  very  ex- 
pression that  was  employed  by  the  German 
Minister. 

But  this  did  not  prevent  the  Kolnische  Zeitung — 
that  important  newspaper  whose  correspondents 

'  Grey  Book,  No.  79,  Annex  2. 


142  The  War  of  191 4 

have  always  received  the  most  cordial  hospitality 
at  Brussels — from  publishing  on  August  loth,^  an 
article  headed  "Belgian  Neutrality"  from  which 
I  quote  the  following  extracts : 

Our  enemies  allege  that  in  entering  Belgium  we 
violated  the  so-called  Belgian  neutrality.  What  this 
so-called  neutrality  has  really  been  is  plainly  shown 
by  a  series  of  actions  of  which  the  following  is  an 
instance. 

Here  follows  a  flagrantly  misleading  account  of 
the  incident,  and  the  article  concludes : 

This  violation  of  international  law  occurred  on 
Friday,  July  31st,  two  days  before  Germany  sent 
her  ultimatum  to  Belgium.  The  first  act  of  illegal- 
ity and  of  unfriendliness  in  the  highest  degree  (wider- 
rechtlich  und  im  hochsten  Grade  unfreundlich)  was 
therefore  committed  not  by  Germany  but  by 
Belgium. 

To  quote  another  charge,  it  is  hardly  necessary 
to  point  out  the  fantastic  nature  of  the  other  as- 
sertion made  by  a  well-known  German  Member  of 
Parliament,  Herr  Erzberger^: 

In  the  morning  of  August  2d,  the  Landsturm  at 
Aix-la-Chapelle  were  called  out.  The  troops  fought 
all  day  and  all  night  against  the  French  and  Belgian 
soldiers  who  on  Sunday  were  already  advancing 

'  No.  901. 

» See  extract  from  the  Tag  reprinted  in  the  Berliner  TageblaU 
of  October  7th. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      143 

through  our  woods  as  far  as  the  road  called  chemin 
des  Prussiens. 

When  it  is  remembered — among  a  hundred  other 
things — that  on  the  night  of  August  2d-3d  the 
German  Minister  at  Brussels  had  not  been  able  to 
furnish  the  General  Secretary  of  the  Department 
of  Foreign  Affairs  with  anything  more  than  very 
vague  indications  of  an  alleged  violation  of  frontier 
committed  by  French  troops  in  Germany,  when 
it  is  remembered  that  the  first  act  of  war  took 
place  at  Gemmenich  in  Belgium  on  the  morning 
of  August  4th,  one  wonders  which  is  the  more 
astonishing,  Herr  Erzberger's  powers  of  imagina- 
tion or  the  tenacity  of  the  Berliner  Tageblatt  which 
still  publishes  this  story  on  October  7th,  two 
months  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

Similarly  it  has  been  alleged  that  various 
measures  taken  before  there  was  any  question  of  a 
threat  from  Germany  reveal  the  warlike  intentions 
of  Belgium. 

This  is  what  the  Kolnische  Zeitung  of  August 
28th ^  calls  a  "proof"  {ein  Beweis): 

A  Proof  of  Belgian  Neutrality 

A  non-commissioned  officer  who  accompanied  a 
convoy  of  Belgian  prisoners  to  Munster  has  sent  us 

'  No.  967. 


144  The  War  of  191 4 

a  coloured  chart  given  to  him  by  a  prisoner.  In 
this  chart  are  shown,  standing  fraternally  side  by 
side,  in  three  rows,  Belgian,  French,  and  British 
soldiers  of  all  arms  in  coloured  uniform.  The  Bel- 
gian prisoner  assured  our  informant  (who  guarantees 
the  accuracy  of  his  story)  that  these  charts  had  been 
distributed  to  all  Belgian  soldiers  three  days  before 
the  official  mobilization,  with  instructions  that  they 
should  study  them  carefully.  The  French  and 
British  soldiers,  with  whose  appearance  they  were  to 
familiarize  themselves  from  the  pictures,  were  to  be 
their  allies  in  the  coming  war. 

I  am  sorry  for  the  sake  of  the  man  who  "guar- 
anteed" the  accuracy  of  this  story,  to  have  to 
assure  him,  on  the  authorit}'  of  official  information, 
that  the  charts  in  question  were  first  distributed 
in  the  course  of  the  second  week  of  the  month  of 
August.  I  will  further  inform  him  that  at  the 
same  time  pictures  showing  the  differences  between 
the  various  types  of  aeroplanes  were  distributed 
and  posted  up  in  a  similar  way. 

Then  there  is  another  little  episode,  the  story  of 
which  was  sent  on  September  9th  to  the  Nord- 
deutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitiing  by  a  gentleman  of 
responsibility  w-hom  I  should  never  have  thought 
likely  to  consecrate  to  this  purpose  the  time  that 
he  lately  used  to  employ  more  w^orthily  when  he 
won  general  popularity  as  Director  of  the  German 
School  at  Antwerp. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      145 

I  learn  from  Mme.  Fr.,  wife  of  the  Oberlehreroi  that 
name,  who  did  not  leave  Antwerp  until  the  begin- 
ning of  the  month,  that  all  the  rooms  of  the  German 
school,  including  the  director's  apartments,  are  used 
as  barracks  for  the  Belgian  army.  This  leads  me  to 
communicate  to  you  a  fact  which  is  perhaps  not 
without  political  importance.  About  the  middle  of 
June  of  this  j^ear  a  police  officer  came  to  the  school 
and  at  the  beginning  of  July  an  officer  of  the  Belgian 
army  also  came  (in  each  case  in  the  absence  of  the 
director)  to  inspect  the  rooms  in  the  school.  In 
answer  to  an  enquiry  from  us,  the  reply  was  given 
on  both  occasions  that  it  was  a  question  of  deciding 
how  many  soldiers  could  be  billeted  in  the  school. 
At  the  second  visit,  the  statement  was  made  that 
the  school  could  house  a  battalion,  including  the 
regimental  staff.  In  the  course  of  the  twelve  and 
a  half  years  of  my  work  at  Antwerp,  such  a  thing 
has  never  happened  before  at  the  school.  It  is  a 
curious  coincidence  that  these  enquiries  should  have 
been  made,  the  first  six  weeks  and  the  second  four 
weeks,  before  war  broke  out,  and  one  which  admits 
of  the  inference  that  in  Belgium  the  authorities 
already  reckoned  on  war  and  on  the  occupation  of 
the  school  by  troops. 

The  gentleman  who  makes  this  grave  disclosure 
perhaps  did  not  know  that  a  census  is  made 
periodically  of  places  available  for  billeting  troops 
in  case  of  war.  If— to  his  knowledge  at  any  rate — 
his  school  had  not  before  been  included  in  the 
census,  this  was  because,  in  consequence  of  the 


146  The  War  of  1914 

reform  of  the  army  and  the  marked  increase  in  its 
strength  in  1 9 13,  the  need  arose  to  make  more 
extensive  accommodation  available  and  a  new 
general  census  became  necessary. 

Another  correspondent  of  the  Kohiische  Zeitung 
discovered'  that,  during  the  course  of  last  June,  the 
authorities  made  an  investigation  at  Antwerp  as 
to  what  places  could  be  used  by  the  various 
branches  of  the  public  service  in  case  the  Govern- 
ment had  to  take  up  its  quarters  there.  Perfectly 
true:  this  operation,  called  "civil  mobilization," 
had  been  arranged  long  beforehand  and  was  the 
subject  of  a  very  complete  dossier  in  the  Ministry 
for  Foreign  Affairs  which  had  given  rise  from  time 
to  time  to  various  practical  steps  for  the  execution 
of  the  plan. 

The  readers  of  the  great  Rhenish  newspaper 
will  also  learn  with  interest  that  long  before  the 
Austro-Servian  dispute,  the  Belgian  General  Staff 
had  studied  the  possibilities  of  provisioning  the 
town  of  Antwerp  on  the  hypothesis  that  it  might 
become  the  seat  of  Government  in  time  of  war. 

Innumerable  other  matters  had  also  been  the 
object  of  study  long  before  with  a  view  to  pre- 
paring the  fortress  of  Antwerp,  in  time  of  peace, 
to  play  the  part  that  had  been  assigned  to  it  in  the 

'  No.  1046,  September  20th. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      147 

plan  of  defence  of  the  country.  None  of  these 
studies  had  any  connection  with  the  war  that 
broke  out  last  year.  They  mereh''  represent 
measures  of  precaution  which  must  be  taken  by 
every  government  that  is  anxious  to  ensure  that 
its  country  shall  not  be  caught  unprepared  in  a 
war,  and,  moreover,  they  prove  once  more  how 
unjust  is  the  complaint  made  nowadays  against 
Belgium  that  she  did  not  take  sufhcient  precau- 
tions for  the  defence  of  her  neutrality. 

It  is  incredible  that  such  measures  could  furnish 
grounds  of  complaint  against  a  country  which, 
after  all,  has  not  been  put  in  tutelage,  and  remains 
mistress  in  her  own  house. 

Subservience  to  France 

In  the  proclamation  addressed  to  the  Belgians 
on  August  4th  by  General  von  Emmich,  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  the  German  Army  of  the  Meuse, 
at  the  moment  when  his  troops  crossed  the  frontier, 
the  violation  of  the  territory  is  justified  by  quite 
a  new  reason.  It  will  be  remembered  that  the 
"Very  Confidential  Note"  of  August  2d  alleged 
the  concentration  near  Givet  of  masses  of  French 
troops  whose  advance  it  was  necessary  for  Ger- 
many to  anticipate.  Nor  on  the  other  hand  will 
the  categorical  explanation  be  forgotten  that  was 


148  The  War  of  191 4 

given  by  the  Secretary  of  State  at  Berlin :  Germany, 
threatened  simultaneously  by  France  and  Russia, 
had  to  choose  the  easiest  route  in  order  to  gain 
time,  and  this  route  was  through  Belgium. 
The  proclamation  says  something  different : 

I  feel  the  greatest  regret  that  the  German  troops 
find  themselves  obliged  to  cross  the  frontier  of 
Belgium.  They  act  according  to  the  dictates  of 
inevitable  necessity,  Belgian  neutrality  having 
been  already  violated  by  French  officers,  who,  dis- 
guised, crossed  Belgian  territory  in  a  motor  car  in 
order  to  penetrate  into  Germany. 

A  variant  is  given  on  August  9th  by  General 
von  Bulow,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Second 
German  Army.    The  following  is  the  text: 

We  have  been  obliged  to  enter  Belgian  territory 
in  order  to  safeguard  the  interests  of  our  national 
defence. 

We  are  fighting  the  Belgian  army  solely  to  force  a 
passage  towards  France  which  your  Government  has 
wrongfully  refused  to  us  although  they  have  allowed 
the  French  to  make  a  military  reconnaissance,  a 
fact  which  your  papers  have  concealed  from  you. 

No  particulars  are  given,  it  is  all  bare  assertion. 

Similar  wanton  statements  are  made  in  the 
offfcial  communique  {amtlich)  of  Quartermaster- 
General  von  Stein  on  August  i8th': 

'  See,  for  instance,  Leipziger  Neueste  Nachrichten  Sonder 
Ausgabe. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      149 

We  have  received  information  that  before  the 
war  French  officers  and  perhaps  also  soldiers  were 
sent  to  Liege  to  instruct  the  Belgian  army  in  work- 
ing the  forts.  Before  the  commencement  of  hostili- 
ties there  would  be  nothing  to  criticize  in  this,  but 
after  the  outbreak  of  the  war  it  constituted  a  viola- 
tion by  France  of  Belgian  neutrality.  Also  we  had 
to  act  quickly. 

The  futility  of  this  accusation  is  obvious  to 
any  one.  Belgium  had  had  modern  fortifications 
and  military  engineers  of  European  reputation  for 
long  enough  not  to  need  to  have  recourse  to 
foreign  instructors.  But  it  is  always  only  a  ques- 
tion of  bare  assertion  not  open  to  any  critical  test. 

The  only  corroborative  details  adduced  at  a 
later  date  by  the  Kolnische  Zeitung  of  August 
26th, '  at  a  time  when  almost  the  whole  of  Bel- 
gium was  occupied,  are  as  follows.  I  reproduce 
them  textually. 

Belgian  Neutrality 

We  have  received  the  following  letter  from  a  firm 
at  Cologne: 

"I  am  in  a  position  to  communicate  to  you  a  fact 
which  shows  the  curious  conception  that  the  Bel- 
gians in  general  have  of  their  neutrality.  Their 
formula  is  'Our  sympathies  draw  us  towards 
Prance,'  an  expression  that  I  heard  over  and  over 
again  at  the  end  of  July  from  the  lips  of  business 

'  No.  959. 


150  The  War  of  191 4 

friends.  On  the  evening  of  Sunday  the  2d  inst., 
about  8  or  9  o'clock,  when  Belgium  had  already 
been  mobilizing  for  some  days,  I  met  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Charieroi  station  Monsieur  D.,  of  the 
firm  A.  Ch.  He  told  me  in  confidence  that  he  had 
just  seen  at  the  station  arriving  from  Namur  a 
military  motor  car  containing  five  or  six  French 
officers,  in  uniform,  looking  greatly  upset.  They  had 
got  into  the  nine  o'clock  train  for  France.  To  my 
remark  that  these  officers  ought  to  have  been  ar- 
rested since  a  state  of  mobilization  existed,  he  made 
some  vague  response,  but  he  admitted  in  a  some- 
what veiled  way  that  if  these  officers  had  been 
German  they  would  have  met  with  short  shrift. 

' '  We  would  point  out  to  you  particularly  that  the 
gentleman  in  question  is  a  person  of  most  upright 
character  so  that  we  can  guarantee  the  genuineness 
of  the  communication.  We  have  not  given  the 
names  in  full,  but  they  are  at  your  disposal  if  you 
wish." 

This  information  is  second-hand.  But  the 
Norddeutscher  Allgemeine  Zeitung  has  published 
seven  depositions  made  by  witnesses  before  Ger- 
man judges,  and  these  were  reproduced  in  the 
Journal  of  the  War.^  These  seven  depositions 
are  in  agreement  on  one  point,  namely,  the  presence 
of  French  officers  or  soldiers  in  Belgium  at  a 
period  anterior  to  the  war — even  as  far  back  as 
191 1.     But  they  vary  as  to  places  and  circum- 

'  November  number,  pp.  i6  and  17. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      151 

stances.  One  says  Charleroi,  another  Erquelines, 
another  the  Ougree  road,  another  Brussels,  another 
Quievrain.  I  do  not  wish  to  suggest  that  the 
witnesses  whose  declarations  are  reported  did  not 
say  what  they  thought  to  be  the  truth,  but  various 
facts  within  my  knowledge  lead  me  rather  to  the 
conclusion  that  mistakes  have  arisen.  Thus  at 
Gand,  in  the  first  days  of  August,  a  Belgian 
barrister  thought  he  saw  French  officers  in  a  motor 
car;  as  a  matter  of  fact  these  were  officers  of  the 
"Marie  Henriette"  regiment  of  Brussels  mounted 
civic  guard.  Another  resident  at  Gand,  whom  I 
know  personally,  mistook  two  officers  of  the  Bel- 
gian Military  Engineers  for  two  French  officers. 
In  fact  the  uniforms  of  troops  quartered  in  unusual 
places  were  largely  unfamiliar  to  the  public.  At 
Brussels  on  August  3d — that  is  to  say  after  the 
German  Note — a  French  soldier  on  furlough  who 
had  been  recalled  by  mobilization  orders  was  car- 
ried in  triumph  by  the  crowd  on  the  Boulevard 
Anspach:  of  course  he  was  unarmed.  The  day 
before,  some  French  soldiers,  also  on  furlough — as 
is  usual  each  year  at  the  time  of  the  national 
holidays,  when  the  sons  of  the  numerous  French 
families  visiting  in  Brussels  are  coming  home — 
had  been  cheered  by  the  French  "  habitues"  of  a 
cafe  on  the  Boulevard  Anspach  on  their  way  to 


152  The  War  of  191 4 

the  Southern  Station,  where  they  took  the  train 
for  France.  Similarly,  at  Brussels  the  French 
Military  Attache  continued  to  walk  about  in  uni- 
form. Lastly,  Belgian  soldiers  of  the  regiments  of 
Guides  wear  red  trousers  and  are  hardly  known 
at  all  except  to  the  people  of  Brussels.  It  is 
obvious  that  many  other  similar  confusions  may 
have  arisen. 

The  official  communique  {Amtliche  Mitteilung) 
sent  from  Berlin  on  August  3d  to  the  German 
press  looks  more  serious.  ^  It  contains  the  follow- 
ing sentence  which  essays  yet  another  different 
justification  of  the  violation  of  Belgian  territory 
by  Germany: 

French  bomb-throwing  aeroplanes  have  violated 
Belgian  neutrality  and  flew  over  Belgian  territory 
yesterday  (Sunday,  August  2d)  evening  on  their  way 
to  the  Rhine  Province  to  destroy  our  railway  lines. 

The  communique  went  the  round  of  the  press  to 
such  good  effect  that  in  the  pamphlet  Die  Wahrheit 
ilber  denKrieg  ("The  Truth  about  the  War"),  pub- 
lished by  a  body  of  well-known  men,  one  may  read 
to-day^  that  masses  of  French  aeroplanes  {Massen 
von  franzosischen  Fliegern)  flew  over  Belgium. 

'  See,  for  instance,  the  Kolnische  Zeitung,  No.  882  of  the  4th  of 
August. 

'  Second  edition,  p.  28. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      153 

Although  it  did  not  receive  the  seal  of  official 
authority  another  imputation  made  by  the  Kdl- 
nische  Zeitimg '  is  none  the  less  worth  quoting : 

We  learn  from  an  eyewitness  that  before  the  issue 
of  the  ultimatum,  a  French  aeroplane  came  to 
ground  at  Antwerp  without  being  seized  by  the 
Belgians. 

The  gravity  of  these  assertions  had  demanded 
clear  and  precise  details,  with  the  mention  of 
localities,  hours,  witnesses,  the  circumstances  in 
which  they  assured  themselves  of  the  presence  of 
aviators,  the  proofs  that  they  had  of  their  French 
nationality,  etc.  A  comparison  may  usefully  be 
made  with  the  very  vague  text  of  the  curious 
declaration  that  the  German  Minister  at  Brussels 
made  on  the  night  of  August  2d-3d  to  the  Gen- 
eral Secretary  of  the  Department  of  Foreign 
Affairs.  ^ 

Now,  the  Government  of  the  French  RepubHc, 
in  their  official  statement  of  August  4th  to  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  gave  a  categorical  denial  to 
the  German  communique.  "At  no  time  has  any 
French  aviator  penetrated  into  Belgium,"  runs 
the  statement  read  by  the  President  of  the 
Council. 

'  No.  901,  August  10th. 
'See  p.  61. 


154  The  War  of  191 4 

So  true  is  this  that  the  French  Minister  at 
Brussels  went  on  August  4th  in  the  afternoon  to 
the  Ministry  for  War,  after  having  already  received 
news  of  the  violation  of  the  Belgian  frontier  by 
German  troops,  to  ask  permission  for  French  Mili- 
tary aviators  to  fly  over  Belgium.  It  was  not 
until  the  day  after  that  a  definitive  reply  could 
be  given  to  him,  after  the  appeal  was  sent  by 
Belgium  to  her  guarantors.  At  this  time,  how- 
ever, the  violation  of  the  frontier  was  already  an 
accomplished  fact. 

Here  is  another  series  of  imputations.  They 
have  an  aim  which  is  altogether  beside  the  ques- 
tion, namely,  to  justify  the  action  of  Germany  by 
adducing  facts  which  are  supposed  to  have  taken 
place  before  the  opening  of  hostilities  but  could  not 
have  been  known  to  the  German  authorities  at 
the  time  when  the  "Very  Confidential  Note"  of 
August  2d  was  presented.  These  facts  are  wholly 
irrelevant  and  I  only  recall  them  here  in  order  to 
show  the  pains  that  the  organs  of  German  public 
opinion  take  to  defend  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality.  Moreover  one  date  dominates  all  these 
allegations.  It  was  on  July  29th  that  the  Imperial 
Chancellor,  in  his  conversation  with  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Berlin,  announced  for  the  first 
time  that,  in  the  event  of  a  conflict  with  France 


Imputations  against  Belgium      155 

Germany  would  only  respect  the  integrity  of 
Belgium  if  she  did  not  resist  the  free  passage  of 
German  troops  across  her  territory.  There  was  no 
question  then  of  reprisals  against  Belgium  any 
more  than  there  was  any  question  of  them  in  the 
very  clear  explanations  given  by  the  Secretary  of 
State  to  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin  on  the 
day  of  the  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations. ' 

The  Berliner  Tageblatt,  quoted  by  the  Kolnische 
Zeitung,''  asserts  that  there  existed  at  the  British 
Foreign  Office  evidence  that  the  plans  of  French 
mobilization  indicated  an  accord  between  Belgium 
and  France  by  the  terms  of  which  Belgium  was  to 
grant  to  France  free  passage  for  her  troops  in 
order  that  they  might  penetrate  into  the  heart  of 
Germany. 

And  in  support  of  this  unsubstantiated  assertion 
the  Berlin  newspaper  reports  such  gossip  as  the 
following : 

France  and  Belgian  Neutrality 

A  German  who  has  lived  fifteen  years  at  Paris 
and  is  thoroughly  familiar  with  the  distinctive  signs 
of  the  French  Army,  assures  me  of  the  following  fact, 
which  he  is  ready  to  repeat  if  desired.  On  the 
morning  of  August  3d,  that  is  to  say  the  day  before 
the  expiry  of  the  German  ultimatum  to  Belgium, 

'  See  p.  64. 

^  No.  793,  September  8th. 


156  The  War  of  191 4 

some  acquaintances  of  his  told  him  that  they  had 
seen  some  French  troops  in  the  early  morning  at 
the  Southern  Railway  Station  at  Brussels.  Since 
this  seemed  to  him  incredible,  my  informant,  who 
guaranteed  the  authenticity  of  the  story,  went 
himself  at  3  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  to  the  same 
place  and  actually  saw  two  French  infantry  regi- 
ments encamped  there. 

Evidence  of  a  similar  occurrence  on  the  same  day 
in  another  part  of  Belgium  has  been  given  by  a 
young  German  governess  who  had  a  situation  with 
a  Belgian  family  on  an  estate  situated  beside  the 
railway  line  from  Bouillon  to  Paliseul,  and  therefore 
near  the  French  frontier  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Sedan.  This  governess,  as  well  as  the  German 
nurse  who  accompanied  her  with  the  children,  on 
this  same  morning  of  August  3d,  about  9  o'clock, 
saw  a  French  cavalryman  asking  the  inhabitants 
what  was  the  nearest  village.  Two  hours  later  a 
young  dairymaid  came  from  the  village  to  the 
estate  and  announced  that  French  troops  had  al- 
ready entered  the  village.  I  can  give  at  any  time 
the  names  and  addresses  of  these  witnesses,  with 
their  consent.  These  two  pieces  of  evidence  show 
clearly  that  neutrality  had  been  violated  on  the 
side  of  Belgium  even  before  the  expiry  of  our 
ultimatum.  Thus  do  the  proofs  of  the  illegal 
acts  committed  by  Belgium  and  her  accomplices 
accumulate. 

The  Kolnische  Volkszeitung  returns  to  the  charge 
two  days  later.  ^ 

'  No.  799,  September  loth. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      157 

Belgian  Neutrality 

We  have  received  the  following  letter : 
"While  ...  I  have  had  frequent  occasion 
recently  to  question  refugees  on  their  lot  and  on  the 
situation  in  Belgian  villages,  a  lady  of  position  told 
me  among  others  that,  as  early  as  August  2d, 
French  officers  were  at  Brussels  in  great  numbers. 
On  my  objecting  that  she  might  have  made  a 
mistake  and  taken  Belgian  officers  for  French 
officers,  she  replied  emphatically  that  that  was  quite 
impossible.  In  consequence  of  her  residence  of 
many  years  duration  in  Belgium  and  in  particular 
at  Brussels,  as  well  as  by  reason  of  her  position  in 
society,  she  was  sufficiently  well  informed  on  the 
subject  to  appreciate  the  difference.  Besides,  the 
presence  of  the  officers  had  caused  a  sensation 
among  the  populace,  a  fact  which  excluded  all 
possibility  of  her  story  being  based  on  a  mistake. 
Unfortunately,  in  the  whirl  of  events,  the  name  of 
this  lady  has  escaped  me.  If  these  lines  come  now 
to  her  notice,  she  will  do  a  service  to  the  country  if 
she  will  personally  relate  the  facts  given  above  to 
the  responsible  authority." 


The  reader  who  has  noted  carefully  the  succes- 
sion of  events,  only  culminating  on  August  4th  in 
an  appeal  for  the  intervention  of  the  guarantor 
Powers,  will  have  already  done  justice  to  these 
figments  of  the  imagination  of  the  correspondents 
of  the  two  German  new^spapers.  In  particular  he 
will   remember   the   refusal   by   Belgium   of   the 


158  The  War  of  191 4 

French  offer  of  military  assistance  on  August  3d — 
which  took  place,  by  the  way,  on  the  very  day  on 
which  the  time  limit  fixed  by  the  German  Note 
expired,  and  not  the  day  before,  as  stated  by  the 
correspondent.  On  this  day  the  German  Minister 
and  the  German  Military  Attache  were  still  at 
Brussels.  I  suppose  I  can  hardly  appeal  to  their 
honesty  to  bear  out  the  complete  inaccuracy  of 
every  allegation  designed  to  establish  the  presence 
of  French  regiments  or  officers  at  the  Southern 
Railway  Station  or  elsewhere. 

The  Kolnische  Zeitung  leaves  its  readers  in  ig- 
norance of  the  real  facts,  and,  on  September  12th, 
it  still  contents  itself  with  the  categorical  assertion 
that  Belgium  had  long  ago  opened  her  fortresses 
to  French  soldiers  and  her  frontiers  to  the  General 
Staffs  of  the  Republic. ' 

I  am  almost  ashamed  to  reproduce  so  puerile  a 
document  as  the  following.^ 

An  Interesting  Communication 

A  correspondent  writes: 

"Before  the  outbreak  of  war  I  was  for  three  and 
a  half  months  in  Belgium  as  a  voluntary  worker 
in  the  office  of  a  barrel  manufactory  at  Tournai,  a 
town  which  is  situated  near  the  French  frontier 

» No.  1019. 

'  Kolnische  Zeitung,  No.  972,  August  30th. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      159 

and  not  far  from  Lille.  About  the  middle  of  June 
the  maitre  d'armes  of  the  garrison  of  this  town  (of 
about  3000  soldiers)  came  and  asked  to  speak 
privately  to  our  Chief.  Afterwards  the  latter  told 
the  office  with  much  amusement  that  the  mattre 
d'armes  had  asked  him  whether  he  would  be  willing 
to  sharpen  the  swords  of  the  garrison  by  means  of 
his  machine  for  sharpening  his  saws,  whether  it 
coiild  be  done  quickly,  how  many  swords  could  be 
sharpened  a  day,  and  what  the  cost  would  be.  The 
Chief  had  refused.  It  was  thought  in  the  office  that 
this  might  be  an  indication  that  war  was  certain, 
anyhow  from  this  time  onwards  there  was  frequent 
talk  of  the  possibility  of  a  war. 

' '  This  is  yet  another  proof  that  war  was  not  made 
inevitable  by  '  Germany's  unbridled  aggression'  but 
was  arranged  long  before  by  our  enemies." 

That  such  nonsense  could  be  accepted  by  an 
organ  of  authority  really  passes  all  understanding. 
And  I  will  not  prolong  this  disquieting  catalogue 
by  quoting  the  statement  of  the  Norddeutsche 
Allgemeine  Zeitung  of  November  17th  regarding  the 
sitting  of  the  Municipal  Council  of  Onnain,  near 
Valenciennes. 

Once  and  for  all  let  it  be  considered  as  estab- 
lished, in  the  eyes  of  every  honest  person,  that 
before  the  evening  of  August  4th  there  was  no 
question,  either  immediate  or  remote,  either  in 
word  or  in  deed,  of  admitting  French  officers  or 
soldiers  onto  Belgian  territory.     It  was  only  then 


i6o  The  War  of  191 4 

that  the  Permanent  Secretary  of  the  Belgian  War 
Office  asked  the  French  Military  Attache  to  ar- 
range without  delay  for  the  French  troops  to  es- 
tablish contact  and  to  co-operate  with  the  Belgian 
troops,  and  it  was  then  only  that  the  order  was 
given  to  the  military  governors  of  the  provinces 
not  to  regard  the  movements  of  French  forces  on 
Belgian  territory  as  acts  of  violation  of  neutrality. ' 

Moreover — and  this  is  conclusive — Belgium  had 
drawn  the  scheme  for  concentrating  her  army  with 
strict  regards  to  the  obligations  of  her  neutrality, 
namely  one  division  facing  England,  two  divisions 
facing  France,  owing  to  the  length  of  the  French 
frontier,  and  one  facing  Germany.  Now  the  army 
kept  these  positions  until  the  night  of  August 
3d-4th,  when  it  became  certain  that  Germany 
meant  to  force  a  passage  through  Belgium,  viz., 
more  than  twenty-four  hours  after  the  reception 
of  the  German  Note. 

But  it  is  alleged  that  long  before  the  present  war 
Belgium  had  come  to  an  understanding  with 
France  with  a  view  to  military  operations  against 
Germany  {sich  schon  seit  Jahren  zum  Nachteil 
Deutschlands  mit  Frankreich  ins  Einvernehmen 
gesetzt  liatte'').     In  particular,  evidence  of  this  is 

'  Blue  Book,  p.  98. 

'  Kolnische  Zeitung,  No.  1260,  November  19th. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      i6i 

thought  to  be  found  in  a  remark  made  by  the 
Belgian  Minister  for  War,  M.  de  Broqueville,  in 
the  course  of  the  secret  session  of  ParHament  to 
which  I  have  already  alluded.'  After  having 
pointed  out  the  dangers  by  which  Belgium  was 
threatened,  the  Minister  said: 

Those  are  the  reasons  why  we  must  beware  of 
Germany.  ...  I  have  no  fear  of  a  violation  of 
Belgian  neutrality  on  the  part  of  France;  but  she  is 
bound  to  make  dispositions  to  meet  the  contingency 
of  the  passage  of  the  Germans  through  Belgium. 

"There,"  cries  the Kolnische Zeitimg,  "is  another 
link  in  the  chain  of  evidence"  {Ein  died  mehr  in 
der  Kette  der  Anzeichen).  But  the  newspaper 
passes  lightly  over  the  sentence  which  followed 
immediately  after  that  quoted  above,  and  which 
serves  to  focus  what  was  in  the  mind  of  the 
Minister : 

In  order  to  anticipate  ever}''  possibility  we  must 
make  preparations  on  both  sides  and  must  make 
them  quickly. 

There  is  one  typical  fact  which  might  be  set 
against  the  imputations  that  aim  at  representing 
Belgium  as  having  a  military  accord  with  France 
before  the  present  war.  Why  has  the  German 
press  never  pointed  out  that  all  Belgium's  supply 

'  P.  22. 


i62  The  War  of  1914 

of  artillery,  both  guns  and  ammunition,  as  well  as 
part  of  her  other  war  materiel,  comes  from  Ger- 
many ?  At  the  most  the  Krupp  works  allowed  some 
Belgian  factories  to  co-operate  in  the  manufacture 
of  certain  guns  and  projectiles.  At  the  time  of  the 
outbreak  of  war  delivery  was  awaited  of  a  con- 
siderable part  of  the  following  orders  which  had 
been  entrusted  to  Krupps  with  the  co-operation  of 
Belgian  firms: 

30,000  universal  shells  (7.5  cm.). 
18,000  fuses  with  detonators. 
70,000  double-acting  fuses. 
4  eclipse  guns  (28  cm.) 
4  embrasure  guns  (28  cm.) 

In  addition  various  orders  had  been  placed  with 
other  German  firms  such  as  Werner,  Siemens  & 
Halske,  Siemens  &  Schiickert,  Ehrardt,  etc. 

If  Belgium  had  contemplated  military  co-opera- 
tion with  France,  would  she  not  have  given  her 
orders  to  French  firms?  Moreover,  during  the 
course  of  the  war,  a  highly  critical  situation  arose 
for  the  Belgian  army.  Not  having  received  from 
Germany  all  the  expected  deliveries,  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  having  been  obliged  to  transfer  into 
France  its  base  of  operations  together  with  all  its 
elements  of  production,  it  found  itself  amongst 
ammunition   of  a  quite  different  type  from  its 


Imputations  against  Belgium      163 

own.  And  it  was  only  after  serious  study  of  the 
matter  by  Belgian  and  French  engineers  that  a 
way  was  found  of  solving  the  complicated  problem 
of  supplying  the  Belgian  army,  equipped  with 
German  materiel,  with  munitions  of  a  somewhat 
modified  French  type. 

A  similar  difficulty  presented  itself  as  regards 
rifle  equipment.  Taken  by  surprise,  in  the  middle 
of  a  complete  army  reorganization,  Belgium  did 
not  possess  a  sufficient  number  of  rifles  at  the 
moment  of  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  This 
shortage  led  her  to  make  demands  on  France, 
after  the  war  had  begun,  notably  for  10,000  Lebel 
rifles  and  1000  rounds  of  ammunition  per  rifle. 
These  rifles  were  distributed  among  the  soldiers 
of  the  fortress  of  Antwerp.  This  circumstance 
affords  a  very  simple  explanation  of  a  fact  that  has 
been  construed  against  Belgium  by  the  Tdglische 
Rundschau  of  October  15th.  The  Germans  had 
found  a  French  rifle  in  the  hands  of  a  Belgian 
soldier;  they  proceeded  to  allege  that  the  "Belgian 
cartridges,"  carried  by  the  soldier,  corresponded 
with  the  bore  of  the  "French  rifle"  and  drew  the 
conclusion  from  all  this  that  an  agreement  ex- 
isted between  Belgium  and  France.  The  Belgian 
Government  issued  in  November  a  formal  dementi 
in  a  communication  made  by  their  Minister  at 


1 64  The  War  of  191 4 

The  Hague:  all  the  cartridges  with  which  the 
Belgian  troops  were  armed  at  the  time  of  the  out- 
break of  war  were  of  Belgian  manufacture  and 
none  of  them  corresponded  with  the  bore  of  the 
French  Lebel  rifle,  which  they  obviously  did  not 
fit. 

As  regards  the  question  of  military  relations 
between  Belgium  and  France,  it  is  perhaps  worth 
while  to  recall  a  small  point  here.  Two  years  ago 
the  scheme  of  the  annual  manoeuvres  of  the  Civic 
Guard  in  Ghent  was  based  on  the  hypothesis  that 
a  French  army  w^hich  had  violated  the  Belgian 
frontier  was  marching  on  the  town.  And  many 
other  tactical  schemes  worked  out  by  the  General 
Staffs  of  the  Army  or  the  Civic  Guard  implied  a 
similar  contingency. 

Moreover,  from  the  day  on  which  the  Franco- 
German  conflict  broke  out,  the  Belgian  authorities 
took  many  additional  measures  which  testify  to  the 
complete  independence  of  Belgium  in  her  relations 
with  France,  no  less  than  in  her  relations  with 
Germany.  On  Sunday,  August  2d,  before  the 
"Very  Confidential  Note"  was  known,  the  Belgian 
Government  ordered  the  seizure  of  a  Brussels 
newspaper,  Le  Petit  Bleu,  which  had  published  an 
article  entitled  "Long  live  France!  Down  with 
German  barbarism!"   the  Brussels  correspondent 


Imputations  against  Belgium      165 

of  the  Kolnische  Zeitung  himself  reported  the 
fact.* 

In  another  telegram  sent  to  that  German  paper 
by  the  same  correspondent,  an  order  of  the  Burgo- 
master of  Brussels  was  quoted  to  the  effect  that 
all  manifestations  either  of  sympathy  or  of  hostility 
were  forbidden;  and  during  the  afternoon  of  the 
same  day  some  people  who  went  about  the  streets 
of  the  capital  waving  a  French  flag  and  singing 
the  Marseillaise  were  at  once  dispersed  by  the 
police. 

Again,  on  the  day  before  these  occurrences,  that 
is  to  say  August  ist,  the  circular  given  below  was 
telegraphed  to  the  Governors  of  Provinces  as  a 
result  of  a  meeting  of  the  General  Secretaries  of 
the  various  Government  Departments. 

In  the  midst  of  the  events  that  are  imminent, 
Belgium  has  determined  to  defend  her  neutrality. 
That  neutrality  ought  to  be  respected,  but  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  nation  to  take  for  this  end  all  measures 
that  the  situation  requires.  It  is  important  there- 
fore that  the  populace  should  join  their  efforts  to 
those  of  the  Government  in  avoiding  any  manifesta- 
tion of  feeling  of  such  a  nature  as  would  be  likely 
to  involve  the  country  in  difficulties  with  one  or 
the  other  of  its  neighbours.  To  this  end  it  is  desir- 
able that  Mayors  should  immediately  issue  notices 
forbidding  all  meetings  which  could  have  for  their 
'  No.  879. 


i66  The  War  of  1914 

object  the  manifestation  of  sympathy  or  antipathy 
towards  one  country  or  the  other.  It  is  equally 
important  that,  by  the  application  of  Article  97 
of  the  Communal  Law,  Boards  of  Mayors  and 
Aldermen  should  prohibit  all  cinematograph  enter- 
tainments showing  military  scenes  of  a  kind  cal- 
culated to  excite  the  passions  of  the  people  and  to 
provoke  popular  excitement  that  would  endanger 
public  order.  Governors  will  kindly  take  immediate 
steps  to  have  these  instructions  carried  out  without 
delay. 

It  is  not  only  from  the  military  point  of  view 
that  Belgium  and  France  are  said  to  have  thrown 
in  their  lot  together.  The  Kolnische  Zeitung  in  its 
issue  of  October  23d  denounces  an  economic 
agreement : 

Since  the  spring  of  1913  French  agents  in  Belgium 
have  been  draining  away  all  coin  and  have  been 
offering  notes  in  exchange  on  advantageous  terms. 
It  was  in  consequence  of  these  measures  that  the 
Belgian  Government  found  themselves  compelled 
to  issue  five-franc  notes.  We  have  seen  a  specimen 
bearing  date  July  I,  1914. 

The  Belgian  Government  have  done  nothing  to 
check  the  drain  of  silver  money  and  have  thus 
financially  facilitated  the  military  preparations  of 
France. 

This  piece  of  news  is  the  result  of  putting 
in  juxtaposition  several   facts,  each  of  which  is 


Imputations  against  Belgium      167 

quite  accurate,  but  it  is  none  the  less  quite  false  as 
a  whole. 

First,  it  is  true  that  during  the  period  pre- 
ceding the  war  a  drain  of  five-franc  pieces  from 
Belgium  to  France  took  place  on  a  large  scale. 

Secondly,  it  is  also  true  that  the  coins  thus 
drained  were  replaced  in  circulation  by  bank  notes. 

Lastly,  it  is  true  that  the  first  five-franc  notes 
issued  by  the  National  Bank  with  the  sanction  of 
the  Belgian  Government  bore  date  July  i,  1914. 

But.  .  .  . 

If  there  was  a  flow  of  five -franc  pieces  from  Bel- 
gium to  France,  the  reason  was  simply  the  altera- 
tion of  the  rate  of  exchange  between  the  two 
countries.  This  curious  traffic,  well  known  to  those 
who  are  familiar  with  financial  and  money  mat- 
ters, has  now  been  going  on  for  a  long  time,  as  it 
went  on  in  Switzerland  about  1900.  It  is  quite 
natural  that  it  should  be  accentuated  when  the 
rate  of  exchange  moves  against  Belgium.  It  costs 
the  National  Bank  a  sum  amounting  to  several 
millions  of  francs  a  year  to  get  five-franc  pieces 
back  into  the  country.  Also  it  has  constantly  been 
the  Belgian  policy  to  put  every  possible  obstacle  in 
the  way  of  dealing  in  five-franc  pieces.  And  if 
any  distinction  can  be  drawn  between  the  period 
that  preceded  the  war  and  other  periods,  it  lies 


i68  The  War  of  1914 

precisely  in  the  exceptional  revival  of  such  preven- 
tive measures.  By  virtue  of  a  provision  of  1822,  a 
Royal  decree  of  February  2'j,  191 4,  prohibited  the 
export  of  silver  coins  otherwise  than  by  railway; 
a  customs  duty  of  5%  has  been  imposed  on  their 
export,  the  amount  of  which  absorbed  all  profit 
on  the  deal;  petty  inconveniences  were  multiplied 
in  the  hope  that  those  responsible  for  the  drain 
might  get  tired  of  the  business.  This  contest  of 
ingenuity  between  the  State  and  the  dealers  filled 
the  Press  and  cannot  have  escaped  the  attention 
of  the  Brussels  correspondents  of  the  great  Ger- 
man newspapers. 

This  disposes  of  the  first  point.  Let  us  now 
pass  to  the  second. 

What  took  the  place  of  the  five-franc  pieces  was 
in  no  case  notes  of  the  same  amount,  for  there  were 
none  in  circulation,  but  Belgian  notes  of  various 
denominations,  twenty  francs  and  upwards,  which 
those  who  were  responsible  for  the  drain  pre- 
sented at  the  counters  of  the  National  Bank  in 
order  to  obtain  the  coveted  coins. 

As  to  the  third  point,  it  is  an  open  secret  that 
for  some  years  past  the  Directors  of  the  National 
Bank  have  been  apprehensive  of  the  possible 
consequences  of  a  European  conflagration  on  the 
Belgian  coin  circulation.    Since  1870  an  important 


Imputations  against  Belgium      169 

step  had  been  taken :  the  free  coinage  of  silver  was 
suspended  and  the  Latin  Convention  was  con- 
cluded. This  situation  necessitated  new  precau- 
tions which  it  was  not  necessary  to  consider  in 
1 870-7 1 .  At  the  time  of  the  Morocco  crisis  of  1906 
the  question  of  making  five-franc  notes  was 
considered.  But  Government  sanction  had  not 
yet  been  given.  Two  lines  of  thought  became 
manifest  on  the  subject,  apart  from  the  private 
apprehension  of  the  Directors  of  the  National 
Bank.  On  the  one  hand  the  public  wanted  five- 
franc  notes  to  be  put  into  circulation,  precisely 
because  of  the  continued  scarcity  of  the  coins  and 
also  on  account  of  the  latter's  practical  incon- 
venience. On  the  other  hand  experts  in  financial 
and  monetary  problems  opposed  this  desire, 
basing  their  attitude  on  considerations  of  indis- 
putable weight.  Under  the  pressure  of  these 
divergent  tendencies  it  was  decided  at  the  end  of 
the  first  six  months  of  1914  to  arrange  for  an  issue 
of  five-franc  notes.  A  first  Royal  decree  sanc- 
tioned the  making  of  the  notes  with  the  stipulation 
that  a  second  decree  must  be  obtained  at  the  time 
when  the  Bank  considered  that  it  was  advisable  to 
put  them  into  circulation.  The  events  of  August 
2d  and  3d  brought  matters  to  a  head  and  a  new 
decree  was  at  once  obtained  to  sanction  the  issue. 


170  The  War  of  191 4 

The  notes  which  had  been  made  were  undated, 
on  account  of  the  provisional  nature  of  the  first 
decree,  and  it  was  decided  to  print  on  them  the 
date  of  July  1st,  so  as  to  take  into  account  the 
approximate  average  time  necessary  for  their 
manufacture.  Exactly  the  same  thing  has 
happened  in  Switzerland,  where  five-franc  notes, 
bearing  date  August  i,  1913,  were  put  into 
circulation  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 

The  facts  to  which  the  German  newspaper 
calls  attention  really  form  an  entirely  different 
concatenation  of  events  from  that  in  which  they 
are  presented,  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  do  not 
give  any  ground  for  the  sHghtest  criticism  or  the 
faintest  suspicion  of  the  Belgian  Government. 

Those  who  know  the  economic  history  of  the 
last  few  years,  moreover,  will  not  fail  to  remember 
that,  at  the  time  when  Belgium  was  accused  of 
having  thrown  in  her  lot  with  France,  the  fact  was, 
on  the  contrary,  that  certain  grievances  had  just 
created  a  coldness  between  the  Belgians  and  their 
neighbours.  On  March  29,  191  o,  the  French 
Government  passed  a  law  revising  the  customs 
tariff  then  in  force  and  raising  the  import  duties 
by  an  appreciable  amount  on  a  number  of  manu- 
factured articles.  These  protectionist  measures 
directly  affected  a  large  number  of  Belgian  indus- 


Imputations  against  Belgium      171 

tries.  Also  they  deeply  stirred  public  opinion  in 
the  country  and  gave  rise  to  real  discontent.  The 
Press  took  up  the  question  and  a  campaign  was 
undertaken  with  the  object  of  inducing  the 
Government  to  take  reprisals.  In  particular  it  was 
suggested  that  duties  should  be  raised  so  as  to  hit 
French  wines,  books,  and  newspapers  for  which 
there  is  a  large  market  in  Belgium.  It  was  even 
said  that  a  bill  was  under  consideration  and  was  to 
be  introduced  at  once.  Although  this  bill  never 
saw  the  light,  the  excitement  created  in  industrial 
circles  continued  unabated  for  some  time  and  only 
subsided  very  slowly. 

Subservience  to  England 

The  German  press  like,  in  the  polemics  that 
they  are  carrying  on,  to  draw  a  distinction  between 
the  Belgian  people  and  their  Government.  The 
latter,  they  say,  yielded  to  England's  overtures 
and  misled  public  opinion  in  order  to  make  herself 
an  accomplice  of  the  British  nation,  who,  accord- 
ing to  Germany,  instigated  the  coalition. 

On  August  2 1st  Quartermaster-General  von 
Stein  explained  in  an  official  communique  that  the 
offer  of  an  understanding  made  to  Belgium  after  the 
battle  of  Liege  constituted  a  new  effort  to  "bring 
back  Belgian  public  opinion,  which  had  been  led 


172  The  War  of  1914 

astray."    On  the  same  day  the  Lokal  Anzeiger  of 
Berlin  said: 

The  Belgian  Government  have  now  received  the 
punishment  of  their  obstinacy.  They  obeyed  the 
orders  of  England  and  preferred  bloodshed  on  an 
awful  scale,  while  England  kept  carefully  out  of  the 
way,  to  a  friendly  understanding  with  Germany. 
Belgium  has  got  her  reckoning ;  John  Bull  will  have 
his  very  soon. 

The  same  note  is  struck  by  Professor  Hamack, 
amongst  others,  in  a  letter  reprinted  by  the 
Siiddeutsche  Nachrichtenstelle  Jiir  die  Neutralen, 
and  by  Professor  A.  Loffler  of  Vienna  in  various 
articles, '  as  well  as  by  the  Norddeutsche  Alle- 
gemeine  Zeitung,^  and  on  October  20th  by  a  cor- 
respondent of  the  Berliner  Tageblatt,  who,  after 
describing  the  lamentable  condition  of  the  in- 
habitants of  a  region  devastated  by  the  war,  adds : 
' '  Poor  people,  whose  country  proved  a  step-mother 
to  them." 

It  would  be  easy  to  meet  this  way  of  presenting 
the  case  by  pointing  to  the  enthusiastic  unanimity 
of  Belgian  public  opinion  in  the  decision  to  resist. 
No  one  in  this  country  would  ever  have  thought  it 
possible  that  there  should  be  agreement  so  spon- 

»  See,  for  instance,  Neue  Freie  Presse  of  October  19th,  Volksrecht 
of  November  17th,  and  Neues  Wiener  Tagi/aW  of  November  29th. 
«No.  250,  October  13th. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      173 

taneous — and,  let  us  add,  five  months  after  the 
opening  of  the  war,  a  so  lasting  one — among  people 
of  every  shade  of  opinion.  There  was  nothing 
forced  or  artificial  in  this  irresistible  manifestation 
of  feeling ;  the  Nation  was  moved  to  the  very 
depths  of  its  being. 

But  let  us  get  to  closer  grips  with  this  charge. 
England  is  held  responsible  for  the  Belgian  resist- 
ance and  in  particular  for  the  vigorous  attitude  of 
King  Albert.  The  allegation  even  goes  into  detail 
and  the  name  of  Lord  Curzon  is  given  as  that  of 
the  intermediary  between  the  British  Government 
and  the  King.  Actually,  Lord  Curzon  did  not 
communicate  with  King  Albert  until  the  day  after 
that  on  which  a  Zeppelin  dropped  bombs  on  Ant- 
werp in  the  proximity  of  the  Royal  Palace.  He 
then  wrote  a  letter  to  the  King  offering  one  of 
his  residences  for  the  Royal  family;  he  sent  a 
picture  of  it  accompanied  by  a  description  pub- 
lished in  an  English  magazine.  It  is  simply  and 
solely  the  announcement  in  the  Belgian  press  of 
this  kind  action  on  the  part  of  Lord  Curzon  that 
has  led  certain  German  newspapers  to  attribute 
a  poHtical  role  to  Lord  Curzon. 

None  of  these  hypotheses  will  stand  an  impartial 
examination  of  the  facts. 

So  far  was  England  from  holding  the  strings  of 


174  The  War  of  1914 

a  conspiracy  in  which  Belgium  was  to  have  been 
one  of  the  puppets,  so  far  was  she  from  urging 
Belgium  to  resistance  that,  on  July  31st,  at  the 
time  of  the  visit  paid  by  the  British  Minister  at 
Brussels  to  the  Belgian  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs, '  the  former  was  surprised  at  the  prompt- 
ness with  which  Belgium  had  put  her  mobilization 
in  train.  The  Belgian  Minister  reports  the  incident 
in  the  following  words*: 

In  the  course  of  the  ensuing  conversation,  Sir 
Francis  seemed  to  me  somewhat  surprised  at  the 
speed  with  which  we  had  decided  to  mobilize  our 
army.  I  pointed  out  to  him  that  the  Netherlands 
had  come  to  a  similar  decision  before  we  had  done 
so,  and  that,  moreover,  the  recent  date  of  our  new 
military  system,  and  the  temporary  nature  of  the 
measures  upon  which  we  then  had  to  decide,  made 
it  necessary  for  us  to  take  immediate  and  thorough 
precautions.  Our  neighbours  and  guarantors  should 
see  in  this  decision  our  strong  desire  to  uphold  our 
neutrality  ourselves. 

Sir  Francis  seemed  to  be  satisfied  with  my  reply, 
and  stated  that  his  Government  were  awaiting  this 
reply  before  continuing  negotiations  with  France 
and  Germany,  the  result  of  which  would  be  com- 
municated to  me. 

There  is  another  fact  which  is  still  more  con- 
clusive. 

We  have  seen^  that  from  July  29th  England 
'  See  p.  29.  '  Grey  Book,  No.  ii.  J  Page  91, 


Imputations  against  Belgium      175 

was  aware  of  the  unfavourable  attitude  of  Ger- 
many towards  Belgium.  She  said  nothing  about  it 
to  Belgium.  She  informed  her,  as  we  have  seen, 
that  she  was  continuing  to  negotiate  with  France 
and  with  Germany  and  that  she  would  make  a 
point  of  communicating  the  result  to  her.  Would 
she  have  acted  with  this  discretion  if  a  convention 
or  an  entente  or  any  arrangement  whatever  had 
existed  between  the  two  countries  ?  It  was  only — 
this  point  should  be  noted — on  August  5th,  after 
the  request  for  intervention  addressed  by  Belgium 
to  England  as  a  guarantor  Power  that  the  latter 
replied '  that  she 

considered  joint  action  with  a  view  to  resisting  Ger- 
many to  be  in  force  and  to  be  justified  by  the  Treaty 
of  1839. 

Later,  on  August  loth,  after  the  occupation  of 
Liege,  when  Belgium  had  already  received  from 
Germany  the  invitation  to  an  understanding  to 
which  we  have  already  had  occasion  to  refer,  ^  no 
one  dictated  to  Belgium  the  negative  reply  that  she 
gave.  Keeping  strictly  and  exclusively  to  the  point 
of  view  of  loyalty  to  her  international  obligations, 
she  refused  to  consider  the  suggestions  that  were 
submitted  to  her.    To  enter  into  negotiations  with 

'  Grey  Booh,  No.  48. 
'  See  p.  113,. 


176  The  War  of  1914 

the  Power  who  had  violated  her  neutrality  to  the 
detriment  of  those  Powers  who  had  respected  that 
neutrality  would  have  been  in  manifest  contradic- 
tion to  the  cardinal  rule  of  Permanent  Neutrality. 
To  consent  to  discuss  matters  with  the  Power  who 
had  played  fast  and  loose  with  the  very  life  of  the 
nation  in  order  to  satisfy  her  own  political  am- 
bitions would  have  roused  the  country's  sense  of 
right  into  an  outburst  of  popular  indignation. 
Having  thus  adopted,  in  the  exercise  of  imfettered 
sovereignty,  the  attitude  dictated  by  the  sense 
alike  of  their  obligations  and  of  their  dignity,  the 
Belgian  Government  proceeded,  as  a  matter  of 
courtesy,  to  impart  their  intentions  to  the  Powers 
who  had  responded  to  their  appeal.  On  the  same 
day,  August  loth,  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
at  Brussels  made  the  following  statement  to  the 
British,  French,  and  Russian  Ministers^: 

I  have  the  honour  to  inform  your  Excellency  that 
the  Belgian  Minister  at  The  Hague,  at  the  request 
of  the  Netherlands  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
has  forwarded  to  us  the  following  proposal  from  the 
German  Government. 

The  Belgian  Government  propose  to  return  the 
following  reply  to  this  communication : 

"The  proposal  made  to  us  by  the  German  Govern- 
ment   repeats    the    proposal    formulated    in    their 

I  Grey  Book,  No.  65. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      177 

ultimatum  of  August  2d.  Faithful  to  her  inter- 
national obligations,  Belgium  can  only  reiterate  her 
reply  to  that  ultimatum,  the  more  so  as  since  August 
3d  her  neutrality  has  been  violated,  a  distressing 
war  has  been  waged  on  her  territory,  and  the 
guarantors  of  her  neutrality  have  responded  loyally 
and  without  delay  to  her  appeal.  " 

T'he  Belgian  Government  consider  that  the 
Powers  guaranteeing  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
should  have  cognizance  of  these  documents. 

On  the  following  day,  August  nth,  the  British 
Minister  handed  in  at  Brussels  the  following 
note,  simply  recording  the  approval  of  his  Gov- 
ernment : 

I  have  telegraphed  to  Sir  E.  Grey  the  German 
communication  and  the  draft  reply. 

I  have  been  instructed  to  express  to  Your  Ex- 
cellency the  entire  approval  of  His  Britannic 
Majesty's  Government.  That  Government  cannot 
but  declare  themselves  in  accord  with  the  terms  of 
the  reply  that  the  Belgian  Government  propose  to 
give  to  an  effort  to  sow  disunion  among  the  coun- 
tries now  united  for  the  defence  of  the  treaties 
violated  by  Germany. 

The  simple  record  of  events  in  their  chronologi- 
cal order  is  therefore  sufficient  to  demonstrate  how 
baseless  is  the  opinion  inaccurately  reprinted  in 
the  Kolnische  Zeitung  of  October  23d  after  a 
Dutch  paper. 


178  The  War  of  191 4 

Three  days  before  the  beginning  of  the  war  Sir 
E.  Grey  gave  the  Belgian  Government  to  under- 
stand that  he  hoped  they  would  do  all  in  their 
power  to  ensure  the  observance  of  their  neutrality. 
He  promised  the  support  of  England  and  the  Allies 
as  soon  as  Germany  entered  Belgian  territory,  on 
condition  that  Belgium  would  participate  in  com- 
mon action  with  a  view  to  resist  the  violation  of 
neutrality.  Belgium  accepted.  From  that  moment 
she  formed  part  of  the  Entente;  she  was  no  longer 
fighting  exclusively  for  herself. 

All  this  is  literally  contrary  to  the  facts : 
(i)  It  was  on  August  4th,  the  day  of  the  first 
act  of  war  in  Belgium  and  not  "three  days  before 
the  beginning  of  the  war,"  that  wSir  E.  Grey  in- 
formed Belgium  of  the  intentions  of  England. ' 

(2)  This  proposal  w^as  made  equally  and  at  the 
same  time  to  Holland  and  Norway.  ^ 

(3)  It  was  made  to  Belgium  with  the  reserva- 
tion that  it  was  only  applicable  in  the  event  of  the 
neutrality  of  that  country  being  violated.  ^ 

(4)  It  was  cancelled  by  England  almost  im- 
mediately after  being  formulated,  as  soon  as  she 
learned  of  the  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  by 
Germany  and  so  Belgium  had  neither  to  refuse 
nor  to  accept  it.'' 

(5)  England  did   not   define   her  attitude    to- 

'  See  p.  109.  '  Ibid. 

3  See  p.  no.  ■'Seep.  119. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      179 

wards  Belgium  until  after  the  latter  had,  on 
the  evening  of  August  4th,  asked  for  the  in- 
tervention of  the  Powers  on  whom  she  could  still 
rely. " 

(6)  From  this  moment,  it  is  said,  Belgium 
formed  part  of  the  Entente.  Not  in  the  least. 
She  has  never  ceased  to  fight  for  the  vindication 
of  her  own  outraged  rights.  If  to-day  Belgium  is 
fighting  side  by  side  with  England  and  France, 
that  is  because  the  aggression  of  which  she  was 
the  victim  has  welded  their  cause  to  her  own. 
That  was  in  the  very  nature  of  things,  for,  to 
quote  the  striking  words  of  Rivier,  "a  guarantee 
treaty  ipso  facto  implies  a  contingent  alliance.  "^^ 

The  new  President  of  vSwitzerland,  M.  Motta, 
who  was  elected  in  December,  1914,  expressed  a 
similar  sentiment  when  he  said  in  a  recent  inter- 
view published  in  the  Swiss  press  on  December 
27th: 

From  whatever  side  an  attack  may  come,  if  it  is 
to  come,  the  aggressor  will  be  the  enemy  of  all  the 
Swiss,  and  the  Swiss  Army  will  at  once  go  to  swell 
the  ranks  of  those  who  are  already  fighting  against 
the  aggressor  whoever  it  may  be. 

'  See  p.  79. 

'  Principes  du  droit  des  gens,  vol.  ii.,  p.  loi.  See  also  Heffter, 
translation  in  French  by  Bergson,  Droit  international  public  de 
r Europe,  §  145,  and  Westlake,  Notes  sur  la  neutralite  permanente 
in  the  Revue  de  Droit  international,  1901,  pp.  390,  395. 


i8o  The  War  of  T914 

The  argument  here  discussed  has  as  Httle  sub- 
stance as  one  to  which  a  German  newspaper,  the 
Vossische  Zeitung,  gave  circulation.  According 
to  the  argument  of  the  latter,  participation  in  an 
international  conflict  would  be  inconsistent  with  a 
state  of  permanent  neutrality. 

To  maintain  that  Belgium  is  participating  to-day 
in  an  international  conflict  is  a  complete  distortion 
of  facts.  The  Belgian  army  has  defended  and  is 
defending  the  national  territory;  in  this  defence 
she  is,  in  the  nature  of  things,  led  to  "concerted 
and  joint  action"'  with  the  armies  whose  object 
it  is  to  repel  the  invader.  This  seems,  indeed,  to 
be  axiomatic. 

Further,  the  intervention  of  England  in  the 
European  conflict,  and  her  relations  with  Belgium, 
formed  the  subject  of  a  very  frank  statement  by 
the  British  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Asquith,  in  the 
course  of  the  sitting  of  the  House  of  Commons  on 
August  6th.  After  recalling  the  attitude  of  Ger- 
many towards  Belgium  as  explained  on  July  29th 
by  the  Imperial  Chancellor  to  the  British  Am- 
bassador at  Berlin, ""  Mr.  Asquith  said^ : 

Let  the  House  observe  the  distinction  between 
those  two  cases.     In  resfard  to  Holland  it  was  not 


'  See  p.  80.  'See  p.  91. 

*  Blue  Book,  p.  100. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      i8i 

only  independence  and  integrity  but  also  neutrality ; 
but  in  regard  to  Belgium,  there  was  no  mention  of 
neutrality  at  all,  nothing  but  an  assurance  that 
after  the  war  came  to  an  end  the  integrity  of  Bel- 
gium would  be  respected.  And  these  assurances 
the  Chancellor  hoped  might  form  the  basis  of  an 
understanding  between  England  and  Germany. 

What  does  that  amount  to?  Let  me  just  ask  the 
House.  I  do  so,  not  with  the  object  of  inflaming 
passion,  certainly  not  with  the  object  of  exciting 
feeling  against  Germany,  but  I  do  so  to  vindicate 
and  make  clear  the  position  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment in  this  matter.  What  did  that  proposal 
amount  to?  In  the  first  place,  it  meant  this :  That 
behind  the  back  of  France — they  were  not  made  a 
party  to  these  communications — we  should  have 
given,  if  we  had  assented  to  that,  a  free  license  to 
Germany  to  annex,  in  the  event  of  a  successful  war, 
the  whole  of  the  extra-European  dominions  and 
possessions  of  France.  What  did  it  mean  as 
regards  Belgium?  When  she  addressed,  as  she  has 
addressed  in  these  last  few  days,  her  moving  appeal 
to  us  to  fulfil  our  solemn  guarantee  of  her  neutrality, 
what  reply  should  we  have  given?  What  reply 
should  we  have  given  to  that  Belgian  appeal?  We 
should  have  been  obliged  to  say  that,  without  her 
knowledge,  we  had  bartered  away  to  the  Power 
threatening  her  our  obligation  to  keep  our  plighted 
word.  The  House  has  read,  and  the  country  has 
read,  of  course,  in  the  last  few  hours,  the  most 
pathetic  appeal  addressed  by  the  King  of  Belgium, 
and  I  do  not  envy  the  man  who  can  read  that  appeal 
with  an  unmoved  heart.  Belgians  are  fighting  and 
losing  their  lives.    What  would  have  been  the  posi- 


i82  The  War  of  191 4 

tion  of  Great  Britain  to-day  in  the  face  of  that 
spectacle,  if  we  had  assented  to  this  infamous 
proposal? 

This  shows  a  very  clear  grasp  of  the  situation. 
Mr.  Asquith  was  right  in  saying  that  the  Belgians 
would  have  resisted  the  German  invasion  whether 
England  had  agreed  to  intervene  or  refused  to  do 
so.  The  King's  appeal  for  the  diplomatic  inter- 
vention of  the  British  Government  was  sent  at  a 
time  when  Germany  had  already  been  notified  of 
the  refusal  of  the  proposal  of  August  2d.  The 
appeal  of  the  Government  for  the  military  co- 
operation of  the  British,  French,  and  Russian 
forces  was  sent  after  the  violation  of  Belgian 
territory  at  a  time  when  the  Belgian  army  was 
already  in  action,  and  I  know  from  an  authorita- 
tive source — I  give  my  word  of  honour  for  this — 
that  at  this  moment  there  was  the  most  poignant 
anxiety  in  governing  circles  in  Belgium  while 
they  wondered  what  the  reply  from  London  was 
going  to  be.  .  .  .  Thirty-one  German  professors 
whose  names  are  very  well-known  in  the  scientific 
world,  at  the  same  time  that  they  renoimced  the 
honorary  degrees  conferred  on  them  by  British 
universities,  asserted^  that  if  Belgium  had  not 
been  assured  of  the  assistance  of  England  she 

'  Letter  published  by  the  Kolnische  Zeitung,  September  7th. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      183 

would  never  have  dared  to  resist  Germany.  I 
beg  them  to  believe  that  they  are  absolutely 
mistaken. 

Mr.  Asquith  continued: 

And  what  are  we  to  get  in  return  for  the  betrayal 
of  our  friends  and  the  dishonour  of  our  obligations? 
What  are  we  to  get  in  return?  A  promise — nothing 
more;  a  promise  as  to  what  Germany  would  do  in 
certain  eventualities;  a  promise,  be  it  observed — 
I  am  sorry  to  have  to  say  it,  but  it  must  be  put  upon 
record — given  by  a  Power  which  was  at  that  very 
moment  announcing  its  intention  to  violate  its 
own  treaty  and  inviting  us  to  do  the  same. 

And  the  Prime  Minister  ended  this  part  of  his 
speech  by  recalling  once  again  the  two  motives 
that  ought  to  govern  the  policy  of  England  on  this 
question. 

I  can  only  say,  if  we  had  dallied  or  temporized, 
we,  as  a  Government,  should  have  covered  ourselves 
with  dishonour,  and  we  should  have  betrayed  the 
interests  of  this  country,  of  which  we  are  trustees. 

Then  summing  up  the  situation  he  defined  what 
was  at  stake  in  the  war. 

If  I  am  asked  what  we  are  fighting  for,  I  reply  in 
two  sentences.  In  the  first  place  to  fulfil  a  solemn 
international  obligation,  an  obligation  which,  if  it 
had  been  entered  into  between  private  persons  in  the 
ordinary  concerns  of  life,  would  have  been  regarded 


i84  The  War  of  1914 

as  an  obligation  not  only  of  law  but  of  honour,  which 
no  self-respecting  man  could  possibly  have  repudi- 
ated. Secondly,  we  are  fighting  to  vindicate  a 
principle:  in  these  days  when  force,  material  force, 
sometimes  seems  to  be  the  dominant  influence 
and  factor  in  the  development  of  mankind,  we  are 
fighting  to  vindicate  the  principle  that  small 
nationalities  are  not  to  be  crushed,  in  defiance  of 
international  good  faith,  by  the  arbitrary  will  of  a 
strong  and  overmastering  Power.  The  mainten- 
ance of  these  principles  is  vital  to  the  civilization 
of  the  world. 

No  imputation  can  stand  up  against  the  accumu- 
lative force  of  the  facts  which  mark  the  various 
aspects  of  the  relations  between  Belgium  and 
Great  Britain.  It  is  in  vain  that  attempts  have 
been  made  to  find  a  weak  link  in  the  chain ;  there 
is  none. 

Germany  realizes  this,  and  is  anxious  to  discover 
some  evidence  that  will  compromise  Belgium. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  Germany  is  now  under  the 
impression  that  she  is  in  possession  of  a  series  of 
sensational  pieces  of  documentary  evidence. 

On  October  13th  the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine 
Zeiiung  announced  that  there  had  just  been 
found  in  the  archives  of  the  War  Office  at  Brussels 
a  dossier  containing  a  record  of  the  agreements  con- 
cluded between  Belgium  and  England.  The  same 
newspaper  returned  to  this  discovery  on  November 


Imputations  against  Belgium      185 

24th  when  it  published  the  facsimile  of  a  report. 
A  dementi  had  already  been  issued  by  the  Belgian 
Government  of  the  incorrect  interpretation  that 
the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  had  put  on 
this  document.  But  in  view  of  the  persistence  of 
the  German  press  it  seems  worth  while  to  go  into 
this  matter  in  detail. 

In  1906,  the  British  Military  Attache,  Colonel 
Bamardiston,  had  a  series  of  interviews  with 
General  Ducarne,  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Belgian 
army.  These  interviews  began  in  the  month  of 
January  by  a  preliminary  conversation  of  which 
the  general  purport  was  as  follows : 

"The  situation  is  critical,"  said  the  Military 
Attache,  "the  tone  of  the  press  warrants  every 
apprehension.    Is  Belgium  ready?" 

"Certainly,"  replied  the  General,  "all  our 
arrangements  are  made.  Our  fortifications  are 
prepared.  Antwerp  faces  England,  Liege  faces 
Germany,  and  Namur  faces  France.  " 

"Yes,  but  it  is  Germany  who  must  be  regarded 
with  the  greatest  suspicion  to-day.  If  she  were 
ever  to  violate  your  neutrality  England  would 
come  to  your  help  and  it  would  be  appropriate 
that  technical  arrangements  should  be  made  from 
the  military  point  of  view  for  such  an  eventuality." 

"From  the  military  point  of  view,"  replied  the 


i86  The  War  of  191 4 

Belgian  General,  "this  contingent  intervention  of 
England  could  not  be  anything  but  favourable. 
But  this  question  has  also  a  political  side,  so  that 
I  ought  to  communicate  with  the  Minister  of  War 
on  the  subject. " 

The  discussion  then  proceeded  and  was  followed 
by  others.  Various  technical  aspects  of  the  ques- 
tion were  examined  one  by  one.  The  General 
drew  up  a  report  for  his  Minister.  It  is  the  draft 
of  this  document  that  has  been  found.  I  will  only 
examine  here  a  few  salient  passages.  The  full  text 
is  given  as  an  appendix. ' 

In  the  first  place  what  was  it  that  led  the  Mili- 
tary Attache  to  take  this  step?  "The  preoccupa- 
tions of  the  British  General  Staff.  "^ 

What  people  were  aware  of  it?  "The  British 
Minister  and  the  Chief  of  the  British  General  Staff 
were  the  only  persons  then  aware  of  the  matter"^; 
the  Attache  laid  great  stress  on  this  point. " 

What  was  the  subject  of  the  discussion?  "  Com- 
bined military  operations  in  certain  hypotheses.  "^ 

What  were  these  hypotheses?  Generally  speak- 
ing, "in  the  event  of  Belgium  being  attacked."^ 
In  particular,  "in  the  event  of  a  German  attack 
directed  against  Antwerp, "^  and  "the  hypothesis 

'  See  p.  301.  '  Ibid.  '  P.  303.  *Ibid. 

5  P.  306.  '  P.  302.  7  p.  306. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      187 

of  Belgium  being  crossed  in  order  to  reach  the 
French  Ardennes."' 

When  were  the  British  forces  to  intervene? 
"The  entry  of  the  British  into  Belgium  would  take 
place  only  after  the  violation  of  our  neutrality 
by  Germany."^ 

This  last  phrase  would  of  itself  be  sufficient  to 
put  an  end  to  all  discussion,  but  in  the  report  it  is 
written  in  the  margin  and  connected  with  the 
text  by  an  asterisk.  For  this  simple  reason  the 
Norddeutsche  has  omitted  to  translate  it  and  gives 
it  in  French  at  the  end  of  the  published  report  as 
if  it  were  a  "marginal  addition"  independent  of 
the  text:  Auf  dem  Schrijtstilck  findet  sich  noch  der 
folgende  Randvermerk.  Not  at  all !  The  sentence 
forms  part  and  parcel  of  the  report  itself.  The 
idea  that  it  expresses  so  entirely  dominates  the 
General's  mind  that  it  came  quite  naturally  to 
his  pen  but,  as  will  be  seen  from  the  facsimile  on 
page  188,  the  General  made  corrections  and  ad- 
ditions freely  in  drawing  up  his  report,  and  having 
no  space  to  insert  a  seventeen-word  phrase  in  the 
text,  he  most  naturally  added  it  by  means  of  a 
reference  on  the  side  of  his  paper. 

Also  the  Norddeutsche  allowed  itself  another 
liberty  in  translation.     In  the  very  important  sen- 

•  P.  306.  '  P.  302. 


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Imputations  against  Belgium       189 

tence,  "Our  conversation  was  absolutely  con- 
fidential," the  word  "conversation"  has  become 
Abkommen  which  means  "convention."  Later, 
after  the  falsification  was  denounced,  the  real 
translation  was  printed  in  further  editions,  and  it 
was  argued,  what  is  in  fact  untenable,  viz.,  that 
it  was  a  misreading. 

All  that  tampering  with  the  text  shows  con- 
clusively that  not  even  in  the  eyes  of  those  who 
found  the  document  had  it  any  value  as  it  stood, 
and  that  it  was  necessary  to  give  it  a  manufactured 
value. 

Since  all  the  evidence  establishes  the  fact  that 
the  hypothesis  of  a  previous  violation  of  neutrality 
was  postulated,  no  one  can  take  offence  at  the 
technical  conversations  which  took  place  at 
Brussels.  Was  the  violation  of  the  Belgian  fron- 
tier by  Germany  one  of  the  possibilities  by  which 
Belgium  was  threatened  or  was  it  not?  If  it  was, 
was  it  not  the  duty  of  the  Belgian  General  Staff 
to  bear  carefully  in  mind  the  information  that  the 
Military  Attache  gave  them  on  this  possibility  as 
on  all  others?  What  a  simpleton  the  German  press 
must  suppose  Belgium  to  be  if  it  tliinks  that 
country  capable  of  remaining  in  ignorance  of  the 
writings  of  German  generals  and  of  the  secret 
strategical  dispositions  of  that  country,  which  go 


190  The  War  of  191 4 

to  suggest — especially  since  1895,  to  be  exact — 
the  possibility  of  the  passage  of  German  armies 
through  Belgium. 

I  am  pleased  to  be  able  to  mention  here  a  fact 
which  I  am  sure  is  little  known.  A  short  time 
after  the  steps  taken  in  1906  by  the  British  Mil- 
itary Attache  one  of  the  periodical  tours  of  the 
officers  of  the  Belgian  General  Staff  was  arranged. 
Now,  which  was  the  object  of  this  tour?  To  travel 
over  Flanders  in  order  to  study  there  the  disposi- 
tions to  be  made  against  a  supposed  landing  of  a 
British  force.  No  one  thought  then,  and  no  one 
would  think  to-day,  of  alleging  that  these  tactical 
exercises  argued  the  existence  of  an  agreement 
against  England. 

But,  says  the  German  press,  we  have  other 
documents. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Norddeutsche  published  at 
the  same  time  as  the  Ducarne  report  a  copy  of  a 
letter  from  the  Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin,  Count 
Greindl,  who  in  191 1  communicated  to  Brussels 
his  advice  on  the  subject  of  a  plan  of  defence  of  one 
part  of  Belgium.  It  should  be  noted  that  the 
document  found  at  Brussels  in  a  room  at  the 
Foreign  Office  is  a  "copy"  and  not  the  original 
letter ;  that  is  to  say  that  the  original  of  this  letter, 
as  well  as  the  original  document  annexed,  were 


Imputations  against  Belgium      191 

not  filed  with  the  copy  which  was  discovered. 
The  latter  was  detached  from  the  dossier  in  order 
to  complete  a  file  made  up  in  another  Department. 
The  Norddeutsche  remains  therefore  ignorant  of  the 
past  history  of  the  matter.  If  one  consults  the 
dossier  itself  what  is  found  there?  The  first  docu- 
ment on  the  file  is  a  memorandum  drawn  up  by  a 
high  official  under  the  title:  "What  would  Belgium 
do  in  the  event  of  a  Franco-German  war?"  This 
memorandum  goes  back  to  1910-1911.  It  goes 
into  all  the  points  that  were  within  the  competence 
of  the  official  who  wrote  it.  The  Minister  happened 
to  submit  this  minute  to  Count  Greindl,  whose 
judgment  was  highly  thought  of,  and  to  whom 
documents  regarding  the  international  situation  of 
the  country  were  often  communicated.  Count 
Greindl  expressed  his  views  very  clearly;  the 
following  is  the  substance  of  them:  The  writer  of 
the  memorandum  started  from  the  hypothesis  of 
Belgian  neutrality  being  violated  by  Germany; 
that  is  one  hypothesis,  but  there  are  others,  and 
similar  memoranda  ought  to  be  undertaken  to 
deal  with  them :  our  country  ought  to  fortify  herself 
against  all  dangers  from  whatever  quarter  they 
may  come.  The  Norddeutsche  thought  it  proper 
to  present  these  views  as  a  sort  of  criticism  by 
Count    Greindl    on    his    Government.      I    would 


192  The  War  of  191 4 

explain,  therefore,  that,  on  the  contrary,  in  that 
circumstance.  Count  Greindl  was  expressing  ex- 
actly the  opinion  of  those  responsible  for  the  direc- 
tion of  Belgian  policy,  and  that  as  far  back  as  1906 
this  community  of  views  had  been  apparent  in 
their  diplomatic  correspondence.  Moreover,  the 
Norddeutsche  itself  has  recently  (August,  191 5) 
published  some  diplomatic  reports  of  the  Belgian 
Ministers  abroad  to  their  government,  and  it 
would  be  really  beyond  human  understanding  to 
,  qualify  as  anti-German  the  tendency  of  the  Bel- 
gian foreign  policy  as  outlined  by  these  reports. 

Then  there  is  yet  another  document  relating  to 
a  further  conversation  which  took  place  in  19 12 
between  another  British  Military  Attache,  Lieu- 
tenant Colonel  Bridges,  and  the  Chief  of  the  Bel- 
gian General  Staff,  General  Jungbluth.  "Now," 
says  the  German  press  (for  example  the  Nord- 
deutsche, December  24th) ,  ' '  this  time  it  was  stated 
that  England  would  effect  her  landing  even  if 
Belgium  did  not  ask  for  it. " 

What  is  there  surprising  in  this  ?  Every  guaran- 
tor Power  has  not  only  the  right  but  also  the  obliga- 
tion to  defend  a  violated  neutrality,  not  only 
without  waiting  to  be  invited  by  the  neutralized 
State,  but  ex  officio  and  even  against  the  wish  of 
that  State.     We  have  seen  above  that  this  obliga- 


Imputations  against  Belgium      193 

tion  is  of  the  very  essence  of  the  idea  of  Permanent 
Neutrality.'  Nevertheless,  Belgium  had  ever 
been  very  scrupulous  and  always  considered  that 
her  previous  consent  would  be  necessary. 

Indeed,  General  Jungbluth  replied  as  follows 
to  the  British  Military  Attache : 

"But  you  are  well  aware  that  the  permission  of 
Belgium  is  indispensable. " 

"Yes,"  repHed  the  other,  "but  you  would  not 
be  in  a  position  to  stop  the  Germans  in  their  march 
through  Belgium ' '  (in  the  German  version  this  is 
clearly  translated  nicht  im  Stande  seien,  die  Deut- 
schen  abzuhalten  durch  Belgien  zu  marschieren) . 

It  will  readily  be  seen  how  definitely  this  last 
sentence,  which  the  German  press  leaves  in  the 
background,  visualizes  the  hypothesis  which 
formed  the  whole  basis  of  the  discussion,  namely, 
the  previous  violation  of  Belgian  neutrality  by 
Germany. 

There  is  another  point  to  be  noted. 

Everyone  knows  that  it  is  not  within  the  com- 
petence of  a  military  attache  to  carry  on  authori- 
tative conversations  on  matters  of  policy  with  a 
government,  and  that  governments  cannot  be 
held  responsible  for  any  undertakings  into  which 
military  attaches  may  enter.    This  was  pointed  out 

■  See  p.  51. 
13 


194  The  War  of  191 4 

moreover  by  General  Ducame  himself  at  the  time 
of  the  first  interview  in  1906.  It  is  therefore  wholly 
inaccurate  to  represent  the  British  Military 
Attache  as  an  authorized  agent  or  a  plenipoten- 
tiary,— ein  Bevollmdchtigte,  to  quote  the  expression 
used  by  Professor  Bernatzik  of  Vienna  in  his 
article  in  the  Neues  Wiener  Tagblatt.^  The  dis- 
tinction is  vital  and,  not  being  able  to  meet  the 
point,  Herr  Bernatzik  is  led  to  formulate  conclu- 
sions like  the  following: 

If  the  British  Government  were  really  ignorant  of 
the  negotiations  entered  into  by  their  plenipoten- 
tiary they  had  only  to  avail  themselves  of  this 
pretext  for  annulling  the  convention  made  with 
Belgium  {den  Vertrag  Belgien  gegeniiber  zuannulieren) 
and  to  reprimand  their  plenipotentiary  for  having 
exceeded  his  authority  {seinen  Bevollmdchtigten 
wegens  Mandatsiiherschreitung  zu  bestrafen). 

Thus  the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  once 
more  brandishes  before  the  eyes  of  its  readers  a 
docimient  of  no  importance  whatever. 

Above  all  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  the 
Belgian  Government  abandoned  its  political  and 
military  archives  to  the  mercy  of  the  invader; 
they  are  in  a  safe  place  and  it  was  merely  by 
accident  that  the  Germans  were  able  to  put  their 
hands  on  certain  stray  documents  at  Brussels. 

'  November  29th. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      195 

But  I  can  assure  the  Norddeutsche  that  there 
are  in  these  archives  numerous  dossiers  which 
prove  as  clearly  as  can  be  wished  how  keenly 
sensitive  the  Belgian  Government  always  were  to 
the  delicacy  of  the  situation,  and  how  steadfast 
was  their  determination,  as  regards  all  the  Powers 
without  distinction,  to  defend  the  neutrality  of 
their  country  completely  and  unconditionally  in 
the  strictest  spirit  of  loyalty  to  treaties. 

All  the  dossiers  of  which  I  speak  bear  witness 
to  an  excess  of  scruple  rather  than  to  any  sub- 
servience whatever.  Every  timethat  any  incident 
occurred  the  Belgian  Government  were  at  pains 
carefully  to  weigh  its  significance,  with  unremitting 
anxiety  lest  some  Power  might  be  able  to  take 
offence,  and  they  never  allowed  any  indiscretion 
or  excess  of  zeal  to  be  hushed  up. 

For  instance  when  after  191 2  inaccurate  rumoiu-s 
gradually  spread  on  the  subject  of  the  part  played 
by  the  two  British  Military  Attaches,  some  appre- 
hension was  at  once  openly  expressed  in  Belgium. 
This  came  to  the  knowledge  of  Sir  Edward  Grey 
and,  so  loyal  were  the  political  relations  between 
the  two  countries,  that  he  hastened  to  write,  on 
April  7,  191 3,  a  letter  to  the  British  Minister 
at  Brussels,  who  forwarded  a  copy  to  the  Belgian 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 


196  The  War  of  191 4 

This  letter  demolishes  once  and  for  all  the 
construction  put  on  the  affair  by  the  German 
press.  It  might  have  been  published  as  soon  as 
the  German  press  campaign  began.  The  Belgian 
Government  refrained  from  doing  so  with  that 
scrupulous  discretion  which  has  always  charac- 
terized their  policy.  It  was  not  until  December 
7th  last  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  communicated  the 
text  to  the  British  press.     It  runs  as  follows: 

In  speaking  to  the  Belgian  Minister  to-day  I  said, 
speaking  unofficially,  that  it  had  been  brought  to  my 
knowledge  that  there  was  apprehension  in  Belgium 
lest  we  should  be  the  first  to  violate  Belgian  neu- 
trality. I  did  not  think  that  this  apprehension 
could  have  come  from  a  British  source. 

The  Belgian  Minister  informed  me  that  there  had 
been  talk,  in  a  British  source  which  he  could  not 
name,  of  the  landing  of  troops  in  Belgium  by  Great 
Britain,  in  order  to  anticipate  a  possible  despatch 
of  German  troops  through  Belgium  to  France. 

I  said  that  I  was  sure  that  this  Government  would 
not  be  the  first  to  violate  the  neutrality  of  Belgium, 
and  I  did  not  believe  that  any  British  Government 
would  be  the  first  to  do  so,  nor  would  public  opinion 
here  ever  approve  of  it.  What  we  had  to  consider, 
and  it  was  a  somewhat  embarrassing  question,  was 
what  it  would  be  desirable  and  necessary  for  us,  as 
one  of  the  guarantors  of  Belgian  neutrality,  to  do  if 
Belgian  neutrality  was  violated  by  any  Power. 
For  us  to  be  the  first  to  violate  it  and  to  send  troops 
into  Belgium  would  be  to  give  Germany,  for  instance, 


Imputations  against  Belgium      197 

justification  for  sending  troops  into  Belgium  also. 
What  we  desired  in  the  case  of  Belgium,  as  in  that  of 
other  neutral  countries,  was  that  their  neutrality 
should  be  respected,  and  as  long  as  it  was  not 
violated  by  any  other  Power  we  should  certainly  not 
send  troops  ourselves  into  their  territory. 

Slimming  up  all  this,  we  may  conclude  that 
Belgium  cannot  be  accused  of  having  concealed 
from  Germany  understandings  or  conventions 
which  never  existed. 

And,  after  all,  perhaps  Germany  was  not  alto- 
gether ignorant  of  these  matters.  Gossip  says 
that  the  interviews  of  the  British  Military  At- 
taches had  excited  the  lively  interest  of  the  Ger- 
man Military  Attache  at  Brussels,  Staff-Major 
Renner,  and  indeed  of  the  German  Minister  Herr 
von  Flotow.  Those  tw^o  gentlemen  must  both  be 
greatly  surprised  at  the  fuss  that  their  Government 
are  now  making  about  the  conversations  of  which 
they  in  former  times  made  so  light.  .  .  . 

It  is  true  that  there  are  still  some  other  docu- 
ments of  the  same  kind  but  they  are  less  interesting. 
I  refer  to  the  English  edition  of  the  map  of  the  Bel- 
gian General  Staff,  and  the  series  of  English  mili- 
tary manuals,  not  to  mention  the  discovery  of  some 
requisition  forms  at  the  house  of  an  English  agent.  * 

'  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  November  6th. 


198  The  War  of  191 4 

The  map  was  drawn  and  printed  in  England 
from  the  Belgian  map,  but  it  is  alleged  that  this 
cannot  have  been  done  except  with  the  co-opera- 
tion of  Belgium  "for  the  English  edition  was  found 
also  at  the  Belgian  Ministry  of  War."'  I  confess 
that  I  am  quite  unable  to  see  any  point  in  this 
remark.  Perhaps  the  writer  of  the  article  was 
ignorant  of  the  fact  that  the  German  troops  who 
entered  Belgium  were  in  possession  of  copies  of 
the  Belgian  staff  maps  reprinted  in  Germany  with 
marginal  notes  in  German.  For  instance,  a  detach- 
ment of  Uhlans  who  went  about  the  middle  of 
September  by  Oost-Roosebeke  near  Roulers  left  a 
map  of  the  district  beside  a  hedge. 

The  English  military  manuals  were  denounced 
by  the  Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  (December 
1st),  and  the  principal  German  newspapers  at  once 
followed  suit.  These  manuals  give  a  detailed  de- 
scription of  various  districts  of  Belgium  with  mi- 
nute information  regarding  everything  that  could 
be  of  interest  in  military  operations ;  the  German 
newspaper  in  its  criticism  pays  nevertheless  high 
tribute  to  the  care  with  which  these  manuals  were 
compiled.  They  bear  the  inscription  "Confiden- 
tial; the  property  of  the  British  Government."     I 

'  See  for  instance  the  German  Journal  of  the  War,  for  October, 
1914,  edited  by  Herr  Berg  of  Berlin. 


Imputations  against  Belgium      199 

do  not  know  what  the  Norddeutsche  finds  surpris- 
ing in  this  inscription.  And  after  all  what  does 
the  evidence  of  the  English  manuals  amount  to? 
That  the  British  General  Staff  had  considered  the 
possibility  of  having  to  conduct  a  war  in  Belgium ; 
in  which,  as  experience  has  proved,  they  showed 
themselves  remarkably  well  advised.  It  is  Ger- 
many herself  who  is  to  blame  in  the  matter.  Her 
plans  of  campaign  involved  attacking  France  by 
way  of  Belgium.  England  was  aware  of  these 
plans.  It  was  of  vital  importance  to  her  that 
Belgium  should  remain  inviolable;  she  took  her 
precautions  accordingly.  What  complaint  can 
be  made  of  Belgium's  conduct  in  all  this? 

The  Norddeutsche  on  the  contrary  hails  this 
with  triumph.  Such  a  work  it  says  would  not 
have  been  possible  without  the  co-operation  of  the 
Belgian  Government  and  officials  of  the  Army 
administration;  it  is  certain,  according  to  that 
newspaper,  that  official  information  was  used. 
The  conclusion  is  drawn  that  "in  both  political 
and  military  matters  Belgium  was  neither  more 
nor  less  than  a  vassal  of  England"  {nichts  anderes 
ah  ein  Vasall  Englands) .  Well,  the  connection  be- 
tween the  conclusion  and  the  premises  is  indeed 
flimsy.  Do  the  German  newspapers  seriously  think 
that  in  order  to  obtain  full  information  about  a 


200  The  War  of  191 4 

country  it  is  necessary  to  apply  to  official  sources? 
Do  they  think  even  that  it  is  the  most  practical 
method?  What  would  they  say  if  they  were  in  a 
position  to  reveal  to  the  world  that  innumerable 
Englishmen  who  had  settled  in  Belgium  as  elec- 
tricians, chemists,  engineers,  clerks,  workmen, 
employees,  or  even  as  dealers  in  scythes  or  razors, 
had  left  the  country  at  the  opening  of  hostilities, 
only  to  return  to  it  in  uniform,  eager  to  furnish 
to  their  superiors  information  of  every  sort  which 
they  had  collected  when  they  were  enjoying  the 
hospitality  of  Belgium?  Well,  this  is  exactly  what 
did  happen — except  that  these  people  were  Ger- 
mans, not  Englishmen. 

Belgium  has  been  the  chosen  land  of  spies  of 
every  nationality,  and  a  short  time  before  the 
war,  the  Government  had  formed  a  definite  in- 
tention to  introduce  a  bill  on  the  subject. 

Why  may  there  not  have  been  in  this  candid 
country  English  spies  just  as  there  were  German 
and  French  spies  ?  And  why  may  not  these  secret 
agents,  some  of  whom  apparently  divided  their 
time  between  shooting  and  fishing,  have  furnished 
Great  Britain  with  documents  of  no  very  remark- 
able importance  indeed,  such  as  information  about 
Belgian  mobilization,  circulars  sent  to  Belgian 
high  commands,  notes  of  a  sitting  of  the  Belgian 


Imputations  against  Belgium      201 

Commission  appointed  to  inquire  into  the  ques- 
tion of  the  provisioning  of  Antwerp,  reports 
from  the  Belgian  gendarmerie  on  the  concentra- 
tion of  French  rolHng  stock  at  Maubeuge?  The 
Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung  announced  that 
all  this  has  been  found  out  at  the  British  Lega- 
tion at  Brussels  and  it  says  solemnly  that  "this 
new  revelation  adds  overwhelming  evidence  of 
the  Anglo- Belgian  conspiracy." 

To  any  one  who  has  preserved  any  critical  sense 
all  that  this  "revelation  "  proves  is  that  England — 
like  all  the  neighbouring  Powers  of  Belgium — main- 
tained a  secret  service  in  that  country.  So  far  were 
the  Belgian  Government  from  giving  facilities  to 
this  secret  service,  either  overtly  or  tacitly,  that 
they  were  actually  wholly  ignorant  of  its  existence. 

That  is  the  long  and  short  of  the  matter. 

And  the  list  of  "revelations"  will  no  doubt 
increase  still  further.  If  I  were  not  afraid  of 
spoiling  the  appearance  of  these  pages  I  should 
leave  here  some  blank  spaces  in  order  that  they 
might  be  used  to  keep  pace  with  fresh  efforts  of 
the  German  press  to  surpass  itself  in  publishing 
new  evidence  of  the  conspiracy  between  Belgium 
and  England,  and  even  to  present  them  (as  for  in- 
stance does  the  Kolnische  Zeitung  of  December  24th) 
as  confirming  some  grounds  of  suspicion  that  the 


202  The  War  of  191 4 

Germans  already  had  in  their  possession  before 
the  war.  We  may  await  them  with  equanimity. 
Nothing  can  ever  prevail  against  this  simple 
truth:  the  Belgian  State  adopted  an  attitude 
that  was  scrupulously  correct  and  never  asked  or 
accepted  anything  from  England,  either  interfer- 
ence or  joint  action. 

One  word  more. 

The  time  at  which  the  Norddeutsche  presumes 
that  an  Anglo-Belgian  Convention  was  concluded 
is  very  badly  chosen.  It  is  a  matter  of  common 
knowledge  that  about  1906  the  long-standing 
sympathetic  relations  between  England  and  Bel- 
gium became  somewhat  strained.  The  incidents 
of  the  Boer  War,  the  attempt  of  a  half-witted  boy 
at  Brussels  to  assassinate  the  then  Prince  of  Wales, 
who  was  soon  after  to  become  Edward  VII.,  the 
IVIorel  campaign  against  the  administration  of  the 
Congo,  all  this  had  tended  to  produce  a  certain 
coldness  between  the  two  nations. 

It  is  also  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that 
since  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  the 
pivot  of  Belgian  diplomatic  activity  has  been  the 
Congo  Free  State.  If  Germany  would  think  for  a 
moment  she  would  realize  that  it  is  certainly  not 
the  case  that  her  interest  during  these  critical 


Imputations  against  Belgium      203 

years  had  been  sacrificed  to  British  interest  in  the 
Belgian  Congo  and  that  it  was  certainly  not  in 
England  that  the  companies  founded  by  King 
Leopold  II.  had  sought  the  protection  of  the  law. 

Why  labour  all  these  points? 

I  need  not  tell  my  readers  that  on  July  28th  last, 
when  the  international  situation  became  grave, 
the  instructions  given  to  the  Belgian  administra- 
tion of  the  Congo  indicated  the  precautions  which 
should  be  taken  against  a  possible  blockade  of  the 
river  by  France  and  England  acting  in  common, 
just  as  much  as  against  a  violation  of  the  frontier 
of  the  colony  by  Germany.  It  was  only  after  the 
rupture  with  Germany  that  orders  were  given  to 
concentrate  all  efforts  on  the  one  side  only. 

And  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to  point  out,  merely 
for  the  sake  of  adding  to  the  mass  of  evidence, 
that  up  to  the  time  of  the  war  the  Belgian  Royal 
Family  had  not  yet  paid  an  official  visit  to  the  King 
and  Queen  of  England,  though  they  had  already 
visited  Berlin  and  Vienna. 

Next,  the  facts  are  here,  and  the^^"  make  all 
discussion  superfluous.  In  August,  1914,  Ger- 
many violated  Belgian  neutrality  for  the  sake  of 
her  strategic  interests  and  the  march  of  her  armies 
corresponded  exactly  with  the  plans  that  she  was 
known  to  have  made.     In  August,   1914,  Great 


204  The  War  of  191 4 

Britain  waited  for  a  fait  accompli  before  announc- 
ing her  intention  to  intervene,  and  her  troops  only 
entered  Belgium  eighteen  days  later. 

Nothing  more  need  be  said. 

Belgium  was  not  bound  to  England  by  any 
bargain  or  any  understanding,  expressed  or  tacit. 
In  her  relations  with  England,  as  in  her  relations 
with  France  and  Germany,  she  was  in  August,  1914, 
as  she  had  been  for  the  last  seventy -five  years: 
free  of  all  engagements,  upright,  and  unswervingly 
loyal. 

To  put  it  bluntly,  it  is  a  thoroughly  base  slander 
to  make  unfavourable  comparisons  (as  does  a 
communique  of  the  Wolff  Agency  in  the  Neue 
Zilrcher  Zeitung  of  November  4th)  between  the 
impartial  policy  of  Switzerland  and  the  policy  of 
Belgium,  who  is  said  to  have  destroyed  her  own 
neutrality  by  becoming  the  military  ally  of  France 
and  England. 

Such  is  the  material,  flimsy,  rotten,  and  specious, 
which  forms  the  basis  of  the  indictment  for  treason 
that  German  public  opinion  wishes  to  bring  against 
Belgium. 

A  campaign  of  defamation  has  followed  the 
campaign  of  arms.  Slander  continues  remorse- 
lessly.    Does  Germany  wish  to  try  to  minimize 


Imputations  against  Belgium      205 

her  crime  before  her  judges  by  belittling  her 
victim?  Or  does  she  perhaps  wish  to  prepare 
men's  minds  to  accept  the  conquest  of  a  country 
that  had  lost  its  claim  to  respect. 

It  does  not  matter.  One  thing  remains,  and 
it  was  a  Swiss,  the  great  poet  of  the  German  lan- 
guage, Carl  Spitteler,  who  had  the  courage  to 
declare  it^: 

After  the  deed  was  done,  that  the  stain  of  his 
guilt  might  less  appear,  Cain  has  besmirched  the 
fair  name  of  Abel.  .  .  .  Surely  it  was  amply 
sufficient  to  have  cut  his  throat.  To  slander  him 
afterwards  was  going  too  far. 

I  will  only  add  one  line  to  these  noble  words. 
There  is  no  justification  whatever  for  the  assump- 
tion by  Germany  of  the  role  of  a  judge  whose 
sternness  is  mingled  with  compassion.  "Already," 
wrote  the  Lokal  Anzeiger  of  BerHn  of  August  21st, 
"Belgium  has  been  crushed  and  has  fallen  on  her 
knees." 

On  her  knees! 

For  what  crime  is  this  poor  little  coimtry  paying 
the  penalty,  except  that  of  remaining  loyal?  And 
is  it  not  a  last  outrage  to  her  dignity  to  deem  her 
capable  of  assuming  the  attitude  of  suppliant 
before  her  persecutor? 

'  Neue  Ziircher  Zeitung,  December  i6th. 


V 


German  Rules  of  War  and  Their 
Application  to  Belgium 


207 


GERMAN   RULES   OF  WAR   AND  THEIR  APPLICA- 
TION TO   BELGIUM 

In  the  proposal  for  an  entente  which  Germany 
addressed  to  Belgium  after  the  battle  of  Liege  the 
following  passages  ^  have  already  been  quoted : 

The  German  Government  most  deeply  regret 
that  bloody  encounters  should  have  taken  place. 
Germany  is  not  coming  as  an  enemy  into  Belgium. 
.  .  .  The  German  Government  beg  the  King  of 
the  Belgians  and  the  Belgian  Government  to  spare 
Belgium  the  horrors  of  war. 

These  words  have  the  appearance  of  being 
inspired  by  a  feeling  of  sincere  pity.  When 
Germany  resolved  to  give  over  to  the  horrors  of 
war  a  country  for  which  she  professed  every 
sympathy,  one  might  have  expected  her  to  enjoin 
a  certain  moderation  on  her  officers.  Without 
compromising  the  success  of  military  operations 
she  might  have  disclosed  to  her  armies  the  fact 

'  Page  113. 

14  209 


210  The  War  of  191 4 

that  she  had  not  even  declared  war  on  Belgium, 
but  that,  to  quote  the  second  Note, '  ' '  the  Emperor 
found  himself  compelled  to  take — if  necessary  by 
force  of  arms — measures  of  defence."  Without 
disregarding  the  laws  of  war,  the  German  authori- 
ties might  have  instilled  principles  of  equity  into 
those  whose  duty  it  was  to  apply  those  laws.  -  It 
may  even  be  said  that  this  was  the  elementary 
duty  of  Germany  at  a  moment  when  she  had 
only  been  able  to  plead  "necessity"  to  excuse  her 
conduct.  According  to  the  statement  that  she 
made  to  the  world  she  was  passing  through  Bel- 
gium only  because  strategic  necessity  compelled  her 
to  do  so :  she  was  wronging  an  innocent  country, 
and  necessity  alone  was  the  excuse  for  this  wrong ; 
in  the  Notstand  everything  which  is  not  absolutely 
necessary  is  criminal.  But  the  truth,  as  we  have 
seen,  was  different.  It  was  the  subjugation  of 
Belgium  that  was  being  aimed  at,  and  from  the 
very  beginning  of  hostilities  events  proved  that 
war  was  to  be  conducted  in  Belgium  with  syste- 
matic and  cruel  vigour.  The  German  Government 
itself  on  August  14th  informed  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment in  an  official  note  that  the  war  would  assume 
' '  a  cruel  character ' '  {emen  grausamen  Charakter) . 
Belgium,    they   continued,    would    bear    the    re- 

I  Belgian  Grey  Book,  No.  27. 


German  Rules  of  War  211 

sponsibility  for  this    {Belgien   trdgt   die   Schuld). 
The  Note  stated  in  effect : 

1.  That  numerous  civilians  had  taken  part  in 
the  fighting  around  Liege ; 

2.  That  civilians  had  ill-treated  the  wounded; 

3.  That  the  civilian  population  at  Antwerp  had 
destroyed  the  property  of  Germans  and  had  brutally 
massacred  {in  bestialischer  Weise  niedergemetzelt) 
women  and  children. 

Moreover,  the  Emperor  himself  actually  ad- 
dressed the  following  message  to  the  President  of 
the  United  States  in  which  he  said : 

The  Belgian  Government  has  openly  encouraged 
the  Belgian  population  to  take  part  in  the  war,  and 
it  has  for  a  long  time  been  preparing  with  care  for 
this  participation.  The  cruelties  committed  in  this 
guerilla  war  on  soldiers,  doctors,  and  ambulance 
men,  even  by  women  and  priests,  have  been  such 
that  my  generals  have  been  finally  obliged  to  have 
recourse  to  the  most  severe  measures  in  order  to 
chastise  the  culprits  and  to  spread  terror  in  a  popu- 
lation thirsting  for  blood,  to  prevent  the  continuance 
of  their  murders  and  abominations. 

Now,  it  is  beyond  question  that  the  informa- 
tion received  by  the  German  Government  was  in- 
accurate and  misleading  and  they  may,  without 
exaggeration,  be  accused  of  having  lightly  given 
credit  to  slanderous  tales. 


212  The  War  of  1914 

It  is  premature  to  attempt  to  arrive  at  a  final 
conclusion  on  this  matter,  which  demands  dis- 
passionate consideration,  as  at  the  present  moment 
it  is  difficult  to  assume  the  good  faith  of  witnesses 
as  a  matter  of  course.  It  is  our  duty  nevertheless 
to  clear  the  data  on  which  public  opinion  is  formed 
of  a  number  of  elements  which  certainly  have  no 
foundation  in  fact.  From  this  point  of  view,  I  will 
briefly  examine  the  three  accusations  directed 
against  the  inhabitants  of  invaded  Belgium. 

I.    The  Participation  of  Civilians 

The  Emperor  and  the  whole  of  the  German  press 
have  accused  the  Belgian  Government  of  having 
actively  or  tacitly  favoured  resistance  on  the  part 
of  civilians.  For  example,  several  papers  stated 
that  the  Government  had  taken  no  steps  to  instruct 
civilians  with  regard  to  their  obligations  towards 
enemy  troops  or  that  they  had  only  intervened 
tardily  or  weakly.  It  was  even  stated  in  a  note 
to  the  German  Consul  at  Geneva  that : 

A  general  rising  of  the  people  against  the  enemy 
had  been  organized  long  beforehand ;  depots  of  arms 
had  been  set  up  in  which  every  rifle  was  marked 
with  the  name  of  the  civilian  for  whom  it  was 
intended. 


German  Rules  of  War  213 

It  is  scarcely  necessary  to  refute  this  last  ac- 
cusation. What  certain  Germans  had  taken  for 
depots  of  arms,  placed  by  the  Belgian  Government 
at  the  disposal  of  civilian  inhabitants,  were  merely 
the  places  in  which  the  local  authorities,  as  a 
measure  of  precaution,  had  ordered  the  firearms 
of  private  individuals  as  well  as  those  of  the  civic 
guards  to  be  collected.  As  is  well  known,  in 
Belgium  all  citizens  between  the  ages  of  twenty  and 
forty  are  liable  for  service  in  the  Civic  Guard.  Only 
two  exceptions  are  made,  first,  when  a  citizen  has 
already  done  his  military  service,  and  secondly 
when  he  has  not  sufficient  money  to  pay  for  his 
equipment.  Each  member  of  the  guard  keeps  his 
arms  and  his  uniform  at  home.  At  the  central 
depot,  a  full  register  is  kept  of  all  the  names  and 
addresses  of  the  members,  with  an  indication  of 
the  numbers  of  their  arms.  At  these  central 
depots,  or  in  some  other  local  building,  the  arms 
had  been  deposited  in  those  communes  in  which 
the  members  of  the  guard,  notably  those  of  the 
special  reserve,  had  been  disarmed. 

The  correspondent  of  a  German  paper  ifi  Belgium 
even  alleged  that  in  order  to  be  able  to  distribute 
such  a  vast  quantity  of  arms  to  the  population, 
the  Belgian  Government  must  have  collected 
a  considerable  stock  with  a  view  to  war.     As  a 


214  The  War  of  191 4 

matter  of  fact  the  situation  was  entirely  different. 
The  "Very  Confidential  Note"  of  August  2d 
found  the  Belgian  Government  about  to  reor- 
ganize the  army  and  in  the  throes  of  the  upheaval 
consequent  on  so  radical  a  reform.  The  increase 
of  effectives  and  armament  was  to  be  spread  over  a 
period  of  five  years.  This  reform  could  not  there- 
fore produce  full  results  until  the  expiration  of 
that  period.  With  regard  to  armament  in  par- 
ticular, a  serious  shortage  of  rifles  made  itself  felt, 
so  that,  so  far  from  being  able  to  distribute  arms 
to  the  civilian  population,  the  Government  found 
themselves  unable  immediately  to  call  to  the 
colours  the  classes  of  19 14  and  19 15. 

Far  from  having  prepared  in  any  way  whatso- 
ever for  armed  resistance,  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment at  the  very  beginning  of  the  war,  on  August 
4th,  issued  to  the  administrative  authorities  of  the 
2600  communes  of  the  country  a  circular  of  which 
the  following  are  the  extracts  relevant  to  the 
point  in  question;  certain  parts  are  taken  textu- 
ally  from  The  Hague  Convention.  ^ 

Hostile  Acts.  By  the  laws  of  war,  hostile  acts, 
that  is,  armed  resistance  or  attack,  the  use  of  arms 
against  detached  soldiers  of  the  enemy,  and  direct 

'  For  example  the  third  paragraph  which  reproduces  Articles 
of  the  rules  contained  in  an  appendix  of  the  Convention. 


German  Rules  of  War  215 

interference  in  battles  or  chance  encounters  are 
forbidden  to  those  who  are  neither  in  the  army  or 
civil  guard  nor  members  of  a  voluntary  corps  ob- 
serving military  laws  under  the  command  of  a  chief 
and  wearing  a  distinctive  and  recognizable  badge. 

Those  who  are  authorized  to  perform  hostile  acts 
are  called  "belligerents":  when  they  are  taken 
prisoner  or  have  laid  down  their  arms  they  have  the 
right  of  treatment  as  prisoner  of  war. 

If  the  population  of  a  territory  which  has  not 
been  occupied  b}'-  the  enemy  spontaneously  take 
up  arms  on  the  approach  of  the  invader  without 
having  had  time  to  organize  themselves  in  a  military 
manner,  they  will  be  regarded  as  belligerents  if  they 
carry  arms  openly  and  if  they  respect  the  laws  and 
customs  of  war. 

Any  individual,  not  being  classed  under  any  of 
the  foregoing  categories,  who  commits  a  hostile  act, 
would  not  be  considered  a  belligerent;  if  he  were 
taken  prisoner,  he  would  be  treated  with  greater 
severity  than  a  prisoner  of  war,  and  he  might  even 
be  put  to  death. 

It  is  even  more  imperative  that  the  civilian 
population  should  abstain  from  acts  which  are  pro- 
hibited to  soldiers;  these  acts  are  principally:  the 
use  of  poison  or  poisoned  weapons ;  to  kill  or  wound 
treacherously  individuals  belonging  to  the  hostile 
nation  or  army;  to  kill  or  wound  an  enemy  who, 
having  laid  down  his  arms  or  having  no  longer 
the  means  of  defending  himself,  has  surrendered  at 
discretion. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  on  the  one  hand  that 
the  administrative  organization  of  Belgium  is  very 


2i6  The  War  of  191 4 

complete,  and  on  the  other  hand  that  at  the  moment 
when  the  circular  note  was  sent  with  as  much 
despatch  as  possible  the  territory  was,  with  the 
exception  of  a  few  localities,  still  free  of  the  enemy. 
The  administrative  machinery  was  therefore  able 
to  work  perfectly,  and  the  instructions  from  head- 
quarters reached  almost  instantly  their  various 
destinations  all  over  the  country.  These  instruc- 
tions were  posted  in  all  the  communes  without 
exception  and  in  several  places  in  each  of  them. 
This  is  the  general  rule  in  Belgium  for  official 
injunctions.  I  myself  have  actually  seen  this 
notice  posted  up  in  the  towns  and  villages  of 
Flanders,  and  personal  friends  of  mine  have  seen 
the  same  in  various  parts  of  the  country.  This 
posting  was  carried  out  with  the  utmost  celerity. 
At  Liege,  for  example,  it  was  placarded  on  the 
walls  as  early  as  August  5th;  the  Germans  must 
have  read  it  when  they  entered  the  town.  Simi- 
larly at  Aerschot,  a  little  town  which  suffered  a 
terrible  fate,  the  Germans  were  able  to  see  on  their 
entry,  posters  of  the  burgomaster  calling  upon  his 
fellow-citizens  to  abstain  from  any  hostile  acts  in 
case  of  invasion.  When  Professor  C.  Wegener' 
states  that  similar  steps  were  taken  at  Rheims,  he 
cannot  help  expressing  his  admiration.    Why  has 

'  In  the  Kolnische  Zeitung  of  September  15th,  No.  1025. 


German  Rules  of  War  217 

the  German  press  never  acknowledged  the  same 
careful  precautions  taken  by  the  commimal 
magistrates  in  Belgium? 

The  Minister  of  the  Interior  did  not  content 
himself  with  this  step  alone.  At  the  very  begin- 
ning of  August,  he  asked  the  principal  papers  to 
publish  either  every  day,  or  from  time  to  time, 
the  following  injunctions,  which  request  was 
faithfully  carried  out. 

To  Civilians. 

The  Minister  of  the  Interior  advises  civilians,  if 
the  enemy  appears  in  their  district: 

Not  to  fight. 

Not  to  try  any  abuse  or  threats. 

To  keep  indoors  and  shut  their  windows,  so  that 
it  will  be  impossible  to  say  that  any  provocation  was 
given. 

If  soldiers  occupy  a  house  or  an  isolated  village 
for  purposes  of  defence,  to  leave  it  at  once  in  order 
that  the  allegation  may  not  be  made  that  civilians 
have  fired. 

An  act  of  violence  committed  by  a  single  civilian 
will  be  a  crime  legally  punishable  by  law,  for  it  may 
serve  as  a  pretext  for  a  bloody  repression,  pillage 
and  massacre  of  innocent  population,  women  and 
children. 

The  communal  authorities  also  enjoined  the 
inhabitants  to  get  rid  of  their  arms.  I  myself  have 
read  these  posters  in  many  little  places  and  I  will 


2i8  The  War  of  1914 

merely  give  here  as  an  example  the  text  of  the 
poster  which  was  placarded  in  Brussels  over  the 
signature  of  the  Burgomaster. 

The  laws  of  war  prohibit  the  civil  population  from 
taking  part  in  hostilities,  and  as  any  failure  to  ob- 
serve this  rule  may  cause  reprisals,  many  of  my 
citizens  have  expressed  to  me  a  desire  to  rid  them- 
selves of  the  firearms  that  they  possess. 

These  arms  may  be  deposited  at  police  stations, 
where  a  receipt  will  be  given  for  them.  They  will 
be  put  in  safety  in  the  central  arsenal  at  Antwerp 
and  will  be  restored  to  their  owners  at  the  end  of 
hostilities. 

The  instructions  in  the  Circular  of  August  4th 
to  the  communal  authorities  were  subsequently 
repeated  on  various  occasions.  Some  of  these 
instructions  were  sent  to  the  authorities  with  a 
German  translation, 

in  order  [as  the  Minister  wrote]  that  local  ad- 
ministrations may  eventually  show  the  German 
authorities  the  instructions  followed  by  those 
administrations  in  conformity  with  the  rules  laid 
down  by  The  Hague  Convention  to  which  the 
German  Empire  subscribed. 

In  the  light  of  these  known  facts,  it  is  possible 
to  state  in  the  most  emphatic  manner  that  the 
Belgian  Government  deliberately  organized  the 
non-resistance   of   the   population   in   order   that 


German  Rules  of  War  219 

even  in  the  hour  of  wild  indignation  it  should 
remain  faithful  to  the  tenets  of  international 
conventions.  What  conclusions  can  we  draw  then 
from  an  article  which  appeared  in  the  Kolnische 
Zeitung,  No.  967,  of  August  28th? 

The  attitude  of  the  Belgian  population  is  incom- 
prehensible, but  that  of  the  Belgian  Government  is 
still  more  so.  With  them  rests  the  responsibility 
for  the  destruction  of  Belgian  towns  and  villages. 
...  In  the  first  place  the  Belgian  Government 
encouraged  armed  resistance  by  the  diffusion  of 
gross  calumnies  about  our  troops.  They  then  had 
arms  distributed,  and  now  that  this  resistance  is  on 
the  wane  they  are  stirring  it  up  again,  instead  of 
putting  an  end  to  it  once  and  for  all  by  issuing  a 
vigorous  statement. 

It  would  have  been  easy  for  a  paper  which  had 
at  its  command  as  reliable  sources  of  information 
as  were  available  to  the  Kolnische  Zeitung  to 
verify  such  grave  statements  before  publishing 
them.  But  reasoned  criticism  is  helpless  before 
the  comments  that  the  newspaper  makes  on  this 
statement : 

Here  is  a  certain  proof  which  will  convince  the 
entire  world,  that  before  the  war  the  resistance  of  the 
population  was  counted  on  and  had  been  prepared. 
On  October  19,  191 3,  the  Annates  of  Paris  expressed 
lively  approval  of  the  suggestion  of  a  Belgian  officer 
to  militarize  the  population  of  the  provinces  of 


220  The  War  of  1914 

Luxemburg  with  a  view  to  resisting  a  contingent 
invasion  by  guerilla  warfare.  This  idea  emanated, 
then,  from  a  Belgian  and  was  approved  of  and 
spread  by  a  Frenchman.  We  thus  catch  the 
accomplices  in  full  collusion  in  support  of  the  idea 
of  a  war  oi  francs-tireursf 

If  the  Kolnische  Zeitung  will  take  the  trouble  to 
re-read  the  papers  of  that  date,  it  will  easily  find 
that  this  idea,  which  was  started  without  any 
success  by  two  members  of  Parliament,  contem- 
plated the  formation  in  the  provinces  of  Lux- 
emburg of  a  corps  similar  to  that  of  the  chasseurs 
alpins.  As  for  the  rest,  the  arguments  of 
the  Kolnische  Zeitung  are  too  childish  to  be 
discussed. 

But  since  I  am  on  the  subject  of  astounding 
statements,  I  will  add  some  more. 

First  this  news  in  the  Hamburger  Nachrichten 
reproduced  in  the  pamphlet  entitled  Die  Wahrheit 
ilber  den Krieg,  "The  Truth  about  the  War"': 

Here  [at  Lou  vain]  the  facades  of  many  houses 
are  prepared  with  a  view  to  a  war  of  francs-tireurs. 
They  have  openings  through  which  the  barrel  of  a 
rifle  can  be  thrust  and  which  can  be  shut  by  means 
of  movable  metal  plates.  These  were  made  by 
experts  with  a  view  to  the  systematic  organization 
of  such  warfare. 

*  Second  edition,  page  60. 


German  Rules  of  War  221 

No,  my  worthy  correspondent,  experts  con- 
structed them  with  the  very  inoffensive  object  of 
holding  the  pieces  of  wood  necessary  to  support 
scaffolding  when  repairs  are  being  done  to  the 
fagade. 

Secondly  the  following  story  related  in  the 
Leipziger  Tagblatt  and  contained  on  page  38  in  the 
pamphlet  entitled  Die  helgischen  Greueltaten  to 
which  I  shall  refer  again  later. 

According  to  a  postcard  sent  by  a  soldier  to  his 
parents  at  Possneck,  the  Belgian  Government  had 
promised  the  civil  population  a  reward  of  fifty 
francs  for  every  German  soldier  killed.  This  is 
further  confirmed  in  a  letter  of  a  reserve  lieuten- 
ant to  his  parents  at  Leutenberg.  The  latter  writes 
that  he  found  on  the  body  of  a  Jranc-tireur  who 
had  been  killed,  a  note  in  which  the  French  Govern- 
ment recognized  him  as  a  franc-tireur  and  allocated 
to  him  a  monthly  pay  of  fifty  francs. 

Comment  is  superfluous. 

The  term  francs-tireurs  has  just  been  used. 
It  has  had  an  extraordinary  vogue  in  Germany. 
Under  the  denomination  of  francs-tireurs  the 
Germans  have  included  bands  of  men,  either  in 
uniform  or  in  peasant  blouses,  as  well  as  isolated 
individuals  whom  they  accuse  of  having  fired  on 
their  troops.  I  will  first  consider  the  case  of  armed 
bands. 


222  The  War  of  191 4 

The  Germans  met  in  certain  localities  com- 
batants who  were  differently  equipped  from  the 
Belgian  troops.  They  were  soldiers  of  the  Civic 
Guard  which  I  have  already  mentioned. ' 

As  Professor  P.  Errera  explains  in  his  Traite  de 
droit  public  beige  the  Civic  Guard  was  created  by 
the  Congres  National  of  1830  to  establish  harmony 
between  the  public  force  and  the  fundamental 
principles  of  government.  Examples  proved  the 
great  influence  which  the  executive  power  wields 
over  the  army  itself,  as  it  is  placed  in  the  hands 
of  that  power.  The  Congrh  thought  it  necessary 
to  create  by  the  side  of  the  army  another  military 
force  which  would  better  represent,  especially  by 
its  method  of  recruitment  and  the  designation  of 
its  officers,  the  entire  nation,  and  which  would 
defend  constitutional  liberties  equally  against 
menaces  from  outside  and  against  dangers  from 
within. 

It  is  necessary  [said  the  report  of  the  Central 
Section  of  the  Belgian  Chamber,  in  1831]  to  create 
a  counterpoise  in  favour  of  the  country.  It  is  there- 
fore indispensable  to  organize  a  military  force  which, 
if  necessary,  might  become  an  army  capable  of 
maintaining  our  institutions.* 

'  See  page  213. 

'  Report  of  January  24,  1831 ;  Huyttens,  Discussions  du  Congrhs 
National,  vol.  iv.,  p.  108. 


German  Rules  of  War  223 

This  is  the  spirit  which  inspired  the  subsequent 
laws  with  regard  to  the  Civic  Guard  and  which  re- 
asserted itself  in  the  Law  of  September  9,  1897, 
which  is  actually  in  force. 

The  object  of  the  Civic  Guard  is  determined 
by  Article  i  of  this  Law : 

The  duty  of  the  Civic  Guard  is  to  maintain  law 
and  order,  to  preserve  national  independence,  and 
the  territorial  integrity  of  the  country. 

The  duty  of  the  Civic  Guard  in  time  of  war  was 
clearly  stated  during  the  preHminary  discussions 
of  the  Law  of  1897.  The  Minister  for  War  himself 
said  that  the  Civic  Guard  was  to  assume  the 
auxiliary  services  of  the  army — that  is,  garrison 
service  in  the  forts,  miscellaneous  services  in  the 
rear  of  the  army,  and  the  protection  of  communica- 
tions between  garrison  troops  and  the  armies  in 
the  field,  etc. 

The  Civic  Guard  is  therefore  very  similar  to  the 
German  Landsturm  whose  role  is  defined  by  the 
Law  of  February  11,  1888.' 

The  Civic  Guard  has  the  same  cadres  as  the 
army.  In  fact  it  is  commanded  by  officers  the 
majority  of  whom  are  ex-army  officers.  The  result 
is  that  both  by  its  composition  and  by  the  nature 

'  Paragraph  23. 


224  The  War  of  1914 

of  its  functions  the  Civic  Guard  constitutes  one  of 
the  two  elements  of  the  pubhc  forces.  This  is 
known  to  all  those  who  have  studied  Belgian 
law. 

The  Civic  Guard  is  either  "active"  or  "non- 
active."  It  is  "active,"  unless  the  Government 
has  issued  instructions  to  the  contrary,  in  all 
localities  in  which  the  population  exceeds  ten 
thousand  inhabitants  and  in  those  localities  which 
are  fortified  or  protected  by  a  fort.  In  other 
localities  it  is  "non-active."  It  can,  however, 
be  called  into  activity  by  a  Royal  Decree,  on  the 
demand  of  the  local  council,  or  if  such  a  step  is 
considered  desirable  in  the  interests  of  order  and 
public  safety  in  that  locality. ' 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  present  war  the  Govern- 
ment considered  it  urgent  to  call  into  activity  the 
Civic  Guard  in  all  localities :  the  uniforms  of  the 
members  of  the  Civic  Guard  thus  called  out  con- 
sisted of  a  blue  blouse,  a  tricolour  cockade,  and  a 
brassard  of  the  same  colour.  They  carried  arms 
openly,  and  in  performing  their  duties  conformed 
to  the  laws  and  customs  of  war.  The  Government 
extended  this  measure  so  as  to  include  the  officers 
and  personnel  of  two  great  public  services  who 
wear  uniform  in  the  normal  course  of  their  duties, 

'  Article  4  of  the  said  Law. 


German  Rules  of  War  225 

namely  the  customs  officials,  and  the  guards  of 
forests. 

These  decisions  were  in  strict  and  complete 
accordance  with  the  prescriptions  of  The  Hague 
Conference,  and  the  Belgian  Government  hastened 
to  give  notice  of  them  on  August  8th  to  the  German 
Government  through  the  diplomatic  intermediary 
of  the  Spanish  Minister  at  Brussels. 

Subsequently,  and  for  purely  internal  reasons, 
other  circulars  were  issued  which  partly  annulled 
these  decisions.  It  is  nevertheless  a  fact  that  in 
the  places  in  which  German  troops  met  these  Civic 
Guards  in  one  of  the  uniforms  described  above,  or 
in  their  blouses,  they  had  no  right  to  consider  or 
to  treat  them  as  Jrancs-tireurs  inasmuch  as  they 
fell  in  every  respect  within  the  terms  of  the  four 
conditions  stated  at  the  head  of  the  rules  annexed 
to  The  Hague  Convention.  ^ 

1.  That  of  being   commanded  by  a  person  re- 
sponsible for  his  subordinates; 

2.  That  of  having  a  distinctive  emblem  fixed 
and  recognizable  at  a  distance ; 

3.  That  of  carr^'ing  arms  openly ;  and 

4.  That    of    conducting    their    operations    in 
accordance  with  the  laws  and  customs  of  war. 

A  German  magazine  published,  under  the 
heading  of  The  War  of  Francs-Tireurs,  a  picture  of 

'  Article  i . 
IS 


226  The  War  of  191 4 

the  Civic  Guard  wearing  their  blouses.  Numerous 
articles  in  the  German  press  give  the  impression 
that  voluntary  troops  of  civilians  had  taken  part 
in  the  fighting,  harassing  the  German  columns, 
and  carrying  on  a  guerilla  warfare. 

Now,  it  is  absolutely  certain  that  never  in  Bel- 
gium have  any  acts  of  this  sort  taken  place. 

But  there  is  a  very  active  press  campaign  in 
Germany  to  establish  other  contentions. 

What  are  the  German  grounds  of  complaint? 
Their  troops  while  going  through  villages  are 
supposed  to  have  been  fired  at  from  certain  houses ; 
German  columns  marching  on  high  roads  are 
supposed  to  have  been  fired  at  from  neighbouring 
thickets ;  detachments  of  German  troops  occupying 
certain  localities  are  supposed  to  have  been  fired 
at  suddenly  from  cellars  and  windows. 

Instead  of  confining  itself  to  definite  facts,  the 
German  press  immediately  generalized  and  repre- 
sented the  entire  population  as  given  over  to  this 
war  of  francs-tireurs.  On  the  strength  of  these 
statements,  certain  admirers  of  the  Belgians  ac- 
tually gave  them  credit  for  a  kind  of  heroism 
which  would  have  been  absolutely  contrary  to 
the  laws  of  modern  warfare. 

The  Belgian  nation,  it  is  true,  has  given  proof  of 


German  Rules  of  War  227 

its  courage;  but,  at  the  same  time  it  has  not  for  a 
moment  lost  its  dignity.  In  less  than  a  fortnight 
about  twenty  thousand  volunteers  from  the  highest 
to  the  humblest  ranks  of  society  answered  the  noble 
appeal  of  King  Albert.  Regardless  of  all  parties, 
the  people  mustered  enthusiastically  round  the 
tricolour  standard.  In  opulent  cities,  just  as  in 
poorer  villages,  cheers  were  given  for  the  soldiers 
who,  in  the  defence  of  their  country,  were  obliged 
to  blow  up  bridges,  raze  houses  to  the  ground, 
devastate  fields,  shut  up  factories,  block  roads, 
tear  up  railway  lines  or  open  sluices.  It  is  thus, 
and  not  by  rifle  shots  from  behind  walls,  that  the 
Belgians  received  the  Germans. 

How  then  can  it  be  said  in  Germany,*  "There 
is  not  a  single  Belgian  who  is  not  Si  franc-tireur .'  "? 
In  his  answer  to  Romain  RoUand,  Herbert 
Eulenberg^  went  so  far  as  to  write: 

From  the  very  outbreak  of  hostilities  a  systematic 
(planmdssig)  war  of  francs-tireurs  was  begun  in 
Belgium  against  the  Germans.  The  Belgians 
behaved  like  Paris  Apaches  {Pariser  Apachen)  and 
the  heroic  Flemish  Lion  has  nothing  in  common  with 
the  Jackals  of  Flanders  of  to-day. 

;  Herbert    Eulenberg    describes    himself    at    the 
head  of  his  article  as  a  mouthpiece  of  German 

*  As  for  instance  the  Kolnische  Zeitung,  No.  967,  of  August  28th. 

*  Kolnische  Zeitung,  September  17th,  No.  1035. 


228  The  War  of  191 4 

contemporary  thought  {ein  Vertreter  des  heutigen 
geistigen  DeiUschlmids) .  Does  German  thought, 
which  has  filled  human  souls  with  so  many  serene 
truths  and  so  many  great  ideas,  so  forget  itself  as 
to  slander  a  whole  people  without  giving  its  insults 
even  the  appearance  of  justification?  What  are 
the  real  facts  within  the  knowledge  of  Herbert 
Eulenberg?  If  his  pen  did  not  hesitate  before 
writing  this  is  it  really  still  the  pen  of  a  thinker? 
Did  not  also  the  pen  of  Max  Hochdorf  tremble 
when  he  wrote  that  the  francs-tireurs,  who,  accord- 
ing to  him,  were  particularly  numerous  between 
Louvain  and  Tirlemont,  were  peasants  whose 
judgment  had  long  since  been  destroyed  by  alco- 
holism and  religious  fanaticism?'  Max  Hochdorf 
knows  me;  he  has  had  his  workroom  at  the  Sol- 
vay  Institute  in  Brussels.  He  will,  I  hope,  be- 
lieve me,  when  I  tell  him  that  I  am  painfully 
astounded  to  see  him  father  this  story  of  drunken 
and  fanatical  Belgians,  Let  him  mark  on  a  map 
of  Belgium  in  great  stains  the  burnings  and  de- 
vastations of  which  the  only  pretext  was  reprisals 
against  the  inhabitants.  Would  he  maintain  that 
in  the  vicinity  of  Liege,  in  South  Luxemburg,  at 
Dinant,  Andenne,  Tamines,  the  population  is 
made  up  of  fanatics  and  drimkards?  Has  he  for- 

^  Berliner  TageUatt,  September  9th. 


German  Rules  of  War  229 

gotten  that  a  number  of  these  locaHties  are  centres 
of  higher  popular  education,  and  that  at  Wavre, 
for  example,  where  one  of  his  colleagues  of  the 
Kolnische  Zeitung''  states,  without  any  proof,  that 
street  fights  took  place  against  the  francs-lireurs, 
there  flourishes  one  of  the  most  active  committees 
of  the  University  Extension  at  Brussels? 

The  German  socialist  deputy,  R.  Fischer,  has 
also  repeated  this  story  of  ignorant  fanatical 
Belgians  in  a  letter  to  the  Volksrecht  of  Ziirich.  ^ 
Does  he  not  think  that  in  stating  that  "the 
population  was  incited  by  priests  who  feared  that 
they  would  lose  their  privileges"  he  is  reducing  the 
argument  to  a  very  degraded  level?  I  can  assure 
him  that,  from  the  very  beginning  of  August,  the 
priests,  in  conformity  with  the  express  instructions 
of  their  bishops,  preached  in  the  churches,  on  the 
one  hand,  the  patriotic  duty  of  voluntary  enlist- 
ment in  the  ranks  of  the  army,  and  on  the  other 
hand,  the  abstention  of  civilians  from  all  military 
operations. 

In  fact  it  is  absolutely  certain  that  no  concerted 
resistance  on  the  part  of  the  population  has  ever 
taken  place.  Weapons  had  been  given  up  to  the 
local   authorities,    and   the   latter   had   enjoined 

'  September  22d,  No.  1050. 
*  September  5th. 


230  The  War  of  1914 

absolute  calm  everywhere.  Inhabitants  of  towns 
and  villages,  terrified  by  the  unexpected  calamity 
which  befell  them,  had  other  thoughts  than  of 
waging  a  war  of  francs-tireurs. 

What,  then,  is  the  origin  of  the  German  state- 
ments? 

After  having  read  and  re-read  everything  that 
has  been  written  for  and  against  this  allegation, 
and  after  having  spoken  with  soldiers  who  have 
taken  part  in  the  campaign,  and  with  people  who 
had  returned  from  invaded  districts,  and  after 
having  deeply  thought  the  matter  over,  I  have 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  there  are  many  widely 
different  circumstances  which  explain  the  belief  in 
Belgian  francs-tireurs  which  to-day  is  held  as  an 
estabHshed  article  of  patriotic  faith  in  Germany. 

First,  I  am  perfectly  ready  to  admit  that  cer- 
tain exceptional  isolated  cases  actually  did  take 
place.  Trustworthy  friends,  for  example,  have 
told  me  how  in  two  villages  poachers  hid  in  the 
woods,  or  spent  the  night  in  ambush,  in  order 
to  fire  on  German  soldiers.  I  do  not  attempt  to 
deny  this,  and  I  even  add  that  it  may  have  taken 
place  elsewhere.  These  men,  who  carry  arms  as 
well  in  self-defence  against  gamekeepers  and  gen- 
darmes as  to  kill  game  with,  may  have  escaped 
the  preventive  and  repressive  regulations  of  the 


German  Rules  of  War  231 

authorities  and  kept  their  arms,  when  they  had 
been  ordered  to  give  them  up,  and  may  have  at- 
tacked the  troops  when  they  had  been  definitely 
forbidden  to  do  so. 

But  apart  from  these  local  and  exceptional 
cases,  I  surmise  that  the  very  large  majority  of 
other  cases,  have  been  mere  coincidences. 

In  this  connection  I  should  like  to  ask  all  those 
people  who,  in  Germany  and  elsewhere,  have 
placed  their  names  and  social  position  at  the 
service  of  this  campaign  of  defamation  against 
the  inhabitants  of  Belgium,  to  consider  dis- 
passionately the  following  few  facts,  the  truth  of 
which  can  at  any  time  be  checked.  Their  only 
importance  is  that  they  show  with  what  reserve 
the  allegation  of  this  firing  on  the  part  of  civilians 
should  be  accepted  and  how  easy  it  is  for  mistakes 
to  be  made.  I  am  compelled,  from  motives  which 
will  readily  be  understood,  to  refrain  from  giving 
certain  names. 

During  the  month  of  September  on  the  Brussels- 
Mons  line,  a  German  train  near  Jurbise  exploded 
a  detonator  used  for  signalling  purposes  on  the 
line.  The  soldiers  in  the  train  on  hearing  the 
explosion  immediately  concluded  that  an  attack 
had  been  made  by  francs-tireurs.  They  seized 
some  peasants  who  were  working  nearby  and  shot 


232  The  War  of  191 4 

them  on  the  spot.  When  at  last  they  were 
made  to  understand  the  cause  of  the  explo- 
sion, they  expressed  regret  and  continued  on  their 
journey. 

On  September  25th  in  a  village  in  Hainaut,  a 
similar  incident  nearly  took  place.  A  detachment 
of  Belgian  soldier  cyclists  had  been  sent  across 
the  enemy's  lines  to  cut  the  communications  by 
destroying  bridges.  The  cyclists  hid  behind 
bushes  and  crossed  into  a  park  forming  part  of 
the  property  of  M.  X.,  whom  I  know  person- 
ally. The  park  was  situated  near  the  railway 
line  on  which  the  Belgian  soldiers  had  to  carry 
out  their  work.  German  soldiers  were  guarding 
the  line.  They  were  surprised  by  the  fire  of  the 
cyclists,  and  as  they  were  more  than  seventy 
kilometres  from  the  Belgian  lines  they  thought 
that  this  was  an  attack  oifrancs-tirenrs.  M.  X.  was 
arrested  and  only  escaped  thanks  to  his  knowledge 
of  German  which  enabled  him  to  explain  what  had 
happened  and  ask  for  an  inquiry  to  be  held. 

Along  the  road  from  Brussels  to  Termonde  a 
few  gendarmes^  were  ambushed  behind  two  farms. 
They  were  waiting  for  a  German  patrol,  and  when 
it  passed  fired  without  coming  out  of  cover.  The 
German  soldiers  took  note  that  the  shots  were 

'  Gendarmes  form  part  of  the  regular  army. 


German  Rules  of  War  233 

fired  from  the  two  farms.  Shortly  afterwards 
these  were  both  burnt. 

A  similar  occurrence  took  place  near  the  little 
Flemish  town  of  Waereghem,  except  that  in  this 
case  it  was  a  detachment  of  infantry  who  crawled 
along  beside  the  houses  to  fire. 

During  the  days  between  September  29th 
and  October  3d,  part  of  the  commune  of  Wet- 
teren  situated  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Scheldt 
was  put  into  a  state  of  defence  to  cover  the  retreat 
of  the  cavalry  division  which  made  daily  recon- 
naissances on  the  right  bank.  In  each  of  the 
houses  which  face  the  Scheldt,  most  of  which  had 
not  been  evacuated  by  the  inhabitants,  a  machine- 
gun  had  been  placed  on  the  first  floor.  The  in- 
fantry of  the  Civic  Guard  occupied  the  ground 
floor.  If  the  enemy  had  appeared  during  these 
days  they  would  have  been  received  with  rifle  and 
machine-gun  fire,  and  if  they  had  managed  to 
carry  the  place,  the  Belgians  would  have  been 
able  to  escape  by  the  gardens  of  the  houses  which 
protected  them,  and  reach  Lokeren  or  Ghent  by 
way  of  Laeme  or  Destelbergen  without  being  seen 
by  the  Germans.  The  latter  would  have  doubtless 
been  under  the  impression  that  this  resistance  had 
been  organized  by  the  civilian  population. 

During  the  whole  period  of  the  operations  at 


234  The  War  of  191 4 

Antwerp,  detachments  of  Belgian  soldiers,  not 
working  on  any  preconcerted  plan,  but  left  to  their 
own  initiative,  carried  on  a  guerilla  war  against 
the  German  army.  Protected  by  the  woods,  or 
under  cover  of  night,  small  bodies  of  them  ad- 
vanced as  far  as  possible,  often  behind  the  enemy's 
lines.  These  little  bands  of  brave  men  harassed 
the  German  communications.  The  Belgian 
General  Staff  encouraged  these  expeditions  which 
worried  the  enemy  and  completely  upset  their 
calculations  as  to  our  operations. 

The  tactics  of  the  Belgian  army,  with  its  obvious 
numerical  inferiority,  frequently  took  the  form  of 
this  constant  harassing  of  the  enemy.  A  great 
number  of  patrols  were  left  in  the  rear  and  spread 
about  in  the  villages  through  which  the  German 
troops  were  to  pass,  with  orders  to  harass  them 
and  then  rejoin  their  column.  These  tactics  be- 
wildered the  enemy  greatly.  A  German  engineer 
of  the  corps  of  officers,  who  was  billeted  at  Ghent 
on  one  of  my  friends,  expressed  his  surprise  to  him : 

"  In  what  a  curious  way  your  army  wages  war," 
he  said  one  day,  "your  soldiers  are  never  where 
we  suppose  them  to  be  or  they  appear  on  the  scene 
when  they  are  least  expected.  A  detachment  ap- 
pears to  be  the  advance  guard  of  an  important 
column :  steps  are  consequently  taken  to  meet  the 


German  Rules  of  War  235 

situation,  and  we  suddenly  discover  that  we  have 
before  us  a  mere  patrol  which  disappears  as  we 
advance."  It  can  easily  be  imagined  how  these 
tactics  make  the  German  command  nervous  and 
foster  the  belief  in  francs-tireurs.  Appearing  in 
districts  where  the  Germans  thought  themselves 
entirely  protected,  these  detachments,  although 
composed  of  Belgian  regular  soldiers  in  uniform, 
often  caused  the  enemy  to  believe  that  they  were 
the  victims  oi  francs-tireurs. 

At  Aerschot,  on  the  very  morning  of  the  sack 
of  the  town,  the  Germans  entered  after  having 
met  with  a  somewhat  severe  resistance  on  the 
part  of  a  Belgian  detachment.  The  fighting  took 
place  between  six  and  eight  o'clock.  A  Belgian 
witness  stated  to  the  Commission  of  Inquiry  that 
that  afternoon  a  soldier,  who  had  taken  refuge  in  a 
house,  left  it,  rifle  in  hand,  after  having  taken  off 
his  uniform  and  put  on  civilian  clothes.  Assuming 
that  he  was  neither  a  drunkard  nor  a  madman,  and 
supposing  that  he  did  fire  a  shot  as  the  German 
commandant  asserts,  could  the  act  of  a  single 
individual  be  imputed  as  a  crime  to  the  whole 
population  of  a  town? 

At  Dinant,  according  to  the  statement  of  the 
correspondent  of  the  Berliner  Tageblatt/  the  in- 

'  September  26th. 


236  The  War  of  191 4 

habitants  fired  on  the  German  soldiers  during  the 
night.  "They  were,"  says  this  correspondent, 
' '  supported  by  French  soldiers  who  were  hiding  in 
'certain  houses."*  The  question  arises  as  to  how 
it  was  possible  during  the  night  to  distinguish 
whether  the  shots  from  the  windows  were  actually 
fired  by  the  inhabitants  and  not  by  the  French 
soldiers. 

At  Tamines,  machine  guns  had  been  placed  in 
two  houses  which  overlooked  the  bridge  over  the 
Sambre.  French  soldiers  were  concealed  there. 
The  Germans  probably  thought  that  the  shots 
had  been  fired  by  the  inhabitants,  and  who  knows 
whether  the  terrible  fate  which  befell  the  little 
town  was  not  due  to  a  mistake  of  this  sort? 

Lastly  here  are  two  incidents  from  which  I 
should  be  reluctant  to  generalize  but  which  never- 
theless are  of  importance  in  the  chain  of  evidence. 
The  German  army,  just  like  any  other  army,  is 
liable  to  include  in  its  ranks  individuals  of  doubt- 
ful character  whose  criminal  propensities  find  an 
opening  in  the  manifold  and  varying  cricumstances 
of  war. 

In  a  Walloon  town,  the  Burgomaster  was  ar- 
rested because  a  German  officer  had  been  shot. 
The  inhabitants  were  accused  of  this.  ' '  Shoot  me, " 
answered  the  Burgomaster,  "but  I  first  demand 


German  Rules  of  War  237 

a  post-mortem  examination  of  the  victim."  A 
German  bullet  was  found  in  the  body. 

At  Herve,  during  the  scenes  of  burning  and 
devastation  of  which  the  Kolnische  Zeitung^  of 
September  loth  has  sketched  the  lamentable 
sequel,  Madame  Y.,  fifty  years  old,  the  aunt  of 
one  of  my  colleagues  at  the  Brussels  University, 
saw  from  her  window  a  German  non-commissioned 
officer  fire  a  revolver  from  the  window  of  a  neigh- 
bouring house.  He  then  rushed  downstairs  and 
called  out  to  his  men, "  A  shot  was  fired  from  here ! " 

I  have  given  my  reason  for  relating  all  these 
episodes.  My  object  is  simply  to  show  how,  in  the 
course  of  the  innumerable  events  of  daily  life,  some 
commonplace  circumstances  may  arise  which  may 
lead  to  fatal  mistakes. 

Now  I  must  dwell  upon  this  circumstance,  that 
generally  speaking,  no  inquiry  is  held;  guilt  is  as- 
sumed as  a  matter  of  course,  and  reprisals  take 
place  at  once — sojort  as  the  German  accounts  say 
so  often;  that  is  to  say  without  giving  time  for 
possible  mistakes  to  be  corrected  or  for  responsi- 
bility to  be  determined. 

Thus  with  regard  to  Louvain,  a  German  tele- 
gram runs*: 

'  No.  1009. 

» Kolnische  Zeitung,  No.  967,  August  28th. 


238  The  War  of  19 14 

The  movement  was  crushed  at  once  (sofort)  and 
the  punishment  inflicted  without  pity  (unerbittlich) . 

At  Namur,  a  correspondent  of  the  same  paper 
relates  what  he  has  just  learned: 

At  a  given  moment  a  violent  fire  was  opened  on 
the  Grand'  Place  on  our  troops.  As  this  could  not 
have  come  from  a  single  fanatic,  steps  were  im- 
mediately taken  {alsbald  ereilt)  to  inflict  a  well- 
deserved  punishment.  Both  sides  of  the  Place  were 
set  on  fire. 

Referring  to  Tamines,  another  correspondent 
writes  in  the  Kolnische  Zeitung': 

Then,  not  being  able  to  reach  those  who  had  fired, 
the  rage  of  our  troops  vented  itself  on  the  little 
town.  Without  pity  it  was  given  up  to  the  flames 
and  became  a  heap  of  ruins. 

The  depositions  collected  by  the  Belgian  Com- 
mission of  Inquiry  on  the  violation  of  the  rules  of 
international  law  confirm  these  accounts  of  Ger- 
man origin.    In  the  Third  Report,  page  2, 1  find: 

The  inhabitants  were  indiscriminately  arrested 
and  shot  without  trial  and  without  apparent  reason. 

Sometimes,  even  as  in  the  case  of  the  unfortun- 
ate town  of  Aerschot,  it  was  chance  that  deter- 
mined who  should  be  the  victims.     I  have  taken 

» No.  968. 

» No.  1009  of  September  loth. 


German  Rules  of  War  239 

this  passage  from  the  Fourth  Report.  It  is  vouched 
for  by  M.  Orts,  Counsellor  of  Legation,  whose 
good  faith  nobody  who  knows  him  could  attempt 
to  question: 

After  some  searching  I  found  at  the  foot  of  a 
bank  the  spot  where  fell  these  innocent  victims. 
Black  clots  of  blood  still  marked,  on  the  stubble,  the 
place  occupied  by  each  of  them  under  the  fire  of  the 
executioners.  These  blood  stains  are  two  yards 
distant  from  each  other,  which  confirms  the  testi- 
mony of  the  witnesses  according  to  which,  at  the 
last  moment,  the  executioners  took  from  the  ranks 
two  out  of  every  three  men,  chance,  in  default  of 
any  sort  of  inquiry,  pointing  out  those  who  had 
to  die. 

Really,  in  these  circumstances,  how  coidd  it  be 
hoped  that  officers  in  command  of  troops  could 
distinguish  between  the  apparent  and  the  real 
cause,  between  simple  coincidence  and  governing 
fact?  And  on  what  a  portentous  chain  of  excep- 
tional circumstances  does  bare  justice  depend. 

Above  all,  the  cardinal  fact  must  not  be  over- 
looked that  the  soldiers,  non-commissioned  officers, 
and  officers  of  the  German  army,  in  their  training 
for  war,  are  obsessed  with  the  idea  of  armed 
civilians  and  haunted  by  visions  of  francs-tireurs. 
I  was  told  of  the  case  of  German  soldiers  in  Hai- 
naut,  whose  only  knowledge  of  French  consisted  of 


240  The  War  of  191 4 

the  words  "  Civils  ont  tire.''  Again,  a  certain  re- 
servist of  the  137th  Infantry  Regiment,  on  August 
29th,  twice  wrote  down  in  his  notebook  "Fra- 
diroer."  Professor  Hauser  stated  in  the  Temps  on 
this  subject  that  the  German  officers  seemed  to 
develop  systematically  in  their  men  ''une  sorte 
d'hypnose  particidiere.'"  The  fact  that  officers 
and  men  practically  expected  to  be  fired  at  by 
civilians  caused  their  minds  to  be  centred  round 
jraiics-tireurs  as  their  one  preoccupation. 

When  a  body  of  men  are  haunted  by  this  idea, 
and  incidents  occur  which  shake  their  nerves  and 
induce  contagious  excitement,  all  the  elements  are 
present  for  a  confusion  that  is  likely  to  end  in 
tragedy.  It  is  impossible  not  to  be  struck  by 
the  fact  pointed  out  by  many  observers,  notably 
in  the  evidence  taken  by  the  Belgian  Commis- 
sion of  Inquiry,  that  reprisals  for  " tir  des  civils'' 
often  took  place  either  after  the  Germans  had 
suffered  checks  in  engagements  with  the  Belgian 
troops  or  in  parts  of  the  country  where  the  Ger- 
mans had  met  with  a  military  resistance  which 
irritated  them  and  ill-disposed  them  against  the 
inhabitants.  I  have  heard  this  explanation  given 
of  the  difference  between  the  northern  and  south- 
ern regions  of  the  province  of  Luxemburg.  In 
the  south  numerous  villages  have  been  devastated 


German  Rules  of  War  241 

or  burnt :  there  French  regiments  had  opposed  the 
advance  of  the  Germans  whereas  in  the  north  their 
progress  was  unimpeded. 

A  correspondent  of  the  Kolnische  Zeitung^  has 
himself  pointed  out  the  contrast  between  these 
two  neighbouring  regions,  one  of  which  had  been 
spared  and  the  other  devastated.  He  infers  that 
this  difference  of  treatment  is  due  to  a  difference 
in  the  attitude  of  the  inhabitants.  This  inference 
is  very  rash,  all  the  other  circumstances  being 
obviously  far  from  equal.  Further,  these  contrasts 
are  noticeable  not  only  as  between  neighbouring 
regions  but  even  as  between  places  quite  close  to 
one  another.  Common  sense  forbids  us  to  suppose 
that  the  inhabitants  showed  themselves  violently 
hostile  in  one  place  and  in  another  extended  a 
peaceful  welcome,  and  this  fact  lends  great  prob- 
ability to  other  explanations.  In  any  case,  as  the 
German  correspondents  themselves  admit,  this 
fact  destroys  the  hypothesis  of  a  general  and 
systematic  armed  resistance  on  the  part  of  the 
Belgian  civilian  population. 

Therefore  when  four  American  journalists,  after 
travelling  through  Belgium,  signed  on  September 
3d  a  declaration  in  which  they  stated  on  their 
honour  that  they  were  unable  to  find  a  single  case 

'  No.  1035,  September  17th. 
16 


242  The  War  of  191 4 

in  which  these  reprisals  were  not  the  result  of 
provocation'  they  do  not  throw  any  light  on  the 
point  as  to  whether  the  Belgian  population  really 
did  organize  an  armed  resistance.  In  the  minds  of 
those  who  ordered  them,  these  reprisals  were  of 
course  undertaken  with  good  cause.  It  is  quite 
another  matter  as  to  whether  this  was  actually  the 
case. 

It  has  been  undeniably  proved  [wrote  Professor 
Stier-Somlo  in  the  Kolnische  ZeitungY  {es  steht 
unumstosslich  fest)]  that  the  civilian  population  in 
Belgium  has  fired  in  ambush  from  houses,  cellars, 
windows,  and  hedges,  on  the  German  troops  and 
even  on  convoys  of  wounded  and  on  doctors,  that 
they  killed  a  number  of  them,  and  that  they 
poured  boiling  oil  on  our  brave  soldiers. 

I  have  been  accustomed  to  a  stricter  sense  of 
scientific  documentation  and  argument  on  the 
part  of  my  colleague,  and  I  have  no  doubt  that  he 
would  be  the  first  to  demand  the  proofs  which  logic 
requires  to  arrive  at  complete  certainty.  In  parti- 
cular, I  hope  that  he  did  not  base  his  conviction 
with  regard  to  boiling  oil  on  the  account  written  by 
a  Dutch  journalist  of  the  attitude  of  the  population 
of  Herstal,  near  Liege.     Men,  women,  and  children 

'  Propaganda  Pamphlet,  No.  3,  of  the  Bureau  des  Deutschen 
Handelstages. 

^  No.  977,  September  ist. 


German  Rules  of  War  243 

were  supposed  to  have  thrown  themselves  before 
the  German  troops ;  every  kind  of  projectile  was 
said  to  have  been  made  use  of;  boiHng  oil  to 
have  been  poured  and  the  place  to  have  been  given 
over  to  wholesale  pHlage.  A  few  days  after  the 
publication  of  this  terrifying  account,  it  was  learnt 
from  an  official  source  that  nothing,  absolutely 
nothing,  had  happened  at  Herstal  and  moreover 
that  there  had  not  been  the  slightest  reprisals. 

I  will  not  add  anything  further,  and  I  think  I 
may  draw  the  conclusion  that  the  detractors  of  the 
Belgian  people  have,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  shown  a 
lack  of  the  most  elementary  critical  sense. 

I    find  a   further  proof   of  this  in  a  German 
pamphlet.    It  is  one  of  those  innumerable  propa- 
ganda publications  which  flow  ceaselessly  from  all 
parts  of  Germany.    This  particular  one  was  pub- 
lished at  Leipzig  by  Zehrfeld,  and  is  entitled  Die 
Belgischen  Greueltaten  (Belgian  atrocities)  and  the 
sub-title  is  Amtliche  und  glaiibenswilrdige  Berichte 
(official  and  trustworthy  reports).     The  inference 
is  that  the  contents  are  taken  partly  from  official 
sources    and    partly   from    trustworthy  sources. 
The  object  of  the  pamphlet  seems  to  be  to  col- 
lect in  a  sort  of  compendium  the  more  character- 
istic accounts  of  the  acts  of  cruelty  of  which  the 
Belgian  population  is  accused.     A  special  chapter 


244  The  War  of  191 4 

is  of  course  devoted  to  Der  Franktireur-Krieg  (the^ 
war  oi  francs-tireurs) . 

What  do  we  read  in  these  pages? 

Three  of  these  accounts  relate  to  the  ill-treat- 
ment said  to  have  been  inflicted  on  German  soldiers 
by  the  civilian  population  after  a  battle.  This 
question  is  discussed  in  the  next  section.  I  will 
therefore  only  treat  here  of  the  statements  with 
reference  to  the  participation  of  the  civilian  popula- 
tion in  hostilities. 

Six  of  the  accounts  emanated  from  journalists' 
who  on  their  own  admission  were  not  eye-wit- 
nesses of  the  facts  they  report.  Further,  they 
make  no  mention  whatever  of  the  sources  from 
which  the  facts  are  drawn;  the  six  accounts  do 
not  therefore  carry  any  weight.  The  same  can  be 
said  of  seven  other  declarations  which  are  supposed 
to  have  been  made  by  eye-witnesses,  but  these  are 
described  in  so  vague  a  manner^  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  check  them.  It  should  also  be  said  that,  in 
most  of  the  facts  reported,  the  narrators  do  not 
even  give  the  names  of  the  places  in  which  they 
are  supposed  to  have  taken  place. 


'  Gottfried  Traub  and  the  war  correspondents  of  B.  Z.  am 
Mitlag,  Berliner  Lokal  Anzeiger,  Leipziger  Neueste  Nachrichten, 
Norddeutsche  Allgemeine  Zeitung,  and  Leipziger  Tagehlatt. 

'  A  Dominican,  two  Swedish  women,  and  four  soldiers. 


German  Rules  of  War  245 

Finally  there  is  one  declaration  in  which  the 
author  states  his  name  and  in  which  verification 
is  therefore  possible.  It  was  made  by  Alexander 
Berg,  a  barrister,  to  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung,  and 
refers  to  the  destruction  of  the  town  of  Andenne. 
M.  Berg  alleges  that  the  night  attack,  which  was 
made  on  his  company  while  they  were  going 
through  Andenne,  was  carried  out  by  francs- 
tireurs,  but  he  does  not  state  any  fact  to  justify 
this  allegation  and  excludes  the  hypothesis,  which, 
however,  is  just  as  probable,  that  the  assailants 
might  have  been  Belgian  soldiers  and  not  civilians. 

We  shall  see  below'  how  a  quite  recent  German 
dementi  has  proved  M.  Berg's  account  to  be  false 
in  an  essential  particular. 

Such  is  the  net  result  of  this  pamphlet. 

Is  it  not  obvious  that  the  accusations  made 
against  the  Belgians  have  been  accepted  by  Ger- 
mans with  inexcusable  readiness? 

2.    The  Treatment  of  the  Woimded 

The  allegation  with  regard  to  the  treatment  of 
wounded  put  forward  in  a  note  of  protest  on 
August  I4th^  was  repeated  officially  on  two  other 
occasions. 

»  P.  288.  '  Pp.  210-21 1. 


246  The  War  of  191 4 

On  September  6th,  the  Chancellor  of  the  German 
Empire  stated  in  a  communication  to  the  repre- 
sentatives of  the  great  American  Press  agencies : 

What  you  were  not  told  is  that  on  the  fields  of 
battle  young  Belgian  girls  gouged  out  the  eyes  of 
our  wounded. 

One  of  Germany's  highest  officials  therefore 
accepted  and  gave  his  warranty  to  an  infamous 
accusation  which  the  entire  press  of  his  country- 
had  been  pleased  to  propagate.  The  German 
Government  even  invoked  this  allegation  during 
November  as  a  pretext  for  refusing  to  allow  the 
daughter  of  General  Leman,  the  hero  of  the  army 
of  Liege,  whose  bravery  the  German  Note  of 
August  9th'  was  forced  to  admit,  to  visit  her 
sick  father  who  was  a  prisoner  in  Germany. 

Such  a  proceeding  would,  said  the  answer,  deeply 
wound  the  feelings  of  the  German  people,  for  relia- 
ble witnesses  had  stated  that  German  wounded  and 
prisoners  of  war  had  been  in  Belgium  the  victims 
of  treatment  which  was  not  only  contrary  to  inter- 
national law,  but  also  a  disgrace  to  civilization. 

To  refute  these  "reliable  witnesses"  I  could 
quote  the  Kolnische  Volkszeitung,  or  the  Vorwdrts 
which,  in  articles  which  I  have  before  me,  have 

'  See  p.  113. 


German  Rules  of  War  247 

themselves  been  obliged  to  admit  that  facts  which 
had  been  considered  as  established  were  in  reality- 
pure  fiction. ' 

I  could  also  tell  how  the  first  German  wounded 
picked  up  in  Belgium  on  the  battlefields  were  sent, 
by  the  express  wish  of  our  Queen,  to  the  ambulance 
of  the  Royal  Palace  in  just  the  same  way  as  the 
Belgian  wounded. 

But  I  prefer  to  allow  a  document  which  is  based 
on  observation  made  by  the  Germans  themselves 
to  speak  for  itself. 

Two  official  commissions  have  been  instituted 
in  Germany,  one  civilian  and  the  other  military, 
separately  charged  with  the  duty  of  holding  an 
inquiry  into  all  acts  of  cruelty  alleged  against 
belligerents. 

As  to  the  question  of  the  gouging  out  of  eyes,  it 
has  been  stated  that  in  all  the  cases  reported  in  the 
papers  or  by  private  individuals,  witnesses  have 
been  found  and  questioned.  It  has  been  stated 
before  the  Civilian  Commission,  that  in  a  great 
many  cases,  not  to  say  in  nearly  all,  these  witnesses 
admitted  that  they  only  possessed  hearsay  evi- 

'  See  especially  the  Vorwdrts  of  October  22d  and  the  heading 
"Das  Marchen  von  den  ausgestochenen  Augen"  (The  Legend  of 
the  Gouged-Out  Eyes),  which  this  paper  introduced  in  order  to 
collect  evidence  from  German  sources  in  refutation  of  the  accu- 
sations made  against  the  Belgians. 


248  The  War  of  191 4 

dence  of  the  facts;  other  witnesses  declined  to 
make  their  depositions  and  did  not  appear.  The 
finding  was  that  it  had  not  been  proved  that 
Belgian  women  had  gouged  out  the  eyes 
of  wounded  or  of  prisoners  of  war  and  that 
in  no  single  case  had  this  fact  been  stated 
officially. 

The  German  Commission  explained  that  this 
story  must  have  arisen  from  the  fact  that  a  great 
number  of  wounded  had  their  eyes  put  out  by 
fragments  of  shrapnel  which  burst  about  a  man's 
height  from  the  ground  and  often  hit  men  in  the 
eyes. 

The  story  still  persists  in  spite  of  these  find- 
ings and  declarations.  But  in  official  circles 
these  acts  of  cruelty  alleged  against  the  Bel- 
gians are  formally  denied.  The  Civilian  Com- 
mission was  positive  and  unanimous  on  this 
point. 

The  Military  Commission  arrived  at  the  same 
conclusions. 

We  now  see  what  is  left  of  the  rash  statements 
of  German  officials  and  the  German  Press.  The 
unfortunate  thing  is  that,  during  long  months, 
this  defamation  has  accomplished  its  evil  work 
and  that  we  are  now  witnessing  its  deplorable 
effects. 


German  Rules  of  War  249 

3.    The  Treatment  of  Foreigners 

If  we  can  believe  the  note  of  protest'  and  the 
German  Press  which  commented  upon  it  with  pain- 
ful insistence,  the  German  residents  in  Belgium  on 
their  departure  met  with  inhuman  treatment  at 
the  hands  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  large  towns, 
especially  at  Brussels  and  Antwerp.^  Nor  did 
Austrians  escape  the  hatred  of  the  populace;  in 
fact,  Austria-Hungary  thought  fit  to  justify  her 
declaration  of  war  against  Belgium  on  August 
28th  by  the  statement  that 

Austrian  and  Hungarian  nationals  in  Belgium  have 
had  to  submit,  under  the  very  eyes  of  the  Belgian 
authorities,  to  treatment  contrary  to  the  most 
primitive  demands  of  humanity,  and  inadmissible 
even  towards  subjects  of  an  enemy  State. 

I  will  quote  a  statement  spontaneously  sent  by 
a  German  on  September  loth  to  the  Kolnische 
Zeitung.^  I  will  give  it  in  detail  because  it 
shows  in  a  remarkably  clear  light  both  the  irre- 
proachable conduct  of  the  inhabitants  as  of  the 
Belgian  authorities,  and  also  the  inevitable  ex- 
cesses of  that  part  of  the  population  which  is  ever 
ready  to  join  in  disorderly  expressions  of  popular 

'P.  211. 

*  See,  for  example,  Kolnische  Zeitung,  Nos.  896,  900,  901,  937, 
948.  •'  No.  799. 


250  The  War  of  191 4 

feeling.  That  windows  were  broken,  German  beer 
advertisement  boards  smashed  to  pieces,  people 
in  the  street  jeered  at  and  even  jostled,  cannot 
cause  any  surprise,  but  these  were  isolated  cases 
which  were  vigorously  checked  by  the  police, 
severely  punished  by  the  Belgian  Courts,  and  dis- 
avowed, in  short,  by  everybody.  I  will  let  the 
correspondent  of  the  Kolnische  Volkszeitung  tell 
the  story : 


For  the  past  fortnight,  the  German  Press  has  been 
full  of  accounts  of  acts  of  brutality  committed  by 
the  Belgians  against  our  fellow-countrymen,  and  it 
would  seem  as  if  all  Belgians  are  cut-throats  from 
whom  Germans  can  only  escape  with  their  lives 
by  some  piece  of  good  fortune. 

The  author  of  these  lines  has  no  intention  of 
casting  any  doubt  as  to  the  truth  of  the  numerous 
incidents  which  have  been  reported.  He  himself 
witnessed  the  way  in  which  the  population  of  the 
centre  of  Brussels,  stirred  by  the  news  of  Germany's 
first  steps,  gave  vent  to  its  anger  by  attacking 
German  restaurants  and  shops.  He  heard  that 
Germans  were  severely  handled,  and  he  is  far  from 
wishing  to  condone  such  behaviour.  He  merely 
wishes  to  show  that  these  outbursts  were  the  work 
of  a  disorderly  crowd  recruited  from  the  dregs  of 
the  people. 

The  author  of  this  account  was  obliged  to  leave 
Brussels  with  his  family  on  Friday,  August  7th,  at 
daybreak.     He  had  to  spend  the  Thursdaj^  night 


German  Rules  of  War  251 

at  the  German  Consulate  which  was  already  under 
American  protection.  About  three  thousand  of  our 
fellow-countrymen  had  arrived  there  with  their 
wives  and  children,  taking  with  them  the  bare 
necessities  of  life,  in  order  to  escape  from  personal 
danger,  and  to  return  to  their  country  under  official 
protection. 

I  met  several  families  of  foreigners  there,  who  had 
fled  from  the  French  frontier.  They  had  already 
spent  two  days  and  two  nights  without  undressing, 
and  had  had  very  little  food.  Huddled  up  together, 
at  the  German  Consulate,  we  sat  on  the  floor,  in  the 
corridors,  and  on  the  stairs.  It  was  decided  about 
midnight — probably  on  account  of  the  serious 
danger  of  keeping  so  great  a  number  of  people  in  a 
relatively  small  and  ill-lit  house — to  transport  us  to 
the  Cirque  Royal.  This  is  a  big  building  belonging 
to  the  town,  very  roomy  and  well-ventilated,  and 
only  a  few  minutes  distant.  During  this  transfer, 
as  indeed  afterwards  in  the  Cirque  itself,  and  at 
dawn  the  next  day  on  the  way  to  the  station, 
the  Civic  Guard  watched  over  us,  and  showed 
such  consideration  that  one  felt  as  if  their  duty 
had  rather  been  protection  than  surveillance.  It 
was  certainly  a  lamentable  sight  to  see  these  in- 
nxmierable  fugitives  with  their  wives  and  children, 
and,  in  spite  of  the  early  hour,  we  heard  exclama- 
tions of  pity  from  the  inhabitants  as  they  gazed  at 
us  from  their  windows.  The  soldiers  were  just  as 
sorry  for  us;  they,  one  and  all,  by  look  or  gesture, 
expressed  pity  for  us.  Several  Civic  Guards  came 
to  the  help  of  those  who  were  in  the  sorriest  plight, 
by  carrying  their  bags  or  their  children.  The 
burgomaster    himself,   Mr.   Max,   arrived   at   two 


252  The  War  of  191 4 

o'clock  in  the  morning  in  a  motor  to  see  that  every- 
thing went  smoothly.  In  the  Cirque,  the  soldiers 
themselves  looked  after  the  children,  giving  them 
milk  and  food.  An  eye-witness  told  me  that  he  had 
seen  the  soldiers  make  a  collection  among  them- 
selves for  the  benefit  of  a  destitute  family.  An 
officer  on  duty,  who  happened  to  be  a  friend  of 
mine,  left  me  no  peace  until  I  had  entrusted  my  wife 
and  children  to  him  so  that  he  might  take  them  to 
his  own  house  not  far  off.  During  the  hours  of 
waiting  in  the  Cirque,  the  soldiers  whose  duty  it  was 
to  collect  all  weapons,  did  their  utmost  to  speak 
German  as  best  they  could.  In  a  word,  each  one  did 
all  that  was  in  his  power  to  succour  the  fugitives, » 


This  account,  written  from  the  heart,  fully  con- 
firms what  I  know  and  what  is  indeed  a  matter  of 
general  knowledge.  On  page  14  of  the  pamphlet 
I  have  already  mentioned,  Die  Belgischen  Greuel- 
taten,  it  is  stated  that,  at  Brussels,  between  August 
6th  and  8th,  two  women  were  so  beaten  that  one 
of  them  died  in  consequence;  that  two  children 
between  the  ages  of  three  and  five  were,  in  two 
different  streets,  thrown  out  of  second-floor  win- 
dows, and  one  of  them  subsequently  beaten  to 
death;  finally  that  several  men  had  their  eyes 
gouged  out  and  their  ears  cut  off,   and  that  a 

'  See  also  Kolnische  Zeitung,  No.  901  of  August  loth,  which 
contains  a  similar  account. 


German  Rules  of  War  253 

butcher  was  disembowelled,  and  that  at  Antwerp, 
the  hotel -keeper  Weber  was  murdered. 

There  is  not  a  word  of  truth  in  all  this. 

It  is  to  be  noted  that  at  Antwerp,  an  official 
inquiry,  undertaken  by  the  Bench  itself,  found  that 
no  offence  had  been  committed  against  Germans 
or  Austrians  either  on  August  6th,  or  at  any  other 
date;  as  for  the  hotel -keeper  Weber,  he  went  to 
Holland  where  he  lived  for  a  long  time  in  perfect 
health. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  not  for  inaccuracy  of  state- 
ment or  exaggeration  of  facts  that  I  find  fault  with 
the  authors  of  this  propaganda  pamphlet,  who 
prefer  to  remain  anonymous.  They  have  doubtless 
received  from  various  sources  the  information 
which  they  print.  Their  mistake  lies  in  forgetting 
that  passion  and  supposition  are  liable  both  to 
distort  and  to  exaggerate  impressions  received  in  a 
moment  of  panic.  Their  crime,  an  unpardonable 
one,  has  been  to  spread,  in  an  official  guise,  un- 
truths of  this  nature,  and  to  exploit  them  with  a 
view  to  exciting  resentment  both  between  individ- 
uals and  between  nations. 

I  have  taken  the  trouble  to  examine  these  three 
categories  of  accusations,  whose  systematic  dif- 
fusion has  had  the  disastrous  result  that,  in  the 


254  The  War  of  191 4 

greater  part  of  Central  Europe,  the  people  of  my 
country,  so  honest,  so  industrious,  so  hospitable, 
so  good,  are  to-day  held  up  by  public  opinion  to  the 
execration  of  the  civilized  world.  The  result  is 
that  there  has  been  added  to  the  undeserved 
disasters  with  which  the  German  invasion  has 
overwhelmed  Belgium  the  moral  torture  of  know- 
ing herself  calumniated,  and  suffering  the  defile- 
ment of  her  name. 

But  I  might  have  abstained  from  this  painful 
discussion. 

For  if  war  has  been  waged  in  Belgium  in  the 
manner  in  which  everyone  knows  it  has  been 
waged,  it  is  not  in  expiation  of  any  presumed 
crime:  it  is  in  conformity  with  a  code;  it  is  in 
accordance  with  all  the  precepts  of  the  special 
code  of  war  which  Germany  has  set  up  for  herself. 

Although  a  party  to  the  international  conven- 
tions signed  at  The  Hague  in  1899  and  confirmed 
in  1907,  Germany  has  in  fact  preserved  a  collec- 
tion of  rules  of  war  which,  both  in  the  spirit  and 
the  letter,  are  far  removed  from  those  laid  down 
by  The  Hague  Convention,  which  has  been 
called  the  charter  of  the  law  of  nations  in  time 
of  war. 

It  is  this  German  war  code  that  I  propose  to 
examine  here.     It  is  material  to  show  that  the 


German  Rules  of  War  255 

acts  which  have  aroused  the  public  conscience  in 
the  course  of  the  hostiHties  carried  on  in  Belgium 
are  not  by  any  means  accidental;  they  are  not  a 
matter  of  personal,  temporary,  or  local  circum- 
stances. They  arise  from  a  system,  from  a  doc- 
trine, and  are  what  that  system  and  doctrine 
required  them  to  be. 

There  exists  in  Germany  a  manual  of  the  laws 
of  war  on  land. '  This  manual,  which  dates  from 
1902,  was  published  by  the  historical  section  of 
the  Grand  General  Staff  in  a  compilation  of  studies 
prescribed  for  officers.  It  is  therefore  entitled  to 
be  considered,  as  the  French  translator  of  the 
manual,  Paul  Carpentier,  rightly  said,  as  is  the 
nature  of  instructions  emanating  directly  and 
officially  from  the  German  higher  command. 

The  chief  impression  left  in  the  mind  of  a  reader 
of  this  code  is  that  the  German  Grand  General 
Staff  has  set  its  face  against  the  modem  tendencies 
which  would  confine  the  unchained  passions  of  war 
within  limits  prescribed  by  the  requirements  of 
law  and  humanity. 

From  the  very  outset  the  manual  contrasts  the 
true  characteristics  of  war  with  the  conceptions  of 
it  formed  by  the  conscience  of  our  times.  * 

'  Kriegsgebrauch  im  Landkriege. 

•  The  German  War  Book,  Professor  Morgan's  translation,  p.  54. 


256  The  War  of  191 4 

But  since  the  tendency  of  thought  of  the  last 
century  was  dominated  essentially  by  humani- 
tarian considerations  which  not  infrequently  de- 
generated into  sentimentality  and  flabby  emotion 
{Sentimentalitdt  und  iveichlicher  Gejiihlschwdrmerei) , 
there  have  not  been  wanting  attempts  to  influ- 
ence the  development  of  the  usages  of  war  in  a  way 
which  was  in  fundamental  contradiction  with  the 
nature  of  war  and  its  object.  Attempts  of  this 
kind  will  also  not  be  wanting  in  the  future,  the  more 
so  as  these  agitations  have  found  a  kind  of  moral 
recognition  in  some  provisions  of  the  Geneva  Con- 
vention and  the  Brussels  and  Hague  Conferences. 

Moreover  the  officer  is  a  child  of  his  time.  He 
is  subject  to  the  intellectual  tendencies  which  in- 
fluence his  own  nation ;  the  more  educated  he  is  the 
more  will  this  be  the  case.  The  danger  that,  in  this 
way,  he  will  arrive  at  false  views  about  the  essential 
character  of  war  must  not  be  lost  sight  of.  The 
danger  can  only  be  met  by  a  thorough  stud}''  of  war 
itself.  By  steeping  himself  in  military  history  an 
officer  will  be  able  to  guard  himself  against  excessive 
humanitarian  notions. 

In  many  passages  the  manual  refers  to  the 
violent  contradictions  between  the  opinions  of 
professors  of  international  law  and  those  of  the 
military.  ^ 

All  juristic  demands  to  the  contrary  are  as  a 
matter  of  principle  to  be  repudiated  as  being  in 
fundamental  conflict  with  the  principles  of  war. 

*  The  German  War  Book,  p.  80. 


German  Rules  of  War  257 

And  again; 

The  claims  to  the  contrary  put  forward  by  some 
jurists  are  completely  inconsistent  with  war  and 
must  be  repudiated  by  soldiers.  ^ 

A  propos  of  a  particular  question,  the  manual 
also  reproduces  a  characteristic  passage  of  a 
German  treatise  on  the  law  of  war,  prefacing  it 
with  a  few  lines  in  which  it  again  marks  the 
contrast  which  I  have  just  pointed  out.  == 

As  regards  the  admissibility  of  reprisals,  it  is  to 
be  remarked  that  these  are  objected  to  by  numerous 
teachers  of  international  law  on  grounds  of  human- 
ity. To  make  this  a  matter  of  principle,  and  apply 
it  to  every  case  exhibits,  however,  a  misconcep- 
tion due  to  intelligible  but  exaggerated  and  unjusti- 
fiable feehngs  of  humanity,  of  the  significance,  the 
seriousness,  and  the  right  of  war.  It  must  not  be 
overlooked  that  here  also  the  necessity  of  war  and 
the  safety  of  the  State  are  the  first  consideration, 
and  not  regard  for  the  unconditional  freedom  of 
prisoners  from  molestation. 

Finally  the  general  principle  which,  according 
to  this  German  code,  ought  to  dominate  all  modem 
war  is  clearly  stated  in  these  sentences  which  the 
jurists  of  the  Grand  General  Staff  put  in  the  intro- 
duction to  their  work^: 

*  The  German  War  Book,  p.  78. 
'Ibid.,  p.  74.  i  Ibid.,  p.  52. 

17 


258  The  War  of  191 4 

A  war  conducted  with  energy  cannot  be  directed 
merely  against  the  combatants  of  the  Enemy  State 
and  the  positions  they  occupy,  but  it  will  and  must 
in  like  manner  seek  to  destroy  the  total  intellectual 
and  material  resources  of  the  latter.  Humanitar- 
ian claims  such  as  the  protection  of  men  and  their 
goods  can  only  be  taken  into  consideration  in  so  far 
as  the  nature  and  object  of  the  war  permit. 

It  is  quite  categorical.  In  war,  everything  must 
be  subordinated  to  the  achievement  of  the  main 
end. 

Against  the  law  of  war  the  German  code  op- 
poses the  object  of  war.  As  arbitrary  as  the 
object  of  the  State  the  object  of  war  takes  into 
consideration  only  what  will  forward  the  realiza- 
tion of  the  plan  formed  by  the  belligerent.  It 
allows  them  "to  have  recourse  to  all  means 
which  enable  it  to  attain  the  object  of  the  war."' 
This  rule  admits  in  practice  of  certain  limita- 
tions, but  they  are  all  governed  by  "one's  own 
interest,"^  by  "the  recognition  of  one's  own 
advantage,"^  to  which  one  may  add  "Chiv- 
alrous feelings,  Christian  thought,  higher  civ- 
ilization."'* 

Moreover — let  there  be  no  mistake — these  re- 
strictions are  far  from  constituting  a  law  of  war: 

»  The  German  War  Book. 

'  Ibid.  i  Ibid.  *  Ibid. 


German  Rules  of  War  259 

.  .  .  They  have  in  the  course  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury often  led  to  attempts  to  develop,  to  extend,  and 
thus  to  make  universally  binding  these  pre-existing 
usages  of  war;  to  elevate  them  to  the  level  of  laws 
binding  nations  and  armies,  in  other  words  to 
create  a  codex  belli,  a  law  of  war.  All  these  attempts 
have  hitherto,  with  some  few  exceptions  to  be 
mentioned  later,  completely  failed.  If,  therefore, 
in  the  following  work  the  expression  "the  law  of 
war"  is  used,  it  must  be  understood  that  by  it  is 
meant  not  a  lex  scripta  introduced  by  international 
agreements,  but  only  a  reciprocity  of  mutual  agree- 
ment; a  limitation  of  arbitrary  behaviour,  which 
custom  and  conventionality,  human  friendliness, 
and  a  calculating  egotism  have  erected,  but  for  the 
observance  of  which  there  exists  no  express  sanction, 
but  only  "the  fear  of  reprisals"  decides.^ 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  tendencies  revealed  by 
these  comments  are  hardly  in  accord  with  the 
preamble  which  the  Powers,  including  Germany, 
prefixed  to  the  "Convention  of  July  29,  1899, 
regarding  the  laws  and  customs  of  war  on  land." 

According  to  the  view  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties,  these  provisions,  the  wording  of  which  has 
been  inspired  by  the  desire  to  diminish  the  evils  of 
war,  so  far  as  military  necessities  admit,  are  in- 
tended to  serve  as  general  rules  of  conduct  for 
belligerents.  It  could  not  be  intended  by  the 
High  Contracting  Parties  that  the  cases  not  pro- 

'  The  German  War  Book. 


26o  The  War  of  191 4 

vided  for  should,  for  want  of  a  written  provision,  be 
left  to  the  arbitrary  judgment  of  military  com- 
manders. 

Until  a  more  complete  code  of  the  laws  of  war 
can  be  issued,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  think 
it  expedient  to  declare  that  in  cases  not  included 
in  the  Regulations  adopted  by  them,  populations 
and  belligerents  remain  under  the  protection  and 
rule  of  the  principles  of  the  law  of  nations,  as  they 
result  from  the  usages  established  between  civilized 
nations,  from  the  laws  of  humanity,  and  the  require- 
ments of  the  public  conscience.' 

It  is  apparent  that  the  two  documents  are  not 
inspired  by  the  same  spirit.  The  divergence  was 
so  clear  that  it  was  intended  to  discuss  the  matter 
at  the  second  Hague  Conference  in  1907. 

As  M.  Louis  Renault  recently  explained  at  the 
Institut  de  France': 

The  Conference  was  concerning  itself  with  induc- 
ing the  Germans  to  give  an  explanation  of  the  spirit 
of  this  manual,  when  a  rather  dramatic  incident  oc- 
curred. The  German  delegates  made  a  proposal 
with  the  object  of  providing  a  sanction  for  the  rules 
of  the  Convention.  According  to  this  proposal, 
slightly  amended,  and  embodied  as  Article  3  of  the 
Convention  "a  belhgerent  party  which  violates  the 
provisions  of  the  said  Regulations  shall,  if  the  case 
demands,  be  liable  to  make  compensation.    It  shall 

■  Pearce  Higgins,  The  Hague  Peace  Conferences,  p.  209. 
>  Le  Temps,  October  27th. 


'German  Rules  of  War  261 

be  responsible  for  all  acts  committed  by  persons 
forming  part  of  its  armed  forces." 

The  Treaty  is  obligatory  since  the  party  who 
violates  it  is  bound  to  make  good  the  damage 
caused  by  the  violation.  The  Conference  took  into 
consideration  that  the  terms  of  the  Convention  in 
question  should  be  observed  not  only  by  the  com- 
manders of  the  belligerent  armies,  but  generally  by 
all  the  officers,  non-commissioned  officers,  and  sol- 
diers; thus  possibly  extending  to  international  law, 
in  all  cases  of  violation,  the  principle  of  private  law 
that  the  principal  is  responsible  for  his  agents. 

Some  have  wished  to  interpret  the  "dramatic 
incident,"  of  which  M.  Renault  spoke,  as  tactics 
with  the  object  of  evading  the  awkward  questions 
which  it  was  proposed  to  put  to  the  German 
delegates.  For  my  part  I  only  wish  to  see  in  it 
evidence  of  the  importance  of  the  engagements 
made  at  The  Hague  by  the  forty-four  Powers,  and 
of  the  solemn  adherence  given  to  them  by  the 
German  Empire. 

Nevertheless  the  German  code  of  1902  has 
continued  in  force.  Not  only  has  the  Grand 
General  Staff  modified  nothing  in  it,  but  various 
jurists  of  authority  in  Germany  have  not  hesitated, 
both  to  defend  it  and  to  denounce  the  divergence 
which  separates  it  from  The  Hague  Convention. 

These  jurists  cannot  conceive  of  a  law  of  war 


262  The  War  of  1914 

not  subject  to  modification  by  a  "state  of  neces- 
sity" {Notstand)  and  we  shall  see  what  remains  of 
the  law  when  so  modified. 

There  is  no  violation  of  the  law  of  war  [writes 
Meurer]  when  an  act  of  war  is  necessary  for  the 
maintenance  of  troops  or  for  their  defence  against  a 
danger  which  cannot  be  avoided  by  any  other  means, 
or  to  attain  or  consolidate  the  success  of  a  military 
operation  not  in  itself  prohibited.' 

A  similar  impression  is  obtained  from  the  perusal 
of  a  work  which  has  just  appeared  and  in  which 
one  of  the  editors  of  Jahrbuch  des  Volkerrechts, 
Dr.  Karl  Strupp,  surveys  in  detail  the  law  of  war 
on  land.^  In  his  introduction  he  freely  develops 
the  idea  that  there  can  never  be  any  question  of 
limiting  the  freedom  of  the  command  and  that 
above  all  law  of  war  is  always  placed  the  object  of 
war.^ 

Strupp,  moreover,  takes  great  care*  to  discover 
in  the  proceedings  of  The  Hague  Conference  the 
notion  of  "a  state  of  necessity."  This  notion, 
he  says,  appears  there,  as  distinct  from  the  "mili- 
tary objective"  and  more  comprehensive  than  it. 
Thus  the  destruction  of  enemy  property  is  per- 

'  Die  Haager  Friedenskonferenz,  II.  Band,  p.  14. 
•  Das  Internationale  Latidkriegsrecht,  1914. 
3  Ibid.,  p.  5.  4  Ibid.,  pp.  7-8. 


German  Rules  of  War  263 

mitted  by  Article  23  (g)  of  The  Hague  Convention 
in  exceptional  cases  when  it  is  urgently  dictated 
by  the  necessities  of  war;  for  example,  in  order  to 
reach  hostile  positions  artillery  may  bombard  an 
intermediate  village.  Here  there  is  present  a 
"military  objective"  imposed  by  the  technical 
conditions  of  war.  But  "the  state  of  necessity" 
would  include,  in  a  general  way,  all  cases  which 
can  arise  in  the  course  of  the  operations : 

Thus  troops  may  be  obliged  to  allow  prisoners 
to  die  of  hunger,  if  the  Command  deems  that  that  is 
the  only  means  of  carrying  out  an  order  which  it  has 
received.  For  example,  to  reach  at  the  proper  time 
a  position  indispensable  for  the  success  of  the 
operations,  *  .  .  .  the  provisions  of  the  laws  of  war 
can  be  disregarded  whenever  a  violation  appears  to 
be  the  only  means  of  carrying  out  an  operation  of 
war  or  assuring  its  success,  or  even  of  preserving 
the  armed  forces,  even  if  only  a  single  soldier  is 
concerned.  ^ 

Uncertain  as  some  of  the  provisions  of  inter- 
national law  may  be  at  the  present  day — as 
Professor  Max  Huber  has  shown  with  reference 
to  the  idea  of  necessity  in  war^ —  it  is  not  possible 
that  such  interpretations  should  meet  with  the 
approval    of   those   who   concluded   The    Hague 

^  Das  Internationale  Landkriegsrecht,  1914,  p.  7.        ^  Ibid.,  p.  8. 
i  Zeitschrift  Jtir  Volkerrecht,  vol.  vii.,  p.  363. 


264  The  War  of  191 4 

Convention  of  1899,  and  solemnly  renewed  it  in 
1907.  And  if  these  interpretations  are  to  prevail 
it  would  be  more  dignified  on  the  part  of  certain 
Powers  not  to  associate  themselves  at  all  with  a 
work  which  really  becomes  merely  a  hypocritical 
parody  of  law. 

The  general  spirit  of  the  German  code  is  appar- 
ent in  every  one  of  its  particular  rules  and  the 
result  is  a  striking  unity  of  conception  which 
cannot  fail  to  leave  a  decisive  imprint  on  the 
training  of  officers. 

Thus  the  application  of  the  various  methods  of 
war  is  governed  by  the  following  principle^ : 

What  is  permissible  includes  every  means  of 
war  without  which  the  object  of  the  war  cannot  be 
obtained;  what  is  reprehensible  on  the  other  hand, 
includes  every  act  of  violence  and  destruction  which 
is  not  demanded  by  the  object  of  war. 

The  idea  that  the  end  in  view  must  be  the 
governing — if  not  the  exclusive — consideration  is 
found  in  the  commentary  on  this  rule^: 

As  a  supplement  to  this  rule,  the  usages  of  war 
recognize  the  desirability  of  not  employing  severer 

*  The  German  War  Book,  Professor  Morgan's  translation,  p.  64. 
« Ibid.,  p.  65. 


German  Rules  of  War  265 

forms  of  violence  if  and  when  the  object  of  the  war 
may  be  attained  by  milder  means,  and  furthermore 
that  certain  means  of  war  which  lead  to  unnecessary 
suffering  are  to  be  excluded. 

It  follows  from  these  general  propositions  that 
all  devastation,  destruction,  and  injury  is  per- 
missible whenever  it  is  demanded  by  the  necessi- 
ties of  war.  ^ 

No  harm  must  be  done,  not  even  the  very 
sHghtest,  which  is  not  dictated  by  military  consid- 
eration; every  kind  of  harm  may  be  done,  even  the 
very  utmost,  which  the  conduct  of  war  requires  or 
which  comes  in  the  natural  course  of  it. 

Ultimately,  the  application  of  these  rules  rests 
upon  the  absolute  power  of  the  command.  ^ 

Whether  the  natural  justification  exists  or  not  is 
a  subject  for  decision  in  each  individual  case.  The 
answer  to  this  question  lies  entirely  in  the  power  of 
the  Commanding  Officer,  from  whose  conscience 
our  times  can  expect  and  demand  as  far-reaching 
humanity  as  the  object  of  war  permits. 

Further,  as  another  passage  says,^ 

wide  limits  are  set  to  the  subjective  freedom  and 
arbitrary  judgment  of  the  Commanding  Officer. 
...  If  in  the  following  pages,  we  develop  briefly 

'  The  German  War  Book,  p.  124  or  again  p.  125. 
'  Ibid.,  p.  125.  i  Ibid.,  p.  64. 


266  The  War  of  191 4 

the  principles  ...  it  must  none  the  less  be  clearly 
emphasized  that  the  necessities  of  war  not  only 
allow  a  deviation  from  these  principles  in  many 
cases  but  in  some  circumstances  make  it  a  positive 
duty  of  the  Commander.* 

It  is  appropriate  to  emphasize  the  consequences 
which  the  German  conception  of  "the  necessities 
of  war"  imposes  on  a  commander  of  troops. 

The  first  of  these  consequences  clearly  ap- 
pears in  the  quotations  which  we  have  just  given ; 
it  is  the  consecration  of  arbitrary  rule.  The 
command  may  proceed  to  the  violation  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the  most  solemn  treaties,  "if  it  thinks 
it  necessary." 

I  have  no  wish  to  discuss  here  the  validity  of  the 
supreme  principle  of  necessity;  I  will  limit  myself 
to  the  remark  that  it  should  be  well  understood  and 
judiciously  applied.  It  is  a  dangerous  principle; 
necessity  has  never  been  in  the  eyes  of  jurists  a 
matter  of  justification  except  in  the  case  of  a  really 
inevitable  necessity,  a  necessity  which  is  absolute. 
But  subjected  to  the  interpretation  of  a  military 
commander  this  so-called  necessity  is  inevitably 
transformed  into  mere  expediency. 

Now  the  point  is  just  the  danger  that  the  prin- 
ciple  of  necessity  in  practice  often  degenerates 

'See  pp.  147-148. 


German  Rules  of  War  267 

easily  into  a  mere  rule  of  expediency;  and  what 
is  still  worse,  of  an  immediate  expediency.  It 
cannot  be  otherwise  when  its  application  is  en- 
trusted to  men  such  as  the  commanders  of  troops, 
whom  quickness  of  action  and  self-confidence  are 
specially  apt  to  lead  to  fling  all  scruples  aside. 
Moreover  in  every  sphere  the  principle  of  im- 
mediate expediency  is  subversive  of  all  law  and 
all  morality.  Law  and  morality  have  as  their 
function  the  repelling  of  appeals  to  egoism  and 
personal  necessity.  To  say  to  a  miHtary  command- 
er that  he  can  put  a  man  to  death  without  trial, 
that  he  can  shoot  the  mayor  of  a  locality  because 
an  inhabitant  has  fired  on  a  soldier,  that  he  can 
for  the  same  reason  shoot  one  inhabitant  out  of 
ten,  that  he  can  set  fire  to  a  defenceless  village, 
if  these  things  are  necessary,  allows  in  fact  this 
military  commander  to  commit  all  these  acts 
every  time  he  thinks  it  useful ;  that  incites  him  to 
the  violation  of  all  treaties,  and  of  all  rules  of  in- 
ternational law.  It  is  expedient,  it  is  "neces- 
sary" to  place  before  troops  a  human  barrier 
formed  of  civilians  if  one  wishes  to  prevent  the 
troops  from  being  destroyed ;  the  enemy  will  not 
dare  to  fire,  or  he  will  fire  less,  and  the  lives  of  the 
German  soldiers  will  be  spared.  It  is  expedient, 
it  is  "necessary"  to  reduce  a  village  or  a  town  to 


268  The  War  of  191 4 

ashes  if  the  civilians  there  have  fired;  for  such 
treatment,  to  be  repeated  if  necessary,  has  the 
result  of  preventing  any  one  laying  hands  on  the 
German  soldiers  whose  life  and  well-being  are 
"necessary"  to  the  defence  of  the  Fatherland.  I 
said,  "Reduce  a  town  to  ashes,  because  civilians 
have  fired,"  but  the  application  of  the  principle 
of  necessity  is  even  worse ;  one  reduces  a  town  to 
ashes  because  one  believes,  because  one  has  reason 
to  believe,  because  one  is  pleased  to  beUeve,  that 
civilians  have  fired. 

I  will  go  back  for  a  moment,  and  emphasize 
here  that  it  is  just  this  military  conception  of  the 
principle  of  necessity  which  inspired  the  Imperial 
Chancellor  to  make  his  famous  exclamation,  '^  Not 
kennt  kehi  Gebot''  ("Necessity  knows  no  law"). 
The  Chancellor  was  not  then  speaking  the  lan- 
guage of  a  statesman,  otherwise  he  would  have 
perceived  that  his  declaration  was  the  very  ne- 
gation of  the  solemn  engagements  of  Germany.' 
It  was  the  war-men  who  expressed  themselves 
through  his  mouth,  and  who  suggested  to  him 
the  dangerous  dialectic  of  the  military  theory 
of  the  principle  of  necessity.  Who  can  believe 
to-day  that  to  pass  through  Belgium  and  Luxem- 
burg was  a    "necessity"  for   Germany,  that,  in 

•  See  p.  69. 


German  Rules  of  War  269 

other  words,  it  was  the  one  and  only  means  of 
carrying  on  a  victorious  struggle  against  her  ene- 
mies? In  what  in  fact  did  the  occupation  of 
Belgium  end?  In  the  occupation  of  Belgium,  and 
not  in  the  destruction  of  the  French  forces.  Who 
could  have  asserted,  in  July  or  in  the  first  days  of 
August,  that  it  was  an  absolute  certainty  that  in 
concentrating  all  her  efforts  against  the  French 
barrier  on  the  west,  the  German  army  would  not 
have  succeeded  in  effecting  a  breach  with  the 
help  of  those  great  guns,  of  the  existence  of  which 
foreign  countries  as  yet  knew  nothing?  Who 
could  assert  indeed  that  there  were  not  other  pos- 
sible plans  of  campaign?  .  .  .  The  fact  is  that 
the  German  General  Staff  had  chosen  that  which 
appeared  to  it  the  best.  But  that  which  appears 
to  be  the  best  is  not  therefore  "necessary." 
And  if  the  military  authorities  made  light  of  this 
embarrassing  but  elementary  distinction,  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  political  authorities  to  refuse  to  follow 
them. 

Returning  to  the  German  rules  of  war,  it  is  well 
known  that  the  events  in  Belgium  have  afforded 
abundant  evidence  that  in  the  course  of  military 
operations  the  military  command  had  no  scruples 
whatever,  in  its  blind  application  of  the  rule  of 
necessity.     I  will  quote  by  way  of  example  cer- 


270  The  War  of  191 4 

tain  passages  of  the  proclamation  displayed  at 
Grivegnee,  near  Liege,  by  Major  Commandant 
Dieckmann : 

By  September  6,  1914,  at  four  in  the  afternoon, 
all  arms,  munitions,  explosives,  and  fireworks,  still 
in  the  possession  of  citizens  must  be  delivered  up  at 
the  Chateau  de  Bruyeres.  Any  one  who  does  not 
do  so  will  be  liable  to  the  death  penalty.  He  will  be 
shot  at  sight,  or  bayoneted,  unless  he  proves  that 
he  was  not  at  fault. 

All  the  inmates  of  inhabited  houses  in  the  locali- 
ties of  Beyne-Heusay,  Grivegnee,  Bois-de-Breux 
must  be  at  home  by  nightfall.^  The  said  houses 
must  be  illuminated  as  long  as  any  one  in  them  is  up. 
The  outer  doors  must  be  locked.  Any  one  who  does 
not  conform  to  these  rules  will  expose  himself  to 
severe  penalties.  Any  resistance  whatever  to  these 
orders  involves  death. 

The  Commandant  must  not  meet  with  any 
difficulty  in  his  domiciliary  visits.  Everybody  is  re- 
quested without  special  demand  to  show  every  room 
in  the  house.  Any  one  who  resists  will  be  severely 
punished.  .  .  . 

I  require  that  all  civilians  who  move  about  in 
my  area,  and  especially  those  of  the  localities  of 
Beyne-Heusa3^  Fleron,  Bois-de-Breux,  Grivegnee, 
show  respect  to  German  officers  by  taking  off  their 
hats,  or  by  carrying  their  hand  to  their  head  as  for 
the  military  salute.  In  case  of  doubt,  every  German 
soldier  should  be  saluted.    Any  one  who  does  not  do 

^  Now  7  P.M.  German  time. 


German  Rules  of  War  271 

this  may  expect  the  German  soldiery  to  exact  re- 
spect by  any  means  in  their  power. 

The  German  soldiery  may  inspect  vehicles, 
packages,  etc.,  of  all  the  inhabitants  of  the  neigh- 
bourhood. Any  resistance  in  this  matter  will  be 
severely  punished. 

Any  one  who  has  knowledge  that  quantities  of 
more  than  one  hundred  litres  of  petrol,  benzine, 
benzol,  or  other  similar  liquids  exist  in  a  place 
within  the  above-mentioned  districts,  and  who  has 
not  reported  them  to  the  military  commander  there 
stationed,  will,  if  there  is  no  doubt  as  to  the  place 
and  the  quantity,  incur  the  penalty  of  death. 
Quantities  of  one  hundred  litres  are  alone  regarded. 

Any  one  who  disobeys  a  command  to  hold  up  his 
hands,  incurs  the  penalty  of  death. 

Entry  to  the  Chateau  de  Bruyeres  or  the  roads  of 
the  park  is  forbidden  under  pain  of  death  from 
dusk  to  dawn  to  all  persons  save  soldiers  of  the 
German  army. 

Any  one  who  by  the  dissemination  of  false  news 
of  a  nature  calculated  to  injure  the  morale  of  the 
German  troops,  or  any  one  who  in  any  way  seeks  to 
contrive  against  the  German  army,  makes  himself  a 
suspect,  and  incurs  the  risk  of  being  shot  at  sight. 

The  death  penalty  for  any  one  who  fails  to  report 
a  petrol  depot, — the  death  penalty  for  any  one  who 
refuses  to  illuminate  his  house  as  long  as  any  one 
is  up  in  it, — the  death  penalty  for  any  one  who 


2^2  The  War  of  191 4 

spreads  news  calculated  to  injure  the  morale  of  the 
German  troops :  it  is  impossible  to  conceive  a  more 
intolerable  manifestation  of  arbitrary  power. 

But  there  is  another  consequence  of  the  German 
precepts  as  to  the  attitude  of  the  command. 

Having  merely  for  its  criterion  of  conduct  the 
object  of  the  war,  the  command  may  have  recourse 
to  methods  far  removed  from  the  immediate  exi- 
gencies of  military  operations;  intimidation,  terror- 
ism, and,  generally,  any  proceedings  calculated  to 
engender  fear  or  submissiveness  are  recognized,  not 
by  way  of  defence  or  punishment,  but  with  a  view 
to  preventing  hostile  acts  or  their  repetition.^ 
On  this  subject  a  particular  rule  is  enunciated  with 
reference  to  the  relations  between  the  army  oc- 
cupying a  territory  and  the  inhabitants  of  the 
territory^: 

...  to  employ  ruthlessly  the  necessary  means  of 
defence  and  intimidation  is  obviously  not  only  a 
right  but  indeed  a  duty  of  the  staff  of  the  army. 

Generally  speaking,  a  commander  should  be 
inspired  by  this  sort  of  humanitarian  paradox^: 

.  .  .  that  certain  severities  are  indispensable  to 
war,  nay  more,  that  the  only  true  humanity  very 
often  lies  in  a  ruthless  application  of  them. 

'  See  The  German  War  Book,  p.  121. 
»  Ihid.,  p.  120.  J  Ihid.,  p.  55. 


German  Rules  of  War  273 

One  can  easily  imagine  the  mentality  of  a 
commander  impregnated  with  such  a  spirit. 
Always  in  fear  of  "yielding  to  the  solicitations  of 
exaggerated  sensibility,"  experiencing  the  weight 
of  the  responsibility  resting  upon  him  if  he  neglects 
to  conform  in  all  his  relations  with  the  necessities 
of  war,  and  impatient  to  arrive  at  his  goal,  he 
chooses  the  most  rapid  way  and  excuses  to  himself 
the  harshness  which  his  choice  involves.  As  be- 
tween two  reports  he  is  led  to  accept  the  worse; 
pushed  to  action  because  he  fears  the  consequences 
of  postponement  he  is  little  disposed  to  delay 
punishment  by  the  dilatoriness  of  trial.  Removed, 
in  the  midst  of  the  realities  of  war,  from  all  pres- 
sure of  public  opinion,  drawn  on  by  the  example 
of  others  less  scrupulous  than  himself,  he  is  liable 
to  lose  all  critical  sense  and  to  found  his  judgment 
on  what  is  really  mere  coincidence. 

Thus,  for  instance,  a  German  detachment  enters 

a  Belgian  village ;  it  finds  a  few  peasants  around  a 

newly  made  grave,  some  of  them  are  still  spade  in 

hand.     Beside  them  is  the  corpse  of  a  German 

officer.     The  corpse  is  examined,  the  temple  is 

found  to  be  pierced  by  a  revolver  bullet;  the 

wound  is  not  one  such  as  would  be  received  in 

battle.    The  clothes  of  the  dead  man  are  searched; 

the  search  discloses  that  all  his  personal  belongings 
18 


274  The  War  of  191 4 

have  disappeared.  "These  people  have  killed 
and  robbed  our  comrade, "  cries  the  commander  of 
the  detachment,  "punish  the  village!  That  will 
serve  as  an  example  to  others. "  Eight  farms  are 
burnt;  the  village  is  sacked,  the  soldiers  take 
money,  valuables,  clothes,  and  provisions;  women 
are  violated;  men  are  tied  up,  led  to  a  field,  in- 
sulted and  threatened  with  death.  In  the  evening 
fourteen  people  are  killed.    They  are: 

G.  Deboetz,  C.  Bourguignon  and  his  two  sons, 
J.  Maillard,  J.  Jonniaux,  A.  Bitanne,  J.  Triffaux,  L. 
Divraad,  E.  Dalhe,  H.  Penhar,  L.  Desisans,  E. 
Jonniaux,  and  his  wife  L.  Verdael. 

Amongst  them  are  the  peasants  of  the  morning. 
The  corpses  are  buried  in  a  field  by  the  Germans. 

That  which  I  have  just  described  happened  at 
Linsmeau,  a  little  village  of  the  province  of  Bra- 
bant, on  Monday,  August  loth,  a  short  time  after 
the  occupation  of  Liege. 

But  I  have  not  told  the  early  part  of  the  story, 
which  was  not  known  to  the  commander  of  the 
detachment. 

On  the  morning  of  the  fatal  Monday,  on  the 
high  road  of  Linsmeau,  some  Belgian  soldiers  met 
some  German  soldiers  making  a  reconnaissance. 
Shots  were  exchanged,  and  the  German  soldiers  re- 


German  Rules  of  War  275 

treated.  An  officer  fell.  The  Belgians  approached : 
he  was  their  first  victim,  never  before  had  they 
wounded  or  killed  any  one.  Their  commanding 
officer  did  not  conceal  his  emotion.  They  gathered 
round  the  officer  as  he  lay  on  the  ground.  Suddenly 
he  got  up,  seized  his  revolver,  and  threatened 
those  who  stood  around  him.  He  defied  them  with 
proud  and  wild  words.  One  of  the  Belgians  fired 
and  the  bullet  struck  the  officer  on  the  temple: 
he  fell.  Emotion  choked  them;  before  this  inert 
form  their  pity  increased.  ' '  Let  us  take  his  belong- 
ings from  him,"  said  one  of  the  men.  "We  will 
send  them  to  his  family."  The  objects  were 
collected  and  placed  in  a  pocket  handkerchief 
with  its  corners  tied  up.  The  little  packet  was 
taken  to  the  Vicar  of  a  neighbouring  village  and  he 
was  told,  "When  the  Germans  pass  by  give  this  to 
an  officer  and  ask  him  to  have  the  contents  sent 
to  the  family  of  the  man  who  lies  dead  up  there. ' ' 
Then  some  peasants  were  called  and  asked  to  dig 
a  grave  to  bury  the  victim.  The  Belgian  soldiers 
went  on  their  way;  the  peasants,  talking  over  the 
occurrence,  slowly  applied  themselves  to  their  sad 
task.  They  were  still  busy  with  it  when  the 
main  body  of  the  German  detachment  passed  by 
Linsmeau. 

These  facts,  established  by  irrefragable  proofs 


276  The  War  of  191 4 

which  have  been  furnished  to  me,  should  suffice. 
They  are  a  perfect  illustration  of  the  German 
system  of  war  and  of  the  consequences  which  it 
involves  in  the  mentality  of  the  officers.  All  that 
I  have  said  above  is  verified  here  to  the  letter. 


But  there  is  a  practice  of  war  wholly  characteris- 
tic of  the  German  system  which  has  received  many 
a  sad  appHcation  in  Belgium;  I  mean  that  of 
collective  repression. 

What  is  to  be  understood  by  "collective  re- 
pression "  ?  It  is  both  defined  and  forbidden  in  the 
text  of  Article  50  of  the  Second  Hague  Convention 
with  regard  to  the  Laws  and  Customs  of  War  on 
Land. 

No  general  penalty,  pecuniary  or  otherwise,  can 
be  inflicted  on  the  population  on  account  of  the 
acts  of  individuals  for  which  it  cannot  be  regarded 
as  collectively  responsible.' 

This  is  clear  and  explicit. 

If  in  any  place  some  persons  have  been  guilty  of 
unlawful  acts,  it  is  forbidden  to  punish  the  locahty 
as  a  whole  in  any  manner  whatsoever. 

Here  also  German  lawyers  who  comment  on  the 
code  of  1902  and  on  the  Hague  Convention  are 

•  Higgins,  p.  247. 


German  Rules  of  War  277 

forced  to  restrict  the  application  of  Article  50  by 
subtle  dialectic.  In  particular  Strupp,  of  whose 
recent  work  I  have  spoken,  writes  with  regard  to 
the  events  which  have  occurred  in  Belgium  during 
the  present  war': 

These  are  intentional  and  deliberate  infractions 
of  the  laws  of  war,  but  they  were  nothing  more  than 
a  reaction  against  and  a  threat  with  regard  to  the 
violations  already  committed  by  the  enemy;  in 
spite  of  their  horror  they  thus  appear  to  us  as  having 
been  necessary  measures  and  in  conformity  with 
international  law  {vdlkerrechtsgemdss). 

It  has  been  seen  in  the  preceding  pages  how  lit- 
tle foundation  there  is  for  the  accusations  made 
against  the  Belgian  population  and  how  rash  it 
therefore  is  to  try  to  find  a  justification  for  the 
measures  of  reprisal  taken  by  the  German  troops. 
But  even  if  outrages  had  been  committed  by 
particular  individuals,  the  population  as  a  whole 
cannot  be  considered  as  having  a  collective  re- 
sponsibility. Hence  the  Hague  Convention  should 
have  been  observed.  And  it  is  not  possible  to 
deprive  it  of  force  by  distinguishing,  as  Strupp 
does,  ^  the  passive  responsibility  of  the  authorities 
from  the  active  responsibility  of  the  inhabitants, 

'  Das  Internationale  Landkriegsrecht,  p.  9. 
"  Ibid.,  pp.  9  and  108. 


278  The  War  of  191 4 

for  in  Belgium  the  authorities — all  the  authorities 
— so  far  from  not  intervening,  had  taken  from 
the  very  beginning,  as  I  have  explained,  rigorous 
measures  to  ensure  complete  calm. 

But  I  do  not  wish  to  deal  at  greater  length  with 
the  controversies  which  have  been  raised  in  so 
unexpected  a  manner  by  German  lawyers,  and  I 
return  to  cases  of  collective  repression  which  in 
Belgium  has  been  applied  both  to  localities  and  to 
their  inhabitants. 

It  will  have  been  observed  that  the  text  of 
Article  50  of  the  Hague  Convention  specially 
mentions  the  infliction  of  a  collective  fine:  in  this 
it  has  in  mind  a  war  contribution  in  so  far  as  this 
has  the  character  of  a  collective  repression. 
Although  it  is  forbidden  by  virtue  of  this  Article 
it  has  been  several  times  applied  in  Belgium  by 
German  commanders. 

Thus  the  following  words  occur  in  the  proclama- 
tion posted  up  at  Wavre  on  August  27th  by 
Lieutenant-General  von  Nieber: 

On  August  22,  1 914,  the  General  Commanding 
the  Second  Army,  General  von  Biilow,  imposed  on 
the  town  of  Wavre  a  war-levy  of  frs.  3,000,000 
(£120,000),  payable  up  till  September  ist,  to  ex- 
piate the  heinous  conduct,  contrary  to  the  Laws 
of  the  Rights  of  Nations  and  the  Customs  of  War, 


German  Rules  of  War  279 

which  they  showed  in  making  a  surprise  attack  on 
the  German  troops.  ^ 

More  characteristic  still  is  the  notice  affixed  in 
Brussels  on  November  1st  by  the  Governor  of 
Brussels,  Baron  von  Lutwitz: 

The  town  of  Brussels  apart  from  its  suburbs  has 
been  punished,  on  account  of  the  attempt  com- 
mitted by  one  police  agent,  de  Ryckere,  against  a 
German  soldier,  by  the  imposition  of  an  additional 
contribution  of  five  million  francs. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  same  proclamation 
states  that  the  agent  in  question  had  been  con- 
demned to  five  years'  imprisonment  for  the  crime 
mentioned  above  and  for  another  offence.  It  will 
be  agreed  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  find  a  more 
complete  transgression  of  the  Hague  Convention. 

In  other  cases,  much  more  numerous,  the  war 
contribution  imposed  belonged  to  the  class  of 
requisitions  on  the  subject  of  which  the  Hague 
Convention  expressly  stipulates^  that  they  should 
only  be  claimed  "for  the  needs  of  the  army 
occupying  the  country"  and  that  they  "should  be 
in  conformity  with  the  resources  of  the  country." 

It  has  not  been  possible  for  me  to  obtain  a  list 
of  the  war  contributions  imposed  in  the  various 

'  Sixth  Report  of  the  Belgian  Committee  of  Inquiry. 
» Article  52. 


28o  The  War  of  191 4 

parts  of  the  country,  but,  from  what  has  been 
established  beyond  all  possible  doubt,  we  may 
assert  that  the  two  conditions  just  mentioned 
have  not  in  the  least  been  the  guiding  principles  in 
Belgium.  In  the  first  place  in  nearly  all  cases  it  has 
been  a  question  of  supplying  the  needs,  not  of 
contingents  occupying  the  country,  but  of  armies 
of  invasion  often  engaged  in  the  struggle  against 
France  and  England.  Further — and  this  is  the 
most  important  point — the  contributions  imposed 
were  obviously  disproportionate  to  the  resources 
of  the  locality.  Sometimes  instead  of  allowing 
some  sort  of  a  composition  for  requisitions  in  kind, 
these  were  imposed  in  addition  without  its  be- 
ing possible  to  ascertain  even  approximately  the 
principles  of  taxation. 

But  collective  repression  has  taken  many  other 
forms  besides  that  of  the  imposition  of  fines  and  I 
should  like  to  deal  at  greater  length  with  this  ques- 
tion by  citing  proclamations  which  have  emanated 
from  German  authorities  in  the  localities  occu- 
pied. I  emphasize  the  passages  which  imply  col- 
lective repression  and  give  the  original  texts: 

At  Hasselt  on  August  17th: 

Should  the  inhabitants  fire  on  the  soldiers  of  the 
German  army  a  third  part  of  the  male  population 
will  be  taken  away. 


German  Rules  of  War  281 

At  Liege,  August  22d': 

The  inhabitants  of  the  town  of  Andenne,  after 
having  asserted  their  pacific  intentions,  have 
treacherously  surprised  our  troops.  ^ 

It  is  with  my  consent  that  the  General  in  charge 
has  burned  the  whole  locality  and  that  one  hundred 
persons  have  been  shot. 

I  bring  this  fact  to  the  knowledge  of  the  town  of 
Liege  in  order  that  the  inhabitants  may  realize  the 
fate  with  which  they  are  threatened  if  they  assume 
a  similar  attitude. 

At  Namur,  August  25th  ^ : 

The  people  of  Namur  ought  to  understand  that 
there  is  no  greater  or  more  horrible  crime  than  that 
of  endangering  the  existence  of  the  town  and  the  life 
of  the  inhabitants  by  making  attempts  on  the 
German  army. 

At  Wavre,  August  27th'': 

On  August  22,  19 14,  the  General  commanding  the 
second  army,  M.  de  Biilow,  imposed  on  the  town 
of  Wavre  a  contribution  of  war  of  three  million 
francs  payable  before  September  1st  as  a  punish- 
ment for  their  indescribable  conduct  in  violation  of 
international  law  and  of  the  usages  of  war  in  attack- 
ing German  troops  by  surprise,  s 
'  General  von  Bulow.  ■■ 

'  This,  according  to  the  Sixth  Report  of  the  Commission  of 
Inquiry,  is  a  mere  assertion  contradicted  by  the  inhabitants. 
3  General  von  Bulow. 
*  Lieutenant-General  von  Nieber. 
sin  reality  the  civil  population  did  not  take  any  part  in  the 


282  The  War  of  191 4 

The  town  of  Wavre  will  be  burned  and  destroyed 
if  the  payment  is  not  made  in  time,  without  respect 
of  persons ;  the  innocent  will  suffer  with  the  guilty. 

At  Brussels,  September  25th ' : 

It  has  recently  happened  in  districts  which  are 
not  at  present  more  or  less  strongly  held  by  Ger- 
man troops  that  supply  columns  or  patrols  have 
been  surprised  and  attacked  by  the  inhabitants.  I 
draw  the  attention  of  the  public  to  the  fact  that  a 
register  of  towns  and  of  communities  in  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  which  such  attacks  have  taken  place  is 
kept,  and  that  they  must  expect  to  be  punished 
when  German  troops  are  in  their  neighbourhood. 

At  Brussels,  October  5th ' : 

In  the  evening  of  September  25th  the  railway 
line  and  the  telegraph  line  have  been  destroyed 
between  Lovenjoul  and  Vertryck.  In  consequence 
the  two  places  mentioned  have  had,  on  the  morn- 
ing of  October  3d,  to  give  an  account  of  this.  In 
future,  places  which  lie  nearest  the  spot  where  such 
acts  have  taken  place — whether  they  are  accom- 
plices or  not — will  be  punished  without  pity. 

The  texts  of   these  various  proclamations  will 
no  doubt  cause  surprise.    They  are  nevertheless  in 


hostilities,  a  medical  inquiry  having  proved  that  the  German 
soldier  who  was  wounded  had  been  wounded  by  a  German  bullet 
(meeting  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry,  September  7,  19 14, 
third  witness). 

'  Field-Marshal  von  der  Goltz. 


German  Rules  of  War  283 

complete  conformity  with  the  general  dispositions 
which  the  German  war  organization  contem- 
plates. Here  also  we  are  dealing  with  a  system, 
and  it  is  the  system  of  which  it  is  important 
to  know  much  more  than  the  incidents  of  its 
application. 

In  the  work  of  Strupp  of  which  I  have  spoken, 
there  appears  in  the  appendix  a  model  of  a  procla- 
mation drawn  up  in  view  of  the  present  war. 
The  following  passage  occurs  in  it*:  "The  whole 
town  is  responsible  for  the  acts  of  each  of  its 
inhabitants." 

I  have  before  me  a  small  book  published  at 
Berlin  in  1906  by  Bath,  It  is  the  military  phrase- 
book  intended  for  German  officers  acting  as  inter- 
preters in  countries  where  French  is  spoken.  The 
text-book,  which  has  the  sub-title  Zum  Gelrauch  im 
Fetndesland,  "For  use  in  an  enemy  country," 
contains,  according  to  the  introduction,  the  French 
text  of  most  of  the  documents,  letters,  proclama- 
tions, and  other  papers  which  it  may  be  necessary 
to  use  in  time  of  war. 

Now  among  these  documents  there  are  to  be 
found  ^  several  models,  which,  taken  together, 
would  constitute  a  complete  text-book  of  collective 
repression.    I  note,  for  example: 

»  P.  248.  '  P.  128  et  seq. 


284  The  War  of  191 4 

A  fine  of  600,000  marks,  owing  to  the  attempted 
assassination  made  by  a  .  .  .  on  a  German  soldier 
has  been  imposed  on  the  town  of  O  by  order  of  .  .  . 

Unavailing  efforts  have  been  made  to  postpone 
the  payment  of  this  sum  or  to  reduce  it. 

The  period  fixed  for  payment  expires  to-morrow, 
Saturday,  December  17th,  at  midday. 

Bank  notes,  cash,  and  silver  will  be  accepted. 

In  the  following  formula  also  the  repression 
takes  the  form  of  a  pecuniary  contribution  and  it 
also  has  in  view  collective  punishment  for  individ- 
ual acts  when  there  is  no  evidence  of  collective 
responsibility. 

The  German  authorities  having  demanded  a 
war  contribution  of  two  million  francs  from  the 
town  of  M.  because  the  inhabitants  shot  on  the 
troops  when  entering  the  town,  and  the  munici- 
pality having  declared  that  they  do  not  possess  the 
necessary  funds  and  that  they  cannot  get  the 
money  from  the  inhabitants,  the  German  authori- 
ties demand  a  settlement  by  means  of  letters  of 
exchange. 

The  following  is  the  formula  for  burning  down 
whole  localities : 

I  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  letter  dated 
the  7th  of  this  month  notifying  me  of  the  great 
difficulties  which  you  believe  you  will  experience  in 
obtaining  contributions.  ...  I  can  only  express 
my  regret   at   the  explanations  which   you  have 


German  Rules  of  War  285 

thought  it  desirable  to  offer  me  on  this  matter. 
The  order  in  question  emanating  from  my  Govern- 
ment is  so  clear  and  precise,  the  instructions  which 
I  have  received  on  this  matter  are  so  categorical, 
that  if  the  sum  of  money  due  from  the  town  of  B. 
is  not  paid  it  will  be  burned  without  mercy. 

The  following  formula  is  even  more  characteris- 
tic if  one  bears  in  mind  what  I  have  said  above  ^ 
about  the  very  frequent  cases  where  the  destruc- 
tion of  bridges,  railways,  etc.,  in  Belgium  was  due 
not  to  civilians,  but  to  small  detachments  or  even 
to  isolated  soldiers : 

In  consequence  of  the  destruction  of  the  bridge 
of  F.  I  order: 

The  district  will  pay  an  extraordinary  contribu- 
tion of  ten  million  francs  by  way  of  a  fine.  This  is 
brought  to  the  knowledge  of  the  public  who  are 
informed  that  the  method  of  spreading  this  sum  will 
be  indicated  at  a  later  date  and  that  the  payment  of 
the  sum  mentioned  will  be  exacted  with  the  great- 
est severity.  The  village  of  F.  has  been  at  once 
burned  with  the  exception  of  some  buildings  re- 
served for  the  use  of  the  troops. 

What  can  I  add  to  this  irrefutable  evidence  ?  Is 
it  necessary  to  give  accounts  of  atrocities  which 
the  reader  dare  not  believe  and  which  one  can 
only  try  to  forget  so  shocking  are  they  to  modern 

'  P.  232. 


286  The  War  of  1914 

consciences  disaccustomed  to  cruelty?  The  ac- 
counts might  be  regarded  with  suspicion,  they 
might  be  accused  of  exaggeration.  I  prefer  not  to 
dwell  on  them  in  these  pages,  whose  main  aim  is  to 
consider  the  facts  in  their  general  relation  to  law. 
The  facts  pass,  the  law  remains.  It  need  not 
cause  surprise  therefore  that  I  do  not  pause  to 
describe,  as  so  many  others  have  done,  scenes  of 
destruction  and  incendiarism,  or  to  find  out  how 
many  streets  have  been  destroyed  at  Louvain  or 
how  many  persons  shot  at  Dinant,  or  to  discuss  the 
circumstances  which  may  have  led,  here  and  there, 
German  commanders  to  think  that  civilians  had 
fired.  Further,  I  do  not  say  that  wherever  the 
German  troops  have  passed  they  have  sown  ruin 
and  desolation,  nor  do  I  say  that  they  have  sys- 
tematically destroyed  works  of  art.  I  will  not 
say  this,  because  it  is  not  true.  But  I  do  say  that 
the  German  armies  have  a  system  of  war  which  is 
unjustifiable,  that  this  system  of  war  is  applied  in 
an  arbitrary  manner,  brutally  and  inconsiderately, 
and  that  the  acts  to  which  it  leads,  far  from  be- 
ing capable  of  denial,  are  the  normal,  inevitable, 
automatic  outcome  of  the  system.  This  I  say 
because  it  is  true. 

Moreover  all  these  accounts  would  weaken  the 
force  that  the  official  proclamations  which  I  have 


German  Rules  of  War  287 

reproduced  derive  from  their  conciseness.  When 
the  General  Commanding-in-Chief  von  Biilow 
writes,  "It  is  with  my  consent  that  the  General 
has  burned  the  whole  locality  of  Andenne  and  that 
one  hundred  persons  have  been  shot, "  it  is  almost 
superfluous  to  describe  acts  of  incendiarism  and 
the  shooting  of  civilians : 

It  was  a  vision  of  Hell  [writes  an  eye-witness,  who 
deserves  the  fullest  credence].  I  seemed  to  see  by  the 
light  of  the  flames  soldiers  pushing  back  with  the 
bayonet  people  who  wanted  to  escape  from  their 
burning  houses.  Mingled  with  the  sound  of  the 
rifles  were  the  sharp  crackle  of  machine  guns  and 
the  explosions  of  bombs.  A  machine  gun  was 
placed  in  a  shop  in  the  principal  street  and  from 
there  was  directed  against  the  houses  opposite. 

It  was  a  moving  spectacle  to  see  all  these  old 
men,  women,  and  children  forced  to  march  towards 
La  Place  des  Tilletds,  where  the  populace  was  be- 
ing collected  together.  One  paralytic  was  brought 
there  in  a  bath  chair,  others  were  carried.  The 
men  were  separated  from  the  women  and  children. 
It  was  at  first  proposed  to  shoot  them  all  en  masse 
with  machine  guns,  then  to  kill  several  at  a  time  by 
placing  them  one  behind  another  in  three  ranks. 
Finally  they  picked  out  three,  who  were  executed 
against  the  houses  in  the  Place  before  the  eyes 
of  everybody.  The  men  were  then  divided  into 
various  companies  and  were  led,  some  towards  the 
Meuse  to  be  shot  there,  others  to  be  imprisoned  as 
hostages. 


288  The  War  of  191 4 

This  is  horrible,  you  say.  Well,  all  horrors  are 
possible  when  free  rein  is  given  to  soldiers.  All 
the  victims  were  innocent?  No  doubt,  but  it  is 
just  because  they  were  innocent  that  they  were 
struck  down.  At  the  moment  of  writing  these 
pages,  I  read  in  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  of  Janu- 
ary 6th  ^  that  the  account  of  the  so-called  fight- 
ing of  jrancs-tireurs  of  Andenne,  given  by  the 
correspondent  whom  I  have  already  mentioned,^ 
is  false  in  essential  particulars.  Oberlieutenant  von 
Eulwege  has  in  fact  just  replied  to  the  Pax-Injor- 
mationen  that  the  vicar  of  Andenne  did  not  excite 
the  populace  to  street  fighting.  "Moreover,"  he 
adds,  "the  greater  part  of  the  inhabitants  were 
not  able  to  see  anything  because  they  were  hidden 
in  their  cellars. " 

And  these  are  the  inhabitants  whom  General 
von  Billow  accuses  of  having  "treacherously  sur- 
prised the  German  troops." 

But  why  discuss  further?  Lieutenant-General 
von  Nieber  said  to  the  town  of  Wavre:  "The  in- 
nocent will  suffer  with  the  guilty,"  and  the 
Governor- General  in  Belgium,  Field-Marshal  von 
der  Goltz,  has  confirmed  this:  "Localities  will 
be  punished  without  mercy,  it  does  not  matter 
whether  they  are  accomplices  or  not. "     Thus  a 

'  No.  6  /I  b'endUatt.  '  P.  245. 


German  Rules  of  War  289 

correspondent  of  the  Kolnische  Zeitung,  speaking 
of  Tamines,  can  write  with  perfect  sincerity : 

Then,  not  being  able  to  get  at  those  who  had  fired, 
the  rage  of  our  troops  was  directed  against  the  little 
town.  Without  delay  it  was  given  over  to  the 
flames  and  it  has  become  a  heap  of  ruins. 

I  have  explained  why  I  do  not  lay  emphasis 
here  on  the  excesses  committed  in  too  many  places 
by  German  troops.  I  wish,  however,  to  recount 
how  one  of  my  old  pupils  of  the  University  of 
Brussels  was  killed  when  on  his  holidays  at  Fran- 
corchamps,  together  with  other  persons  as  indis- 
putably innocent  as  himself,  when  this  little 
picturesque  village  was  put  to  the  flames  and 
sacked. 

Three  shots  were  fired  on  Saturday  August  8th 
at  half-past  eight  in  the  morning.  By  whom? 
At  whom?  Why?  For  four  days  the  German 
columns  had  been  passing  in  perfect  tranquillity; 
it  was  warm,  and  the  peasants  had  put  buckets  of 
water  along  the  side  of  the  road  in  order  that  the 
German  soldiers  might  be  able  to  quench  their 
thirst;  the  officers  were  guests  at  the  hotel;  the 
population  of  the  village  and  the  small  colony  of 
people  from  Brussels  spending  their  holidays  there 
were  already  becoming  accustomed  to  the  passage 


290  The  War  of  191 4 

of  the  troops.  .  .  .  But  suddenly  comes  the 
fatal  cry,  "Man  hat  geschossen!''  ("Someone  has 
fired ! ") .      The  innocent  must  pay  for  the  guilty. 

And  suppose  that  no  one  was  guilty? 

Now  it  happens  that  I  am  to-day  in  a  position 
to  state  precisely  the  origin  of  the  three  shots 
heard  on  the  morning  of  August  8th.  Up  till  the 
middle  of  August  small  detachments  of  Belgian 
cavalry  had  pushed  their  reconnaissances  behind 
the  German  line  under  cover  of  the  woods  which  are 
very  numerous  round  about  Spa.  Thus  it  happened 
that  on  August  8th,  early  in  the  morning,  two 
gendarmes  and  two  lancers  were  hidden  in  the 
thickets  of  Francorchamps.  Seeing  the  German 
column  resting  they  shot  at  them.  The  Germans, 
on  the  other  hand,  not  having  met  with  any  Bel- 
gian troops  in  those  parts  since  their  entry  into 
the  country,  imagined  that  the  shots  could  only 
come  from  civilians,  and  at  once,  without  any 
inquiry,  collective  repression  burst  out  without 
mercy. 

There  was  therefore  no  one  guilty  at  Francor- 
champs. In  expiation  of  what  crime  was  it  then 
that  the  peasants  of  the  Ardennes  and  the  hoHday- 
makers  of  Brussels  were  killed  ? 

That  is  indeed  the  true  question  which  arises. 
What  is  the  real  object  of  collective  repression? 


German  Rules  of  War  291 

What  has  been  the  object  of  the  destruction  of  the 
beautiful  parts  of  Lou  vain,  of  the  sack  of  Dinant 
and  Aerschot,  of  the  massacres  of  Tamines  and 
Andenne,  of  the  devastation  of  the  Ardennes  and 
the  district  between  the  Sambre  and  the  Meuse, 
the  country  of  Wavre  and  Vilvorde,  of  the  burning 
of  so  many  peaceful  and  prosperous  villages?  It 
is  not  punishment,  since  in  most  cases  there  has 
been  no  crime,  and  since  in  any  case  the  punish- 
ment is  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  offence. 

The  inscriptions  appearing  in  various  places  on 
the  houses  which  were  spared  during  methodi- 
cal pillage  and  incendiarism  indicate,  moreover, 
how  little  attempt  is  made  to  base  repression  on 
equitable  grounds.  "Good  people:  to  be  spared" 
{Gute  Leute;  schonen).  "They  gave  us  food  to 
eat."  (Man  hat  uns  zu  essen  gegeben).  "Poor 
people  who  are  ill."  (Arme  kranke  Leute). ^ 
What  is  the  meaning  of  these  statements?  At 
what  price  have  the  inhabitants  been  able  to  pur- 
chase the  complaisance  of  the  soldiers  passing 
through?  Was  there  not  one  who  was  more  dis- 
posed than  his  comrades  to  mercy?  Here  it  has 
happened  that  someone  in  the  house  uttered  a  few 
words  of  German ;  there,  that  the  nursemaid  was  a 
German.     What  have  these  considerations  to  do 

'  See  Kolnische  Zeitung,  September  loth. 


292  The  War  of  191 4 

with  the  matter  ?  The  only  question  of  importance 
is  that  of  the  innocence  or  guilt  of  the  resident  in 
the  house  that  is  protected  or  the  house  that  is 
sacked?  Why  are  such  flimsy  presumptions  to 
decide  that  one  man  will  keep  his  life  and  a  family 
its  home,  while  others  lose  them  ? 

No!  Collective  reprisals  on  innocent  people 
are  without  any  foundation  in  law.  They  have  no 
other  object  than  that  of  sowing  terror  amongst 
the  inhabitants,  whether  with  the  object  of  facili- 
tating the  invasion  of  the  territory  or  with  a  view 
to  intimidating  the  troops  of  the  enemy  and 
preventing  certain  inconvenient  operations.  "Ex- 
perience has  shown,"  one  finds  for  instance  in  the 
code  of  war  "that  a  contribution  in  money  pro- 
duces the  greatest  effect  on  the  civil  population." 
And  here  we  find  the  goal  of  the  system  of  methodi- 
cal terrorism  which  the  German  code  of  warfare 
expounds. 

That  this  system  produces  effective  results  is 
sufficiently  attested  by  various  episodes  observed 
in  Belgium.  So  far  from  there  being  any  rising  of 
the  populace  against  the  invader,  the  mere  news 
of  the  approach  of  the  German  troops  was  suffi- 
cient to  cause  the  exodus  of  veritable  crowds. 
Thus  according  to  an  account  taken  from  the 
Kolnische  Zeitung  of  October  15th,  not  only  did 


German  Rules  of  War  293 

twelve  scouts  succeed  in  putting  to  flight  the 
whole  population  of  Selzaete,  but  the  inhabitants 
were  even  seen  calling  upon  the  Belgian  soldiers 
not  to  fire  at  the  invaders.  In  certain  villages  the 
fear  was  so  great  that  the  inhabitants  went  so  far 
as  to  facilitate  the  passage  of  the  German  columns 
in  order  to  get  them  away  as  quickly  as  possible, 
and  so  avoid  incidents  from  which  the  worst  form 
of  reprisals  might  arise.  In  Flanders,  with  a 
Flemish  and  agricultural  population,  as  well  as  in 
Hainaut  with  a  Walloon  and  industrial  population, 
the  inhabitants  hung  up  small  white  flags  with 
which  to  beg  for  mercy. 

Such  is  the  end  that  is  deliberately  pursued. 
It  is  true  that  the  inhabitants  cannot  be  compelled 
to  co-operate  directly  in  the  action  of  the  enemy 
against  their  country.'  But  the  same  object  can 
be  attained  by  means  of  intimidation.  Field- 
Marshal  von  der  Goltz  knew  what  he  was  doing 
when  he  issued  his  threatening  notice  to  the  in- 
habitants of  the  districts  bordering  on  the  railway 
line  between  Lovenjoul  and  Vertryck.  It  is  true 
that  the  rails  and  telegraph  wires  had  been  de- 
stroyed on  this  line,  but  this  destruction,  as  I 
know,  was  deliberately  carried  out  by  Belgian 
soldiers  who  had  been  entrusted  with  the  duty 

'  Article  44  of  The  Hague  Convention. 


294  The  War  of  191 4 

of  cutting  communications  behind  the  lines 
of  the  enemy.  Decorations  have  indeed  been 
pubUcly  granted  to  those  who  carried  out  these 
exploits.  Now  by  threatening  a  "punishment 
without  mercy"  the  German  authorities  aimed  at 
gaining  the  complicity  of  the  civilian  population 
itself  and  using  it  as  their  informant,  so  that  each 
inhabitant  of  the  villages  was  exposed  to  military 
vengeance  before  the  appalling  alternative  of 
either  pointing  out  a  soldier  who  was  going  to  ac- 
complish his  duty  towards  the  common  fatherland, 
or  of  condemning  to  death  his  relatives,  his 
friends,  his  neighbours,  who  had  been  taken  away 
as  hostages. 

When,  during  the  sack  of  Lou  vain,  the  unfor- 
tunate inhabitants  were  taken  across  the  country 
and  were  then  made  to  travel  in  a  famished  condi- 
tion into  Germany,  cooped  up  in  cattle  trucks,  and 
exposed  to  the  insults  of  the  populace,  only  to 
be  brought  back  again  to  Brussels  and  finally 
set  free  after  having  been  threatened  over  and 
over  again  with  being  shot ;  when  sham  executions 
were  indulged  in  before  spectators  who  were 
compelled  to  assist  and  even  to  applaud,^  can 
there  have  been  any  other  object  than  to  sow 
terror  by  a  refinement  of  cruelty? 

'  See  Fifth  Report  of  the  Commission  of  Inquiry. 


German  Rules  of  War  295 

Now,  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out  that 
though  intimidation  may  assure  to  those  in  com- 
mand the  docility  of  the  terrorized  population, 
such  a  result  and  many  others  would  be  much 
more  surely  gained  by  an  attitude  of  gentleness, 
kindness,  justice,  and  humanity.  This  attitude 
provokes  neither  hatred  nor  resentment,  but 
creates  without  effort  an  atmosphere  of  calm, 
however  implacable  the  hostility  of  the  people 
may  remain.  Thus  nothing  justifies  intimidation; 
it  is  a  baneful  system,  contrary  to  human  nature. 

The  same  must  be  said  with  regard  to  the  taking 
of  hostages,  a  practice  which  has  frequently  oc- 
curred in  the  course  of  the  German  occupation 
of  Belgium.  Provision  is  clearly  made  for  it  in 
the  precepts  contained  in  the  military  phrase- 
book  of  which  I  spoke  before. '  In  Belgium 
various  proclamations  of  the  leaders  of  the  army 
have  formally  authorized  this  taking  of  hostages^: 

At  Namur,  August  25th  ^: 

All  the  streets  will  be  occupied  by  a  German 
guard  who  will  take  ten  hostages  in  each  street 
whom  they  will  keep  guarded.  If  any  attack  takes 
place  in  the  street  the  ten  hostages  will  be  shot. 

'  P.  255.     See  p.  129  of  the  book. 
*  I  reproduce  the  original  text. 
3  General  von  Biilow. 


296  The  War  of  191 4 

At  Brussels,  October  5th ' : 

With  this  object  hostages  have  been  taken  from 
all  places  bordering  on  the  railways  which  are  threat- 
ened with  such  attacks,  and  on  the  first  attempt  to 
destroy  the  railway  track,  the  lines  of  telegraph  or 
of  the  telephone,  they  will  be  at  once  shot. 

At  Grivegnee,  September  6th  ^ : 

After  9  A.M.  on  September  yth,  I  will  permit  the 
houses  in  Beyne-Heusay,  Grivegnee  and  Bois-de- 
Breux  to  be  inhabited  by  the  persons  who  lived  in 
them  formerly,  as  long  as  these  persons  are  not 
forbidden  to  frequent  these  localities  by  official 
prohibition. 

In  order  that  the  above-mentioned  permit  may 
not  be  abused,  the  Burgomasters  of  Beyne-Heusay 
and  Grivegnee  must  immediately  prepare  lists  of 
persons  who  will  be  held  as  hostages  for  twenty- 
four  hours  each  at  Fort  Fleron. 

The  life  of  these  hostages  depends  on  the  popula- 
tion of  the  above-mentioned  Communes  remaining 
quiet  in  any  circumstances. 

From  the  list  which  is  submitted  to  me  I  will 
designate  persons  who  shall  be  hostages  from  mid- 
day till  the  following  mid-day.  If  the  substitute 
is  not  there  at  the  correct  time,  the  hostage  must 
remain  another  twenty-four  hoiirs  at  the  fort. 
After  these  twenty-four  hours  the  hostage  will  incur 
the  penalty  of  death,  if  the  substitute  has  not 
presented  himself. 

'  Field-Marshal  von  der  Goltz. 
'  Major  Dieckmarm. 


German  Rules  of  War  297 

Priests,  Burgomasters,  and  Members  of  the 
Administration  are  to  be  taken  first  as  hostages. 

These  examples  will  suffice;  they  could  be  in- 
definitely multiplied. 

Once  again  no  surprise  need  be  felt  at  the  action 
of  the  German  armies  in  the  field.  The  code, 
whose  spirit  I  have  explained,  sanctions  these  acts 
in  express  terms. 

The  taking  of  hostages  has  become  more  rare 
in  contemporary  wars,  from  which  fact  some  pro- 
fessors of  international  law  have  wrongly  concluded 
that  it  had  disappeared  from  the  laws  of  war  among 
civilized  nations. 

And  after  asserting  that  this  practice  was 
current  in  various  campaigns  in  the  nineteenth 
century,  the  author  of  the  German  manual  adds: 

We  must  accordingly  reject  the  unfavourable 
judgments  expressed  on  the  subject  of  the  employ- 
ment by  the  German  army  of  this  means  of  warfare 
in  isolated  cases  and  for  diverse  reasons. 

As  a  matter  of  fact  it  is  by  no  means  in  isolated 
cases  that  the  German  commanders  have  insisted 
on  the  surrender  of  hostages,  and  the  opinion  of 
the  legal  adviser  of  the  Grand  General  StafiF  is 
very  far  from  being  that  of  contemporary  special- 
ists on  the  laws  of  war.    The  rules  annexed  to  The 


298  The  War  of  191 4 

Hague  Convention  do  not  deal  with  the  question 
of  the  taking  of  hostages,  but  the  prohibition  of 
collective  punishment  in  consequence  of  individ- 
ual acts  for  which  the  group  cannot  be  held 
responsible,  involves  the  condemnation  of  this 
practice.  Further,  as  the  life  of  individuals  must 
be  respected'  there  can  be  no  question  of  de- 
ciding to  put  hostages  to  death  in  those  cases 
where  the  conditions  for  which  they  are  held 
guarantors  cannot  be  carried  out.  Even  if  hos- 
tages were  in  the  same  position  as  prisoners  of 
war,  they  would  have  the  right  to  their  lives. 
This  is  the  point  of  view  assumed  as  early  as  1863 
in  the  Instructions  for  the  Armies  in  the  Field  of  the 
United  States  of  America.'' 

The  only  explanation  which  is  possible  of  this 
persistence  of  a  practice  which  is  so  little  in  con- 
formity with  the  ideas  of  our  time  and  with  the 
evolution  of  the  laws  of  war,  is  to  be  found  in  the 
fundamental  principle  which  inspires  the  whole  of 
the  German  code:  it  is  necessary  above  all  things 
so  to  act  as  to  produce  intimidation. 

In  the  evening  of  August  27th,  the  day  after 
the  devastation  of  Louvain,  a  wireless  message 
came  from  Berlin^: 

'  Article  46.  ^  Article  54. 

3  See  The  Times  of  August  29th. 


German  Rules  of  War  299 

The  only  means  of  preventing  surprise  attacks 
from  the  civil  population  has  been  to  interfere  with 
unrelenting  severity  and  to  create  examples  which, 
by  their  f rightfulness,  would  be  a  warning  to  the 
whole  country. 

This  is  precisely  the  same  idea  as  a  German, 
Herr  Bloem,  expressed  on  February  10,  191 5,  in  the 
Kolnische  Zeitung:  measures  of  reprisal  are  much 
less  in  the  nature  of  punishments  than  in  the  nature 
of  warnings  {Warnungssignale) : 

There  can  be  no  doubt  of  this;  the  burning  of 
Baltice,  Herve,  Louvain,  Dinant,  was  carried  out 
by  way  of  warning.  The  inevitable  incendiarism 
and  the  blood  poured  out  during  the  first  days  of 
the  war  have  deprived  the  great  Belgian  towns  of 
all  temptation  to  assail  the  garrisons,  necessarily 
weak,  which  we  left  behind.  If  Brussels  is  occu- 
pied by  us,  and  if  we  move  about  there  to-day  as  if 
we  were  at  home,  can  anyone  doubt  for  a  moment 
that  it  is  because  the  capital  is  afraid  of  us  and 
trembles  before  our  vengeance  {vor  unserer  Rache 
zittert)  ? 

Such  is  the  system  of  war  which  all-powerful 
Germany  has  deliberately  applied  to  Belgium,  as 
attested  by  the  very  people  whose  aims  are  to  be 
served  by  the  adoption  of  such  methods. 

That  a  war  so  conducted  is  contrary  "to  the 
laws  of  humanity  and  the  requirements  of  the 


300  The  War  of  1914 

pubKc  conscience,"  to  quote  the  terms  of  the  rules 
formulated  at  The  Hague,  must  be  obvious  to 
everyone.  Be  the  aim  of  the  war  merely  the 
passage  across  neutral  and  friendly  territory  such 
as  Germany  publicly  proclaimed,  or  the  complete 
or  partial  subjection  of  Belgium  such  as  she  con- 
fidentially confessed  to  Great  Britain, — this  war 
is  the  last  thing  in  the  world  that  Belgium  deserved. 
Strong  in  her  probity,  her  loyalty,  and  her 
innocence,  Belgium  will  never  accept  the  verdict  of 
arms.  Confident  and  resolute,  she  lays  her  cause 
before  the  judgment  of  those  nations  who  find 
their  highest  pride  in  the  sentiment  of  national 
honour. 


APPENDIX 


Report  of  the  Chief  of  the  Belgian  General 
Staff  Respecting  the  Confidential  Inter- 
views WITH  the  British  Military  Attache  in 
1906.' 


Lettre  d,  M.  le  Ministre  de  la 
Guerre  au  sujet  des  Entre- 
tiens  confidentiels. 

(Confidentielle.)    Bruxelles, 

le  10  avril,  1906. 
M.  LE  Ministre, 

J  'ai  1  'honneur  de  vous  rendre 
compte  sommairement  des  en- 
tretiens  que  j'ai  eus  avec  le 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Barnardis- 
ton  et  qui  ont  fait  I'objet  de 
mes  communications  verbales. 

La  premiere  visite  date  de  la 
mi- Janvier.  M.  Bamardiston 
me  fit  part  des  prfoccupations 
de  I'etat-major  de  son  pays 
relativement  k  la  situation 
politique  g^nerale  et  aux  even- 
tualites  de  guerre  du  moment. 


(Translation.) 

Letter  to  the  Minister  of  War 
respecting  the  confidential 
Interviews. 

(Confidential. ) 

Brussels,  April  10,  1906. 
Sir, 

I  have  the  honour  to  furnish 
herewith  a  summary  of  the 
conversations  which  I  have 
had  with  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bamardiston,  which  I  have 
already  reported  to  you 
verbally. 

His  first  visit  was  in  the 
middle  of  January.  Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Bamardiston  told 
me  of  the  preoccupation  of 
the  British  General  Staff  con- 
cerning the  general  political 
situation     and     the     existing 


'  I  give  the  text  of  the  Report  textually  as  General  Ducarae 
has  drawn  it  himself,  viz. :  introducing  the  additions  and  cor- 
rections made  by  him,  on  the  rough  draft  that  was  found  in 
Brussels. 

301 


302 


Appendix 


Un  envoi  de  troupes,  d'un 
total  de  100,000  hommes  en- 
viron, ^tait  projet^  pour  le  cas 
oil  la  Belgique  serait  attaqu^e. 

Le  lieutenant-colonel  m  '- 
ayant  demand^  comment  cette 
action  serait  interpr^t^e  par 
nous,  je  lui  r^pondis  que,  au 
point  de  vue  militaire,  die  ne 
pourrait  qu'etre  favorable; 
mais  que  cette  question  d 'in- 
tervention relevait  ^galement 
du  pouvoir  politique  et  que, 
des  lors,  j'^tais  tenu  d'en 
entretenir  le  Ministre  de  la 
Guerre. 

M.  Bamardiston  me  rdpon- 
dit  que  son  Ministre  k 
Bruxelles  en  parlerait  k  notre 
Ministre  des  Affaires  Etran- 
ghres. 

II  continua  dans  ce  sens:  le 
d^barquement  des  troupes  ang- 
laises  se  ferait  sur  la  c6te  de 
France,  vers  Dunkerque  et 
Calais,  de  fagon  k  h^ter  le  plus 
possible  le  mouvement.  L 'en- 
tree des  Anglais  en  Belgique 
ne  se  ferait  qu'aprfes  la  viola- 
tion de  notre  neutrality  par 
I'Allemagne.  Le  debarque- 
ment  par  Anvers  demanderait 
beaucoup  plus  de  temps,  parce 
qu'il  faudrait  des  transports 
plus  considerables  et  d 'autre 
part  la  s6curit6  serait  moins 
complete. 

Ceci  admis,  il  resterait  k 
r^gler    divers    autres    points, 


possibilities  of  war.  Should 
Belgium  be  attacked,  it  was 
proposed  to  send  about  100,000 
men. 

The  lieutenant-colonel 
having  asked  me  how  we 
should  interpret  such  a  step, 
I  answered  that,  from  the 
miUtary  point  of  view,  it 
could  only  be  advantageous; 
but  that  this  question  of  inter- 
vention had  also  a  political 
side,  and  that  I  must  accord- 
ingly consult  the  Minister  of 
War. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Bar- 
nard iston  replied  that  his 
^linister  at  Brussels  would 
speak  about  it  to  our  Minister 
for  Foreign  Affairs. 

He  continued  as  follows: 
The  disembarkation  of  the 
British  troops  would  take 
place  on  the  French  coast,  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  Dunkirk 
and  Calais,  in  such  a  manner 
that  the  operation  might  be 
carried  out  in  the  quickest 
possible  way.  The  entry  of 
the  English  into  Belgium 
would  only  take  place  after 
the  violation  of  our  neutrality 
by  Germany.  Landing  at 
Antwerp  would  take  much 
longer,  as  larger  transports 
would  be  required,  and,  more- 
over, the  risk  would  be  greater. 

This  being  so,  several  other 
points  remained  to  be  decided, 


Appendix 


303 


savoir:  les  transports  par 
chemin  de  fer,  la  question  des 
requisitions  auxquelies  Tarm^e 
anglaise  pourrait  avoir  recours, 
la  question  du  commandement 
superieur  des  forces  alliees. 

II  s'informa  si  nos  disposi- 
tions etaient  sufBsantes  pour 
assurer  la  defense  du  pays 
durant  la  travers6e  et  les 
transports  des  troupes  ang- 
laises,  temps  qu'il  ^valuait  a 
une  dizaine  de  jours. 

Je  repondis  que  les  places  de 
Namur  et  de  Li^ge  6taient  k 
I'abri  d'un  coup  de  main  et 
que,  en  quatre  jours,  notre 
arm^e  de  campagne,  forte  de 
100,000  hommes,  serait  en 
etat  d'intervenir.  Apres  avoir 
exprim^  toute  sa  satisfaction 
au  sujet  de  mes  declarations, 
mon  interlocuteur  insista  sur 
le  fait  que:  (i)  notre  conversa- 
tion etait  absolument  con- 
fidentielle;  (2)  elle  ne  pouvait 
Her  son  Gouvemement;  (3) 
son  Ministre,  I'etat-major  gen- 
eral anglais,  lui  et  moi  ^tions 
seuls,  en  ce  moment,  dans  la 
confidence;  (4)  il  ignorait  si 
son  Souverain  avait  ete  pres- 
senti 

Dans  un  entretien  subse- 
quent, le  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bamardiston  m'assura  qu'il 
n 'avait  jamais  regu  de  con- 
fidences d  'autres  attaches  mili- 
taires  au  sujet  de  notre  armee. 
II     pr^cisa    ensuite    les    don- 


viz.,  transport  by  rail,  the 
question  of  requisitions  to 
which  the  British  Army  might 
have  recourse,  the  question  of 
the  chief  command  of  the 
allied  forces. 

He  enquired  whether  our 
arrangements  were  adequate  to 
secure  the  defence  of  the 
country  during  the  crossing 
and  transport  of  the  British 
troops — a  period  which  he 
estimated  at  about  ten  days. 

I  answered  that  the  fort- 
resses of  Namur  and  Lidge 
were  safe  against  a  surprise 
attack,  and  that  in  four  days 
our  field  army  of  100,000  men 
would  be  ready  to  take  the 
field.  After  having  expressed 
his  entire  satisfaction  at  what 
I  had  said,  my  visitor  em- 
phasized the  following  points: 
(i)  Our  conversation  was 
absolutely  confidential;  (2)  it 
was  in  no  way  binding  on  his 
Government;  (3)  his  ^Minister, 
the  British  General  Staff,  he, 
and  myself  were  the  only 
persons  then  aware  of  the 
matter;  (4)  he  did  not  know 
whether  his  Sovereign  had 
been  consulted. 

At  a  subsequent  meeting 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Bamard- 
iston assured  me  that  he  had 
never  received  any  confidential 
information  from  other  mili- 
tary attaches  about  our  army. 
He  then  gave  me  a  detailed 


304 


Appendix 


nees  num6riques  concemant  les 
forces  anglaises ;  nous  pouvions 
compter  que,  en  douze  ou  treize 
jours,  seraient  d^barqu^s :  deux 
corps  d'arm^e,  quatre  brigades 
de  cavalerie,  et  deux  brigades 
d'infanterie  mont^e. 

II  me  demanda  d 'examiner  la 
question  du  transport  de  ces 
forces  vers  la  partie  du  pays  oti 
elles  seraient  utiles,  et  dans  ce 
but,  il  me  promit  la  composi- 
tion detainee  de  I'armee  de 
d^barquement. 

II  revint  sur  la  question  des 
eflectifs  de  notre  arm^e  de 
campagne  en  insistant  pour 
qu'on  ne  fit  pas  de  detache- 
ments  de  cette  arm^e  a  Namur 
et  k  Li^ge,  puisque  ces  places 
6taient  pourvues  de  gamisons 
suffisantes. 

II  me  demanda  de  fixer  mon 
attention  sur  la  n^cessite  de 
permettre  a  I'arm^  anglaise  de 
ben^ficier  des  avantages  pre- 
vus  par  le  reglement  sur  les 
prestations  militaires.  Enfin, 
il  insista  sur  la  question  du 
commandement  supreme. 

Je  lui  r^pondis  que  je  ne 
pouvais  rien  dire  quant  k  ce 
dernier  point,  et  je  lui  promis 
un  examen  attentif  des  autres 
questions. 

Plus  tard,  1 'attach^  militaire 
anglais  confirma  son  estima- 
tion   pr6:^dente:  douze    jours 


statement  of  the  strength  of 
the  British  forces:  we  might 
rely  on  it  that,  in  twelve  or 
thirteen  days,  two  army  corps, 
four  cavalry  brigades,  and  two 
brigades  of  mounted  infantry 
would  be  landed. 

He  asked  me  to  study  the 
question  of  the  transport  of 
these  forces  to  that  part  of  the 
country  where  they  would  be 
most  useful,  and  with  this  ob- 
ject in  view  he  promised  me  a 
detailed  statement  of  the  com- 
position of   the  landing  force. 

He  reverted  to  the  question 
of  the  effective  strength  of  our 
field  army,  and  considered  it 
important  that  no  detachments 
from  that  army  should  be 
sent  to  Namur  and  Li^ge,  as 
those  fortresses  were  provided 
with  adequate  garrisons. 

He  drew  my  attention  to 
the  necessity  of  letting  the 
British  Army  take  full  advan- 
tage of  the  facilities  afforded 
under  our  regulations  respect- 
ing military  requirements. 
Finally,  he  laid  stress  on  the 
question  of  the  chief  com- 
mand. 

I  replied  that  I  could  say 
nothing  on  the  latter  point, 
and  I  promised  that  I  would 
study  the  other  questions  with 
care. 

Later,  the  British  military 
attach^  confirmed  his  previous 
estimate:  twelve  days  at  least 


Appendix 


305 


seraient  au  moins  indispen- 
sables  pour  faire  le  d^barque- 
ment  sur  la  cote  de  France. 
II  faudrait  beaucoup  plus 
(un  a  deux  mois  et  demi)  pour 
d^barquer  100,000  troupes  k 
Anvers. 

Sur  mon  objection  qu'il  ^tait 
inutile  d  'attendre  1  'acheve- 
ment  du  debarquement  pour 
commencer  les  transports  par 
chemin  de  fer,  et  qu'il  valait 
mieux  les  faire  au  fur  et  k 
mesure  des  arrivages,  a  la 
c6te,  le  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Bamardiston  me  promit  des 
donn^es  exactes  sur  I'etat 
journalier  du  debarquement. 

Quant  aux  prestations  mili- 
taires,  je  fis  part  a  mon  inter- 
locuteur  que  cette  question 
serait  facilement  reglee. 

A  mesure  que  les  etudes  de 
I'etat-major  anglais  avan- 
gaient,  les  donnees  du  prob- 
leme  se  precisaient.  Le  colonel 
m'assura  que  la  moitie  de 
I'armee  anglaise  pourrait  etre 
debarquee  en  huit  jours,  et  que 
le  restant  le  serait  a  la  fin  du 
douzieme  ou  treizieme  jour, 
sauf  I'infanterie  montee,  sur  la- 
quelle  il  ne  fallait  compter  que 
plus  tard. 

Ndanmoins,  je  crus  devoir 
insister  a  nouveau  sur  la 
n^cessite  de  connaitre  le  rende- 
ment    journalier,    de    fagon    a 


were  indispensable  to  carry 
out  the  landing  on  the  coast 
of  France.  It  would  take 
much  longer  (from  one  to  two 
and  a  half  months)  to  land 
100,000  men  at  Antwerp. 

On  my  objecting  that  it 
would  be  useless  to  wait 
till  the  disembarkation  was 
finished,  before  beginning  the 
transport  by  rail,  and  that  it 
would  be  better  to  send  on 
the  troops  by  degrees  as  they 
arrived  on  the  coast,  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Bamardiston 
promised  me  precise  details 
of  the  daily  disembarkation 
table. 

With  regard  to  the  question 
of  military  requirements,  I 
informed  my  visitor  that  that 
question  would  easily  be  ar- 
ranged. 

As  the  plans  of  the  British 
General  Staff  advanced,  the 
details  of  the  problem  were 
worked  out  with  greater  pre- 
cision. The  colonel  assured 
me  that  half  the  British  Army 
could  be  landed  in  eight  days, 
and  the  remainder  at  the  end 
of  the  twelfth  or  thirteenth 
day,  except  the  mounted  in- 
fantry, on  which  we  could  not 
count  till  later. 

Nevertheless,  I  felt  bound 
once  more  to  urge  the  necessity 
of  knowing  the  numbers  to  be 
landed   daily,   so  as   to   work 


3o6 


Appendix 


rsgler  les  transports  par  chemin 
de  fer  de  chaque  jour. 

L'attach^  anglais  m'entre- 
tint  ensuite  de  diverses  autres 
questions,  savoir:  (i)  n^cessit^ 
de  tenir  le  secret  des  opera- 
tions et  d'obtenir  de  la  presse 
qu'elle  I'observat  soigneuse- 
ment;  (2)  avantages  qu'il  y 
aurait  k  adjoindre  un  officier 
beige  a  chaque  6tat-major 
anglais,  un  traducteur  k  chaque 
commandant  de  troupes,  des 
gendarmes  a  chaque  unit6 
pour  aider  les  troupes  de  police 
anglaises. 

Dans  une  autre  entrevue,  le 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Bamardis- 
ton  et  moi  examinames  les 
operations  combinees  dans  le 
cas  d'une  agression  de  la  part 
de  I'Allemagne  ayant  comme 
objectif  Anvers  et  dans  I'hy- 
po  these  d'une  traversde  de 
notre  pays  pour  atteindre  les 
Ardennes  frangaises. 

Par  la  suite,  le  colonel  me 
marqua  son  accord  sur  le  plan 
que  je  lui  avais  presents  et 
m'assura  de  I'assentiment  du 
General  Grierson,  chef  de 
I'^tat-major  anglais. 

D  'autres  questions  second- 
aires  furent  egalement  r^gl^es, 
notamment  en  ce  qui  regarde 
les  officiers  intermediaires,  les 
traducteurs,  les  gendarmes, 
les  cartes,  les  albums  des 
uniformes,  les  tires  a  part  tra- 
duits    en    anglais    de    certains 


out  the  railway  arrangements 
for  each  day. 

The  British  attach^  then 
spoke  to  me  of  various  other 
questions,  viz.:  (i)  The  neces- 
sity of  maintaining  secrecy 
about  the  operations,  and  of 
ensuring  that  the  Press  should 
observe  this  carefully;  (2) 
the  advantages  there  would 
be  in  attaching  a  Belgian 
officer  to  each  British  staff,  an 
interpreter  to  each  command- 
ing officer,  and  gendarmes  to 
each  unit  to  help  the  British 
military  police. 

At  another  interview  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Barnardiston 
and  I  examined  the  question 
of  combined  operations  in  the 
event  of  a  German  attack 
directed  against  Antwerp,  and 
on  the  hypothesis  of  our 
country  being  crossed  in  order 
to  reach  the  French  Ardennes. 

Later  on,  the  colonel  signi- 
fied his  concurrence  in  the 
scheme  I  had  laid  before  him, 
and  assured  me  of  the  assent 
of  General  Grierson,  Chief  of 
the  British  General  Staff. 

Other  questions  of  second- 
ary importance  were  likewise 
disposed  of,  particularly  those 
respecting  intermediary  offi- 
cers, interpreters,  gendarmes, 
maps,  illustrations  of  uniforms, 
English  translations  of  extracts 
from    certain    Belgian    regula- 


Appendix 


307 


riglements  beiges,  le  r^glement 
des  frais  de  douane  pour  les 
approvisionnements  anglais, 
ITiospitalisation  des  blesses  de 
rarm6e  alliee,  &c.  Rien  ne 
fut  arrets  quant  a  Taction  que 
pourrait  exercer  sur  la  presse 
le  Gouvemement  ou  I'autorite 
militaire. 

Dans  les  demi^res  rencontres 
que  j'ai  eues  avec  I'attachd 
anglais,  il  me  communiqua  le 
rendement  joumalier  des  d6- 
barquements  a  Boulogne,  Cal- 
ais et  Cherbourg.  L'eloigne- 
ment  de  ce  dernier  point, 
impose  par  des  considerations 
d'ordre  technique,  occasionne 
un  certain  retard.  Le  premier 
corps  serait  d^barqu^  le 
dixieme  jour,  et  le  second 
corps  le  quinzieme  jour.  Notre 
materiel  des  chemins  de  fer 
ex^cuterait  les  transports,  de 
sorte  que  I'arrivee,  soit  vers 
Bruxelles-Louvain,  soit  vers 
Namur-Dinant,  du  premier 
corps  serait  achevee  le  on- 
zieme  jour,  et  celle  du  deux- 
ieme  corps,  le  seizieme  jour. 


J'ai  insiste  une  demifere  fois 
et  aussi  teergiquement  que  je 
le  pouvais,  sur  la  ndcessite  de 
hater  encore  les  transports 
maritimes  de  fagon  que  les 
troupes  anglaises  fussent  pr^s 
de  nous  entre  le  onzi^me  et  le 
douzifeme  jour;  les  resultats  les 


tions,  the  regulation  of  customs 
dues  chargeable  on  the  British 
supplies,  hospital  accom- 
modation for  the  wounded  of 
the  allied  army,  &c.  Nothing 
was  settled  as  to  the  possible 
control  of  the  Press  by  the 
Government  or  the  military 
authorities. 

In  the  course  of  the  last 
meetings  which  I  had  with 
the  British  attache  he  com- 
municated to  me  the  daily 
disembarkation  table  of  the 
troops  to  be  landed  at  Bou- 
logne, Calais,  and  Cherbourg. 
The  distance  of  the  latter 
place,  included  owing  to  cer- 
tain technical  considerations, 
would  cause  a  certain  delay. 
The  first  corps  would  be 
landed  on  the  tenth  day,  the 
second  corps  on  the  fifteenth 
day.  Our  railways  would 
carry  out  the  transport  opera- 
tions in  such  a  way  that  the 
arrival  of  the  first  corps,  either 
towards  Brussels-Louvain  or 
towards  Namur-Dinant,  would 
be  completed  on  the  eleventh 
day  and  that  of  the  second 
corps  on  the  sixteenth  day. 

I  finally  urged  once  again, 
as  forcibly  as  was  within  my 
power,  the  necessity  of  acceler- 
ating the  transport  by  sea  in 
order  that  the  British  troops 
might  be  with  us  between  the 
eleventh  and  the  twelfth  day; 
the  very  best  and  most  favour- 


308 


Appendix 


plus  heureux,  les  plus  favor- 
ables  peuvent  6tre  obtenus 
par  une  action  convergente  et 
siraultan^e  des  forces  alli6cs. 
Au  contraire,  ce  sera  un  6chec 
grave  si  cot  accord  no  se 
produit  pas.  Le  Colonel  Bar- 
nardiston  m'a  assurd  que  tout 
sera  fait  dans  ce  but. 

Au  cours  de  nos  entretiens, 
j'eus  1 'occasion  de  convaincre 
I'attach^  militaire  anglais  de 
la  volont6  que  nous  avions 
d'entraver,  dans  la  limite  du 
possible,  les  mouvements  de 
I'ennemi  et  de  ne  pas  nous 
refugier,  d^s  le  debut,  dans 
Anvers.  De  son  c6te,  le 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Bamardis- 
ton  me  fit  part  de  son  peu  de 
con  fiance  actuellement  dans 
I'appui  ou  I'intervention  de  la 
Hollande.  II  me  confia  ^gale- 
ment  que  son  Gouvernement 
projetait  de  transporter  la 
base  d'approvisionnements 
anglaise  de  la  c6t6  f  rangaise  a 
Anvers,  des  que  la  mer  du 
nord  serait  nettoy^e  de  tous  les 
navires  de  guerre  allemands. 

Dans  tous  nos  entretiens  le 
colonel  me  communiqua  regu- 
lierement  les  renseignements 
confidentiels  qu'il  possedait 
sur  r^tat  militaire  et  la  situa- 
tion de  notre  voisin  de  Test, 
&c.  En  meme  temps,  il  in- 
sista  sur  la  n^cessit^  imp6rieuse 
pour  la  Belgique  de  se  tenir  au 


able  results  would  accrue  from 
the  concerted  and  simultane- 
ous action  by  the  allied  forces. 
On  the  other  hand,  a  serious 
check  would  ensue  if  such 
co-operation  could  not  be 
achieved.  Colonel  Bamardis- 
ton  assured  me  that  every- 
thing would  be  done  with  that 
end  in  view. 

In  the  course  of  our  con- 
versations I  took  the  oppor- 
tunity of  convincing  the  mili- 
tary attach^  of  our  resolve  to 
impede  the  enemies'  move- 
ments as  far  as  lay  within  our 
power,  and  not  to  take  refuge 
in  Antwerp  from  the  outset. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Bamard- 
iston,  on  his  side,  informed  me 
that  he  had  at  present  little 
confidence  in  the  support  or 
intervention  of  Holland.  He 
likewise  confided  to  me  that 
his  Government  intended  to 
move  the  British  base  of 
supplies  from  the  French  coast 
to  Antwerp  as  soon  as  the 
North  Sea  had  been  cleared 
of  all  German  warships. 

At  all  our  interviews  the 
colonel  regularly  communi- 
cated to  me  any  confidential 
information  he  possessed  re- 
specting the  military  condition 
and  general  situation  of  our 
eastern  neighbour,  &c.  At 
the  same  time  he  laid  stress 
on    the    imperative    need    for 


Appendix 


309 


courant  de  ce  qui  se  passait 
dans  les  pays  rhdnans  qui 
nous  avoisinent.  Je  dus  lui 
confesser  que,  chez  nous,  le 
service  de  surveillance  au 
delk  de  la  frontiere,  au  temps 
de  paix,  ne  releve  pas  directe- 
ment  de  notre  etat-major; 
nous  n'avons  pas  d 'attaches 
militaires  aupres  de  nos  lega- 
tions. Je  me  gardai  bien, 
cependant,  de  lui  avouer  que 
j'ignorais  si  le  service  d 'es- 
pionage, qui  est  present  par 
nos  reglements,  etait  ou  non 
prepare.  Mais  il  est  de  mon 
devoir  de  signaler  ici  cette 
situation  qui  nous  met  en 
etat  d'inferiorite  flagrante  vis- 
k-vis  de  nos  voisins,  nos 
ennemis  6ventuels. 

Le  G^n^ral-Major,  Chef  d'- 

E.-M.  DUCARNE. 

Note. — Lorsque  je  rencon- 
trai  le  G^n^ral  Grierson  a 
Compiegne,  pendant  les  man- 
oeuvres de  1906,  il  m'assura 
que  la  r&)rganisation  de 
I'armee  anglaise  aurait  pour 
resultat  non  seulement  d 'assu- 
rer le  d^barquement  de  1 50,000 
hommes,  mais  de  permettre 
leur  action  dans  un  delai  plus 
court  que  celui  dont  il  est 
question  prec^demment. 

DuCARNE. 

Fin  septembre  1906. 


Belgium  to  keep  herself  well 
informed  of  what  was  going 
on  in  the  neighbouring  Rhine 
country.  I  had  to  admit  to 
him  that  in  our  country  the 
intelligence  service  beyond  the 
frontier  was  not,  in  times  of 
peace,  directly  under  our  Gen- 
eral Staff.  We  had  no  mili- 
tary attaches  at  our  legations. 
I  took  care,  however,  not  to 
admit  to  him  that  I  was  un- 
aware whether  the  secret  ser- 
vice, prescribed  in  the  Belgian 
military  regulations,  was  or- 
ganized or  not.  But  it  is  my 
duty  here  to  call  attention  to 
this  state  of  affairs,  which 
places  us  in  a  position  of  glaring 
inferiority  to  that  of  our  neigh- 
bours, our  possible  enemies. 
Major-General, 
Chief  of  General  Staff. 

DuCARNE. 

Note. — When  I  met  General 
Grierson  at  Compiegne  at  the 
manoeuvres  of  1906  he  assured 
me  that  the  reorganization  of 
the  British  army  would  result 
not  only  in  ensuring  the  land- 
ing of  150,000  men,  but  in 
enabling  them  to  take  the 
field  in  a  shorter  period  than 
had  been  previously  estimated. 

DuCARNE. 

End  of  September,  1906. 


INDEX 


Aerschot.  Circumstances  of 
the  sack  of  the  town,  235, 
238;  object  of  the  massacres 
and  pillage,  291 

Albert,  King  of  the  Bel- 
gians, Present  (before  his 
accession)  at  the  banquet 
organized  by  M.  von  Bary 
in  honour  of  the  burgo- 
masters of  the  Rhenish 
towns,  8;  accession  (Decem- 
ber, 1909),  10;  relations  with 
the  German  Imperial  family, 
10;  marriage,  10;  visit  to 
Berlin  (June,  1910),  li; 
toasts  exchanged  at  a  dinner 
given  during  the  visit,  1 1 ; 
toasts  exchanged  at  a  dinner 
given  during  the  visit  of  the 
German  Emperor  and  Em- 
press to  Brussels  (October, 
191  o),  12;  visit  to  Paris 
(July,  191  o),  14;  toasts 
exchanged  at  a  dinner  given 
during  that  visit,  14;  applies 
himself  to  the  reorganization 
of  the  army,  2 1 ;  speech  to 
the  Grenadier  Regiment,  2 1 ; 
visit  to  Switzerland,  22; 
conversation  with  President 
Poincare,  22;  reception  at 
Potsdam  (November,  1913), 
23;  invited  to  the  German 
Imperial  manoeuvres  of 
September,  19 14,  23;  letter 
to  the  German  Emperor 
(July  31st),  31,  102;  tele- 
gram to  the  King  of  England 
(August  3d),  102;  appeal  to 
the  Belgian  nation,  227 


Andenne.  Statement  of  A. 
Berg  to  the  Frankfurter  Zei- 
tung,  245;  description  of  the 
shooting  and  burning,  287; 
object  of  the  massacres,  291 

AsQUiTH  (British  Prime  Minis- 
ter). The  nature  of  the 
intervention  of  Britain  in 
the  European  conflict  and 
her  relations  with  Belgium 
(speech  of  August  6th),  180 

AULNIS  DE  BOURROUIL  (Pro- 
fessor  d')-  His  interpreta- 
tion of  the  refusal  of  Sir  E. 
Grey  to  promise  to  Germany 
the  neutrality  of  Great 
Britain  if  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  were  not  violated, 
note,  99 

Austria-Hungary.  Ultima- 
tum to  Serbia  (July  24th), 
24;  diplomatic  conflict  re- 
sulting from  that  ultimatum, 
87;  declaration  of  war  on 
Serbia  (July  28th),  27; 
declaration  of  war  on  Bel- 
gium (August  28th),  249 

Barnardiston  (Lieut.-CoL). 
Formerly  British  Military 
Attach^  at  Brussels.  Inter- 
views with  General  Ducarne 
(1906),   185,  301 

Belgian  Army.  Reorganiza- 
tion (1913),  21;  decision  to 
place  the  army  on  a  strength- 
ened peace  footing,  27; 
mobilization  (July  31st),  30; 
acknowledgment  by  Ger- 
many of  the  heroism  of  the 


311 


312 


Index 


Belgian  Army — Cont'd. 

Belgian  army  at  Liege,  113; 
the  defensive  system  of  Bel- 
gium, 135;  condition  of  the 
army  at  the  beginning  of 
war,  163;  tactics,  233 

Belgian  Clergy.  Attitude 
of,  229 

"BelgischenGreueltaten  " 
(Die).  The  Belgian  Govern- 
ment said  to  have  promised 
to  the  civil  population  a 
reward  of  50  francs  for 
every  German  soldier  killed, 
221;  the  war  oi  Jranc-tireurs 
in  Belgium,  244;  the  Ger- 
mans resident  in  Belgium 
said  to  have  been  maltreated 
by  the  population,  252 

Belgium.  Dispositions  to- 
wards Germany  before  the 
war:  economic  relations,  i; 
scientific  relations,  5;  Bel- 
gian Government  represent- 
ed at  the  anniversary  cere- 
mony of  the  Norddeutscher- 
Lloyd,  8;  her  confidence  in 
her  neighbours,  1 5 ;  proposed 
expedition  to  China  (1900), 
16;  far-reaching  reform  of  the 
army  (1913),  21;  cordiality 
of  relations  with  her  neigh- 
bours, 22;  effect  of  the 
Austro-Serbian  conflict,  24; 
notification  to  the  Powers 
that  she  intended  to  main- 
tain and  defend  her  neu- 
trality (July  31st),  30; 
origin  of  her  permanent 
neutrality,  41;  the  "Very 
Confidential  Note"  (August 
2,  1914),  39;  attitude  to- 
wards the  German  demand 
necessitated  by  her  position 
as  a  neutral  State,  48;  the 
bargain  offered  by  Germany, 
55;  the  violation  of  her 
neutrality  was  premeditated 
by  Germany,  72;  reply 
to  the     "Very  Confidential  I 


Note"  (August  3d),  75; 
reply  to  the  oflfer  of  co- 
operation from  France,  78; 
appeal  to  the  guaranteeing 
Powers  (August  4th),  79; 
Germany  sees  in  Belgian 
neutrality  a  pawn  with 
which  she  might  bargain, 
III;  the  stages  of  the  bid- 
ding, 112;  acknowledgment 
by  Germany  of  the  heroism  of 
the  defenders  of  Lidge,  113; 
the  plot  against  Belgium, 
115;  the  German  proposition 
of  August  9th,  113,  209; 
resume  of  her  attitude  in  the 
European  conflict,  124;  said 
to  have  not  respected  the 
stipulations  of  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin  on  the  subject  of  the 
Congo,  133;  her  military 
organization  said  to  have 
been  inadequate,  134;  said 
to  have  committed  hostile 
acts  towards  Germany  before 
the  war,  140;  said  to  have 
taken  measures  indicatmg 
warlike  intentions  before  the 
German  menace,  143,  159; 
alleged  subservience  to 
France,  147;  said  to  have 
arranged  with  France  before 
the  war  to  grant  free  passage 
for  troops  to  penetrate  into 
Germany,  155;  orders  for 
arms  and  ammunition  of 
German  manufacture,  162; 
in  the  course  of  the  war  has 
had  to  order  materials  and 
munitions  from  France,  162; 
circular  from  the  Govern- 
ment to  the  Governors  of 
Provinces  (August  ist),  165; 
said  to  have  come  to 
an  economic  understanding 
with  France,  166;  alleged 
subservience  to  England, 
171;  said  to  have  been  mis- 
led by  her  Government  at 
the   instigation   of    Britain, 


Index 


313 


Belgium — Cont'd. 

172;  allegation  that  she 
would  not  have  resisted 
Germany  except  under  pres- 
sure by  Britain,  173;  noti- 
fied to  the  Powers  the  reply 
that  she  intended  to  make 
to  the  German  proposition 
of  August  9th,  176;  said  to 
have  concluded  a  military 
convention  with  Britain 
against  Germany  before 
being  menaced  by  Germany, 
178;  participation  in  an  in- 
ternational conflict  would  be 
contrary  to  a  state  of  per- 
manent neutrality,  180;  re- 
sistance to  the  German 
invasion  was  not  conditional 
on  the  intervention  of  Great 
Britain,  182;  the  dossiers  of 
the  Minister  for  War,  184; 
had  considered  the  disposi- 
tions to  be  made  against  an 
imaginary  landing  of  a 
British  force  (1906),  190; 
said  to  have  furnished  to 
Great  Britain  the  infor- 
mation necessary  for  the 
production  of  military  maps, 
manuals,  and  requisition 
forms,  198;  at  the  time  when 
she  is  said  to  have  concluded 
a  military  convention  with 
England,  the  relations  be- 
tween the  two  States  were 
not  very  cordial,  202;  the 
Government  of  the  Congo 
were  given  instructions  to 
take  the  necessary  steps  to 
guard  against  a  possible 
blockade  of  the  river  by 
France  and  England  as  much 
as  against  a  violation  of  the 
frontier  by  Germany,  203; 
Germany  had  not  declared 
war  on  Belgium,  210;  said 
to  have  been  responsible  for 
the  cruel  character  of  the 
war  on  the  part  of  Germany, 


212;  the  participation  of 
civilians  in  military  opera- 
tions, 212;  the  allegation 
that  the  Government  had 
beforehand  organized  a  gen- 
eral rising  of  the  people 
against  the  enemy,  212;  that 
tlie  Government  had  estab- 
lished depots  of  arms  for  use 
by  the  civil  population,  213; 
circular  from  the  Govern- 
ment to  the  communal  au- 
thorities on  the  nature  of  a 
belligerent,  214;  recommen- 
dation by  the  communal 
authorities  to  civilians  to 
abstain  from  hostile  acts  and 
to  deposit  their  arms  with 
the  police  authorities,  217; 
the  Belgian  Government 
said  to  have  mobilized  the 
population  of  Luxembourg, 
220;  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment said  to  have  promised 
a  reward  to  the  population 
of  50  francs  for  every  Ger- 
man soldier  killed,  221;  the 
call  into  activity  of  the  non- 
active  civic  guard,  224;  noti- 
fication to  Germany  (August 
8th),  225;  Belgian  popula- 
tion said  to  have  subjected 
wounded  Germans  to  ill- 
treatment,  245;  Germans 
and  Austrians  resident  in 
Belgium  said  to  have  been 
ill-treated,  249 

Berg  (Alexandre).  His  de- 
scription of  the  massacres 
of  Andenne,  245,  288 

"  Berliner  Lokal-Anzeiger" 
(Der).  Belgium  said  to 
have  been  misled  by  her 
Government  at  the  instiga- 
tion of  Great  Britain,  172; 
Belgium  said  to  be  on  her 
knees  before  Germany,  205 

"Berliner  Tageblatt" 

(Das).  The  Belgian  army 
said  to  have  invaded  German 


314 


Index 


Berliner — Cont'd. 

territory  as  early  as  August 
2d,  142;  Belgium  said  to 
have  accorded  free  passage 
to  French  troops  to  pene- 
trate into  Germany  before 
the  German  menace,  155; 
Belgium  said  to  have  been 
misled  by  her  Government 
at  the  instigation  of  Great 
Britain,  171 

Bernatzik  (Professor).  The 
dossiers  of  the  Belgian  Min- 
ister for  War,  194 

Beknhardi  (General  von). 
Permanent  neutrality,  20; 
small  States,  20;  the  advan- 
tage to  Germany  of  crossing 
Belgium,  20 

Bethmann-Hollweg  (von). 
Declaration  in  191 1  tliat 
Germany  would  respect  the 
neutrality  of  Belgium,  17; 
speech  to  the  Reichstag 
(August  4th),  68,  III;  de- 
claration to  the  British  Am- 
bassador at  Berlin  that  the 
fate  of  Belgium  would  de- 
pend on  the  Franco-German 
war  (July  29th),  92;  assur- 
ance to  the  British  Govern- 
ment that,  even  in  the  case 
of  an  armed  conflict  with 
Belgium,  Germany  would, 
under  no  pretext  whatever, 
annex  any  part  of  Belgian 
territory,  no;  declaration 
to  the  Reichstag  that,  so 
long  as  Britain  remained 
neutral,  Germany  would  re- 
spect the  territorial  integrity 
and  independence  of  Bel- 
gium (August  4th),  III; 
necessity  knows  no  law,  118, 
268;  young  Belgian  girls 
said  to  have  gouged  out  the 
eyes  of  wounded  German 
soldiers,  246 

Beyens  (Baron).  Belgian 
Minister  at  Berlin.     Warn- 


ing to  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment of  the  gravity  of  the 
political  situation  (July 
27th),  26;  informed  his 
Government  that  the  Ger- 
man Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs  could  not 
reply  to  the  question  put  by 
Great  Britain  on  the  subject 
of  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
(August  1st),  33;  interview 
with  Herr  von  Jagow 
(August  3d),  64 

Bismarck.  Respect  of  treat- 
ies and  neutrality,  72; 
letters  addressed  in  1870  to 
Baron  Nothomb,  Belgian 
Minister  at  Berlin,  85 

Blume  (von),  Professor.  At- 
tempt to  justify  the  violation 
of  Belgian  neutrality,  134 

Bluntschli.  The  right  of 
intervention  of  State  guar- 
anteeing neutrality,  52 

BouRGET  (Paul).  King  Albert 
"the  Honest  Man,"  54 

Bridges  (Lieutenant-Colonel). 
British  Military  Attache  at 
Brussels.  Conversations  with 
General  Jungbluth  (1912), 
192 

British  Ambassador  at  Ber- 
lin. Interviews  with  Herr 
von  Jagow  (August  4th), 
66,  121;  interview  with  Herr 
von  Bethmann  -  Hollweg 
91 ;  informed  his  Govern- 
ment that  the  German  Sec- 
retary of  State  could  not 
reply  to  the  British  demand 
that  Belgian  neutrality 
should  be  respected,  96 

British  Military  Attache 
AT  Brussels.  See  Bar- 
nardiston  a7id  Bridges 

British        Minister  at 

Brussels.  Informed  his 
Government  of  the  second 
German  note  to  the  Belgian 
Government    (August    4th), 


Index 


315 


British — Cont'd. 

109;  announcement  to  his 
Government  of  the  viola- 
tion of  the  Belgian  frontier 
by  German  troops  (August 
4th),  no;  surprised  at  the 
promptness  of  the  Belgian 
mobilization  (July  31st),  174 

Broqueville  (de).  Belgian 
Minister  for  War.  An- 
nouncement to  Parliament 
on  the  subject  of  military 
reform  (1913J,  22;  descrip- 
tion of  the  military  efforts 
of  Belgium  (November  30, 
1911),  139;  said  to  have 
admitted  the  existence  of  a 
Franco-Belgian  understand- 
ing against  Germany,  161 

Brussels.  Proclamation  of 
the  Governor,  von  Lutwitz 
(November  ist),  279;  pro- 
clamation of  the  Governor- 
General,  von  der  Goltz  (Sep- 
tember 25th),  282;  proclama- 
tion (October  5th),  282,  293; 
the  innocent  are  struck  down 
because  they  are  innocent, 
288;  the  taking  of  hostages, 

295 

Bjlow  (General  von).  Pro- 
clamation to  the  Belgians 
(August  9th):  France  the 
first  to  violate  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium,  148;  proclama- 
tion posted  at  Liege  (August 
22d),  281;  proclamation 
posted  at  Namur  (August 
25th),  281,  295 

Bureau  of  Deutschen  Han- 
DELSTAGES.  Statement  by 
American  journalists  that 
they  were  unable  to  estab- 
lish a  single  case  in  Belgium 
in  which  reprisals  were  not 
the  result  of  provocation, 
241 

Burgomaster  of  Brussels. 
Prohibition  of  the  manifes- 
tation   of   either   sympathy 


or  hostility  towards  any  of 
the  belligerents  (August  2d), 
165 

Charles,  King  of  Roumania. 
His  advice  to  Belgium,  20 

Civic  Guard.  Its  character 
and  organization,  213,  222; 
its  members  have  the  charac- 
ter of  belligerents,  223;  the 
calling  into  activity  of  the 
non-active  civic  guard;  noti- 
fication to  Germany,  225 

Collective  Repression. 

IMeaning,  276;  Hague  Con- 
vention on  the  laws  and  cus- 
toms of  war  on  land,  276; 
German  contemporary  doc- 
trine, 277;  collective  repres- 
sion in  Belgium,  278;  the 
"Military  interpreter,"  283; 
the  innocent  are  struck 
down  because  they  are  inno- 
cent, 288;  object  of  collec- 
tive repression,  291;  the 
result  of  the  system  of 
methodical  intimidation, 
292.     See  also  War  Levy 

Congo.  Belgium  said  to  have 
failed  to  respect  the  stipula- 
tions of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin 
on  the  subject  of  the  Congo, 
33;  influence  of  the  dispute 
relative  to  the  independent 
State  of  the  Congo  on  the  re- 
lations between  England  and 
Belgium,  202;  instructions 
given  by  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment to  the  administration 
of  the  Congo  relative  to  the 
measures  to  be  taken  for 
preparing  a  blockade  of  the 
river  in  case  of  a  violation  of 
the  frontier  by  Germany,  203 

Crown  Prince  of  Germany. 
Relations  with  the  Belgian 
royal  family,  10;  toasts 
exchanged  in  course  of  the 
visit  of  the  Belgian  sovereigns 
at   Berlin    (June,    19 10),    II 


3i6 


Index 


CuRZON  (Lord).  Said  to  have 
been  an  intermediary  be- 
tween the  British  Govern- 
ment and  King  Albert  of 
Belgium,   173 

Descamps.  The  right  of  inter- 
vention of  States  guarantee- 
ing neutrality,  52 

Despagnet  and  De  Boeck. 
The  law  of  intervention  of 
States  guaranteeing  neutral- 
ity, note,  52 

Dieckmann  (Staff  Major). 
Proclamation  posted  at  Gri- 
vcgnce,  270  and  296 

DiNANT.  Circumstances  of  the 
sack  of  Dinant,  235;  object 
of  the  massacres  and  devas- 
tation, 291 

DucARNE  (General).  For- 
merly Chief  of  Staff  of  the 
Belgian  army.  Interviews 
with  Lieut. -Col.  Bamardis- 
ton  (1906),  1S5,  301 

Elizabeth,  Queen  of  Bel- 
gium. Alarriage,  10;  visit 
to  Berlin  (June,  1910),  10; 
visit  to  Paris  (July,  1910), 
14;  had  the  first  wounded 
Germans  sent  to  the  hospital 
at  the  Palais  Royal,  247 

Emmich  (General  von).  Pro- 
clamation to  the  Belgians 
(August  4th);  France  said 
to  have  violated  Belgian  neu- 
trality before  Germany,  147 

Entre  -  Sambre  -  et  -  Meuse. 
Object  of  the  devastation, 
291 

Errera  (Paul).  The  civic 
guard  in  Belgium,  222 

Erzberger.  The  Belgian 
armj?-  said  to  have  invaded 
German  territory  as  early  as 
August  2,  1915,  142 

Espionage.  German,  British, 
and  French  spies  in  Belgium, 
i43 


Eulenberg  (Herbert).  The 
Belgians  said  to  have  sys- 
tematically organized  the 
war  oi  francs-tireurs,  227 

Eulwege  (von),  Lieut. -Col. 
Admission  of  the  untruth  of 
the  story,  told  by  A.  Berg, 
of  the  massacres  of  Andenne, 
288 

Facsimile  of  a  part  of  the 
report  of  General  Ducarne, 
Belgian  Chief  of  Staff,  188 

Fallieres  (A.).  Ex-President 
of  the  French  Republic. 
Visit  to  Brussels  (May,  1901), 
15;  toasts  exchanged  at  the 
dinner  given  during  the 
visit,    15 

Fischer  (R.).  The  Belgian 
population  said  to  have  been 
incited  by  the  priests,  229 

Flotow  (von).  Formerly  Ger- 
man Minister  at  Brussels. 
Was  aware  of  the  interviews 
of  the  British  Military 
Attaches  with  the  Belgian 
Chief  of  Staff,  197 

Foreigners.  Alleged  ill-treat- 
ment of  German  and  Aus- 
trian residents  in  Belgium, 
249 

France.  Declared  that  she 
would  respect  the  neutrality 
of  Belgium,  28;  repeated 
that  declaration  when  in- 
terrogated  by  Britain 
(August  1st),  32,  96;  said  to 
have  violated  Belgian  neu- 
trality before  Germany,  148; 
official  declaration  that  a 
French  aviator  had  not 
flown  over  Belgium  before 
August  4th,  154;  said  to 
have  obtained  free  passage 
through  Belgium  to  attack 
Germany,  155;  said  to  have 
concluded  an  economic  en- 
tcnte  with  Belgium,  166; 
the  revision  in   19 10  of  the 


Index 


317 


Prance — Cont'd. 

customs  tariff  and  its  effect 
on  Belgium,   170 

Francorchamps.  Circum- 
stances of  the  massacres  of 
Francorchamps,  289 

FrAiN'cs-Tireurs.  Belgium 
said  to  have  organized  a  war 
of  jrancs-tireurs,  22(>;  the 
existence  and  numbers  of  the 
francs-tire urs  said  to  have 
been  due  to  alcoholism  and 
religious  fanaticism,  227 ; 
exceptional  cases  of  francs- 
tireurs,  230;  coincidences, 
231;  the  tacticjs  of  the  Bel- 
gian army,  234r^ertain  acts 
attributed  to  francs-tireurs 
were  committed  by  German 
soldiers,  237;  immediate  re- 
prisals, without  enquiry,  for 
acts  attributed  to  francs- 
tireurs,  237;  the  German 
soldier  obsessed  by  fear  of 
the  francs-tireurs,  22)9\  the 
contrast  between  neighbour- 
ing regions  excludes  the 
hypothesis  of  a  general  and 
organized  armed  resistance 
of  the  civil  population,  240; 
no  proof  recorded  of  the 
existence  of  francs-tireurs, 
2i\^;  the  massacres  of  An- 
denne  said  to  have  been 
reprisals  in  respect  of  acts  of 
francs-tireurs,  245;  acknow- 
ledgment by  the  German 
authorities  and  the  press  of 
the  untruth  of  the  story  re- 
garding Andenne,  288 

"Frankfurter  Zeitung" 
(The).  Belgium  said  never 
to  have  replied  to  the  "  Very 
Confidential  Note"  of  Au- 
gust 2d,  130;  the  destruc- 
tion of  Andenne  a  reprisal 
for  acts  of  francs-tireurs,  245 

French  Minister  at 
Brussels.  Offer  of  the 
support  of  France  if  Belgium 


wished  for  it  (August  3d), 
77;  reply  of  Belgium,  77 

Geffcken,  The  duty  of  a 
neutral  state  to  oppose  the 
passage  of  belligerent  armies 
across  its  territory,  46 

German  Code  OF  War.  "The 
laws  of  war  on  land."  Its 
tendencies  and  principles, 
254;  the  purpose  of  war,  257 ; 
there  are  no  laws  of  war,  258 ; 
opposition  to  the  Hague 
Convention  of  1899  con- 
cerning the  laws  and  customs 
of  war  on  land,  260;  German 
code  of  war  at  the  Hague 
Conference  of  1907,  261 ;  con- 
temporary doctrine,  261; 
the  application  of  the  differ- 
ent methods  of  war,  264; 
the  absolute  power  of  the 
command,  265;  necessity 
and  utility,  266;  the  applica- 
tion of  these  princi])lcs  in 
Belgium  by  the  German 
military  authority,  269;  in- 
timidation and  terrorism, 
271;  effect  of  the  teaching 
of  the  code  on  the  mentality 
of  the  German  officer,  274; 
definition  of  collective  repres- 
sion, particularly  in  regard 
to  the  war  levy,  292;  the 
taking  of  hostages,  297 

German  Military  Attach^ 
AT  Brussels.  Statements 
to  The  Twentieth  Century 
(August  2d),  35;  congratu- 
lates the  Belgian  Minister 
for  War  on  the  rapidity  of 
Belgian  mobiHzation,  137. 
See  also  Renner 

German  Minister  at  Brus- 
sels. Opinion  as  to  the 
security  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality (August  1st),  32; 
demarche  to  the  Belgian 
Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs 
on  the  subject  of  the  depar- 


3i8 


Index 


German  Ministry — Cont'd. 
ture  of  mobilized  Germans 
(August  2d),  33 ;  declarations 
to  Le  Soir  (August  2d), 
34;  reply  to  the  "Very  Con- 
fidential Note"  (August 
2d),  39 

Germany.  Opposition  to  the 
sending  of  a  Belgian  expe- 
ditionary corps  to  China 
(1900),  16;  declaration  in 
1911  that  she  had  no  inten- 
tion of  violating  the  neu- 
trality of  Belgium,  17;  pro- 
clamation of  a  state  of 
danger  of  war  (July  31, 
1914),  28;  the  "Very  Con- 
fidential Note"  to  Belgium 
(August  2d),  39;  reply  to  the 
Swiss  declaration  of  neu- 
trality, 49,  115;  the  bargain 
offered  to  Belgium,  55; 
Germany's  attempt  to  jus- 
tify the  terms  of  the  bargain, 
59;  the  violation  of  Belgian 
neutrality  was  premedi- 
tated, 72;  Belgium's  reply 
to  the  "Very  Confidential 
Note"  (August  3d),  75; 
notification  to  the  Belgian 
Government  of  the  decision 
to  violate  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  (August  4th),  78; 
Germany's  attempts  to  ob- 
tain the  neutrality  of  Eng- 
land, 91 ;  Germany  sees  in 
Belgian  neutrality  a  pawn 
with  which  she  may  bargain, 
III;  stages  of  the  bidding, 
112;  the  proposition  to  Bel- 
gium of  August  9th,  113, 
209;  acknowledgment  of  the 
heroism  of  the  defenders  of 
Lidge,  113;  plot  against 
Belgium,  115;  necessity 
knows  no  law,  118;  resume 
of  her  attitude  in  the  Euro- 
pean conflict,  123;  until 
August  4th  Belgium  had  not 
been  accused,  129;  efforts  to 


ignore  the  question  of  Bel* 
gian  neutrality,  130;  the 
people  left  in  ignorance  of 
the  reasons  for  Germany's 
attitude  towards  Belgium, 
130;  statement  that  Bel- 
gium did  not  reply  to  the 
"Very  Confidential  Note," 
130;  would  have  been  ex- 
pected to  conduct  military 
operations  in  Belgium  with 
a  certain  moderation,  209; 
had  not  declared  war  on 
Belgium,  210;  official  an- 
nouncement to  Belgium 
that  henceforth  the  war 
would  be  of  a  cruel  charac- 
ter (August  14th),  210; 
pretence  that  Belgium  was 
responsible,  210;  refusal  to 
allow  authorization  to  the 
daughter  of  General  Leman 
to  see  her  father,  who  was 
ill  and  a  prisoner,  246; 
official  explanation  of  the 
massacres  at  Louvain,  298 

Gladstone.  The  neutrality 
of  Belgium  from  the  point 
of  view  of  Great  Britain 
(1870),  86 

GoLTZ  (Field  Marshal  von 
der).  Proclamation  posted 
at  Brussels  (September  25th) 
note,  263 ;  proclamation, 
(October  5th),  282;  the  in- 
nocent are  struck  down  be- 
cause they  are  innocent, 
288;  the  taking  of  hostages, 

295 

Granville  (Lord).  The  neu- 
trality of  Belgium  from  the 
point  of  view  of  Great 
Britain  (1870),  86 

Great  Britain".  Announces 
that  she  relies  on  Belgium's 
defending  her  neutrality 
(July  31st),  29,  95;  demand 
to  Germany  and  France  to 
pledge  themselves  to  respect 
Belgian      neutraUty      (July 


Index 


319 


Great  Britain — Cont'd. 
31st),  29,  86,  and  95;  reason 
for  watchfulness  in  regard 
to  the  neutrality  of  Belgium 
(1870),  85;  mediatory  action 
in  the  Austro-Serbian  con- 
flict, 88;  resume  of  Great 
Britain's  attitude  in  the 
European  conflict,  123;  said 
to  have  brought  pressure 
to  bear  on  Belgium  to  per- 
suade her  to  resist  Germany, 
173;  nature  of  her  inter- 
vention in  the  European 
conflict  and  relations  with 
Belgium  (speech  of  Mr. 
Asquith,  August  6th),  180; 
said  to  have  concluded  a 
military  convention  with 
Belgium  against  Germany, 
184 

Grf.indl  (Count).  Formerly 
Belgian  Minister  at  Berlin. 
Letter  to  the  Belgian  Minis- 
ter for  Foreign  Afl'airs  ( 1 9 1 1 ) , 
190 

Grey  (Sir  E.).  Statement  to 
the  German  Ambassador  at 
London  that  England  might 
be  involved  in  the  conflict 
(July  29th),  92;  refusal  to 
bargain  with  Germany  re- 
garding the  obligations  and 
interests  of  England  in  re- 
gard to  Belgian  neutrality 
(July  30th),  93;  refusal  to 
enter  into  any  engagement 
whatever  against  France 
(July  31st),  95;  discussion 
with  the  French  Ambassador 
at  London  on  the  Belgian 
situation  (August  2d),  100; 
speech  in  the  House  of 
Commons  (August  3d),  103; 
announcement  to  the  Bel- 
gian Minister  at  London 
that  if  Belgian  neutrality 
were  violated  war  would 
break  out  between  Germany 
and   England    (August  3d), 


108;  directed  the  British 
Ministers  at  Brussels,  The 
Hague,  and  Christiania  to 
make  it  known  to  the 
Governments  to  which  they 
were  respectively  accredited 
that  Great  Britain  expected 
that  they  would  resist  Ger- 
man pressure  and  that  she 
would  give  them  support  if 
they  desired  it  (August  4th), 
108;  directed  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Berlin  to 
request  immediately  from 
the  German  Government  an 
assurance  that  the  demand 
made  to  Belgium  by  the 
"Very  Confidential  Note" 
would  not  be  carried  into 
effect  (August  4th),  108; 
directed  the  same  Ambassa- 
dor to  repeat  this  request 
and  demand  a  reply  before 
midnight  (August  4th),  120; 
letter  to  the  British  Minister 
at  Brussels  on  the  subject  of 
the  landing  of  British  troops 
in  Belgium  (April  7,  1913), 

195 
Grivegnee.      The    proclama- 
tion of  Staff  Major  Dieck- 
man,    252;    the    taking    of 
hostages,  296 

Hagerup.  The  right  of  inter- 
vention of  States  guarantee- 
ing neutrality,  52 

Hague  Convention  Con- 
cerning THE  Laws  and 
Customs  of  War  on  Land. 
Preamble  to  the  Convention 
of  July  29,  1899,  259;  sanc- 
tion established  in  1907,  260; 
collective  repression,  276; 
war  levy,  279;  inhabitants 
not  to  be  forced  to  co-operate 
in  the  action  of  the  ene- 
my against  their  country, 
293 ;  the  taking  of  hostages, 


320 


Index 


Hague  Convention  on  Neu- 
trality.     Resistance   of   a 
State    to    a    breach   of    its 
neutrality,  44;  passage  of  a 
belligerent     across     neutral 
territory,   47 
"Hamburger  Nachrichten" 
(The).    The  frontages  of  the 
houses  at   Louvain  said   to 
have  been  prepared  with  a 
view    of    a    war    of  francs- 
tireurs,  220 
Harden    (Maximilien).      Bel- 
gium must  become  Prussian, 
117 
Harnack.      Belgium    said    to 
have    been    misled    by    her 
Government  at  the  instiga- 
tion of  Great  Britain,  172 
Hasselt.      Collective    repres- 
sion, 280 
Heeringen  (von).     Formerly 
Prussian   Minister   of   War. 
Declaration  in  19 13  on  the 
subject  of  Belgian  neutral- 
ity, 18 
Herstal.     Alleged  participa- 
tion of  the  civil  population 
in  the  hostilities,  242 
Herve.    Circumstances  of  the 

sack  of  the  town,  237 
HocHDORF  (Max).  War  of 
francs-tireurs  said  to  have 
been  due  to  alcoholism  and 
religious  fanaticism  of  the 
Belgian  peasants,  228 
Hostages.  Taking  of  hos- 
tages in  Belgium,  295;  the 
military  interpreter,  295; 
proclamation  of  army  com- 
manders, 295;  the  German 
Code  of  War,  297;  the 
Hague  Convention  on  the 
Laws  and  Customs  of  War 
on  Land,  297;  the  Instruc- 
tions for  the  Armies  in  the 
Field  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  298 
Hymans  (Paul).  Belgian 
Minister  of   State.     Article 


in    The  Outlook  (September 
30,  1914),  24 

"Instructions  for  the 
Armies  in  the  Field  of 
THE  United  States  of 
America"  (The).  The 
taking  of  hostages,  298 

Jagow  (von).  German  Secre- 
tary of  State  for  Foreign 
Affairs.  Declared,  in  19 13, 
that  Germany  intended  to 
respect  Belgian  neutrality, 
18;  interview  with  Baron 
Beyens,  Belgian  Minister  at 
Berlin  (August  3,  1914),  64; 
interviews  with  the  British 
Ambassador  at  Berlin 
(August  4th),  66,  67,  and 
120;  implies  that  Belgium 
had  committed  hostile  acts 
against  Germany  before  the 
war  (July  3d),  139 

"Journal  of  the  War." 
France  said  to  have  violated 
Belgian  rtcutrality  before 
Germany,  150;  Belgium  said 
to  have  furnished  England 
with  information  necessary 
for  the  preparation  of  mili- 
tary maps  of  Belgium, 
198 

JuNGBLUTH  (General).  For- 
merly Chief  of  Staff  of 
Belgian  Army.  Conver- 
sations with  Lieut.-Col. 
Bridges  (1912),  192 

"KOLNISCHE    VoLKSZEITUNG" 

(Die).  Belgium  said  to  have 
accorded,  before  the  war, 
free  passage  to  France  to 
penetrate  into  Germany, 
156;  denial  that  wounded 
German  soldiers  had  their 
eyes  gouged  out  by  the 
Belgian  civil  population, 
246 


Index 


321 


"KSlnische  Zeitung  "  (Die). 
The  way  in  which  Germans 
effected  their  departure 
from  Belgium  on  mobiliza- 
tion, 34;  interpretation  of 
the  refusal  of  Sir  E.  Grey  to 
promise  to  Germany  the 
neutrality  of  Great  Britain 
in  the  case  of  Belgian  neu- 
trality not  being  violated, 
99;  pretence  that  Belgium 
had  menaced  Germany,  131 ; 
Belgium  said  to  have  not 
respected  the  stipulation  of 
the  Treaty  of  Berlin  on  the 
subject  of  the  Congo,  133; 
Belgium  said  to  have 
stopped  merchandise  in  its 
transit  to  Germany  before 
the  war,  141;  to  have  taken 
steps  indicating  belligerent 
intentions  before  the  German 
menace,  143,  146,  and  159; 
France  said  to  have  violated 
Belgian  neutrality  before 
the  war,  149,  152;  Belgium 
said  to  have  accorded  free 
passage  to  France  to  pene- 
trate into  Germany  before 
the  war,  155,  160;  the  Bel- 
gian Minister  of  War  said 
to  have  admitted  the  exist- 
ence of  a  Franco-Belgian 
agreement  against  Germany, 
161;  the  seizure  of  Le  Petit 
Bleu  (August  2d),  164; 
prohibition  by  the  Burgo- 
master of  Brussels  of  mani- 
festations of  feeling  in  re- 
gard to  either  of  the  bel- 
ligerents, 166;  Belgium  said 
to  have  concluded  an  eco- 
nomic entente  with  France, 
166;  the  Belgian  Government 
said  to  have  organized  a  war 
of  francs -tireurs,  2  ig;  an  al- 
leged fight  of  francs-tireurs 
at  Wavre,  229;  the  contrast 
between  neighbouring  dis- 
tricts,   241 ;    Germans    resi- 


dent in  Belgium  said  to  have 
been  ill-treated,  249;  the 
innocent  are  struck  down 
because  they  are  innocent, 
288;  inscriptions  on  the 
houses  which  were  spared 
at  the  time  of  the  pillage, 
291;  result  of  the  system  of 
methodical  intimidation,  292 

"Laws  of  War  on  Land" 
(The).  See  German  Code  of 
War 

Leopold  II,  King  of  the 
Belgians.  Relations  with 
the  German  Court,  10; 
appeals  to  the  Belgian 
nation,  21 

Li6ge.  Acknowledgment  by 
Germany  of  the  heroism  of 
the  defenders  of  Li^ge,  113 

Linsmeau.  Circumstances  of 
the  massacres  and  sack  of 
Linsmeau,  274 

LoFFLER  (A.),  Professor.  '  Bel- 
gium had  been  misled  by  her 
Government  at  the  instiga- 
tion of  Great  Britain,  172 

LouvAiN.  The  frontages  of 
the  houses  said  to  have  been 
prepared  with  a  view  to  a 
war  of  francs-tireurs,  221; 
the  "chastisement"  of  the 
inhabitants  was  sudden  and 
pitiless,  239;  object  of  the 
destruction  of  the  finest 
buildings,  291;  description 
of  the  devastation,  294; 
official  explanation  by  Ger- 
many (August  27th),  298 

LuTWiTZ  (General  von).  Pro- 
clamation posted  at  Brussels 
(November  ist),  279 

Luxembourg  (Grand  Duchy 
of).  Its  permanent  neu- 
trality, 45 

Meurer  (Professor).  The 
laws  of  war  and  the  state 
of  necessity,  262 


322 


Index 


"Military  Interpreter" 
(The).  Collective  repression, 
283;  the  taking  of  hostages, 

295 
Morocco.    Effect  on  Belgium 
of  the  Morocco  crisis  (1911), 

19 

MoTTA.  President  of  the 
Swiss  Confederation.  Atti- 
tude of  Switzerland  in  the 
case  of  the  violation  of  her 
neutrality,  179 

Namur.  The  "chastisement" 
of  the  inhabitants  was  im- 
mediate, 232;  proclamation 
of  General  von  Biilow 
(August  25th),  281 

Necessity  (State  of).  The 
state  of  necessity  and  the 
laws  of  war,  262 

Nieber  (Lieut. -General  von). 
Proclamation  posted  at 
Wavre  (August  27th),  278; 
the  innocent  are  struck 
down  because  they  are  inno- 
cent, 288 

"Nieuwe  Courant"  (Die). 
Belgium  said  to  have  con- 
cluded a  convention  with 
Britain  against  Germany 
before  being  menaced  by 
Germany,   178 

"Norddeutsche  Allgemeine 
Zeitung"  (Die).  Belgium 
said  to  have  taken  measures 
indicating  belligerent  inten- 
tions before  being  menaced 
by  Germany,  144;  France 
said  to  have  violated  Bel- 
gian neutrality  before  Ger- 
many, 150;  the  dossiers  of 
the  Belgian  Minister  for 
War,  184;  Belgium  said  to 
have  furnished  to  Britain 
the  information  necessary 
for  the  production  of  mili- 
tary maps,  manuals,  and 
requisition  forms,  198 

Nothomb    (Baron).      Ex-Bel- 


gian Minister  at  Berlin. 
Letters  addressed  to  him  by 
Bismarck  in  1870,  85 

Orts  (Councillor  of  Legation). 
Report  on  the  sack  of 
Aerschot,  238 

"Outlook"  (The).  Article 
by  M.  Paul  Hymans  (Sep- 
tember 30,  1914),  24 

"Pax-Informationen"  (Die). 

Acknowledges  the  untruth 
of  the  story,  told  by  A.  Berg, 
of  the  massacres  of  Andenne, 
288 

Permanent  Neutrality. 
Outline  of  the  notion,  42; 
its  consequences  for  the 
States  which  confer  neu- 
trality, 42 ;  consequences  for 
neutral  States,  44;  the  per- 
manent neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium, 43;  a  neutralized 
State  should  hinder  the 
passage  of  belligerent  troops 
across  its  territory,  45;  ne- 
cessity for  the  absolute  in- 
dependence of  a  neutralized 
State,  46;  the  right  of  inter- 
vention of  States  which 
confer  neutrality,  52;  the 
equilibrium  realized  by  the 
permanent  neutrality  of  Bel- 
gium, 84;  demonstration  of 
that  equilibrium  in  1870, 
84;  the  participation  of 
Belgium  in  an  international 
conflict  would  be  contrary 
to  a  state  of  permanent 
neutrality,  179 

"Petit  Bleu"  (Le).  Seiz- 
ure on  August  2d,  164 

PoiNCARE  (Raymond).  Presi- 
dent of  the  French  Republic. 
Assured  the  King  of  Belgium 
that  France  was  peaceful 
and  had  no  intention  of 
violating  Belgian  neutrality, 
22 


Index 


323 


Reason  of  War.  The  reason 
for  war  in  the  German  code, 
257;  the  reason  for  war  in 
the  German  contemporary 
doctrine,  263 

Renault  (Louis).  The  Ger-. 
man  Code  of  War  at  The 
Hague  Conference,  260 

Renner  (Commandant).  For- 
merly German  Military 
Attache  at  Brussels.  Know- 
ledge of  the  conversations  of 
the  British  Military  At- 
taches with  the  Chiefs  of 
the  Belgian  Staff,  197 

RiviER.  The  duty  of  a  neutral 
State  to  oppose  the  passage 
of  belligerent  troops  across 
its  territory,  45 

Secretary  to  the  King  of 
THE  Belgians.  His  opti- 
mism on  August  2d,  36 

Selzaete.  The  culmination 
of  the  system  of  methodical 
intimidation,    293 

"Soir"  (Le).  Declaration  of 
the  German  Minister  at 
Brussels  (August  2d),  34 

Spitteler  (Carl).  Conference 
at  Zurich  (December,  1914), 
205 

Steffen  (G.  F.).  Advice  on 
the  attitude  of  Belgium,  50 

Stein  (Quartermaster-General 
von).  France  said  to  have 
violated  the  neutrality  of 
Belgium  before  Germany, 
149;  Belgium  said  to  have 
been  misled  by  her  Govern- 
ment,   171 

Stier-Somlo  (Professor).  The 
participation  of  the  Belgian 
civil  population  in  hostili- 
ties,  242 

Strupp  (Karl).  The  reason  of 
war,  force  majeure  and  the 
laws  of  war,  262;  collective 
repression,  277  and  283 

Switzerland.      Her    perma- 


nent neutrality,  48;  declara- 
tion of  neutrality  in  the 
European  conflict :  Ger- 
many's reply,  48,  115;  action 
of  Switzerland  in  case  of  the 
violation  of  her  neutrality 
(declaration  by  M.  Motta), 
179 

TAMiiTES.  Circumstances  of 
the  massacres  of  Tamines, 
236;  the  innocent  are  struck 
down  because  they  are 
innocent,  288;  object  of 
the  massacres,  291 

"Twentieth  Century" 

(The).  Declaration  of  the 
German  Military  Attache  at 
Brussels  (August  2d),  35 

Vilvorde  (Environs  of).  Ob- 
ject of  the  massacres,  291 

"Vorwarts."  Denial  that 
the  eyes  of  wounded  Ger- 
mans had  been  gouged  out 
by  the  Belgian  civilian  popu- 
lation, 246 

"Vossische  Zeitung"  (The). 
The  participation  of  Bel- 
gium in  an  international 
conflict  would  be  contrary 
to  a  state  of  permanent 
neutrality,  180 

"  WaHRHEIT  tJBER  DEN  KrIEG" 

(Die).  France  said  to  have 
violated  Belgian  neutrality 
before  Germany,  151;  the 
frontages  of  the  houses  of 
Louvain  said  to  have  been 
prepared  with  a  view  to  a 
war  of  francs-tireurs,  220 

War  Levy.  Application  in 
Belgium,  279;  the  object  of 
the  war  levy  in  the  German 
code,  291 

Wavre.  Alleged  combats  of 
francs-tireurs,  229 ;  procla- 
mation by  Lieut. -General 
von   Nieber   (August  27th), 


324 


Index 


Wavre — Cont'd. 

278,  note  281; the  innocent 
are  struck  down  because 
they  are  innocent,  288;  ob- 
ject of  the  devastation,  291 

Weber.  Said  to  have  been 
assassinated  at  Antwerp  by 
the  population,  253 

Wegener  (Carl).  Congratu- 
lations to  the  Mayor  of 
Rheims  on  his  recommenda- 
tions to  the  civil  population, 
216 

William  II,  (Emperor  of  Ger- 
many). Visit  to  Brussels 
(October,  1910),  12;  toasts 
exchanged  during  the  visit, 
1 2 ;  surprised  at  the  measures 
of   defence   taken   by    Bel- 


gium (1912),  138;  message 
to  the  President  of  the 
United  States  on  the  parti- 
cipation of  the  Belgian 
population  in  the  military 
operations  and  their  cruelty 
towards  the  German  soldiers, 
211 

Wolff  Agenxy.  Allegation 
that  Belgium  had  omitted 
to  reply  to  the  "Very  Con- 
fidential Note"  of  August 
2d,  130;  contrasts  the  policy 
of  Belgium  with  that  of 
Switzerland,    204 

Wounded.  The  Belgian  popu- 
lation said  to  have  ill- 
treated  wounded  Germans, 
245 


Germsuiy,    France,    Russia 
and  Islam 

By  Heinrich  von  Treitschke 

A  series  of  essays,  now  translated  for  the  first  time,  by 
the  great  German  historian,  friend  of  Bismarck  and 
teacher  of  William  II  and  Bernhardi.  His  works  have 
shaped  the  present  policy  of  Germany  in  its  attempt  to 
secure  a  dominating  influence  in  Europe  and  throughout 
the  world. 

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The  Origins  of  the  War 

By  J.  Holland  Rose,  Litt.D. 

Fallow  of  Christ's  College  and  Reader  in  Modern  History  in  the 
Unirersity  of  Cambridge,   Corresponding  Member  of   the 
Massachusetts  Historical  Society,  Author  of  "  De- 
velopment of  the  European  Nations,"  "  The 
Personality  of  Napoleon  " 

In  this  volume  the  author  traces  the  course  of  the  politi- 
cal developments  out  of  which  the  present  war  has  arisen, 
the  subject  being  treated  under  the  following  headings: 
"Anglo-German  Rivalry"  (1875-1888),  "The  Kaiser," 
"Germany's  Worid-Policy,"  "Morocco,"  "The  Bagdad 
Railway,"  "Alsace-Lorraine,"  "The  Eastern  Question 
(190&-1913),"  "  The  Crisis  of  1914,"  "  The  Rupture." 

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Can  Germany  Win? 

By  "  An  American  " 

The  author  of  this  illuminating  work  has  spent  many 
years  in  a  careful  study  of  economic  conditions  in  Ger- 
many and  his  findings  bear  the  stamp  of  authority. 

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Treitschke 

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The  Writings  of   Bemhardi^s  Teacher, 

Heinrich  von  Treitschke,  Together 

with   a   Life,   by   His   Close 

Friend,  Adolf  Hausrath 

The  works  of  this  great  German  historian 
have  shaped  the  present  policy  of  Germany  in 
its  attempt  to  secure  a  dominating  influence  in 
Europe  and  throughout  the  world.  The  follow- 
ing is  a  brief  summary  of  the  subjects  presented 
in  this  distinctive  work  : 

I.  Treitschke's  Life  and  Work,  by  Adolf 
Hausrath.  2.  The  Army.  3.  International  Law. 
4.  German  Colonization.  5.  The  Two  Emperors. 
6.  In  Memory  of  the  Great  War.  7.  Germany 
and  the  Neutral  States.  8.  Austria  and  the 
German  Emperor.  9.  Russia  from  the  German 
Point  of  View.     10.  On  Liberty. 

Treitschke  was  a  close  friend  of  Bismarck,  and 
his  list  of  pupils  include  the  political  and  military 
leaders  of  the  present  generation,  such  as  the 
Emperor  William,  Bernhardi,  and  others. 

Lord  Acton  says  of  Treitschke:  "He  is  the 
one  writer  of  history  who  is  more  brilliant  and 
more  powerful  than  Droysen;  and  he  writes 
with  the  force  and  incisiveness  of  Mommsen, 
but  he  concerns  himself  with  the  problems  of 
the  present  day,  problems  that  are  still  demand- 
ing solution." 


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Deutschland  Uber  AUes 

Or  Germany  Speaks 

A  Collection  of  the  Utterances  of  Representative 
Germans — Statesmen,  Military  Leaders,  Scholars,  and 
Poets — ^in  Defence  of  the  War  Policies  of  the  Fatherland. 

Compiled  and  Analyzed  by 

John  Jay  Chapman 

16°.    75c 


Alsace  and  Lorraine 

From  Caesar  to  Kaiser.  58  B.C.-1871  A.D. 

A  sketch  of  the  political  affiliations  of  the  provinces 
before  the  creation  of  the  Reichsland  of  Elsass- 
Lothringen. 

By  Ruth  Putnam 

Author  of  "  A  Mediaeval  Princess,"  "  Charles  the  Bold," 
♦'  William  the  Silent,"  etc. 

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Lorraine  in  Several  Phases  of  its  History — ^Alsace-Lorraine, 
1871-1914. 

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A  Study  of  the  Relation  of  Military  Power  to 
National  Advantage 

Fourth  Edition,  Revised,  with   Additional  Material 
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Who  will  "  win  "  in  the  present  war  ?  Who  wiU  "  lose  "  ? 
And  just  what  will  they  win  and  lose  ?  Will  Germany  be 
"destroyed"?  Will  England  be  "wiped  out"?  Will 
any  of  the  countries  "  lose  their  colonies  "  ?  And  if  so, 
how  much  actual  loss  will  it  involve  ? 

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of  the  American  people  that  •  will '  (without  which  no 
'  way '  can  be  devised)  to  take  the  leadership  in  the 
civilization  of  Christendom,  for  which  its  situation  and 
the  happy  circumstances  of  its  history  furnish  so  good 
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Author  of  "The  Great  Illusion,"  etc. 

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The  Confessions  of 
Frederick  the  Great 

and 
Treitschke's  "Life  of  Frederick" 

Edited,  with  a  Topical  and  Historical   Introduction,  by 
Douglas  Sladen 

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The  coupling  of  these  two  works  in  a  single 
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— upon  one  of  the  great  figures  of  Prussian  and 
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philosophy  of  war  and  the  views  regarding  the 
destiny  of  the  German  nation  embodied  in 
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Great  Britain  and  the  War 

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Mr.  Sladen  has  taken  as  his  text  a  pamphlet  which,  while  not 
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in  Germany  under  the  supervision  of  a  Committee  of  Repre- 
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justification  of  the  War."  Care  has  been  taken  to  prevent  copies 
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and  Luxemburg.  Apart  from  this  duty,  it  is  the  conviction  of 
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In  order  that  the  case  for  England  may  be  complete,  the  pub- 
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be  devised  to  limit  its  inherent  peril.  The  true,  effective, 
and  equitable  basis  on  which  the  problem  must  be  solved 
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Way  to  Peace 

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Why  Europe  is  at  War 

The   Question  Considered  from  the  Points  of  View  of 

France,  England,  Germany,  Japan,  and 

the  United  States 

By  Frederic  R.  Coudert,  Frederick  W.  Whitridge, 

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Francis  Vinton  Greene 

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peaceful  relations  with  the  United  States. 

New  York        G.  P.  Putoam's  SoilS  London 


UNIVERSt'  Y  OF  C^LIFORPIA  LIBRARY 


3  1158  01220  6867 


AA    000  819176    9 


A 


i.  HiT 


